



7.3 UNRESTRICTED WARFARE—SENIOR PERSPECTIVES

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades that I have been involved in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) defense, one thing I have noticed is that the WMD milieu is pretty much like NASCAR: all the players are pretty much the same; the cars are all identical; we always take left turns; and from time to time, the sponsor changes.

Many of the people you see today are the same players that have been in this game for a very long time. The concept of interagency cooperation has become somewhat of a moot point because if you know your counterparts, over the historical perspective of this WMD game, you should have a much easier time of dealing with them and starting a more reasonable collaboration. I wish I could tell you that this is just natural and second nature. It actually takes work to do it, even though you know everybody in this game.

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UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS

In the specific case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), we have been working with chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear explosives (CBRNE) issues for more than 15 years. Right after the subway attack in Japan by the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group, the FBI decided that they needed to have the capability to deal with unconventional material and evidence as well as particular cases that involved the use of chemical, biological, and radiological material.

It was not until roughly three years ago that the Director specifically asked me to put the entire CBRNE portfolio under one umbrella and create a concerted effort to deal with WMD issues. Because I had a blank slate in a way, it was both a challenge and an opportunity; how do you start a program so that it meets all of your requirements, recognizing what you have seen in the past two decades? I have tried to put a program together that actually meets the citizen's needs; it has reasonable costs, but it has high productivity.

The first thing that came to our minds is that this is not an arena in which anyone has sufficient resources to support a stand-alone organization, be responsible for everybody, and conduct a productive program. There are simply not enough resources in a country. We looked both internally and externally and decided to set up an organization that met the overall requirement through integration, both internally and externally; every organization has their own columns of excellence, but sometimes those interactions are difficult to maintain between these columns of excellence within the organization.

As you work outside your organization, the interactions become even more difficult. One thing that is apparent in the FBI is that we do have very good legacy, established organizations (i.e., the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber divisions). The criminal and cyber divisions obviously are not within the national security branch but nonetheless have significant impact on the FBI's overall mission.

For the WMD Directorate to work well, the first thing we did was to decipher everyone's function. A very rudimentary interpretation of what columns of excellence do, in the example of counterterrorism, is to look at people and groups. They look for that one lone wolf (e.g., al Qaeda, Hezbollah, White Supremacists, or even the Animal Liberation Front).

To proceed further with our examples, counterintelligence is very country focused. They want to know adversaries (i.e., countries like Iran, North Korea, and Russia). If you look at the criminal division, they look at criminal enterprises and violent gangs, such as Cosa Nostra, the Italian and Russian Mafia, or MS-13. Obviously, the cyber division looks at computers and networks for specific subsets of activities. In the WMD area, we look at expertise and materials. To be frank, you cannot be a player in this game unless you have a reasonable background in CBRNE sciences and access to precursor materials.

Without one of those two, you certainly will not be a credible threat in WMD, whether a single person is trying to achieve a disturbance or a country trying to develop a WMD program. Having those two points of focus causes us to intersect very extensively with all of the divisions within the FBI. You could be a terrorist group trying to get the expertise and the material, you could be a criminal enterprise trying to benefit from a financial windfall of a transaction, and you could be a country trying to establish a WMD program.

Thus, WMD defense was inherently integrated within the FBI, and our challenge was how to design a new program that meets the needs of the FBI. This, however, is just the first challenge because as you go outside the FBI, you have many different government and non-government agencies with which you must be able to integrate well. That is exactly the way we decided to go forward. We used a social networking concept, without presenting the overall structure of the way we put it, which is much the way hobbyists interact.

SOCIAL NETWORKING

Everyone is familiar with social networking; everyone and their brother have a Facebook page; they have blogs and so forth. You may be familiar with the whole Kevin Bacon game: you can connect everybody in Hollywood to everybody else within six degrees of separation, and often, the actor, Kevin Bacon, is one of the nodes.

When you scientifically analyze social networking, there are two parameters that stand out. Parameter number one is called a super node. These are nodes that are much more effective than other nodes. When tracing the connectivity through these network nodes, the super nodes have very high density. If you look at the overall worldwide web, 10 percent of the websites take 90 percent of the traffic. That 10 percent are the super nodes.

The second parameter that we use to define these social networks is called a path link. The shorter the path link is, the easier it is to connect two people together. To define and design those social networking criterion within the FBI' WMD functions, it was pretty straightforward that what we really needed to do was to have an integrated approach and be able to reach out to internal and external organizations.

The best way to discover a super node is to ensure the existence of personal exchanges; we call them detailees. If you look across the organization, we have a very extensive detailee program within the WMD Directorate. We have very close connectivity with the Counterterrorism Center (CTC); we have a number of people actually embedded in that organization.

Some of the other organizations that we have a large investment in are the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), national laboratories, the few biological laboratories that have a bio-safety level four facility, and the White House. We also have representation at the State Department, the Department of Commerce, and the National Security Agency (NSA). Then, we have also exchange information with the Department of Energy (DoE), the Defense

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), CIA, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These are our super nodes.

HEADQUARTER ELEMENTS

We also have a number of short path-linked organizations. The way we set up our overall structure is that we split our activities into three parts: The first is countermeasures and preparedness. As we heard earlier there is a lot of consternation about organizations not doing enough exercises. As a part of that preparedness, we do in fact develop some exercises. One of the reasons we actually do not do too many exercises is that we deploy a lot.

You have heard anecdotally, from either the Graham Commission, the WMD Commission, or various other studies, the chances of the U.S. being hit with a WMD is high, and some say the chance is 50/50 within the next five years. I argue that we have roughly 24 WMD attacks annually. If you look at a definition of WMD from the statute's point of view, it is the use of any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in any criminal activities.

In fact, annually we receive roughly 1000 leads or 1000 threats that we dissect. Out of those 1000, 800 of them end up being junk. Two hundred of them are really what peak our interest and actually develop to full cases. Out of the 200, the majority of them are hoaxes, which are crimes in their own right, and we chase those as well.

About two dozen or so become cases that actually involve chemical, biological, or radiological materials, never nuclear. You may say there is a lack of exercise within the FBI, but actually last year alone, we had 170 deployments of all of our response assets. That by itself becomes the annual exercise that we do. Nonetheless, we do engage with many of our partners to study outside-the-box activities because what we know is routine; that is our deployment, and what we anticipate beyond the routine is what we exercise.

As a part of preparedness and prevention, we conduct exercises and develop training, but, more importantly, we develop trip

wires or pre-event indicators. These are methodologies to determine if someone is trying to gain access to expertise or material.

The second pillar of our organization is intelligence analysis, which includes our Intel analysts that have an extensive scientific or analytical background, who are brought together to establish an analytical cadre that can deal with our day-to-day activity in strategic intelligence. If they come across something that we have never seen before, it becomes a new trip wire for our countermeasures. If it is case relevant, it is translated for our investigator so we can actually go forward with the case. As always, we have to disseminate the rest of the information to the rest of the community.

The last pillar of the main headquarter element is investigation and operations. Investigations and operations are exactly what we have done over the past 100 years, which is investigate every one of these cases, except these agents are actually trained to look for WMD nexus on all materials. We have developed a whole new set of investigative techniques that actually use the scientific methodologies in our case investigations.

We developed a technique for biological threats; it is called forensic epidemiology. We pair our FBI agents with the Center for Disease Control (CDC) or public health representatives and send them to the investigation so that they can ask parallel questions simultaneously and then come back for a conference to help resolve the issues. We do that with public health all the time.

Every field office actually has an entity or a person, sometimes a whole squad called a WMD coordinator (e.g., an FBI agent with an appropriate education that certifies him/her to be a WMD coordinator). Thus, there is a singular individual in every field office that actually interfaces with public health, universities, and industry; that person is that short path link seen in social network science. Any time we need expertise or access to these facilities, we exercise through that WMD coordinator.

Furthermore, we have a multi-tier program that can do this both nationally and internationally. Internationally, we work through our legal attachés and have started a program putting

WMD coordinators overseas in conjunction with the blessing of our intelligence community partners; the first one was placed in Georgia because there is an inordinate amount of transfer of highly enriched uranium ore, special nuclear material. We want to make sure that we are there, we can understand the problem, and we can help our partners; the entire University System of Georgia can be made available to resolve some of these issues.

The last thing I want to leave you with is that interagency collaboration sometimes is more difficult within your own organization than outside your organization. What I found is that when the day comes that you need your agencies or interagency partners, everybody comes to the table with the best intentions in mind. I have rarely seen parochialism in any of these issues.

Sometimes, it is a little bit more challenging when you work with the internal elements because then we do have to worry about the delineation of intelligence versus law enforcement. Information sharing is really not an issue, to be honest with you. What is at issue is that sometimes, from the law enforcement perspective, we do take the case to its full fruition and an individual is actually going through the court hearing. As they prepare that case, it becomes somewhat of a black hole; we cannot take that information now and actually shove it the other way. However, taking the information from the intelligence community is not difficult at all because we already have the methodologies and mechanisms in place.