



UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE
SYMPOSIUM

14 - 15 MARCH 2006

MEETING THE UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE THREAT:
INTEGRATING STRATEGY,
ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY

URW Analysis: Supporting Deterrence & Warfighting

Discussion Group



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Desired Products

- **Summary of Insights from the Roundtable**
- **Additional Insights from the Discussion Group**
- **Unanswered Questions**
- **Suggested Actions for:**
 - **Strategy / Policy community**
 - **Analysis community**
 - **Technology community**



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Summary of Insights from the **Analysis** Roundtable

- **Tailored Deterrence**

- Tailored deterrence presents a complex analytical challenge
 - Success is dependent upon developing dynamic analytical techniques
- Goal: “reduce the margin of ignorance”
 - Analytical agenda must provide decision-makers reasoned options for risk management
- Need new thinking on deterrence and how it applies against UW adversaries
 - Where are today’s Schelling, Kahn, and Brodie?



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Summary of Insights from the **Analysis** Roundtable – II

- **Potential Issues for War Gaming**
 - **Exactly What Do You Want To Game?**
 - Estimate opponents likely to undertake URW?
 - Estimate circumstances likely to see URW?
 - Force on force interaction?
 - **Political / economic impact “Anything Goes”**
 - Not limited by organizational preferences, strategic choice, laws of war, or rationality
 - **Will Deterrence Work**
 - Game symmetrical / asymmetrical response?
 - URW does seem to be coercive/retaliatory
 - **How effective is URW**
 - “What appears impossible in foresight seems politically inevitable in hindsight”



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Summary of Insights from the **Analysis** Roundtable – III

- **Necessary Changes: Quantitative analysis of operations, tactics, systems, & technologies for Unrestricted Warfare must:**
 - Expand beyond conventional warfare success criteria (e.g., territory & attrition)
 - Use measures of effectiveness that show defensive and offensive options
 - Include the knowledge & behavioral sciences along with physics
 - Incorporate mathematical & quantitative techniques from other scientific disciplines



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Discussion Group Insights

(**Analysis** Roundtable)

Strategy

- Tactical actions can have strategic implications.
 - If counterproductive at strategic level, do not want to use at tactical level.
- Are there any common threads across the categories of Unrestricted Warfare?
- CONOPS should focus on a specific area to be more focused and valuable. Someone somewhere needs to focus on how we win the Global War on Terrorism.

Analysis

- What is the goal we want the analysis to provide? Enable decision maker to narrow focus.
- Human element causes complications in modeling/analysis planning.
- Are we measuring the right things?
- The term 'analysis' is used loosely, when in reality, many different types of analysis are needed to understand the problems and find solutions.

Counter IEDs

- Old scenarios, new technology, aren't IEDs a lot like Vietnam booby traps?
- What is different about countering IEDs and mine hunting/clearing?



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Unanswered Questions (**Analysis** Roundtable)

- Are we in an Unrestricted war and if so, with whom?
 - Should we be addressing the sub-elements within URW?
- If we don't have a strategy, we can't measure progress; therefore, we can't measure the value of our systems/tactics.
- Sometimes it is challenging for an outsider, and even for an insider, to determine what is policy and what is not policy.
- Are our organizational structures within the government and DoD appropriate for fighting URW and 21st Century threats?



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Suggested Actions for **Strategy** (Analysis Roundtable)

- Push to develop identifiable national doctrine to aid in the GWOT.
- Can or should we assess the impacts of lack of Operational Security?
- What does it *mean* to win the GWOT? What are these metrics of success?
- How much money do we need to put towards the proper education to better enable problem identification and problem solving?



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Suggested Actions for **Analysis** (Analysis Roundtable)

- **Analysis exist in a variety of forms – all of which have different needs.**
 - Policy Analysis
 - Intelligence Analysis
 - Systems/Cost Effectiveness Analysis
- **Need to consider new analytic techniques, particularly a combination of agent based modeling and systems dynamics.**
- **Data collection specific to the area, specific to the discipline, specific to the economics.**
- **Intelligence drives operations. Since the Cold War, we have relied upon technical intel while ignoring the softer intel disciplines. Intel should be multi- disciplined rather than just technical.**
 - Leaders must be involved in the intelligence cycle in order to receive proper answers to their intelligence requirements.



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Suggested Actions for **Technology** (Analysis Roundtable)

- Are we relying too much on technology?
- How do we deal with rapidly changing and adaptive threats and how do we tip that balance back to our side?
 - How do we (can we?) become proactive rather than reactive.
 - Technology solutions in the field for our soldiers
- Sharing info (SA) at the small unit and below
 - Use of SIPRNET for secure information sharing rather than internet.
- Should we be developing educational technology to support both public and military needs?
- Improved ISR for counter IEDs.
 - Use of cameras on routes in the AO?