



UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE
SYMPOSIUM

14 - 15 MARCH 2006

MEETING THE UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE THREAT:
INTEGRATING STRATEGY,
ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY

Tailored Deterrence: New Challenges for the Analytical Agenda

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2006 QDR: Major Shifts in 21st Century Warfare

From...

- A time of reasonable predictability
- Single-focused threats
- Nation-state threats
- Responding after a crisis (reactive)
- 20th century processes
- Focusing on inputs
- “One size fits all” deterrence

To...

- An era of surprise and uncertainty
- Multiple, complex challenges
- Decentralized networked threats from non-state enemies
- Preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive)
- 21st century integrated approaches
- Tracking outputs (results)
- Tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-term competitors

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










Roots of the Tailored Deterrence Concept

- **Fallacy of Cold War deterrence**
 - Assumption of rationality vs reasonable behavior
- **Post- 9/11 security environment**
 - Multiple adversaries in a complex international system
 - Peer/Near-Peer/Emerging peer competitors
 - Rogue actors
 - Terrorists and other violent extremists

Deterrent policies must be ‘tailored’ to specific antagonists and contexts to ‘get-inside’ the decision-making process of the challenger


Tailoring Deterrence to Diverse Actors*

Deterring...	Peer / Emerging Peer	Rogue States	Violent Extremists (VE)
Senior Leadership			State Sponsor Org Leaders 
Military Commanders			Cells 
Trigger Pullers			
General Populace			

* Presented by Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
IFPA-Fletcher Conference, 17 Dec 2005



Deterrence in a Complex and Dynamic Strategic System




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Analytical Roles for Tailored Deterrence



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Describing the System: *Elucidation*

A Deterrence Framework (Payne)

- **Step 1: Identify antagonists, issue, objectives, actions**
- **Step 2: Identify factors affecting adversary's decision-making**
 - Degree of rationality and predictability
 - Leadership characteristics
 - Values and cost/risk structure
 - Adversary's options
 - Beliefs about costs to U.S.
 - Communications
 - Credibility of U.S. threats
- **Step 3: Construct strategic profile of adversary with respect to the crisis in question**
- **Step 4: Assess susceptibility to deterrent policies**
- **Step 5: Identify available U.S. deterrence policy options**
- **Step 6: Identify gaps between deterrent requirements and available options**

*Requires detailed system information
and dynamic analytical tools*



Comparing Options: *Estimation*

Jervis's observations of system effects:

- Indirect and delayed effects: *emergent properties*
- Relations are often not bilaterally determined: *complex*
- Interactions, not additivity: *nonlinear*
 - Results cannot be predicted from separate actions
 - Strategies depend on the strategies of others
 - Behavior changes the environment
- Outcomes do not follow from intentions

In order to estimate multi-level effects, modeling and simulation will need to consider:

- *Systems dynamics*
- *Agent-based interactions*
- *Human behavior*

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Analyzing Effects: *Evaluation*

- **Strategy defines the objective, but not the measures**
- **Metrics and measures of success**
 - How do we know we've achieved the desired behavior?
 - Can we establish cause and effect?
 - By what standards do we judge the efficacy of our deterrent capabilities?
 - How much do the measures and metrics differ for each context?



Closing Thoughts

- **Tailored deterrence presents a complex analytical challenge**
 - Success is dependent upon developing dynamic analytical techniques
- **Goal: “reduce the margin of ignorance”**
 - Analytical agenda must provide decision-makers reasoned options for risk management
- **Need new thinking on deterrence and how it applies against UW adversaries**

Where are today's Schelling, Kahn, and Brodie?