

UNCLASSIFIED

United States Joint Forces Command
Joint Center for Operational Analysis
(JCOA)

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Joint Center for Operational Analysis

Real time assessment of ongoing operations
.... facilitates immediate improvement

Primarily focused at 2 & 3-star joint headquarters

A “living diagnosis” vs. a post mortem report


Informs operations, training and future concepts

Active Collection ...

Strategic National

Joint Staff (J7)

Operational - Theater



Tactical




Individual Services


Key Take Away

- Strategies, analytical techniques, and technologies required to fight wars successfully require a government – industry – military synergy as never before
- Analysis of recent operations ('95 through present) has proven the need to properly pre-plan and resource the broad tasks that support security, transition and reconstruction in the post-conflict environment
- Civilian and Military efforts in this environment are not “parallel” but interdependent...true Block IV operations


Deconflict
Service Forces




Coordinate
Stitch Service
Seams



Integrate
Services/SOCOM
Capabilities



Coherently Integrate
Interdependent,
Collaborative,
Learning & Adaptive
Coherently Joint Force



Result:
Effects-Based Outcomes

**Build integration, seek interdependence:
future operations require it**

JCOA Complex Lessons Crosswalk

	Knowledge Sharing	Command & Control	Integrated Planning	Manning / Resourcing	Info Operations		
JCCO	●	●	●	●	○	○	○
SSTR	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
Haiti	●	○	●	●	○	○	○
Kosovo	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
NSSE	●	●	●	○	●	○	○
Tsunami	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Katrina	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Pakistan	●	●	●	●	○	●	●

JCCO = Joint Combined Combat Operations SSTR = Stabilization, Security, Transition & Reconstruction
 NSSE = National Special Security Events

Discussion Areas

- Planning
- Execution
- Impact of the Information Age
- Information Pathology

Planning Lessons

- **An agreed-upon end state, a desired outcome is the point of departure for *pre-conflict* planning**
- **Be cautious of your planning assumptions**
 - Assumptions drive resources, responsibilities
 - Must be accepted by all involved in the operation
 - The enemy has a vote
 - Conditions may change
- Understand, accept and learn to **work with the “cultural” differences between military and civilian agencies** and organizations involved in the planning process
- Alliance and partner Rules of Engagement **limitations may drive assigned tasks** – deal with this “up front”

Lessons in Execution (1 of 2)

- **Security leads all actions**...security of “self” and reasonable security of assigned area...capabilities for both cannot be underwhelmed
- If, initially there will only be soldiers, expect great demand for immediate improvement in conditions; “Money is ammunition;” **authorities and resources should equal mission responsibility**
- Balancing force protection with local contact: **local contact is force protection**
- Pace of operations: **military and civilian operations are linked, concurrent and interdependent**
- **Transition points in unity of effort** (who is in charge?) **must be flexible and condition based**

Lessons in Execution (2 of 2)

- **A failed state** or post-conflict host nation government **will lack skilled bureaucrats**:
 - And will require **mentorship of ministries**
 - **Development of security forces** and a security apparatus
 - Initial existence and **competence of the host nation government** may be **linked to your operations**
- Contractors on the Battlefield:
 - Essential, but they bring **accountability and support challenges** that require planning
- Non-governmental organizations require conditions set (your effort); but also should be held responsible for their actions

Challenge of Battle Command in a Complex Environment

Where do you focus your effort?

At MNF-I and CFC-A level:

D I m E

To focus the effort, ask: If this (left) is true, ...

What staff sections have primacy (at each level)?

At MNC-I and CJTF-76 level:

d i M e

What skill sets are in greatest demand (at each level)?

How should the nature/structure of the staff adapt to execute/support this emphasis?

At Division and Brigade level:

D I M E

Is there necessary and/or unnecessary redundancy?

What interagency organizations need to be present at each level?

Impact of Information Age

- **Planning and execution** must take a **local, regional and global view**
- **Strategic communications** is a critical civilian-military integrated task that **must be properly resourced**
- **Speed of information:**
 - Massive volumes coming in...much required to go out
 - Force headquarters must be equipped and prepared to manage and react to demand
 - Data has a critical role in how “you see yourself,” how “others see you,” measuring success, and making decisions
 - Data can paralyze decision makers

Information Pathology

- Information collection and analysis are disconnected from decisions. (Cannot know everything, need to know what we need to know)
- Too much unfiltered data obscures the “picture.” (Information does not equal understanding)
- Staffs hiding behind volumes of data leaves US forces vulnerable to the next big surprise. (Fear of failure leads to analysis paralysis)


Leaders must decide what to do—using the information they have

THE FOG OF WAR AND INFORMATION PATHOLOGY

The Old Paradigm = lack of information thus uncertainty



The New Paradigm = a deluge of unfiltered information thus a new kind of uncertainty.
What is important / relevant?



Uncertainty will not go away. Focus on proactive measures rather than reactive ones. Set conditions for victory versus tracking IOT mitigate against defeat.

The solution is to filter information to inform decisions. What decisions should be informed?

Selection of the decisions is based on the conditions we want to create:

STRATEGIC AIM, DESIRED END STATE, OPERATIONAL OBJ / EFFECTS

OCT 2003 - Dynamics of Post-Major Combat Operations (1 of 2)

Power + Industry = Employment

Employment + Security = Stability

Stability + Governance + Justice = Success

Unemployment + Security = Confrontation

NOTE: Not policy...simply a JCOA tool

July 2004 - Dynamics of Post-Major Combat Operations (2 of 2)

Power + Industry = Employment

Employment + Perception + Security = Stabilization

Stabilization + Iraqi-ization = Progress

Progress + Governance + Justice = Success

Unemployment + Security = Confrontation

Stabilization – Perception = Alienation

**Economic, Employment, Governance & Justice Issues
have major impacts on both the success of the Military
and Civil Missions**

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Dynamics of Transition to Sovereignty

Victory in Iraq: Credible, Viable, Self-Sustaining Governance

Recruitment + Equipping + Training + Experience² + Leadership³ = Competent Security Forces

Competent Security Forces + Judicial System + Confidence = Rule of Law

Rule of Law + Success Against Insurgents + Managing Foreign Influence = Security

Security + Infrastructure + Power + Commerce + Jobs = Economic Opportunity

Economic Opportunity + Security + Rule of Law + Sovereignty = Credible, Viable Self-Sustaining Governance

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Action Against Terror: De-legitimize the Insurgency

Decrease Political Gain + Increase Risk + Increase Cost + Reduced Funding = Reduced Opportunity

De-legitimize Leaders + Kill Experts + Reduce Extremists = Ineffective Terror Organization

Reduced Opportunity + Ineffective Terror Organization = Reduced Terror Threat

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New Security Framework: Address Root Causes / Build Global Partners

Self Worth + Community + Opportunity = Climate of Moderation

Elected Government + Capitalism + Secular Government = Democracy

Alliances + Coalitions + United Nations = International Engagement and Support

Climate of Moderation + Democracy + International Engagement and Support + Globalization + Regional Security = Global Partner

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Closing

- When **planning**, visualize the end-state and bring in all Block IV elements
- In **execution**,
 - Forces on the ground have to be resourced and equipped to conduct concurrent stability and reconstruction as well as security operations
 - Commit to the work of interdependency among civilian and military
- Speed of information flow demands rapid decision making processes – using tools that **help inform decisions**

JCOA C-IED PRODUCT WAY AHEAD

Unclassified / FOUO

WS Day 1
Identify
Operational
Assessment
Criteria
25-26 Oct '05

WS Day 2 / JCOA TEAM

Criteria	...
...	...


UNITS OF MEASURE

WORKSHOP 2
Identify Measures of
Performance Data Sources
2-3 Nov '05

Resource	...
...	...



Resource Data



Measure of Effectiveness:
Reduce level of Insurgent
IED activity.

Operational
Assessment
Tool



Integrated
Lessons
Learned
Plan

Unclassified / FOUO

Learn, Adapt, Dominate

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[To Symposium
Agenda](#)

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