



UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE
SYMPOSIUM

14 - 15 MARCH 2006

MEETING THE UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE THREAT:
INTEGRATING STRATEGY,
ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY

“Build it and they will come”

**-- use of parallel hierarchies to defeat
adversary networks**

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Wise words from Uncle Karl....


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“ the fate of a theory, its acceptance or rejection, is decided by **observation and experiment – by the result of tests. So long as a theory stands up to the severest tests we can design, it is accepted; if it does not, it is rejected ”**

Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1963



Most of what we “know” about enemy networks is theory – our knowledge evolves through “trial and error”. And the enemy evolves too...

To Symposium
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Outline

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- **Theoretical and practical problems with “disrupting enemy networks”**
- **A possible alternative: “parallel networks”**
- **Strategic implications**

Paradoxically, the best way to disrupt adversary networks may be to create competing networks to replace them.

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Disrupting Enemy Networks: the theory

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- ***Understand the network***
 - SNA
 - Influence mapping
 - Complex adaptive systems analysis
 - etc etc etc
- ***Identify key nodes, links, processes***
 - Find targetable vulnerabilities
- ***Act to disrupt the network***
 - Destroy nodes
 - Cut links
 - Force a system phase change
 - etc etc etc

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Assumption: destroying terrorist networks will (help) defeat terrorists.



Theoretical Problems

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- **Tyranny of the known:**
 - The prominence/significance fallacy
 - The surveillance/reconnaissance trap
 - Intolerance of structural uncertainty
- **Reification of networks**
 - Networks are patterns of interaction, not physical entities (ie they are “dissipative structures” nested in the environment)
 - They form a [complex adaptive] system
 - We are part of the system, not separate from it
- **Sample size and diversity**
 - Small sample size (rarely statistically significant)
 - Each datum is a complex event needing interpretation
 - Terrorist networks hide and apply deception

Patterns and trends, insights not conclusions



Practical Problems

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• Complexity

- We tend to identify parts of terrorist networks after major incidents; the rest remains opaque
- Acting against part of the network temporarily blinds us
- Thus it is almost impossible to gather enough info to do sophisticated “effects-based” targeting against networks

• Uncertainty

- We can never do “bomb damage assessment” against a network: most of the time we have to guess what effect we are having
- Cause and effect are difficult to identify: why is the network acting this way, and did our actions cause it?

• Flux

- Our knowledge is a “snapshot” of a rapidly changing situation
- And different datum points are out of date by different (but unknowable) amounts
- So we act blindly, and often too slowly

• Collateral Damage

- The enemy network is a needle in a haystack
- But we live in the haystack



Not so simple in practice...

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“ During the first year of my counterinsurgency duties, I believe I created more insurgents than I...eliminated. This was not only because of inexperience, but also because I lacked fundamental knowledge of the terrain, the people, the culture. I also didn't know how to sift through local intelligence effectively. A combination of my own naïveté and enthusiasm, not to mention pressure from senior commanders to deliver results, resulted in actions that alienated the locals and, inadvertently, helped the insurgency.”

Anit Mukherjee, “Lessons from another insurgency”, NY Times March 8, 2006



Parallel Networks: the Theory

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- All humans belong to [needs-based, affect-laden, dyadic, socio-cultural] networks
- The enemy network is not separate from its parent society – it is a pattern of relationships *within* the society
- So just destroying enemy networks does no good: they must be replaced with “friendly” networks, or the population just gravitates back its previous pattern of behavior (i.e. the hostile network)
- Call this “destructive” v “constructive” CT/COIN
- It turns out that, if you build friendly networks, this forces the enemy to attack them: the network threatens the enemy’s base
- This exposes the enemy network, allowing it to be targeted
- It shifts the parent society into new patterns -- And minimizes collateral damage

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This approach turns the insurgent concept of “parallel hierarchies” and “liberated zones” on its head – and runs it against the enemy



Parallel Networks: the Strategy

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- “A clever military leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature from the strategic point of view that the enemy is forced to attack us in them”. Helmuth von Moltke

- “The strongest form of war is the strategic offensive, combined with the tactical defensive”
Sir Julian Corbett





Parallel networks: Practical illustrations

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- *Firqat salahuddin* in Oman – the “five lines” campaign
- Hizbullah in Lebanon – terrorist charities
- The Pakistani education system – filling the network vacuum
- Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam – the residential approach to Counterinsurgency
- JI vs mass organizations in Indonesia – non-membership as a predictor for terrorist behavior
- *Sections Administratives Speciaux* in Algeria – peaceful penetration



Conclusion: more Captain Perettis

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“We have seen with our own eyes what you have done for us here. You never molested us. None of your soldiers ever cast an eye on our women. Far from stealing from us, they shared their food with the poor. Our sick are taken care of, our children are educated, schools and roads are being built. Recently you had the people elect freely their own leaders and we are now planning with you how to improve our life...I want to tell you that we will help you finish with the criminals who misled us. Just give us the weapons”.

Mayor of Tala Mokhor,
quoted in David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*

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