



7.1 UNRESTRICTED WARFARE—SENIOR PERSPECTIVES

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INTRODUCTION

I think it is interesting that we are going to be discussing inter-agency issues with those of us who actually do work together on a fairly regular basis; thus, we can give you a good demonstration of what it is all about. Let me talk first about irregular warfare. I think by its very nature, irregular warfare, which seeks to deal with the asymmetries in a country, its infrastructure, its forces, and its alliances, calls for an interagency exercise because there is no single agency that encompasses all of these aspects.

ORGANIZATION

This theory really hit home to us at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). We ran something called an evil genius seminar to bring together all the “Lex Luthers,” the evil geniuses that actually had gone straight as young people and had

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not gone over completely to the dark side, to charge them with figuring out how best to destroy the U.S. with the fewest tools and at the lowest cost. They devised some amazing results.

Tom Clancy led the band because he invented the concept behind 9/11. I thought that he would be an appropriate leader. They did not disappoint us. It turns out that there are a lot of techniques to destroy the U.S., but almost none of the cleverest geniuses were clearly within the scope of the DoD. Therefore, the first conclusion is that irregular warfare almost guarantees inter-agency activities that involve everyone.

The second important point is in the nature of interagency functioning. Interagency activities are very interesting because success always requires strong yet unstructured involvement of its actors. There is no Goldwater Nichols Act, as has been pointed out, not even a 1947 Defense Unification Act. There is no Joint Staff, other than the oversight that comes down from the National Security Council (NSC) or the Homeland Security Council (HSC). Quite frankly, interagency action is more or less coordinated based on relationships; it depends on who feels that the particularly problem is in their lane, as well as their degree of initiative and willingness to reach out to others who are working similar problems and conducting business in that area. You would like to think it was extremely formal: if a problem arose, somebody would blow a whistle and say, "I want you, you, and you to all come into the room." Everybody that was needed would be there, and it would be well organized, but the truth is that progress gets made based on personal initiative and relationships. Yes, there is some formality involved in it, but probably less than anyone would like. Because such interagency activities are often based on personal relationships, these relationships have to be continuously renewed to reaffirm everyone's roles and to keep people interested.

BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS

An example is the work against nuclear terrorism threats involving nuclear detection. In the beginning, five years ago, it was thought that by creating the Domestic Nuclear Detection

Office within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), everything to do with nuclear detection would be handled by that organization. They proceeded to work on making our borders secure. However, the Department of Energy (DoE), and also DoD to a certain extent under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which created the mandate to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in the former Soviet Republics, was involved in nuclear detection. That involved a lot of detection work.

Of course DoE was heavily involved. Then DoD had to be brought in because a stolen weapon directed at either an ally or U.S. forces overseas cannot be treated passively; our defense forces have to find and secure it. That means active high search rate capability not being funded by other agencies was required.

Initially, I do not think DoD was that enthralled with putting additional money into that program, but they soon recognized the need for their role and today have a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that involves the DoE, the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), DHS Nuclear Detection Office, and the Science and Technology Office of the Director of National Intelligence. All these organizations now work together to de-conflict our programs in nuclear detection and to counter nuclear terrorism. This was a grassroots group that together put forward a rational program for the U.S., and it is a good example of cooperation that was not originally designed when the responsibilities were assigned.

EXERCISES

Another example is military exercises. We in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) get involved in a lot of these exercises, particularly nuclear accident incident exercises as well as consequence management exercises and a variety corresponding training. A good example of an exercise that turned into a tremendous paradigm of interagency cooperation was one that occurred in Hawaii a couple of years ago. We ran an exercise that included a terrorist nuclear detonation; the Governor of Hawaii played in this exercise, and the whole civil support structure in

the state played along with all the military departments and the interagency actors concerned with this threat. It was an amazing exercise. It cost an awful lot of money to run, but it was a singular example of people recognizing that they had a mutual problem and taking the time on a fairly large scale to work through the issues.

We recognize now our dependence on the national laboratories, particularly the weapons laboratories, which are one of the few places where first rank science meets national security on the same piece of ground. Among those of us who know what has been done over the years to the DoD laboratories to reduce their effectiveness scientifically, we recognize that our national laboratories are true assets for national security.

Another notable example of cooperation is that we created a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with NNSA for mutual DoD and DoE support of the national laboratories. There is a program where we both contribute on shared mission areas, and it is the first time where I have done work with a national laboratory and not felt taxed to work with or for others because it is truly a shared mission space.

We are working in our jurisdiction; we are charged to consider concepts like radiation hardening (RADHARD) and nuclear effects on DoD forces. We have now started some work with the Networks and Information Integration (NII) in the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), along with the National Security Agency (NSA) and others, to look at all threats to the national command and control infrastructure, not just RADHARD or electromagnetic pulse, but also the coordination of cyber and direct physical attacks and their related threats. This brainstorm is important because, in addition to DTRA and the OSD, it eventually brings together the Science and Technology Office and the Office of the President because a lot of that command and control will involve DHS and a broad spectrum of laboratories: the DoE and NNSA Lab, Sandia National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore, Idaho National Laboratory, The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory, companies like the

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), think tanks like the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), as well as several universities (e.g., University of New Mexico and Penn State).

An extremely broad consortium is required to bring the skills together to assess future threats to national command and control. The Global War on Terror, Overseas Contingency Operations now, is another example that brings together a large number of players into a single plan. I have listed several above. It includes DoE, DoD, the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Crime Prevention Center, the national laboratories, the technical support working groups, FBI, DHS, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), etc. Basically, when you get to that level, you see coordination on a massive scale.

FUTURE OBJECTIVES

The question is: what should our objective be over the long haul? I think that we need to start at the very basic level to instruct those who are starting their careers in either the military or other areas in government to understand right from the beginning that there is an interagency venue and they do not stand on the planet alone. It was in 2006 that I first began to recognize that there really was an interagency and that it was important to me and important to my mission. We need to start that education early. If someone happens to come to DTRA and get involved in some of our programs, they will come into contact with the interagency sooner rather than later. However, even with a fairly large military contingent, we do not get enough people cycled through DTRA to really satisfy that education requirement.

The existence and need for interagency collaboration needs to be integrated into professional military training, and included in training at every federal bureau and agency.

Next, we should seriously ask ourselves whether serendipity, individual initiative, and an honest attempt by a lot of people to coordinate well is sufficient enough to carry the day for our needs in the future as threats become more and more severe and complex.

I think that sometimes bureaucracy stifles initiative. There is a lot of good in what we have already done, but we need to give some serious thought to how we are going to govern ourselves in the future in that regard. There is a lot of opportunity here, and hopefully future efforts will be successful in a way that does not detract or destroy our previous efforts, so that we will in fact build upon what is good and change what is not. Maybe we need a reward system that offers promotions for interagency cooperation so that people know that this is a key element of our future.

To summarize, obviously I think the interagency is important; every year I recognize how much more important it has become. I do not think the American public has any real sense of how much of their well being is really carried by a consortium of the willing that are largely self-selected and self-motivated. To this voluntary group of people, you are doing a tremendous job for this country.