



AFTERTHOUGHTS

Thomas Keaney

The Senior Perspectives panel, with the collective experience to really make connections, drew together some of the themes of this symposium, interagency action in particular. I would like to review some of the interagency imperatives that have been introduced these last two days. As you may recall, Mr. Jim Locker began the symposium by presenting a call for interagency cooperation within a new system. He first pointed out the National Security Act in 1947, which constructed our national security system and was already outdated when the system it created came into being. With the new threat environment, that system is woefully inadequate for dealing with the many issues with which it has to deal, particularly in agility, and has an inability to focus on interagency action. These kinds of issues gives purpose to this symposium. In its inception, the National Security Act was very focused on traditional measures of national security and only involved the original members of the National Security Council (i.e., the State Department, DoD, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

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When Locher talked about the need for change, my mind referred back to one of the major revisions of the 1947 Act: the 1986 Goldwater Nickel's Amendment. This revision is now in its 23rd year, but its usefulness, considering the threats we are now discussing, is still really quite limited. The 1986 Amendment tried to create more joint activity and interaction, which has been difficult. The many speakers and panels have discussed four new dimensions that really exacerbate these difficulties: cyber attacks, resource attacks, financial/economic attacks, and nuclear terrorism, probably the most severe threat.

These threats call for expanded interagency activities; the needed actions go far beyond what the military services would have called for in traditional military defense because of the profound differences and difficulties that we now encounter. Let me mention just several of them. First of all, in this new world of interagency activities, increased, more extensive involvement of people from the private sector, as well as local and state governments, is needed. Also, we will need to cooperate with other governments, although that has not been addressed here. Other governments will certainly be involved.

Secondly, the federal government, in many ways, is going to be a minor participant in some of these interactions, when you start talking about the federal government and local agencies. Although the federal government, or parts of it, will be the prime integrators, there will be much greater interaction outside the government.

Another issue is that we are going to have to anticipate great difficulties, depending on the context, in trying to decide on priorities and timing and even identification of the targets. Most important question to ask is who is in charge? Whatever the context, I think the answer will need to shift greatly, and getting people to understand and agree to that is going to be very difficult.

Nuclear terrorism seems to call for bringing together the most agencies; the discussion this morning really brought that out. Not only does it take many agencies but which agencies that are

involved appears to be changing throughout the different phases of a nuclear terrorism threat: detecting, preventing, or recovering.

Another issue is that there is going to be a need for many new skills, models, simulations, and technologies for financial and economic accounting to defend against new threats in this area. It was mentioned yesterday that the tools of the hedge fund manager may become increasingly important to understand the movement of sovereign wealth funds and other funds that could be used against the U.S. Such intelligence developments may have to come from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Another aspect that developed from our discussions is the usefulness of exercising. The military has been very adept at this; they have great experience with using exercises to get everyone to identify and confront different scenarios. I was struck by Eric Coulter's DoD analytical agenda for providing structure to such analyses. We may find that the other agencies outside government are not as used to exercising as DoD. Someone also mentioned that analytical collaboration has been very unsuccessful in bringing together experts from these organizations, and I think that is going to continue to be a factor.

Finally, under almost any of these circumstances, effective interagency actions are going to depend on individual initiative. Even if we start right now with this type of system, it will require people to not simply rely on someone to tell them what to do but to use some initiative. The one thing that I must remember, however, is that every one of these people is already very busy and focused on his/her own immediate problems. I must say finally that this next step cannot happen without the participation of the senior leaders in all of these organizations to support the new system. If they do not encourage this forward motion, I think it is probably not going to happen, which places even more importance on the judgments of the individuals of the Senior Perspectives panelists.