NORTH KOREA WORKSHOP

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the behavior of states and how their peoples perceive various issues that affect them both internally and
externally. To this end, the workshops seek to examine a state's current leadership and population, how and
why they think as they do, their history and the lens through which they look at issues, issues that they are
currently facing, and the possibility for future competition and conflict with the United States.

In conducting the workshops, Panel Members principally from academia and sometimes from the military,
government, and industry are brought together for a one- or two-day moderated discussion session. SAO
personnel lead the discussion through a series of questions posed to the panel. In addition to documenting
verbal discussions, the workshop provides computer software for off-line anonymous discussions among
Panel Members and workshop observers.

DISCLAIMER
This report reflects the personal views of the panel discussants. The opinions presented herein are intended
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INTRODUCTION

NORTH KOREA WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES AND CONDUCT

The North Korea Workshop was held at the JHU/APL on February 16, 2007. The objectives of the North Korea Workshop were to develop a better understanding of:

- North Korea’s motivations, intentions, and priorities;
- The major drivers and constraints underlying North Korean domestic and foreign policies;
- The impact of North Korean policies and development on US international political, economic, technological, and national security interests; and
- The strengths and weaknesses of various US policy options in dealing with North Korea.

The nine experts, who made up the Panel Members, were drawn from the Academic Community. Individual members are nationally and internationally recognized authorities in North Korean affairs, with unique experience and expertise in North Korean political, economic, social, military, and foreign affairs. As a group, the Panel Members brought new perspectives, challenging insights, and “out of the box” thinking that are not always readily available.

The discussions focused on domestic and foreign affairs developments in North Korea, loosely divided into six central issues:

- North Korean National Motivations, Objectives, and Priorities
- North Korean Political Development and Long-Term Stability
- North Korean Domestic Economic Development and Foreign Assistance
- North Korean Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations
- North Korean Military Policy
- The Six-Party Talks and De-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

NORTH KOREA IN PERSPECTIVE

Centralized states began to emerge on the Korean Peninsula in about the first century BC. Until the rise of Japan, China was the major superpower neighbor and cultural influence. At various times, China politically and militarily sided with one state or another, but rarely sought to subjugate and oppress the Korean states. In 936, Korea became a unified state within borders roughly equivalent to today’s North and
South states. Over the next thousand years, its statehood was fairly stable largely because of Chinese benign protection. Even the Mongol invasions of the 1200s were short-lived affairs. It was not until 1910 that Korea was really forced to surrender its statehood identity to the Japanese, who installed a very ruthless and oppressive regime over the Koreans.

While some Americans have a vague understanding of Asian history—including the Chinese invention of dynamite, the British Opium Wars, Perry’s opening of Japan, and the Boxer Rebellion—few Americans have any knowledge of US–Korean relations and how these relations influence North Korean perspectives of the United States. In fact, US–Korean interaction goes back 140 years to the General Sherman Incident of 1866 and the US Korea Campaign of 1871. In the latter, US sailors attacked the Korean homeland and killed about 350 Koreans over three days of conflict. In the Chemulpo Treaty of 1882, the United States pledged to defend Korea from foreign invasion. However, when confronted by the Japanese, the United States unilaterally reneged on the Treaty and acknowledged Korea as a Japanese sphere of interest (in return from Japanese recognition of US influence in the Philippines and Hawaii).

At the end of World War II, the peninsula was split into two states, with North Korea taking control of the more economically developed half of the peninsula. Even with the Korean War hiatus, the North was able to out-pace the more agrarian South by prioritizing industrial development and rural collectivization under a Stalinist centralized planning system.

Under Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev, the collapse of the Sino–Soviet competition, slowly, but severely, curtailed the communist bloc assistance that underpinned North Korean development. By the late 1980s, signs of significant economic troubles in North Korea were beginning to emerge. In the early 1990s, the North Korean economy began to fall apart. By the mid-1990s, the North Korean economy ceased to exist. Industrial production plummeted. Between 1 and 3 million people starved to death before North Korea finally appealed for food aid from the international community. Were it not for external aid, it is likely that North Korea would have withered away.

The single most fundamental political, economic, and military policy of North Korea is called the “Military-First” Policy, in which all activity is subordinated to the development of military power. Thus:

- North Korea is the most militarized state in the world
- North Korea spends about one-third of its GDP on the military
- About 70 percent of North Korean forces are within 100 km of the demilitarized zone (DMZ)
- North Korea has developed or is developing a full spectrum of ballistic missiles
- North Korea possesses—by unclassified estimates—the capability to develop from one to nine nuclear weapons
No other country has rivaled the length and depth of the North Korean threat to US peace and security in the 60 years since World War II and, perhaps, in the entire history of the United States.

If the US aim is to bring the US–DPRK conflict to a close, this state of affairs must change. At one extreme of the spectrum is the instrument of war. If war is deemed the preferable option, US policy-makers must decide: Is such a war winnable? What level of war is acceptable? Would a limited conflict inevitably escalate into a general war? At the other extreme is peace. Assuming that a peaceful settlement is preferable to war, the critical issue for US policy-makers is whether or not peace is achievable. If it is possible, then how are peaceful US–DPRK relations to be achieved? What tools are available? In negotiating practices, which end should/can come first—normalization of relations or disarmament of forces? Which means should/can come first—negotiating of cooperative entanglements or dismantling of the primary threats?

Underlying these questions is the basic issue of North Korean motivations and goals. Many Westerners, especially Americans, tend to dismiss an opponent state’s motivation as either irrelevant or unknowable. For the past decade, our economic and military superiority has allowed us to assume that application of enough pressure and/or threat over sufficient time will inexorably equal victory. We point proudly to World War I, World War II, and the Cold War as prime examples. Our Cold War policy of deterrence was built on the premise that military containment of the “communist camp” was sufficient. Taken to the extreme, many assumed that all “communist camp” members had the same motivations and goals so that differentiation and sophistication in US policy was unnecessary. Conversely, such losses as Vietnam are attributable to our unwillingness to apply appropriate force for long enough. Yet, if we are to achieve a meaningful long-term solution, we must ask: What motivates the DPRK’s behavior? What is the US ability to influence DPRK motivations and, ultimately, behavior?

**Panel Members**

The Panel Members of the North Korea Workshop were highly prestigious members of the Academic Community, selected to provide new perspectives and “out of the box” thinking.

**Dr. Chaibong Hahm**, Director of Korean Studies Institute, University of Southern California

**Dr. David Kang**, Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor and Research Director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College

**Dr. Hong Nack Kim**, Professor of Political Science, West Virginia University

**Dr. Samuel S. Kim**, Associate Director, Center for Korean Research, Columbia University

**Dr. Han S. Park**, Director of the Center for the Study of Global Issues, University of Georgia
Dr. Kyung-Ae Park, Korea Foundation Chair and Associate Director, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia

Dr. David Steinberg, Director, Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University

Dr. Michael Vlahos, Senior Professional Staff, Strategic Assessments Office of the National Security Analysis Department, The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Dr. Quansheng Zhao, Professor and Division Director, Comparative and Regional Studies, SIS, and Director of Center for Asian Studies, American University
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NORTH KOREAN NATIONAL MOTIVATIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND PRIORITIES

North Korea's permanent objectives are security, identity, and prosperity. One major priority is system survival, which requires a security guarantee. North Korean leaders believe in the need for a strong military and/or nuclear capability to assure the country's survival.

Regime survival is closely connected with regime legitimacy as acknowledged both internally and externally. North Korea's Kim Jong-il has a dilemma, namely, to maintain power through a closed society, which enhances internal legitimacy, or promote the development of the society and the economics of the state via openness, which enhances external legitimacy.

Panel Members disagreed on the feasibility of Korean peaceful reunification in the near term.

NORTH KOREAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND LONG-TERM STABILITY

Any fundamental change in policy will require a leader from outside of the Kim family. However, it is unlikely that a leadership change, per se, will necessarily overthrow the system as a whole.

A major obstacle to essential change by a future leadership is the Kim family cult of personality with its mantle of leadership infallibility. Every Kim statement, however trivial in content or remote in time, becomes immutable "holy writ."

Alternatively, if the current or successor leadership could successfully argue that conditions had significantly changed—for example, that North Korea's national security had been assured—then the regime might be able and willing to modify its policies for the better.

NORTH KOREAN DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Panel Members differed very strongly concerning the state of the economy and the prospects for change. One viewpoint held that economic crises will probably not go away until Kim Jong-il is replaced and a new capitalistic economic policy is free to emerge. The other viewpoint held that North Korea's economy has improved since the mid-1990s, due in part to increased trade with Japan, South Korea, and China.
NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Based on Korean history and experience for over a thousand years, North Korean leaders perceive their country as surrounded by real threats to their existence and independence. From the North Korean perspective, US actions and rhetoric confirm this threat.

North Korea would give up little if they gave up nuclear weapons because:

• They would still have the technical know-how and capacity to create nuclear weapons in the future
• They do not want an arms race because North Korea could not compete with South Korea or Japan in the long run
• They want a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula

The Chinese view of the North Korean situation changed significantly with the July 2006 missile launches and subsequent nuclear test. However, China was only willing to go so far in its condemnation.

NORTH KOREAN MILITARY POLICY

North Korea would not choose the option of riding out an attack on its territory. It would choose to preempt if possible or counterattack if necessary.

If North Korea were to use nuclear weapons, it would be against Japanese territory (if Japan were the aggressor) or US assets off the Korean Peninsula (if the United States were the aggressor). It is highly unlikely that North Korea would employ nuclear weapons against South Korean territory, including US bases in South Korea.

THE SIX-PARTY TALKS AND DE-NUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Panel Members considered it unlikely that the Six-Party Talks will make much progress until after the elections in the United States and South Korea.

Panel Members were split on whether the Six-Party Talks could ultimately achieve North Korean de-nuclearization.

• Those who were convinced that complete de-nuclearization was improbable argued that North Korea simply had too much invested politically, psychologically, and economically.
• Those who saw some hope of de-nuclearization contended that US actions were the driver.
DIscussIOn FoRMAt

The workshop centered around free-wheeling give-and-take among the Panel Members on the issues of interest. There were no formal presentations. In addition to oral discussions, each Panel Member was provided with an individual laptop computer running groupware that permitted supplementary comments on oral discussions and/or the development of side-bar issues. Both forms of input were encouraged in order to capture the widest documentation of Panel Member opinions possible. In all instances, Panel Members’ oral remarks and typed comments were documented on a non-attribution basis.

Because of the complexity of the issues covered, two ground rules were established. First, the discussions were oriented toward higher-level insights, observations, and assessments. The discussions were not intended as an exercise in data-gathering. Second, discussants were asked to express their views and assessments in terms of “the most likely” and “the least likely.” While this may have minimized the nuances of some difficult issues, it tended to avoid less useful “one the one hand and on the other hand” observations.

The Moderator opened each of the topics for discussion with a brief introduction to focus the thrust of the exchange. In addition, the Panel Members were presented with a set of potential “Initial Issues for Discussion,” which were intended to provoke, but not direct or delimit, the discussions. The majority of the time was then given to panel discussions. At the end of each topic discussion, a few minutes were given to questions from the in-house and invited observers.
DETAILED DISCUSSIONS

NORTH KOREAN NATIONAL MOTIVATIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND PRIORITIES

Initial Issues for Discussion

• What are the most important motivations that guide the behavior of the North Korean leadership today?

• What are the most critical objectives that the North Korean leadership seeks to attain today?

• Do the North Koreans perceive North–South reunification as a near-term possibility? Under what conditions?

Key Points from Panel Discussions

North Korea’s permanent objectives are security, identity, and prosperity.

One major priority is system survival, which requires a security guarantee. Korean history is full of hostile takeovers by other nation states. North Korea is currently surrounded by major powers who have a history of hostility to Korea (North and South) and others. Therefore, North Korean leaders believe in the need for a strong military and/or nuclear capability to assure the country's survival.

North Koreans do not use the term “regime survival,” but clearly it is a key motivator and problem. Regime survival is closely connected with regime legitimacy as acknowledged both internally and externally. Internally, Kim Jong-il already possesses legitimacy. Externally, at least in the West, he has none. Kim Jong-il has a dilemma, namely, to maintain power through a closed society, which enhances internal legitimacy, or promote the development of the society and the economics of the state via openness, which enhances external legitimacy.

Panel Members disagreed on the feasibility of Korean peaceful reunification in the near term. Some saw North Korea as moving toward an acceptance of South Korea as a legitimate entity, while others argued that the North continues to view the South as illegitimate. However, as to which ideology takes power if reunification occurs—capitalism or communism—the current North Korean line is that future generations will decide. This in itself is a significant change from the past.
**Initial Issues for Discussion**

Is an orderly leadership succession to Kim Jong-il likely? Or is a significant conflict among competing power elites more likely?

Does the Party constitute an “organized opposition” to the military in a future succession conflict?

Is a leadership change likely to produce a change in North Korean objectives and priorities?

**Key Points from Panel Discussions**

During the 1990s, it was commonly assumed that a North Korean economic collapse would lead to regime collapse or change. However, regime change did not occur for two basic reasons:

- First, closed totalitarian societies, like North Korea, do not allow for traditional organized uprising. For example, there are no unions or competing opinion groups. The government and the military are compartmentalized to avoid dissident groups from forming and carrying out a coup.

- Second, external allies have also bolstered the regime at critical times.

Fundamental change in policy will require a leader from outside of the Kim family, for example, the military. However, it is unlikely that a leadership change, per se, will necessarily overthrow the system as a whole. At most, it is likely, as Deng in China and Khrushchev in the Soviet Union, a new leader will seek to modify the regime’s policies while retaining the overall system.

A major obstacle to essential change by a future leadership is the Kim family cult of personality. As currently constituted, the cult makes it impossible to acknowledge that either Kim Il-sung or his son and political heir Kim Jong-il ever made an error, even a minor mistake. Every statement, however trivial in content or remote in time, becomes infallible and immutable “holy writ.” The danger is that any policy change may be interpreted as an acknowledgement of past error and, thereby, challenge the very legitimacy of the entire system.

Alternatively, if the current or successor leadership could successfully argue that conditions had significantly changed—for example, that North Korea’s national security had been assured—then the regime might be able and willing to modify its policies for the better. In 2000, Kim Jong-il remarked to US Secretary of State Madeline Albright that the absence of a security threat had allowed China to modernize its economy by shifting spending from the military sector, implying that North Korea desired to follow the same path.
NORTH KOREAN DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Initial Issues for Discussion

Is the North Korean economy in danger of a collapse on a scale comparable to the mid-1990s? What are the long-term dangers with respect to massive starvation, deaths, diseases, and malnutrition? Are current reports and predictions of imminent catastrophe accurate or exaggerated?

Is North Korean militancy a product of North Korean poverty as some South Korean government officials have recently suggested? Or is North Korean poverty a product of North Korean economic decisions, priorities, and structures as some critics have suggested?

How critical is foreign assistance to the North Korean economy? Would “guaranteed” and “untied” economic aid moderate or intensify North Korean hostility to the external world? Would North Korean prosperity decrease or increase North Korean hostility?

What are the two to three internal changes that are most essential for the revival of the North Korean economy?

What impact would the lifting of all international sanction have on North Korean economic revival?

Key Points from Panel Discussions

Panel Members differed very strongly concerning the the state of the economy and the prospects for change.

• One viewpoint held that economic crises will probably not go away until Kim Jong-il is replaced and a new capitalistic economic policy is free to emerge.
  – North Korea’s state-controlled industries cannot compete on the free market.
  – North Korean agriculture cannot eliminate malnutrition and poverty.

• The other viewpoint held that North Korea’s economy has improved since the mid-1990s, due in part to increased trade with Japan, South Korea, and China.
  – Kim Jong-il seems to admire China’s economic success and may attempt to follow the Chinese model of reform and modernization.
  – A possible sign of changing North Korean attitudes is the recent attempts to replace donor humanitarian aid with long-term developmental assistance.
**Initial Issues for Discussion**

In general, is the North Korean assertion of a US “hostile policy” toward the North a real perception and assessment based on actual US policies and behavior? Or is it a manufactured justification for North Korean behavior?

From the North Korean perspective, what is the fundamental nature of the US–North Korean antagonism: political, economic, military, ideological, or other?

From the North Korean perspective, what would be the essential characteristics of an acceptable North–South unified state?

Would the other four parties in the Six-Party Talks (United States, China, Japan, and Russia) accept a North–South unified state under the control of the current North Korean leadership or under the control of the South Korean leadership?

**Key Points from Panel Discussions**

Based on Korean history and experience for over a thousand years (subjugation by China, colonization by Japan, and occupation by the Soviet Union), North Korean leaders perceive their country as surrounded by real threats to their existence and independence. From the North Korean perspective, US actions and rhetoric confirm this threat.

- From the very beginning, US contacts with North Korea, namely, the General Sherman Incident of 1866 and the US Korea Campaign of 1871, produced armed conflict.
- The United States supported the South Koreans and prevented unification under the North during the Korean War.
- The United States propped up the South for years and propelled its economic development.
- The United States has intervened in other countries around the world and, thus, has no inhibition against invading North Korea.
- US-led military exercises in the area have exacerbated the threat perception.

Of course, North Korean leaders are not adverse to using and even exaggerating the image of US hostility for their own aims.

North Korea would give up little if they gave up nuclear weapons because:

- They would still have the technical know-how and capacity to create nuclear weapons in the future
- They do not want an arms race because North Korea could not compete with South Korea or Japan in the long run
- They do want a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula
The Chinese view of the North Korean situation changed significantly with the July 2006 missile launches and subsequent nuclear test. However, China was only willing to go so far in its condemnation and actions against North Korea, because the Chinese fear an escalation of tensions that might lead to war and/or a huge influx of Korean refugees streaming across their border from a failed state.

**NORTH KOREAN MILITARY POLICY**

*Initial Issues for Discussion*

If a new nuclear crisis were to convince the North Korea leadership that a limited non-nuclear attack on the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the United States (or by South Korea, or by Japan, or by China) had become highly probable, what actions would North Korea take?

If North Korea were to employ the nuclear option in a conflict, against what/whom would the leaders want to use its nuclear weapons?

*Key Points from Panel Discussions*

North Korea would not choose the option of riding out an attack. It would choose to preempt if possible or counterattack if necessary.

It is highly unlikely that the North Koreans would choose to attack South Korea, per se, in reaction to an impending or actual US and/or Japanese conventional action.

If North Korea were to use nuclear weapons, it would be against Japanese territory (if Japan were the aggressor) or US assets off the Korean Peninsula (if the United States were the aggressor). It is highly unlikely that North Korea would employ nuclear weapons against South Korean territory, including US bases in South Korea.

**THE SIX-PARTY TALKS AND DE-NUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA**

*Initial Issues for Discussion*

Are the Six-Party Talks likely to be successful in the near term? Is North Korea likely to come to an agreement with the current US and South Korean administrations?

Is de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula likely to be attained through the current Six-Party Talks in the long term?

Should the Six-Party Talks concentrate exclusively on de-nuclearization as its goal or should the talks cover the full spectrum of interstate issues?

*Key Points from Panel Discussions*

Panel Members considered it unlikely that the Six-Party Talks will make much progress until the after the elections in the United States and South Korea. Based on
experience, North Koreans are well-aware of the potential problems and disconnects that can occur after such elections.

Panel Members were split on whether the Six-Party Talks could ultimately achieve North Korean de-nuclearization.

- Those who were convinced that complete de-nuclearization was improbable argued that North Korea simply had too much invested politically, psychologically, and economically.
- Those who saw some hope of de-nuclearization contended that US actions were the driver. For any chance of success, the United States would have to, inter alia:
  - Stop pressuring North Korea through sanctions and trade restrictions
  - Cease rhetorical hostility
  - Extend legitimacy to the regime through bi-lateral talks
  - Provide security assurances
  - Grant economic incentives and assistance

Both groups cautioned, however, that economic “carrots” must be used very carefully. Aid without strong controls and specific conditions might sustain North Korea and embolden them, thus actually hindering the de-nuclearization goal.

**WRAP-UP: WHAT WOULD YOU TELL THE US PRESIDENT ABOUT NORTH KOREA?**

**Issue**

As a summary to the day’s discussions, the Panel Members were asked to put forth some final observations as if they were addressing the US President personally.

“Mr. President, . . .”

. . . keep in mind that above all else, the main goal should be to prevent a nuclear North Korea and a subsequent nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, that is, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan with nukes.

. . . engage, engage, engage.

. . . allow North Koreans to come to the United States to see what the West is like.

. . . have high-level bi-lateral talks that provide a message that we are not threatening, so negotiations can follow.

. . . anything negotiated must be verifiable.

. . . de-nuclearization comes first. Everything else (economic aid), second. But the two are tied together so we need to keep our end of any bargains made so as not to be accused of breaking a deal.
**WORKSHOP PANEL MEMBERS**

Dr. Chaibong Hahm, Director of the Korean Studies Institute and Professor in the School of International Relations and the Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California. He also taught in the Department of Political Science at Yonsei University, Seoul Korea from 1992–2005. He has published extensively in both English and Korean, including *Confucianism for the Modern World*.

Dr. David C. Kang, Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor and Research Director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. He is the author of *In the Shadow of China: Balancing and Bandwagoning in East Asia* and *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines*.

Dr. Hong Nack Kim, Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University. From 1990 to 1991, he was a Visiting Fulbright Professor of Political Science at Seoul National University. He was also Editor-in-Chief of the *International Journal of Korean Studies* and has written extensively on East Asian affairs including the book *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival* (co-editor with Young Whan Kihl).

Dr. Samuel S. Kim, Senior Research Scholar at the Whitehead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. He is the author or editor of 22 books on East Asian international relations, Korean and Chinese foreign relations, and world-order studies, including his most recent work *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers*.

Dr. Han S. Park, University Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of Global Issues, University of Georgia. He has been actively involved in improving US–North Korean relations and promoting academic and opinion-maker interactions, assisting in the visits of President Carter in 1994 and Secretary Albright in 2000. He is the founding President of Uniting Families, a non-profit humanitarian organization that facilitates in reuniting Korean families. His publications include *North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom*.

Dr. Kyung-Ae Park, Korea Foundation Chair of the Institute of Asian Research at University of British Columbia, Canada. She is a past president of the Association of Korean Political Studies in North America. She is the author, co-author, or co-editor of many scholarly publications on issues of North and South Korean politics, foreign relations, and gender and development, including *Korean Security Dynamics in Transition, China and North Korea: Politics of Integration and Modernization*. She has made several trips to North Korea and hosted North Korean delegation visits to Canada, playing a key role in promoting Track-II exchanges and diplomacy between Canada and North Korea.

Dr. David I. Steinberg, Distinguished Professor and Director of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He was previously a representative of the Asia Foundation in Korea, Hong Kong, Burma, and Washington, D.C., as well as Distinguished Professor of Korea Studies, Georgetown University. As a member of the Senior Foreign Service, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State, he was Director for Technical Assistance in Asia and the Middle East and Director for Philippines, Thailand, and Burma Affairs. His books include *Stone Mirror: Reflections on Contemporary Korea* (2002).

Dr. Quansheng Zhao, Professor and Division Director of Comparative and Regional Studies at the School of International Service and Director of the Center for Asian Studies, American University. He is an Associate-in-Research at the Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, and Guest Professor at Peking University and Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. He is the author, editor, or co-editor of many publications, including *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy*. 