CHINA WORKSHOP

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The Geopolitical Assessments Series seeks to explore those nation states and areas of the world that are of special national security importance to the United States. The nature of future competitions and conflicts and the future security environment that affects the United States and its allies are highly dependent upon the behavior of states and how their peoples perceive various issues that affect them both internally and externally. To this end, the workshops seek to examine a state’s current leadership and population, how and why they think as they do, their history and the lens through which they look at issues, issues that they are currently facing, and the possibility for future competition and conflict with the United States.

In conducting the workshops, Panel Members principally from academia and sometimes from the military, government, and industry are brought together for a one- or two-day moderated discussion session. SAO personnel lead the discussion through a series of questions posed to the panel. In addition to documenting verbal discussions, the workshop provides computer software for off-line anonymous discussions among Panel Members and workshop observers.

DISCLAIMER
This report reflects the personal views of the panel discussants. The opinions presented herein are intended to identify and explore a broad range of ideas and issues. The report and its findings do not necessarily reflect the views of The Johns Hopkins University (JHU), the JHU Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), its sponsors, or any other public or private organization.

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INTRODUCTION

CHINA WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES AND CONDUCT

The China Workshop was held at the JHU/APL on October 4 & 5, 2006. The objectives of the China Workshop were to develop a better understanding of:

• China’s motivations, intentions, and priorities;
• The major drivers and constraints underlying Chinese domestic and foreign policies;
• The impact of Chinese policies and development on US international relations, economic and technological interests, and national security interests; and
• The implications of the US–Chinese relationship for JHU/APL programs and activities in such areas as science and technological development, civilian and military space, and national security affairs.

The nine experts, who made up the Panel, were drawn from the Academic Community. The members are nationally and internationally recognized authorities on Chinese affairs with unique experience and expertise in Chinese political, economic, social, military, and foreign affairs. As a group, the Panel Members brought new perspectives, challenging insights, and “out of the box” thinking that are not always readily available.

The discussions focused on domestic and foreign developments in China, loosely divided into seven central issues:

• Chinese Worldview: Motivations, Goals, and Priorities
• Chinese Domestic Politics and National Leadership
• Chinese Economic Policy and Social Development
• Chinese Technology and Technology Policy
• Chinese Foreign Policy and International Relations
• Chinese Military Policy, Doctrine, and Force Development
• China in 2010–2011: A Crisis Scenario

CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE

Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the Chinese leadership has gradually introduced a series of essential systemic reforms that have significantly reoriented Chinese domestic and foreign goals and priorities. The hallmark of these reforms has
been the loosening of Communist Party controls over some aspects of the economy and the introduction of free market mechanisms. The result has been a rapidly expanding economy, with many positive and also negative consequences. Moreover, whether originally intended or not, the reforms have had wide-spread impact on Chinese internal political, social, cultural, and military developments, as well as Chinese international standing and behavior.

An objective assessment of Chinese motivations and intentions behind the reform movement has been complicated by three major factors:

- The vestiges of the Cold War ideological prism through which many outside observers still perceive China as the malevolent “Red China” that seeks only to pursue irreconcilable struggle with the West;
- The extremely rapid pace and extensive scope of the changes, which have outdistanced the ability of many outside observers to comprehend, analyze, and accept; and
- The assumption that the Chinese Communist Party may allow temporary reform but will ultimately be compelled to truncate the reforms in order to maintain Party control and position.

Despite such obstacles, it is essential for US decision-makers to have an accurate understanding of the long-term Chinese goals and priorities. For example, if China seeks to be a responsible and integrated member of the international community, US interest might best be served by assisting China toward that end and avoiding US actions that would sidetrack the development. Conversely, if China seeks only to become a better rival—economic or military—then misconstructed US policies might expedite Chinese instruments of competition to the US detriment.

In this context, an objective assessment of Chinese domestic and international motivations and intentions was deemed to be critical for future US decision-making.

**Panel Members**

The Panel Members of the China Workshop were highly prestigious members of the Academic Community, selected to provide new perspectives and “out of the box” thinking.

**Dr. June Teufel Dreyer**, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami

**Dr. Scott L. Kastner**, Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park

**Dr. Margaret M. Pearson**, Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park

**Dr. Steven E. Phillips**, Associate Professor in the History Department at Towson University
Dr. David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs in the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University

Dr. Kellee S. Tsai, Associate Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University

Dr. Michael Vlahos, Senior Professional Staff, Strategic Assessments Office of the National Security Analysis Department, The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Dr. Arthur Waldron, Lauder Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania

Dr. Edward Yang Yi, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at James Madison University
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHINESE WORLDVIEW: MOTIVATIONS, GOALS, AND PRIORITIES

Panel Members differed significantly with respect to China’s general strategy. Some saw China as wanting to be a global hegemon. Some saw China as wanting to be a local hegemon. Some saw China's aim as a world with dispersed power among nations with China as one among many.

Panel Members agreed that the Chinese leadership perceives peace, development, and stability to be the guarantee of regime survival and the key drivers in defining China's priorities, including its foreign policy priorities.

CHINESE DOMESTIC POLITICS AND NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Panel Members agreed that the following characteristics are important in understanding the current (that is, the fourth) and next (that is, the fifth) leadership generations:

- The current generation is composed primarily of engineers, who are problem solvers. It also has more economists, lawyers, and representatives from China's interior heartland.
- The next generation will include many individuals who were trained overseas.

Panel Members agreed that the current leadership is fairly stable, but its cohesion is yet to be tested by a major crisis.

CHINESE ECONOMIC POLICY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Panel Members agreed that the current generation is less concerned with risk avoidance and conservative approaches in the economic and social arenas. The overall trend is very proactive in setting policies, identifying problems, and creating solutions.

Panel Members agreed that a key problem is the leadership’s uncertainty about how to confront and solve the problem of financing public sectors.

CHINESE TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Panel Members agreed that the Chinese leaders have the ambition of becoming a high-tech society and innovator in select areas to spur China's domestic development and its world power status.
Panel Members agreed that competition in the core critical industries is highly restricted to a few government-controlled firms. The current Chinese leadership is unwilling to permit the wide-ranging integration and innovative freedom that is necessary to promote large-scale technological development from basic research to applied research and, ultimately, to production.

**CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Panel Members agreed that the key factors driving Chinese foreign policy are:

- Survival of the Communist Party
- Promotion of domestic economic development and growth
- Promotion of peaceful relations with the United States
- Prevention of Taiwan independence

Panel Members agreed that Chinese leaders view the mere presence of the United States in the Pacific region as a threat to China.

Panel Members agreed that China's evaluation of a "nuclear North Korea" is largely dependent on the Japanese response, especially the impact of that response on Japanese military force development.

**CHINESE MILITARY POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT**

Panel Members agreed that the primary factor in the growth and development of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was a perception that US force deployments and alliances are aimed at encircling and containing China.

Panel Members agreed that the Chinese leadership perceive Taiwan as an essential element of Chinese nationalism and patriotism, thus central to Chinese internal politics and force modernization programs. By consensus, the Panel Members agreed, however, that the PLA buildup would continue even if the Taiwan issue were to "disappear."

Panel Members agreed that while most of the PLA modernization has a regional focus, the Chinese will develop a limited power projection capability to show the flag and protect national prestige, foreign investments, and import/export sealanes.

**CHINA IN 2010–2011: A CRISIS SCENARIO**

*The Moderator presented the Panel Members with elements of one plausible Northeast Asia crisis scenario in the 2010–2011 time frame. The crisis is initiated by North Korean nuclear and missile tests. The crisis then escalates to domestic and international events that might conceivably impact current trends in Chinese policy, domestic liberalization commitments, and international behavior. The objective was to discern (1) what Chinese leaders might do in response to specific actions and (2) how major crisis conditions might change current Chinese directions.*
The Panel Members agreed that in a crisis, such as the one presented, the most critical leadership issue would be the maintenance of leadership cohesion.

The Panel Members assessed that in any major crisis situation the most critical issues of domestic security would be, primarily, protection in/along the coastal region in order to maintain freedom of the seas and trade ingress and, secondarily, the suppression of uprisings by local rebellious factions, such as the Uighars.

The Panel members assessed that in any major crisis situation, as long as there was no expectation of a direct military conflict between US and Chinese armed forces, the Chinese would seek to develop and maintain a cooperative united front with the United States. The Chinese would be unlikely to take a hostile course of action even if confronted with increased US force deployments in the region and increased US reconnaissance along the Chinese periphery and/or overhead.

The Panel Members assessed that in a major regional crisis, especially one in which North Korea is viewed as the initiator, the most probable Chinese priorities and courses of action would include:

- Sealing the border with North Korea
- Coordinating diplomatic responses with Japan and South Korea
- Cutting food and fuel assistance to North Korea
- Working by means of diplomacy and troop deployments to prevent Taiwanese exploitation of the crisis situation to declare Taiwan independence
DISCUSSION FORMAT

The China Workshop, as others in the series, centered around a free-wheeling exchange of views among the Panel Members on the issues of interest. There were no formal presentations. In addition to oral discussions, each Panel Member was provided with an individual laptop computer running groupware that permitted supplementary comments to oral discussions and/or the development of side-bar issues. Both forms of input were encouraged in order to capture the widest documentation of Panel Member opinions possible. In all instances, Panel Members’ oral remarks and typed comments were documented on a non-attribution basis.

Because of the complexity of the issues covered, two ground rules were established. First, the discussions were oriented toward higher-level insights, observations, and assessments. The discussions were not intended as an exercise for in-depth information-gathering. Second, discussants were asked to express their views and assessments in terms of “the most likely” and “the least likely.” While this may have minimized the nuances of some difficult issues, it tended to avoid less useful “on the one hand and on the other hand” observations.

The morning discussions concentrated on Chinese internal ideological, political, economic, and socio-cultural developments. The afternoon focused on Chinese foreign and military affairs. Lastly, the Panel Members responded to a hypothetical crisis scenario that might confront the Chinese leadership in the future. The purpose was to examine the permanency of and leadership commitment to reform, not the details of the crisis, per se.

The Moderator opened each of the topics for discussion with a brief introduction to focus the thrust of the exchange. In addition, the Panel Members were presented with a set of potential “Initial Issues for Discussion,” which were intended to provoke, but not direct or delimit, the discussions. The majority of the time was then given to panel discussions. At the end of each topic discussion, a few minutes were given to questions from the in-house and invited guests.
**Detailed Discussions**

**Chinese Worldview: Motivations, Goals, and Priorities**

*Initial Issues for Discussion*

Do Chinese leaders have a consensus worldview or strategic vision that molds Chinese motivations, goals, and priorities?

What are the essential organizing concepts of this worldview or strategic vision and how essential are the following:

- Communist ideology
- Domestic prosperity and well-being
- International power and prestige
- Fear of foreign threat

Do the Chinese leaders perceive the current period as a temporary lull in the “Cold War” struggle between two irreconcilable systems or the start of a newly evolving era of international cooperation?

Is China's long-term preferred intention to integrate into the international community as a responsible partner or to dominate the international community as a superpower leader?

*Key Points from Panel Discussions*

Panel Members agreed that we cannot speak of the Chinese leadership having one mind in worldview or strategic vision. Chinese reform measures were/are driven more by a generally perceived need to overcome past deficiencies and problems that were leading to a future crisis than a vision of the future. However, the Panel Members agreed that once a decision is made, there is little opposition or dissension within the leadership.

Panel Members agreed that Marxism does not drive policy, but rather is used when convenient to defend policy positions. Thus, while Marxist verbiage may sometimes remain the language of discussion, Marxist ideology is not the standard for decision-making.

Panel Members differed on China's strategic goal. Some saw China as wanting to be a global hegemon with the United States as a major obstacle, while others saw China as *not* wanting to be a global hegemon, but rather a local hegemon. Some saw China's worldview as a world with dispersed power among nations with China as one among many.
Panel Members agreed that regime survival is key and that the leadership perceives peace, development, and stability to be the guarantee of regime survival.

Panel Members agreed that Chinese government officials are greatly concerned with internal stability. In contrast to prior regimes, the current leadership looks for indicators of instability and seeks to understand their root causes. Suppressions of dissident movements and groups are conducted when the leadership determines that things are getting out of hand.

Panel Members agreed that peace, economic development, and stability seem to be the key drivers in defining China’s priorities, including its foreign policy priorities. In this context, the current leadership has considerable distrust of US intentions, fearing that the United States wants to bring about regime change or overthrow.

**Chinese Domestic Politics and National Leadership**

*Initial Issues for Discussion*

What characteristics differentiate the current leadership from previous leaderships?

How will the fifth and sixth generations of China’s leaders compare with the current leadership in outlook and priorities?

Will the Party be able to co-opt and control the new generation of professional, technical, and entrepreneurial elites or will the new elites dominate and morph the Party?

What are prospects for the current “balanced factionalism” within the Communist Party leadership to develop into real democracy over the longer term? Conversely, what are the prospects for a relapse into a Cultural Revolution-type retrenchment?

*Key Points from Panel Discussions*

Panel Members agreed that the following characteristics are important in understanding the current (that is, the fourth) and next (that is, the fifth) leadership generations:

- Like the prior (that is, the third) generation, the current generation is composed primarily of engineers, who tend to be problem solvers. In contrast to the prior generation, the current generation rose in the rank after the Sino–Soviet split and have little linkage to the Soviet experience.
- The current generation includes more economists and lawyers than the previous generations.
- The current generation includes more representatives from China’s interior heartland, thus bringing a different set of personal and professional experiences and a heightened concern for the welfare of individuals.
- The next generation will include many individuals who were trained overseas.
Panel Members agreed that the current leadership is fairly stable, but its cohesion is yet to be tested by major crisis. The current leaders realize that pervasive control is impossible and want to transition to a more “corporate” control with the Communist Party as the ultimate power over dispersed centers of executive authority. Within this context, the leadership’s priorities include the following:

- Control the military
- Try to prevent alternative views through cooptation
- Worry about those who will not join the party and their views
- Worry about those coming into the party that might try and change its views and priorities
- Prevent corruption
- Worry about the workers, but also the capitalists at the same time
- Do not let regions slip away
- Do not allow for other parties

**Chinese Economic Policy and Social Development**

*Initial Issues for Discussion*

- How will the Communist Party’s traditional risk avoidance propensities impact future economic and technological reform?
- What are the greatest obstacles to future Chinese economic development?
- What are the prospects and limitations of economic privatization?
- What are the prospects of a Chinese economic collapse from an overheated economy?

*Key Points from Panel Discussions*

Panel Members agreed that the current generation of Chinese leaders are less concerned with risk avoidance and conservative approaches in the economic and social arenas. While some policies are still very draconian, the overall trend is very proactive in setting policies, identifying problems, and creating solutions.

Panel Members agreed that current Chinese leaders seek a dual-track with respect to industrial ownership. On the one hand, the leaders want to retain centralized control over core critical industries, such as transportation, energy, communications, financial services, and defense. On the other hand, they are willing to privatize or enter into joint ventures in non-critical sectors, such as textiles and public services. In the middle are many sectors, such as the auto industry, suggesting that the current leadership is still uncertain about the ultimate scope of free enterprise and private ownership.

Panel Members agreed that the “plight of the peasants” is probably not as severe as is often depicted in Western reports. Aside from some grievous examples of land confiscation, the rural population is doing adequately well overall.
Panel Members agreed that a key problem is the leadership’s uncertainty of how to confront and solve the problem of financing public sectors, such as environmentalism, pensions, health, and social security nets.

**Chinese Technology and Technology Policy**

*Initial Issues for Discussion*

Can the Chinese economy transition from a system oriented toward low-cost manufacturing to a system of high-tech manufacturing on a world competitive level?

Can the political and economic systems support the large-scale communications and commercial interactions essential for the development of national-level high-tech industries?

Will Chinese reliance on the import of foreign technology know-how and equipment spur or impede the development of domestic high-tech industries in the long term?

*Key Points from Panel Discussions*

Panel Members agreed that the Chinese leaders have the ambition of becoming a high-tech society and innovator in select areas to spur China’s domestic development and its world power status. To this end, China has:

- Created innovative S&T centers
- Educated a large number of engineers
- Sent many of its “best and brightest” overseas to be educated in the latest technology areas

Panel Members agreed that competition in the core critical industries is highly restricted to a few government-controlled firms. The current Chinese leadership is unwilling to permit the wide-ranging integration and innovative freedom that is necessary to promote large-scale technological development from basic research to applied research and, ultimately, to production.

Panel Members agreed that obstacles on both sides make US–Chinese cooperation on space-related efforts highly unlikely.

**Chinese Foreign Policy and International Relations**

*Initial Issues for Discussion*

What are the key drivers in Chinese foreign policy?

Does the Chinese leadership perceive the US–Chinese bilateral relationship over the next ten years as hostile, competitive, or cooperative?

Does the Chinese leadership perceive US economic and technological capabilities as critical to Chinese economic development?
Will economic relations (investment and trade) supplant political relations (independence and military confrontation) as the predominant factor in the Taiwan–China relationship?

Is the growing China–Russia relationship motivated primarily by mutually beneficial ties, such as economic trade, or essentially as a counterweight to US interests and position in Asia?

Is China’s involvement in the Six-Party Talks concerning the Korean Peninsula aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea, the prevention of North Korean collapse, or the obstruction of military action against North Korea?

**Key Points from Panel Discussions**

Panel Members agreed that the key factors driving Chinese foreign policy are:

- Survival of the Communist Party
- Promotion of domestic economic development and growth through foreign economic arrangements
- Promotion of peaceful relations with the United States to prevent China’s isolation and containment, to offset US–Japanese and US–Taiwan cohesion, and to protect foreign resource sources
- Prevention of Taiwan independence

Panel Members agreed that Chinese leaders view the mere presence of the United States in the Pacific region as a threat to China. However, China will continue to cooperate with the United States because China receives a disproportionate amount of economic benefit from that relationship.

Panel Members agreed that Chinese leaders worry about the economic and refugee impacts of a North Korean collapse on northeast China and, thus, have extended considerable economic assistance to North Korea. China’s evaluation of a “nuclear North Korea” is largely dependent on the Japanese response, especially the impact of that response on Japanese military force development.

**Chinese Military Policy, Doctrine, and Force Development**

**Initial Issues for Discussion**

Does the Chinese leadership aspire to a global superpower status with a global power projection capability as a counterpart to and protection for China’s emerging global economic reach?

How does the Chinese leadership perceive its military position in East Asia over the next ten years—increasingly stable or increasingly insecure?

How does the Chinese leadership perceive the US–Chinese military relationship over the next ten years—hostile, competitive, or cooperative?
If there were no Taiwan issue, what would be the primary drivers behind China’s future force development?

Key Points from Panel Discussions

Panel Members agreed that the Chinese leadership values its growing military might for its impact on China’s neighbors, Japan excepted.

Panel Members agreed that the primary factor in PLA growth and development was a perception that US force deployments and alliances are aimed at encircling and containing China. However, based on Chinese force deployments, it appears that they still fear a ground attack from either Russia or India.

Panel Members agreed that the Chinese leadership perceives Taiwan as an essential element of Chinese nationalism and patriotism, and thus also an element of Chinese internal politics and force modernization programs. It seeks to avoid a Taiwan war, but would fight to prevent Taiwanese independence. However, given China’s reticence to act in the Sendoku Island conflict with Japan, it is not clear exactly where the red line is drawn.

By consensus, the Panel Members agreed that the PLA buildup would continue even if the Taiwan issue were to “disappear.”

Panel Members agreed that while most of the PLA modernization has a regional focus, the Chinese will develop a limited power projection capability to show the flag and protect national prestige, foreign investments, and import sea-lanes.

China in 2010–2011: A Crisis Scenario

The Moderator presented the Panel Members with the following elements of one plausible Northeast Asia crisis scenario in the 2010–2011 time frame. The crisis is initiated by North Korean nuclear and missile tests. The crisis then escalates to domestic and international events that would conceivably impact current trends in Chinese policy, domestic liberalization commitments, and international behavior. The objective was to discern (1) what Chinese leaders might do in response to specific actions and (2) how major crisis conditions might change current Chinese directions.

The International Environment

- North Korea conducts another underground nuclear test in June. Five days later, North Korea announces plans for long-range missile tests in September.
- Japan nullifies constitutional limitations on military development and announces plans for a major buildup of offensive forces.
- South Korea announces a military buildup to counter both North Korea and Japan.
- In July, the United States begins a reinforcement of its air, naval, and air defense forces in the region.
- In the September missile tests, North Korea fires four Taepo Dong missiles, two of which pass directly over Japanese territory and fall into the Pacific Ocean.
• In October, Japanese aircraft fly simulated attacks over North Korean Taepo Dong launch sites.

• In response, North Korea mobilizes. At the same time, China mobilizes on the North Korean border, with its exact intentions unknown.

• In late October and early November, Japan claims that its imagery satellites are being blinded by ground-based directed energy weapons in China.

• In November, to forestall further escalation, the United States announces that it will intercept any military systems that appear to be undertaking offensive operations.

• In late November, due to rising threat of hostilities, shipping insurance rates skyrocket and shippers curtail shipping to the region.

• In late January, Taiwanese leaders begin parliamentary discussions about a possible declaration of independence. Taiwan signs a strong mutual assistance pact with Japan.

The Domestic Environment
• In July, the PLA is put on wartime alert in anticipation of a major regional conflict and begins to reinforce the coastal Military Regions.

• In August, the State Central Military Commissions calls for a return to peaceful conditions and warns that military operations against North Korea could result in “serious consequences” for all belligerents and their allies.

• In October, numerous internal areas experience popular demonstrations as the Central Administration attempts to raise taxes and cut local social welfare spending in order to pay for the coastal buildup.

• In October and November, the Chinese stock market begins a steady decline.

• In early November, the rural areas begin hoarding food as food prices decline.

• In November, the rising tensions seriously impede China’s foreign trade flows.

• In mid-November, rebellious forces in western and southwestern China seek to exploit the local drawdown of PLA forces. Western rebels impede the flow of Kazakh oil.

• In December, the prospect of rising oil costs and shortages begins to sow panic among business elites, who pressure the political leadership for action.

• In early January, the Chinese stock market reaches a 40 percent decline from the pre-crisis levels. Private business begin to cut expenditures.

Initial Issues for Discussion
How would the Chinese leadership perceive and evaluate this crisis scenario under the new conditions?

Would the leadership revert to strong “Maoist” authoritarian control in the domestic environment?

Can the leadership maintain its internal balance in the context of such a crisis?
Would the PLA leadership support or challenge the political leadership during crisis?

Would the private business elites support or challenge the political leadership during crisis?

Would such a crisis obstruct domestic political and/or economic liberalization temporarily or permanently?

Would the leadership perceive the international aspect or the domestic aspect as the more threatening?

Key Points from Panel Discussions

On the domestic leadership front, the Panel Members assessed that the most critical issue would be the maintenance of leadership cohesion, since the Chinese leadership probably views a power struggle among the leaders to be more likely than a regime-threatening revolt from below.

On the domestic security front, the Panel Members assessed that the most critical issue would be, primarily, protection in/along the coastal region in order to maintain freedom of the seas and trade ingress and, secondarily, the suppression of uprisings by local rebellious factions, such as the Uighars.

The Panel Members assessed that in any major crisis situation, as long as there was no expectation of a direct military conflict between US and Chinese armed forces, the Chinese would seek to develop and maintain a cooperative united front with the United States. The Chinese would be unlikely to take a hostile course of action even if confronted with increased US force deployments in the region and increased US reconnaissance along the Chinese periphery and/or overhead.

On the regional front, the Panel Members assessed that the most likely Chinese course of action would include:

- Sealing the border with North Korea to prevent refugee influx, signal displeasure to North Korea, and dissuade Japan from action
- Coordinating diplomatic responses with Japan and South Korea
- Cutting food and fuel assistance to North Korea
- Using diplomacy and troop deployments to prevent Taiwanese exploitation of the crisis situation to declare Taiwan independence.
Workshop Panel Members

Dr. June Teufel Dreyer, Professor, Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. She has served as Chief Far East Specialist at the Library of Congress, Asia adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations, and as a Commissioner of the congressionally established United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Her research interests include ethnic minorities in China, cross-Strait relations, Asian-Pacific regional security, and the Chinese military.

Dr. Scott L. Kastner, Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park. His current research projects consider the prospects for, and barriers to, unification in mainland China–Taiwan relations; the determinants of support for Taiwan in the US Congress; and the relationship between trade policy and environmental performance.

Dr. Margaret M. Pearson, Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park. Her publications have focused on China’s domestic political economy and integration into the world economy. Her current research interests include the emergence of China’s regulatory state and China’s integration into global trade regimes.

Dr. Steven E. Phillips, Associate Professor in the History Department at Towson University. His main interests are modern China and Taiwan, and United States–East Asian relations. Previously, he was a Historian with the Department of State, where he compiled the Foreign Relations of the United States volume on Sino–American relations during the Nixon years.

Dr. David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs in the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. He has been Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies (1996–1998) and the China Policy Program in the Elliott School (since 1998). He has served as Editor of The China Quarterly (1991–1995), and directed the Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1986–1987).

Dr. Kellee S. Tsai, Associate Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University. Previously, she worked at Morgan Stanley, Women's World Banking, and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest at the World Bank. Her new book is Capitalism Without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China.

Dr. Michael Vlahos, Senior Professional Staff, Strategic Assessments Office of the National Security Analysis Department (NSAD) at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Previously, he was Director of the State Department's Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs and Director of Security Studies at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. His research has led to the development of a broad analytic model for examining war and culture, with a primary focus on how military societies adapt to change.
Dr. Arthur Waldron, Lauder Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania. Previously, he was Professor of Strategy and Policy at the US Naval War College. He has written extensively on China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

Dr. Edward Yang Yi, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at James Madison University. During the 2002–2003 academic year, he was a visiting fellow at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing. His research primarily focuses on foreign policy decision-making, political psychology, and Chinese politics.