PROCEEDINGS FROM

THE INDIAN OCEAN MARITIME SECURITY SYMPOSIUM

Australian Defence College
Canberra, Australia

15-17 April 2009

Hosted by
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS)
University of Wollongong, Australia

Sponsored by
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
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ANCORS

Established in 1994 at the University of Wollongong, the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) is Australia’s only multi-disciplinary university-based research centre dedicated to providing maritime policy related research, education and intellectual support on national and international oceans governance and law, maritime security and co-operation, and ocean resource and environmental management for Australia and the western Pacific, Indian and Southern Ocean region. ANCORS provides knowledge services to Australia and regional countries and agencies to help them develop policies to manage, protect and derive sustainable benefits from marine jurisdictions. As an island continent and maritime nation with a vast maritime domain, Australia has vital national interests to protect and promote within the context of rapidly evolving global and regional maritime policies and issues. Further information about ANCORS is available at: http://www.ancors.uow.edu.au/.

IOMSS

The Indian Ocean Maritime Security Symposium was an unofficial, by invitation only policy forum held at the Australian Defence College, Canberra, Australia. This report of proceedings provides a summary of presentations that were made and discussions that were held at the symposium. The report reflects the views of symposium participants’ who were invited to explore a broad range of issues and to present personal ideas and opinions based upon their perspectives, research and experiences. This report, its findings and recommendations do not necessarily represent the views of any government or other party, including the symposium organisers, sponsors or supporters.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Indian Ocean Maritime Security Symposium (IOMSS) was convened by the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) and held in Canberra, Australia, 15-17 April 2009. The aim of the IOMSS, as a policy forum, was to improve understanding of the issues and challenges for maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with a view to identifying options for enhancing cooperation.

Participants at the IOMSS came from countries and organisations that in general reflected the diversity and breadth of IOR maritime security related issues, challenges and perspectives. The IOR is notable for its lack of homogeneity and the lack of a historical or contemporary sense of a common regional identity, with an accompanying lack of region-wide institutions. The region is exhibiting renewed vibrancy as some regional powers’ economies and capabilities expand and regional issues grow in importance. The IOR has become the focus of increasing Great Power attention in recent times. Piracy and natural disasters have contributed to this heightened level of international interest.

The IOR is characterized by insecurity and instability, particularly in some sub-regions. The IO plays a vital role in world oil production and global maritime trade. Foreign powers have numerous interests and there is evidence of power projection. Rapid economic and population growth are of driving importance in the IO rim. Non-traditional security issues presenting unconventional security challenges are a significant concern in the future. For example, environmental security and climate change security need to be integrated into national security thinking in the same way as energy security has been. Failed states will be the greatest costs of climate change. Circumstances in dysfunctional states will provide fertile grounds for extremism and terrorism as well as law and order issues like piracy and insurgencies. Water supply geopolitics will complicate the security environment.

There was concern expressed by some of the participants about the increasing presence of China in the IO. However, China also has interests in the uninterrupted flow of trade. What might be the implications from IO nations like India, and others, like China, whose relative economic strength may be increasing? Views differed on the potential implications of Chinese naval expansion and its impact in the IO. Chinese presence presents a quandary between capabilities and intent – capabilities need to be hedged against since intent can change quickly.

Key maritime security issues and challenges in the IO identified by the participants included:

- There is a need to look beyond immediate security issues and look to the medium to longer term for major resource and environmental management issues.
- The security of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) is paramount. Supply chain dynamics are the key to maritime security issues and include ships, port security and choke points.
- India and other regional and extra-regional states are faced with major challenges in gaining access to necessary energy resources. There is a growing reliance on imports.
- The IOR is wide spread and disparate; many states have maritime governance challenges. The lack of regional/national maritime surveillance and enforcement and intelligence capabilities is a major problem.
- State-on-state conflict is possible but less likely than other potential challenges suggested by the participants. While the IO could become a “geopolitical centre of conflict,” the potential for conflict is balanced by the common interests of those involved with or in the region.
• Who should pay for maritime security remains a problematic issue that has no easy answers. The maintenance of sovereignty is a national responsibility. The stability of maritime regimes in the high seas is a common responsibility of adjacent coastal states and user states. On the basis of these principles, a cost-sharing regime should be established through regional and extra-regional forums, based on use and capacity.

• IO maritime security should be collective in character; there is a need to take shared responsibility. Sensitivities need to be respected and the interests of many parties need to be carefully balanced. There is a need for synergizing regional forces to combat commonly held non-state threats. However, grandiose and overarching schemes of IOR maritime security cooperation are the least feasible. Most IO regional economic cooperative organisations, for example, have not really contributed much.

• A classic dilemma of regionalism versus globalism exists in the IOR. Many IO states lack the capacity for managing and protecting their maritime zones. Many external powers have significant interests in the IO region including freedom of navigation, flows of trade and concerns about issues like environmental health. Representatives of some IO states at the symposium expressed the view that the responsibility for IO maritime security should rest primarily with the IOR states. However, external powers have legitimate interests to protect and they have the capacity to contribute. The seeds for maritime security cooperation lie in dealing with this dilemma.

• Common interests in non-military security concerns may offer the greatest scope, at least initially, for states to cooperate and work collectively than would more contentious security matters. Longer term common interests, like environmental concerns and sea level rise that have the potential to present deep crises, are not being addressed. The mechanisms to effect collective regional and extra-regional action are lacking.

Major recommendations on how the IOR community along with the extra regional states and entities that have maritime interests in the IO might move forward to improve maritime security cooperation in to the future included:

• Creating a Track II entity titled “Forum for Indian Ocean Maritime Cooperation” (or similar) should be progressed. This organization could operate somewhat like the Maritime Security Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Problems can arise when attempting to transfer solutions to Track I with the lack of action a major concern. Identifying the options to move issues from Track II for ultimate Track I consideration needs to be a related focus in future work.

• The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), currently in its infancy, could be expanded to the next level of cooperation and be broadened. There needs to be a parallel or encompassing group to IONS addressing wider maritime security matters; perhaps a major working group that brings together regional and extra regional countries to consider capacity building, and also policy development. A four pronged organisational approach to maritime cooperation at regional and sub regional levels may work to include: navy, coast guard/maritime law enforcement agencies, ports and shipping, and marine science.

These recommendations will require leadership and political will to progress. Initially, a small-core, multi-national team could be established to develop options.
SYMPOSIUM OVERVIEW

The Indian Ocean Maritime Security Symposium (IOMSS) was convened by the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia and held at the Australian Defence College in Weston Creek, Canberra, Australia 15-17 April 2009. This by invitation event was limited to 60 participants and brought together senior officials and leading academics, many of whom specialise in Indian Ocean (IO) maritime affairs. Participants came from countries around the Indian Ocean rim and also included contributors from some external powers. Attendees were drawn from: Australia, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, The Maldives, Pakistan, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the United States of America.

Aim

The aim of the IOMSS was to improve understanding of the issues and challenges for maritime security in the IO with a view to identifying options for enhancing cooperation. The Symposium was a policy forum.

Scope

Symposium participants considered maritime related issues and challenges as they apply to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in the broadest sense of the concept of security, and as they affect IO littoral states and the wider international community. Traditional maritime security issues such as freedom of navigation, security of sea lanes, maritime boundary and domain security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and challenges to law and order (e.g., piracy and sea robbery; drug, people and arms smuggling; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; illegal immigration; maritime terrorism) were considered. The maritime aspects of economic security, energy security, food security, environmental security and human security were also discussed. Options for enhancing IO maritime security were presented.

Objectives

The objectives of the Symposium were to:

- Share knowledge and perspectives and thus develop a comprehensive understanding of contemporary IO maritime security related issues;
- Contribute to developing a shared sense of community and identity in caring for the IO and the many facets of its maritime security;
- Enhance prospects for maritime security in the IO by identifying options for improving communication and collaboration in dealing with the broad spectrum of maritime security related issues and challenges; and

1 Commodore Lee G. Cordner AM RAN (Retired), Principal Research Fellow (Associate Professor) at ANCORS was the Indian Ocean Maritime Security Symposium Convenor, Director and Symposium Chair. Contact: lecordner@uow.edu.au or +61 2 4221 4883.
Provide a conduit to identify and consider issues and options for enhancing IO maritime security at other international and national forums.

Feedback from participants indicated that the objectives were largely achieved. Knowledge sharing and developing a shared sense of community were significantly progressed and prospects for improving communication and collaboration were enhanced. A useful network was created to progress future IO maritime security policy work and serve as the basis for ongoing dialogue among the attendees and their wider contacts.

**Format**

The IOMSS was designed to encourage maximum contributions by and exchange of views among the participants. Formal presentations set the scene for syndicate group workshops, which were followed by presentations of responses to a series of questions. All attendees, including speakers, were allocated to the five syndicate groups and each syndicate group was led by an experienced moderator. The format was as follows:

**Symposium Day 1: Identify Key Indian Ocean Maritime Security Issues and Challenges**

Formal presentations included:

1. The Indian Ocean Regional Geo-Strategic and Maritime Context
2. Indian Ocean Maritime Security: Environmental Security and Climate Change
4. Indian Ocean Maritime Jurisdictional Issues
5. Indian Ocean Food Security, Law and Order: Somalia Case Study
6. Indian Ocean Maritime Cooperation: The Fight against Piracy off Somalia

Each syndicate was invited to consider one of the following five questions:

1. Identify the issues and challenges for Indian Ocean maritime security from an economic security and development perspective. What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

2. Identify issues and challenges for Indian Ocean maritime security from non-traditional factors like food security, energy security, environmental security and human security (as well as other areas that the group may identify). What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

3. Identify issues and challenges to law and order at sea in the Indian Ocean. What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

4. Identify issues and challenges for Indian Ocean maritime security from traditional maritime security factors like global, regional or state on state conflict, threats to trade, proliferation of WMD (and other areas that the group may identify). What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?
5. Identify issues and challenges for Indian Ocean maritime domain awareness and maritime border security. What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

Symposium Day 2: Identify Key Issues, Prospects and Options for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean

Formal presentations included:

1. Indian Ocean Powers Key Issues and Perspectives On Maritime Security
2. A Regional Perspective on Indian Ocean Maritime Security Issues
3. Between Confrontation and Accommodation: India and China as Security Providers in The Indian Ocean
4. Indian Ocean Maritime Security Cooperation: Employment Of Navies and Other Maritime Forces
5. A vision for Indian Ocean maritime security cooperation in an ideal world

Each syndicate was invited to consider one of the following five questions:

1. What are the key maritime jurisdictional issues for the Indian Ocean, both current and emerging? What impacts will proposals like Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Marine Protected Areas have on the IO and how will they be managed? What are the maritime security implications? How will they be regulated and enforced, and by whom?

2. What workable options for maritime security cooperation currently exist? What role do (should) Indian Ocean littoral states and entities play? What role do (should) external states and entities play in Indian Ocean maritime security?

3. Develop proposals and options for managing Indian Ocean maritime security. What outcomes should be sought? Who are the key players? Who will benefit, who will pay? What are the barriers to effective maritime security cooperation and how might they be overcome?

4. How can the future maritime security interests of all IO rim states be best protected and promoted? What are the recommended options for enhancing maritime security cooperation for the Indian Ocean region into the future? How might these options be progressed? Who would need to be involved?

5. How should Indian Ocean littoral states navies, coastguards and other enforcement capabilities be developed? What roles should they be designed to perform and what opportunities might exist for regional collaboration?

Symposium Day 3: Wrap-up

Presentations and a plenary discussion focussed on issues and challenges for maritime security and exploring options for enhancing cooperation.
KEY INDIAN OCEAN MARITIME SECURITY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

This section of the IOMSS Proceedings summarises the key Indian Ocean maritime security issues and challenges identified and analysed during the Symposium presentations and syndicate discussions. Note: this is not a complete transcript of the symposium – it is an edited summary of presentations and discussions involving the many IOMSS participants.

The Indian Ocean Regional Geo-Strategic and Maritime Context

Dr. Christian Bouchard, Laurentian University, Canada

The Indian Ocean Region’s (IOR) geo-strategic and maritime context presents the following key features and facts:

- There are 51 IOR states – coastal and land-locked, excluding Central Asia
- The total area is 101.6 million sq km
  - Indian Ocean: 68.56 million sq km
  - Land area: 33.05 million sq km
- The Indian Ocean limits range from
  - In the west, continental Africa and the 20° East meridian running south from Cape Agulhas
  - To the North, continental Asia from the Isthmus of Suez to the Malay Peninsula
  - To the East, Singapore and the Indonesian Archipelago, Australia, Tasmania and the 147° East meridian running south of South East Cape
  - To the South, latitude 60° South, which coincides with the Antarctic Treaty Limit (1959)
- Total population is approximately 2.6 billion or 39% of the world’s population

Of the region’s 146 ongoing conflicts 23 are considered to be of high intensity. As a consequence, there is growing interest in the Indian Ocean due to:

- Insecurity that destabilizes the region and characterizes it globally
- The region’s vital role in world oil production and transportation
- Foreign powers’ numerous interests and multifaceted power projection efforts in the region

There are two fundamental features of the IOR:

- Local human life, activities and experiences vary greatly all around the area, and
- Foreign interests, influence and operations are significant throughout the area.
The IOR is, in fact, characterized by its diversity and complexity. There is no real sense of a coherent Indian Ocean region, but rather a set of sub-regions. The closest entity to an overall regional entity is the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), which determined in 1997 that it would deal primarily with trade and investment issues and that it would not address regional security matters. The IOR-ARC has 18 members and 5 dialogue partners. Notably, North East African states and Pakistan are not members and the United States is not a dialogue partner.

**IOR Security Cooperation** There is an urgent need for security cooperation between the Indian Ocean states and the foreign Great Powers. The IOR features large in global geopolitics primarily because of the oil factor, which has very high strategic importance. The global demand for oil is growing and the IOR – specifically the Middle East – contains the bulk of the world’s known oil reserves and is the major exporter of crude oil. Oil is an important element of IO geopolitics because:

- It is the “pillar” of the American model of modern civilisation;
- Since WW1, it is the most strategic resource in the conduct of war;
- Since WW2, America has demonstrated the will to control Persian Gulf oil resources;
- Of the growing need for it and the increasing interest in it from China;
- It is of great mutual interest to the United States and India; and
- It is of growing importance among other energy commodities at sea (e.g., LPG, uranium)

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2 The IOR-ARC members are Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

3 The IOR-ARC dialogue partners are China, Egypt, France, Japan and United Kingdom.
Peace, security and stability The IOR is an area of conflicts with local, regional and global significance as well as foreign interference. According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) Conflict Barometer 2008, the IOR harbors 146 of the world’s total of 345 conflicts (in various forms), or 42.3%, including 6 of 9 wars and a considerable proportion of high intensity conflicts. Conflict related issues include:

- the Israel-Palestine conflict/peace process;
- Iran, proliferation of WMD and development of missile capabilities;
- the weakness of many states which involves issues of their institutions, democracy, corruption, etc;
- the urgent need for development (human, sustainable, economic);
- the urgent need for security cooperation within the IOR and with the foreign powers; and
- the Islamism factor and the global war on terror.
Possible sub-regions for Indian Ocean security cooperation were presented by Dr. Christian Bouchard on the following map:

Geo-strategic Summary of the Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean plays a vital role in today’s world because:

- It is home for more than 2 billion people.
- It forms a vital part of the global shipping routes and network, including vital choke points.
- Oil from IOR remains vital today and will become more so in the foreseeable future.
- It provides an avenue for Great Power projection.
- It allows great powers to project “autonomous” military power in a very strategic area
- Security and stability concerns in the region are increasing as is the prospect of conflict, which could involve:
  - The “impossible” disruption of the Persian Gulf oil supply
  - Growing connections between maritime security and insecurity ashore

Conclusion: Perhaps rough seas lie ahead for IO maritime security.
Indian Ocean Maritime Security: Environmental Security and Climate Change

Professor Brahma Chellaney, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, India

Rapid economic growth and population growth are of driving importance in the Indian Ocean rim. Non-traditional security concerns presenting unconventional security challenges are a significant concern in to the future. There is a need for a better balance in the global agenda between traditional and non–traditional security issues. Environmental security and climate change security need to be integrated into national security thinking in the same way as energy security has been.

The serious environmental degradation found around the Indian Ocean is due to an adverse distribution of land and resources to population. Threats from natural disasters like tsunami are magnified because of environmental degradation conditions such as the denudation of coastal marshlands. In another example, a haze that lingers over South Asia is due to agricultural burning and coal-burning plants, which are becoming more prevalent principally in China.

A climate crisis is imminent, however, the science is immature and reasons for climate change are not completely understood. Nevertheless, worsening droughts and fires can be expected with such situations already taking place. Large mangrove forests called “Sundabans” at the mouth of the Ganges River in Bangladesh, for example, are disappearing due to salt water incursion. Over 100 square km have, in fact, disappeared. As indicated by this example, there will be competition and potentially conflict over natural resources.

Water

“Water wars” are very likely as the majority of Asia’s major rivers originate in the Chinese controlled Tibetan plateau. China has many projects that involve transferring water through major hydro schemes, for example, the Mekong River projects. Exacerbating the problem, glaciers are melting sooner in the year, and not providing a steady water supply through the summer. The good news is that higher temperatures will likely increase monsoon intensity and rainfall amounts, but that water supply is not year round and is too intense when it does occur. Rain water harvesting is becoming a major consideration with “Water Capture and Storage” schemes becoming increasingly important.

Water Management

Inter-state disputes over water sharing arrangements are already occurring from Africa through South Asia to Southeast Asia. Such disputes are leading to sharpening inter-state competition and re-opening old territorial disputes. Water “insecurity” is historically a destabilizing element in international relations. In attempts to alleviate disputes, legal river basin management and water sharing arrangements are in place, including on the Indus, Nile, Niger, and Senegal rivers. While there is a need for international arrangements over water, the issue here is who enforces the arrangements. For example, India and Pakistan have an agreement that India has abrogated by damming rivers and reducing flows to Pakistan. Similarly, India has dammed the Ganges River leading into Bangladesh resulting in reduced flow and salt water incursion in the delta region of Bangladesh.
Climate Change

A higher frequency of “extreme weather events” is expected. Increasingly warm temperatures will result in a greater occurrence of storms and rising sea levels that, in turn, will have a major impact on low-lying coastal areas like Bangladesh. As a result, massive population migration and large refugee flows will occur from coastal to inland areas creating major tensions due to the competition for resources as well as ethnic, religious and cultural tensions or conflicts. Bangladesh, the 7th most populous country in the world would be a likely example of such conflicts. By 2050, 17% of the country will be flooded, and around 30% of arable land will be lost. In response to already occurring changes, 20 million Bangladeshis have migrated to India, and this migration will increase.

In another example, the Maldives will be swamped as the sea level rises that will result in mass migration. “Climate justice” is being sought as the Maldives government believes that climate change is primarily due to man. Therefore, it is seeking aid from the West and China in relocating its population to include the possibly of being given a new homeland.

The overall result for regional security is that large scale refugee flows will undermine stability for those forced to leave their homelands and also for those countries who will receive these immigrants.

Human Security

Vulnerable people in failed states will be the most likely victims of and part of the costs of climate change. Circumstances resulting in dysfunctional states will provide fertile grounds for the fomenting of extremism and terrorism as well as the development of extreme law and order issues like piracy and insurgencies. Water scarcity is already critical and an impediment to economic growth. Water geo-politics will significantly complicate the security environment. The relationship between food production and water will be critical. Ironically, in the future there will be both too much water (flooding, etc.) and too little to drink.
Indian Ocean Maritime Security: Energy Security

Professor Dennis Rumley, Chairperson, Indian Ocean Research Group,
Edith Cowan University and University of Western Australia, Australia

Energy Security Overview

According to an International Energy Agency (IEA) definition, energy security comprises adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy. However, a more complex combination of factors includes minimizing vulnerability to the disruption of energy supplies, which should be available to every nation at a reasonable price while also taking into consideration environmental implications. The importance of the nature of energy flows needs to be understood. A comprehensive representation of factors must include: supply and demand, flows, environmental issues, and policy responses.

Michael Klare identifies China’s attempts to take over a U.S. oil company in 2005 as signaling a “new geopolitics of energy”. This concept recognizes the impact of international development and competition and the potential for conflict. Klare argues that a new “power struggle” for energy will be one of the defining characteristics of the new century.

A new energy security discourse includes terms like “power struggle,” “energy dictatorship,” “defense energy,” “energy diplomacy,” “oil war,” and “new international energy order.” Klare, in fact, has written about a “New International Energy Order” (NIEO) in which the leading states are Russia and China/India versus the Western powers led by the USA. The focus is upon access to energy supplies from Central Asia and the “scramble for African energy.” In the NIEO the U.S. is characterized as being on the energy offensive in Central Asia and on the energy defensive in the Middle East. As a result, there is an emerging energy diplomacy and a militarization of energy security.

Of the 14 “energy-important dependent states” in the world two are IOR states – India and Singapore. There are also 19 “energy-niche economies” that are net exporters of energy, of which four are IOR states – Australia, Iran, Indonesia and the United Amir Emirates (UAE). Another eight IOR states must also be considered – primarily Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States. The juxtaposition of old Cold War adversaries – Russia and the U.S. – must also be taken into account. Increasing competition among the U.S., Japan, China and India for energy supplies will underpin the growing power of Russia and Saudi Arabia. The geopolitical aspects of energy technology transfer are also important and will be increasingly used for taking competitive economic and geopolitical advantage.

Energy Security and Maritime Security in the IOR

The concept of maritime security is being contested and broadened. The security of sea lanes of communication (SLOCS) is vital to global economy, and the Indian Ocean is the world’s most important energy routeway. Half of world oil production is transported by sea tanker through the IO and 36% of oil comes from the IOR. More than 80% of this oil passes through three IO straits: Hormuz, Malacca and Bab el Mandeb.

Northern/Western powers plus India and China have legitimate interests in the IO SLOCS, and 11 IOR states are critical to the free flow of global trade through the IO. The stability of the IOR
as a routeway is vital, yet East Africa and the Northwest Indian Ocean would be characterized as the most unstable areas on earth. Thus, the Indian Ocean is a “nuclear ocean” (Doyle).

Of particular note, 25% of maritime piracy attacks have been on energy vessels, primarily in the Malacca Strait region. Such attacks have been increasing over the past two years off Somalia and Nigeria resulting in an international response via UN Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1846 and other actions. The *MV Sirius Star* piracy attack on 15 November 2008 was particularly significant due to the great volume of the crude oil cargo involved and the distance off-shore and away from the main Gulf of Aden areas of previous attacks.

**Broad Policy Parameters to Minimise Maritime Energy Insecurity**

While the traditional military or “hard power” view of maritime security remains foremost, the oceans offer the potential for the use of “soft power.” Soft power actions may involve military power plus broader-based power concepts including economic, political, environmental and social collaboration both within and between states. U.S. President Barack Obama has spoken in support of a new concept called “smart power” – a combination of hard power, soft power and “brain power.”

There is a need for military regimes or organizations that encompass both Indian Ocean and external powers, but none exist at present. Current arrangements are fragmented and incomplete. A broadly-based military security strategy with greater inter-state cooperation is required. Action so far has involved regional and extra-regional states, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has called for a comprehensive maritime security approach since 2002.

About 23 states can be identified as having a *direct* interest in IO maritime security, with a special interest in secure *energy flows*. One suggestion is for a new Indian Ocean Maritime Energy Security (IOMES) forum which would be a subset of the IOR-ARC and would work in collaboration with the IMO. Since threats to energy and maritime security emanate from land bases, there is a need to address causal issues ashore.

Given a dynamic global energy security environment, the next 20 years will contain some unforeseen shocks. One may be the prospect of a “post-petroleum” world that could develop from the technological breakthroughs expected over the next 25 years and would have an impact upon global and IO energy security. While there will be winners and losers, the IO as a “nuclear” ocean may assume greater global security importance.
Indian Ocean Maritime Jurisdictional Issues

Professor Stuart Kaye, Melbourne University, Australia

This presentation addressed the maritime aspects of the following matters in relation to the Indian Ocean:

- Sovereignty disputes
- Law of the sea practice
- Assertions of jurisdiction
  - Freedom of navigation
  - Territorial sea baselines
- Maritime boundary delimitation
- Future challenges

Sovereignty Disputes

Western Indian Ocean A number of islands are in dispute between France and Madagascar including Bassas da India, Europa Island, Juan de Nova, Gloroso Islands and Tromelin Island (under French control and claimed by Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius). The Madagascan claims have been supported by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Resolution 784, June 1980. Some areas under dispute are strategically located in the Mozambique Channel.
Map of Areas in Dispute Around Madagascar
Other areas in dispute include the Horn of Africa where Somaliland has indicated it wants to break away from Somalia and where the current Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) lacks effective control of the area. Also, Iran and the UAE are in dispute over some small islands in the Persian Gulf including Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs which are in a very significant strategic area adjacent to the Straits of Hormuz.

**Central Indian Ocean** In the heart of the Indian Ocean there are sovereignty disputes between the United Kingdom and Mauritius over the Chagos Archipelago and other islands organised as the British Indian Ocean Territory. This disputes includes the presence of a large American base on Diego Garcia, which is leased from the British until 2036 with an opt-out clause that can be activated in 2016. This lease arrangement involved the deportation of indigenous island population, known as the Ilois, to Mauritius. Recent litigation through British courts by the islanders to return to their homeland ultimately failed in 2008. Mauritius claims the islands and has requested their immediate transfer by the UK while also proclaiming territorial sea baselines around the islands. Other islands in the area have been transferred to the Seychelles jurisdiction.

**Maritime Jurisdictions**

Most Indian Ocean rim states have declared 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial seas, 24 nm contiguous zones and 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in conformance with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while continental shelf claims vary. Notably, Somalia still claims a 200 nm territorial sea. Various other states have also asserted rights that have negative effects on the freedom of navigation and the passage of warships. Such claims are contentious and have been the subject of international protests. Claims of some states include rights to assert security jurisdictions in certain circumstances far out to sea. Many states
have declared territorial sea baselines, some of which are extensive. Particularly contentious claims include baselines claimed by Pakistan, Myanmar (Burma), Iran, Kenya and Bangladesh. Archipelagic baselines have also been proclaimed by several states including Indonesia, Maldives, and recently the Seychelles. Historic waters are claimed by several states including:

- India / Sri Lanka (Palk Bay)
- Mauritius (Maturin Bay, Rodrigues Island)
- Australia (Anxious, Encounter, Lacepede and Rivoli Bays – some of which are outside Indian Ocean region)
- Thailand (the Gulf of Bangkok – also outside Indian Ocean region)

There has been significant progress towards the conclusion of maritime boundary disputes especially in the eastern Indian Ocean. Equidistance lines are the most commonly used solutions with very limited use of joint development zones or judicial settlement.

**Future Challenges**

Extended continental shelf claims can be made under Article 76 of the UNCLOS. States can claim a continental shelf beyond 200nm where certain physical criteria are met. To support such a claim, data must be lodged with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The current deadline for submissions is 30 May 2009. Indian Ocean states that have so far submitted claims include one from Indonesia (June 2008), a joint Mauritius and the Seychelles claim (December 2008), one from Yemen (March 2009) and the one completed claim by Australia (CLCS Recommendations – April 2008). Several other areas may be subject to CLCS claims.

Archipelagic sea lanes claims have also been contentious. Indonesia designated three north-south archipelagic sea lanes which were negotiated through the IMO in the 1990s and implemented by legislation in 2002. International reaction included responses from the United States which stated that the declared lanes could only be viewed as a “partial system” as it lacks east-west routes. The U.S. asserted that as a consequence of this partial system the right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage continues through all routes normally used for international navigation within the Indonesian archipelago until the designation is complete.
Horn of Troubles: Maritime Aspects of Food Security and Law and Order off Somalia

Dr Thean Potgieter, Stellenbosch University, South Africa and
Dr Clive Schofield, ANCORS, University of Wollongong, Australia

The Horn of Africa is known for the frequency of regional conflicts, including territorial disputes within the Sudan, between Ethiopia and Somalia, between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and many others. A number of past conflicts have been addressed through peaceful means. For example, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have negotiated agreements about their maritime and land boundaries. Other dispute resolution processes between and within regional states are in train.

Somalia: Fragmented and Failed

There has been no effective government in Somalia since the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991. The UN Mission withdrew in 1995 leaving Somalia a classic failed state with factional violence, lawlessness, poverty and famine. The international community have been little more than bystanders. The lack of security ashore has spilled into the maritime domain where there is a lack of regional maritime capacity and no credible indigenous maritime forces.

However, not all of Somalia fits the description of ungoverned and ungovernable space. While the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is certainly ineffectual, the ‘Republic of Somaliland’ has all the attributes of a state except recognition. Based upon former British Somalia, it is reasonably well governed. On the other hand, Puntland’s governance is dysfunctional and confused. The southern part of Somalia was also in a state of disarray until the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which did put a stop to lawlessness. When the UIC was ousted by the U.S.-supported Ethiopian intervention in late 2006, piracy attacks increased sharply.

In the current state-of-play Somalia has a new president who was formerly the head of the UIC and who is leading a movement towards a grand coalition that would include the TFG. Major challenges lie ahead. For example, one major player, the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia al-Shabab, is listed by the U.S. as a terrorist organisation, and it controls large portions of southern Somalia.

Somalia has the longest coastline on continental Africa (3,300km). Its broad maritime claims include a 200nm territorial sea and a potential maritime jurisdictional claim of 1.2 million square km. Overlapping is Kenya’s unilateral claim that will probably be subject to challenge when Somalia gains an effective government. Nearby are the strategically important sea lanes where 25-30,000 vessels transit the Gulf of Aden each year including those carrying 3 million b/d of oil via the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

Somali waters also have abundant living resources due to the Somali current marine ecosystem, which includes upwelling’s of nutrient-rich cold waters. Fisheries have been traditionally under-utilised, with estimates of the sustainable yield from Somali waters ranging between 200–500,000 tonnes per annum. Key large pelagic species include tuna (yellowfin, longtail, bonito, skipjack) and mackerel. The country also has valuable inshore fisheries. However, there is great uncertainty over fisheries figures due to the lack of reliable catch data.
The Other ‘Pirates’ of the Horn of Africa: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

Due to the absence of a functioning government in Somalia, which should have maritime surveillance and enforcement agencies and capabilities, Somali waters are essentially not policed. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that around 700 foreign fishing vessels are engaged in unlicensed fishing in Somali waters. IUU fishing vessels come from within the region (Kenya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Yemen) and outside the region (Belize, France, Honduras, Japan, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan). Of note, there is a significant correlation between countries contributing (or planning to contribute) naval vessels to counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and those whose fishing fleets are exploiting the opportunities this area provides.

Unsustainable fishing practices are almost certainly occurring. Local fishermen have allegedly been intimidated by destruction of gear, attacks by high pressure hoses, and the ramming of their vessels. Illegal catches are estimated to be worth U.S. $90-300million per annum. Some fisheries may be on the verge of collapse, although without reliable data this is hard to ascertain. Local fishermen have been significantly disenfranchised and have reportedly turned to what has been labelled as “piracy,” which could be seen locally as informal “coastguards” seeking ransoms as “fines.” Systematic plundering of Somalia’s offshore resources is a potent underlying factor in piracy.

There is an extremely valuable fishery resource off the coast of Somalia which could be utilised to provide food security if brought under Somali control and managed effectively. Ironically, the IUU fishing situation means that the international community is taking considerably more protein out of Somali waters than it is delivering in food aid.
The nature of maritime security problems in the Horn of Africa region

Maritime security problems result primarily from the lack of order at sea. These problems include:

**Piracy:** The pirates have many targets. They are bold and attack in daylight. They are well organized and well armed using mother ships and safe havens ashore. Puntland has had an economic boom because of piracy, and Eyl is a safe-haven. A demand for expensive goods has developed in a country with no functioning central government. Little is being done ashore to stop the pirates due to links to local administration officials and beyond.

**Maritime terrorism:** Asymmetrical threats have occurred in this part of the Indian Ocean for many years. Examples include the *Achille Lauro*, *USS Cole* and the *Limburg*.

**Exploitation of maritime resources:** Illegal fishing is a major problem as is toxic waste dumping and pollution. Maritime sovereignty and sovereign rights are not respected or enforced. Sovereignty must be exercised to be recognized, but it is not occurring off the coast of Somalia. The humanitarian effects are profound and require the provision of international food aid. Smuggling and human trafficking are also reported to be rife. As a result, the economic implications for the region are dire due to the extreme security problems.

**Actual and potential responses to maritime security problems** Naval forces and coastguards contribute to good order at sea. They can provide maritime diplomacy and exercise maritime sovereignty. Legal issues, however, are a major challenge when dealing with piracy. A legal framework, regulatory environment and a mandate are provided by UN Security Council Resolutions. Improvements in port security, intelligence, policing, law and order are needed. Unilateral actions are being taken by some states, and there is also cooperation among states as part of various entities including Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, CTF 151 and Atalanta project. However, one concept for cooperation, the U.S. AFRICOM (African Command) is very unpopular among many African states.

**Possible African roles and responsibilities** Africa has sustained large losses due to its lack of maritime security. There needs to be a focus on building up good capabilities, establishing a policy framework, and identifying required tools and states’ roles.

Fundamentally, the roots of the Somali piracy problem are on land and, therefore, they must be addressed on land. The measures needed to be taken against piracy are known. Whether the political will exists to take them is questionable.

Maritime domain awareness improvements are also a necessary part of the solution. However, success is essentially dependent on political commitment, operational capabilities, regulatory systems, and proper public awareness. There are no simple solutions because the problems are complex and all-encompassing, but still local in nature.

The implications of the Somali situation for the wider IOR are limited because it is a unique case with little chance of replication elsewhere. In fact, there has been significant success against piracy in other parts of the region.

**Conclusion** The prognosis for Somalia is bleak. Unless peace, security and stability are brought to Somalia and the key factors that drive Somali piracy are addressed, the phenomenon is likely to continue.
Indian Ocean Maritime Cooperation: 
The Fight against Piracy Off the Somali Coast

Captain Pierre-Emmanuel Augey, French Navy, Chief of Staff to Admiral Commanding French 
Forces in Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN)

According to French statistics:

- In 2008, there were 165 piracy attacks off Somalia of which 43 were successful or about one 
in three.
- Over the past 12 months there have been 217 attacks of which 53 have been successful, or 
less than one in four.

There is no safe area off the Horn of Africa. The area comprises 2.1 million km² of open seas and 
“Despite the presence of warships, the safety of commercial vessels cannot be guaranteed in the 
Gulf of Aden.”

Pirates operating off the East coast of Somalia utilize small, fast skiffs which are often supported 
by a mother ship that looks just like any other large fishing vessel and are often hijacked vessels. 
The pirates have become increasingly professional and sophisticated in their operations. They are 
now very well organized paramilitary forces with more and more efficient assets including: 
speed boats with considerable range, good communications (IRIDIUM) and navigation systems 
(GPS), and purpose designed equipment to conduct assaults (weapons, ladders, etc.) They have 
mastery of operations in their area expertise, with the ability to sum up the tactical situation and 
use initiative and close coordination in attacks. Additionally, the pirates have very strong 
determination and they do not hesitate to use their weapons.

Existing legal framework makes prosecuting pirates very difficult. The value of hostages makes 
the business very profitable for the pirates and also means the hostages are generally well treated. 
There is no deterring rapid response force available over this vast geographic area when it takes 
approximately 15 minutes between detection of an attack and the completion of the hijacking 
(and taking of hostages).

It should be noted that pirates have nothing to do with terrorism. Their motivation is business 
and money. They belong to well structured criminal groups.

The international community is now completely mobilised to deal with this threat. The authority 
and responsibility to deal with piracy is laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982, in summary:

Article 100 Duty to co-operate in the repression of piracy: All States shall co-operate to the 
fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy.

Article 101 Definition of piracy: Private ends on the high sea against another ship or 
aircraft

Article 105: Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft: Every State may seize a pirate ship or 
aircraft. The courts of that State decide upon the penalties to be imposed.

Article 107 Those entitled to seize on account of piracy: Warships or military aircraft 
identifiable as being on government service and authorized to carry out such duties
In addition, there have been a series of UN Security Council Resolutions summarised as follows:

1814 (May 15th 2008) States and regional organizations are requested to take action to protect the World Food Programme maritime convoys

1816 (June 2nd 2008) For a period of six months States cooperating with the TFG are allowed to enter the territorial waters of Somalia – notification is provided by the TFG

1838 (October 7th 2008) States are urgently requested to take part actively in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia and, to this end, cooperate with the TFG. States and regional organizations are urgently requested to continue to protect the World Food Programme maritime convoys and to coordinate their actions as provided by the TFG

1846 (December 2nd 2008) Extension of 1816 for 12 months

1851 (December 21st 2008) Land intervention is authorized

The international naval/maritime security response comprises two main cooperative groups: the European Union Operation ATALANTA with forces currently from France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Greece and Norway; and the U.S.-led CTF 151 currently comprising forces from the U.S., United Kingdom, Turkey, Denmark, Singapore and South Korea plus potentially others. In addition, independent naval forces from China, India, Malaysia, Japan, Russia and Saudi Arabia have joined the operation. There is good willingness to cooperate and coordinate however this remains a considerable challenge. Most of the assets are concentrated in the Gulf of Aden while the threat has moved increasingly to the Eastern coast of Somalia. The area is vast, skiffs are difficult to detect and there needs to be improved coordination between the international forces. The element of surprise rests with the pirates and they are hard to thwart.

Patrols in the area are not efficient enough to deter pirates and to protect merchant ships. The best way to assure the protection of merchant ships is to escort them with Special Forces on board and with passive protection measures as a complement. Some of the independent navies are practicing this. CTF 151 uses a mix of patrol and escort. In these operations information is vital and includes knowledge of the situation at sea and a close relationship with merchant ships.

The French Navy was the first to commence anti-piracy operations in November 2007 in support of World Food Programme ships. Between September and December 2008 France decided to provide permanent escort forces. France inspects French flag vessels to ensure that passive anti-piracy measures are satisfactory. French shipping companies provide information about shipping movements and intentions and the French Navy provides information about safety. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) provides a similar service for British and U.S. ships. A new initiative called the Maritime Safety Cell in the Horn of Africa (MSC HOA) has been established that invites all merchant ships to register on a website, and provides information about safe transit routes, protected convoys etc.

Merchant ships are encouraged to transit at speeds above 16 knots where possible, to practice evasive manoeuvring and implement passive security measures. Once pirates have successfully boarded a merchant ship it is not possible for military ships to intervene as it becomes a hostage situation and an individual national responsibility, and the negotiation phase commences. Hijacked ships are taken to safe anchorages along the Somali coast near some now well known villages like Xabo, Carluula, Bargaal, Eyl, Garacad and Hobyo. The negotiation phase typically
takes two months, but some time much longer, as the pirates seek ransom from shipping companies.

The legal framework to fight against piracy is national. It involves relationships between states, rules of engagement and penalties, which an EU initiative aims to improve. There is the need for a comprehensive approach (defence and security) which requests the use of armed forces in a law enforcement area. Interdepartmental coordination with adequate readiness is important. It has improved efficiency to give law enforcement responsibilities to ALINDIEN as well as to French warships and maritime patrol aircraft commanding officers.

France has conducted a number of successful special operations to free French vessels, mainly yachts, but there is difficulty in transferring the pirates to France for legal proceedings and gathering the necessary evidence to ensure conviction. The U.S. and the EU recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Kenya to prosecute pirates locally. However, the provision of evidence and witnesses for the trials remains a challenge. French forces have arrested a total of 60 pirates summarised as follows:

- Arrest of 6 pirates after the release of *Le Ponant* the 7th of April 2008 – brought back to France
- Arrest of 6 pirates during the storming of *Carre d’As 4* the 2nd of September 2008 – brought back to France
- Arrest of 9 pirates the 23rd of October 2008 – handed to Puntland authorities
- Arrest of 8 pirates by *FS PM L’Her* the 1st of January 2009 – handed over to Puntland authorities
- Arrest of 19 pirates by *FS Jean de Vienne* the 4th of January 2009 – handed over to Puntland authorities
- Arrest of 9 pirates by *FS Floreal* the 27th of January 2009 – handed over to Puntland authorities
- Arrest of 3 pirates after the release of *Tanit* the 10th of April 2009 – brought back to France
Resolving the piracy situation off Somalia is definitely linked with improving the situation ashore. The EU Operation ATALANTA involves managing the problem with a comprehensive approach including fighting piracy at sea and providing economic and humanitarian support ashore, as well as political support especially by helping to strengthen the transitional government of Somalia.

In summary, the difficulties in countering the piracy threat off Somalia include:

- The huge size of the area
- Complications related to sending pirates to France for trial: no agreement exists with the neighbouring countries creating difficulties, even the impossibility, of having them transit via a third country
- Not enough response from other States authorizing Special Forces to embark in their flagged ships
- Concerns about freedom of the high seas related to weapons and equipment for the pirates
- Freedom of action for pirates ashore

The way ahead for measures to improve the situation includes:

- Reinforcing the legal framework:
  - Reduce the delay for Flag States to allow Special Forces on board their merchant ships for the protection of those ships (by unilateral declaration?)
  - Establish a procedure between ship-owners and States to carry escorts
  - Ease the transfer of captured pirates

- Promoting international mobilization on piracy issues by:
  - Seeking help from bordering countries
  - Involving more assets from capable organisations and countries
• Conducting merchant ships escort operations off the Horn of Africa
• Improving coordination at sea among all the actors

• Expanding ship owners’ awareness and advisories

• Helping Somalia ashore using a comprehensive approach by
  o Helping the political process (Djibouti Agreement)
  o Helping the economic development of Somalia
  o Improving armed and security forces for the Transition Federal Government
  o Fighting against poverty (through the World Food Program, for example)
Syndicate Presentations from Day 1—
Identify Key Indian Ocean Maritime Security Issues and Challenges

The following is a point summary of key issues raised during presentations and discussions by the five Syndicate groups from Day 1 deliberations. The questions posed are presented at the beginning of each response.

**Question 1.** Identify the issues and challenges for Indian Ocean maritime security from an economic security and development perspective. What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

**Current issues from an economic security and development perspective include:**
- Fisheries resources encroachment and depletion – includes other resources as well
- Arms and human smuggling – particularly in the NWIO – involving local efforts as well as proliferation of WMD
- Terrorist activities – sea borne attacks on Mumbai as well as on shipping
- Piracy
- Causes of insecurity and underdevelopment including:
  - Lack of achieving political stability
  - Failed states
  - Varying levels of development and underdevelopment
  - Diverse range of other issues
- Increased concern over China’s presence in the India Ocean
  - Commercial presence and trade facilities
  - May also involve an overall increase in external influence from countries other than China as well
- Information exchange for merchant shipping
  - Need to expand maritime domain awareness
  - Need to develop ways to manage and mandate information exchange

**Potential issues from an economic security and development perspective include:**
- Disruption of trade – IO is relatively stable now but any disruption would have a huge effect on global trade
- Security of lines of energy supply are a large issue for all IO states

**Enduring issues from an economic security and development perspective include:**
- Environmental security
  - The need to protect and husband resources
  - Impact of climate change
• Humanitarian assistance and disaster management
  o Frequency and intensity of extreme weather events will increase
  o Population growth in vulnerable areas
• Significant level of poverty that exists in IOR and that is likely to increase
• Lack of shared concerns within the IOR making the prospects for cooperation slim
  o A lack of common identity or concern with no single compelling shared issue
  o Affects all aspects of multi-lateral cooperation

Related Comments
• Some participants indicated concern about the presence of China in the IO. However, China also has interests in the smooth flow of trade. Why should China be seen as a special concern when perhaps Japan, the U.S. and others could be seen in an equivalent light? Participants clearly had differences in perspective over Chinese involvement in the IO. For example, Chinese support for port facilities in several IO littoral countries is certainly an issue of interest if not concern.
• What might be the implications for IO nations (e.g., India, others, or even China) whose relative economic strength may be increasing? What would be the impact of increases in defence spending by these countries? Is there the possibility of an IO arms race in the future?

Question 2. Identify the issues and challenges for Indian Ocean maritime security from non-traditional factors like food security, energy security, environmental security and human security (and other areas that the group may identify). What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

The Key Security Issues
• Energy Security
  o Safety of Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs)
    ▪ Supply chain dynamics are the main maritime security issues
    ▪ Includes security for ships at sea, in ports and through choke points
  o Security of sustainable supplies
  o Locking up of energy supplies using long term contracts
    ▪ Restrictive trade agreements between partners
  o Security of offshore and overseas-held assets and infrastructure
    ▪ Who is responsible for the safety and security of overseas citizens working in other countries?
  o Competition for maritime resources that could lead to conflict (involves both economic and policy issues)
  o External politics (e.g., U.S. policy hampers Iran liquefied gas sales) making the impact of geo-politics in the region quite significant.
  o Who will protect offshore assets in the long run?
    ▪ Who will fund the security of offshore assets?
    ▪ Many countries will refuse international involvement.
- China’s energy security strategy involves privatised security
  - Chinese nationals are sent to provide security
  - This strategy causes some risks to Chinese engineers
- Coal shipments are effected by piracy (e.g., coal transported from South Africa to India was diverted away from the Somalia coast)
- Price of oil: high oil prices will lead to the development of alternative renewable energy sources

- Food Security
  - Fish is the primary protein source for the region
    - East Africa is particularly dependent on local fisheries
    - Over exploitation of fishing grounds, primarily by foreign IUU fishing in coastal state EEZs, has been growing
  - Inadequate legal frameworks for handling food issues
  - Lack of international cooperation over food issues
  - Production of bio-diesel fuels consumes a lot of water and energy
    - Oil palm is replacing crops thereby displacing farmers who then rely on fish from fishing grounds that are becoming less productive
  - Lack of access to fresh water in some Indian Ocean states

- Environmental Security needs to be a major focus of any strategy
  - Protecting the ecology is the first prerequisite
    - Involves maintaining healthy ecosystems and biodiversity
    - Important for access to protein sources by local communities
  - Extreme weather effects will have impacts on ocean productivity
  - Maritime pollution and domain management
  - Pressure on land use
    - Non-sustainable development patterns by states
    - Illegal dumping of hazardous and toxic waste primarily by richer countries sending waste to poorer countries
  - Vessels dumping liquid waste in the high seas
  - Ship breaking which involves the disposal of toxic materials

- Climate Security
  - Sea level rise will lead to large scale refugee movements (e.g., Bangladesh)
  - Impact of ocean acidification on coral reef production and fish habitats
  - Lack of the coordinated international action needed to remedy problems
• Human Security
  o Transnational crime
    ▪ Human trafficking
    ▪ Drugs smuggling
    ▪ Money laundering
    ▪ Illegal fishing
  o A comprehensive long term strategy on good (better) governance concerning transnational crime is needed
    ▪ Crime networks present complex maritime problems
    ▪ Criminal are borderless, well organized, and well connected

• Concerns of Specific Indian Ocean States
  o Energy security
    ▪ Gulf states experiencing lower prices for their products
    ▪ Purchasing nations must contend with higher prices
    ▪ Need for an equilibrium in supplies and costs
  o Climate Security – a long term vulnerability
    ▪ Island states and Bangladesh are the most concerned about impacts of sea level rise
    ▪ Most other coastal states will also be affected directly or indirectly
  o Human Security
    ▪ Transnational crime is of greatest concern where government is weak – i.e., the Horn of Africa

• Concluding Thoughts
  o There are many non–traditional IOR maritime security issues, most of which are common to several of the littoral states
  o These security issues could be amenable to cooperative effort at the bilateral and multilateral level, sub regionally as well as regionally
  o Some cooperative models in other regions may be useful templates for the IOR (e.g., IEA’s Emergency Oil Sharing Arrangement)

Related Comments
• The Indian Ocean lacks adequate cooperative fisheries management regimes
• Ocean acidification is independent of climate change; proposals to fertilise the ocean are controversial and complicated
• World fish production peaked in 1987; most aquaculture is fresh water
Question 3. Identify the issues and challenges to law and order at sea in the Indian Ocean. What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

Most Indian Ocean law and order issues also have global implications

The most important major problem in the IO is the lack of regional/national maritime surveillance, enforcement and intelligence assets. Much of this work is done by extra-regional nations. However, many other major problems exist, including:

- Piracy and armed robbery against ships
- IUU fishing
- Asymmetric warfare issues and maritime terrorism
  - Especially in the Arabian Sea / Gulf of Oman
  - Differentiation is diminishing between occurrences in chokepoints versus those taking place in the open seas (a controversial view?)
- Smuggling and illegal movement of people and weapons (e.g., from Somalia to Yemen)
- Role of state and non-state actors (e.g., the Sea Shepherd incident in the Southern Oceans)
- Rebellion and separatist movements (e.g., LTTE in Sri Lanka)
- Dangers of linkages developing between piracy and terrorism
  - Currently no direct linkage identified in the region
  - Where does the money from piracy and other organised crime activities go?
- Disaster awareness and management
  - For example, the recent Maldives, Aceh incidents
  - This issue is where cooperation is most likely
- Biodiversity conservation
  - No control over the high seas or on the extended continental shelf
  - Regional organisations for fishing are less effective in the IO than elsewhere
- Navigational issues
  - Economic costs of piracy to shipping are related to increased insurance rates and increased fuel usage needed to avoid dangerous areas, etc.)
  - Must ensure navigational chokepoints in the region remain open
  - Who should pay? Extra-regional trading nations?
- Maritime jurisdictional and boundary issues (creeping coastal State jurisdiction)
  - Excessive boundary claims and other non-UNCLOS compliant disputes
  - UNCLOS may actually create problems (e.g., archipelagic transit rules in the Indonesian archipelago)
- Escalation of violence in piracy attacks is threatening the security of people and cargo at sea
- Sea level rise and climate change causing population migration, mainly by land
- Differences in the interpretation of Law of the Sea issues could be addressed with:
  - Military exercises and information /intelligence gathering in the EEZ
Variations in the definition and acceptable scope of marine scientific research
(distinguishing between ‘pure’ and ‘commercial’ research)

Related Comments
• Somali piracy is well organised and pirates probably could make even more money in other ways.
• The common framework is that these issues have global implications and that the interest and responses generated by the Somalia case will have implications for wider maritime security cooperation.

Question 4. Identify the issues and challenges for Indian Ocean maritime security from traditional maritime security factors like global, regional or state on state conflict, threats to trade, proliferation of WMD (and other areas that the group may identify). What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

Issues and Challenges
• Growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to global economic development and sustainability
  o IO was a backwater
  o Becoming the geo-political centre of gravity in the 21st Century
• More complex security environment at the global and regional level
  o Will there be cooperation or conflict? Or compromise?
• Nation state illness and capacity problems contribute to maritime security problems
  o Some littoral states unable to patrol their EEZs, etc.
• Piracy problem in Somali is driving security cooperation
  o Major powers have a common interest
  o Navies that have not traditionally cooperated are now doing so
• Jurisdictional creep impeding freedom of navigation
• Regional population growth with resultant demographic pressures
  o The major proportion of ocean pollution comes from the land
• Environmental change will cause further demographic changes and increased competition for resources, especially food and water
• Growth in level and geographic spread of organised crime involvement with illegal activities at sea
• Concern about the potential spread of terrorism to the maritime environment
• Diverse group of nations in size / governmental capacity / population / concerns / etc.
  o Lack of existing cooperative structures
  o Lack of effective institutional structures
• Lack of maritime environmental knowledge and capacity
  o One of the least explored and understood maritime environments in the world
• Inadequate international legal architecture and arrangements for dealing with piracy
• Failed or marginal states with limited ability to enforce maritime jurisdiction

**Key Issues of Common concern (and specific concerns to IO States)**

• Piracy
• SLOC security for energy and trade
• Terrorism
• Illegal fishing
• WMD and missile proliferation
• Unregulated movement of people
• Illicit imports/exports/smuggling
• Organised and transnational crime
• Climate change
• Environmental degradation

**Sub-Regional Concerns**

• North East IO–Environmental disasters, smuggling (drugs, arms, people)
• North West IO–Piracy/state and internal conflict, smuggling (drugs, arms, people)
• South West IO–Maritime security capacity, political instability
• South East IO–Fishing and illegal migration and people smuggling
• Southern IO–Too cold!

**Related Comments**

• State-on-state conflict is possible. The IO could become the “geopolitical centre of conflict,” however, common interests do exist. Yet state-on-state conflict is less likely than the other issues listed.

• The potential impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on countries is a consideration. For example, capabilities to sustain the commitment to anti-piracy responses may be affected. The GFC would also be a multiplying factor for unregulated human population movements. For example, the impact of the GFC can already be seen on the Jihadi websites.

• The China issue–China is building the second largest Navy in the World and significant maritime capabilities including long-range, land launched anti-ship missiles. There should be more concern about Chinese naval expansion and its impact in the Indian Ocean. Views on the implications of Chinese expansion differ. This is a classic case of the debate between capabilities and intent in which capabilities must be hedged against while intent can change overnight.

• State-on-state conflict can involve economic “warfare” and does not necessarily mean traditional warfare.
**Question 5** Identify the issues and challenges for Indian Ocean maritime domain awareness and maritime border security. What are the key issues of common concern? What issues are of specific concern to some Indian Ocean states or entities?

- What is Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)?
- What is sharing in the context of MDA?
- What would be MDA’s framework / structure / models / costs / politics?
- Ultimately, isn’t MDA about interests – national and regional?
- What are MDA tasks?
- What MDA technology and information sources are needed / available?
- Which MDA geographical areas of interest do IO states have in common?
- What are the possibilities and limitations of IO MDA cooperation?

MDA needs agreements and methods of sharing. Current agreements include IOR-ARC and SAARC, but they are not very effective at this stage. There is a lack of political will to develop agreements further. Piracy could be used as the catalyst to develop cooperative frameworks. An additional complication is that desirable open source information methodologies can be a problem because the “bad-guys” can also access this information.
MDA Tasks

- Collect information on:
  - vessels and craft
  - cargo
  - crews and passengers
  - ports and port facilities
  - critical infrastructure
  - historical vessel and voyage data
  - geographical areas of interest
  - the physical environment
  - financial transactions

- Integrate collected information, for example by the fusing of data and tracks

- Analyse information including by:
  - Developing anomaly detection
  - Pinpointing actionable intelligence

- Disseminate and share information
  - With relevant agencies and response authorities
  - Throughout the region and internationally

Problems and Challenges

- Data collection for developing states must also involve security of the data
- What data should be shared?
- Data sharing protocols must be developed
- Focus on unclassified data (e.g., Maritime Security Safety Information System, MSSIS)
- Costs and need for capacity building for information sharing and interoperability

Solutions

- Develop regional (or sub-regional) framework(s) for data sharing
- Build upon existing SAR cooperation?
- Possible models for bilateral maritime surveillance and enforcement cooperation:
  - Australia – France (Southern Ocean)
  - India – Mauritius
  - Niue Treaty in the Southern Ocean may be another example
- MDA cooperation has direct benefits for maritime border protection in the national context
- IONS example has not been encouraging as little has really happened since the first meeting.

Related Comment

- IO issues are not necessarily unique; similar problems exist around the world.
Key Issues, Prospects and Options for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean

This section of the IOMSS Proceedings summarises the key issues, prospects and options for maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean identified by the participants during the Symposium presentations and syndicate discussions. Note: this is not intended to be a complete transcript of the symposium. It is an edited summary of presentations and discussions involving the many IOMSS participants.

Indian Ocean Maritime Security Key Issues and Perspectives
Commodore Rajeev Sawhney, formerly National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India

Global Economic Prognosis: According to the World Bank Global Economic Forecast of 31 March 2009, advanced countries are in recession and emerging economies and developing countries are experiencing a slowdown. The global GDP is set to contract by 1.7% this year, the first time since WWII. The World Bank expects a 6.1% contraction in the volume of world trade in goods and services in 2009. The value of the world trade collapse is actually greater due to a drop in commodity prices. This drop will have an inevitable impact on global maritime trade. However, there is a cautious forecast for recovery in 2010 with 2.3% global GDP growth.

Characteristics of the Indian Ocean: The IO is resource rich in energy and minerals, both onshore and, of increasing importance, in the seabed. It is the focus of major shipping routes that provide critical links between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Intra-regional trade is at a relatively low level comprising only about 20% of total trade. The majority of littoral countries are developing states including many weak and some failing states. The resulting instability means that 6 of the world’s 13 major conflicts occurred in the IOR in 2008. The IO also has centres of terrorism and narcotics production and the region is prone to natural disasters.

Competition for Resources: Modern industry requires huge quantities of mineral resources and the known onshore reserves are limited. Studies are underway to establish undiscovered reserves. The IOR contains the major portion of unexploited and undiscovered resources. Bids by competing economies to tie up existing sources through political and commercial deals are also in the works. Will this lead to competition or cooperation? What will be the preferred route?

Global Hydrocarbon Dependence: According to the World Energy Outlook 2006 global energy demand is projected to increase by 50% by the year 2030, an annual increase of 1.6% (from 84mn bbl/day in 2005 to 99mn bbl per day in 2015 and 116mn bbl/day by 2030). A 2005 study by the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that two-thirds of the world’s hydrocarbon energy flows are by sea, of which 43mn bbl/day is crude oil. Energy requirements to sustain economic growth require that these flows not be disrupted. Other energy sources are increasing, however, it will take many years to change dependence on crude oil.
**World Maritime Transport:** Over 90% of global trade is carried by sea. It is the only cost-effective method to transport bulk cargo. In 2008 Global GDP Growth was estimated at 4% while Global Merchandise Trade (GMT) grew at 8%. There is a strong relationship established between GDP growth and maritime trade. Once the world economies recover, global trade can be expected to increase commensurately. In 2006, goods loaded at ports worldwide were estimated at 7.4 billion tons (with an annual growth rate of 4.3%). Of this, crude oil comprised 26.9% of total goods loaded, petroleum products were 9.2%, and 63.9% was dry cargo, including bulk, break-bulk and containerized goods. The geographical distribution of maritime trade was: Asia 39.1%, Americas 21.5%, Europe 19.6%, Africa 10.7% and Oceania 9.1%.

**Spectrum of Maritime Challenges:** There seems to be a consensus that traditional maritime security challenges like state-on-state conflict are waning while unconventional challenges are on the increase. These challenges include piracy, maritime terrorism, drug trafficking, human smuggling, illegal immigration, gun running, WMD proliferation, natural disasters, environmental concerns and illegal fishing. Exacerbating these challenges is the fact that the IOR is an area of instability with numerous existing conflicts and areas of tension.

**Maritime Terrorism:** Terrorists now have their operational space ashore restricted due to tighter security, which makes the maritime domain an attractive alternate venue for high profile attacks. The criticality of the maritime sector and vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure are recognized by the terrorists. Until recently the maritime environment has been relatively unregulated. Some terrorists groups have demonstrated maritime capabilities although maritime terrorism attacks comprise only 2% of all international terrorist incidents over the last three decades. While the probability is low, the consequences of maritime terrorist attacks can be very serious, making it is essential to develop and maintain response strategies.
International Anti-Piracy Efforts – Somalia: Many countries have rushed to participate in operations off Somalia under the umbrella of maintaining global security. Perhaps in some cases they were motivated by a fear of losing relevance. For example, the NATO/EU presence is about re-inventing its ‘raison d’être’. There is an inefficient use of maritime resources with international navy contributions operating independently and in groups with limited coordination. What happened to the U.S. ‘Global Maritime Cooperation Initiative’? Rather than extra-regional powers taking lead roles, is it time for a UN-led maritime peacekeeping force? Why not adopt a regional approach? A nascent IONS model might be appropriate; it could provide an ideal platform to develop a regional maritime capability.

What do Chinese Moves into IOR mean? China has a history of using military assistance in the region to gain influence. Recently, the trend has changed and includes using economic and soft power as well. Is China interested in cornering resources? China’s sustained buildup of its maritime power includes aircraft carrier building plans, which are now out in the open. Clearly, China’s IO ambition is causing India considerable concern. In the Somalia anti-piracy operation, China is demonstrating and practicing its capability for sustained out-of-area operations. Will the next step be the use of local support bases? Japanese and Republic of Korea naval forces are also involved and seem to be there to counter China as well as to protect the flow of shipping. There are many suspicions about the expansion of China’s maritime operations into IOR.

Transnational Crime: Transnational crime operations are of significant concern in the IOR. They comprise illegal trafficking in narcotics, arms and humans. Criminals operate freely across national boundaries, so cooperative approaches are the only answer. The IOR has two of the world’s major opium producing areas in the “Golden Crescent” (Afghanistan) and the “Golden Triangle” (Indo-China).
Natural and Manmade Disasters: The IOR is prone to natural disasters including cyclones/typhoons, tsunamis, floods and earthquakes. Environmental disasters are also a threat and can have a major impact on the marine environment. The regional national response capabilities at sea are generally limited. Cooperation is the only way ahead to ensure prompt relief responses.

Climate Change and Sea Level Rise: According to Coastline Changes – A Global Review (Report of Independent World Commission on Oceans), the likely impact in the IOR will be severe. Two specific examples are Bangladesh and the Maldives. In Bangladesh, 7% of the land area will be subject to inundation affecting 6 million people. Currently, 25% of land is less than three metres above sea level, which means there will be an estimated 20 million environmental refugees by 2050. The Maldives is also extremely vulnerable due to low elevation. A one metre rise in sea level would submerge almost its entire land area. The entire Maldives population will potentially be environmental refugees.

Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes: Numerous maritime boundary disputes offer the potential for conflict including conflicts over differing interpretations of “Freedom of Seas.” Could Chinese actions to limit “Freedoms” in the South China Sea maritime zones prompt problems elsewhere? Different interpretations of the Law of the Sea by different states can be problematic. Is there a need to relook at the definition of legitimate naval roles? The rights of the maritime powers versus the rights of the coastal states can be contentious. However, there must be responsible exercise of both freedom of the seas and sovereign rights – a balancing of freedoms with regulation.

IOR Maritime Forces: Many IO states have a disproportionate relationship between their small land areas and their very large claimed maritime zones (EEZs) that come with search and rescue responsibilities. Most of these states have little or no capacity to effectively govern, police, or manage those maritime areas. Major challenges to capacity building include addressing national sensitivities. Cooperative action is needed, and a regional structure could address the problem.

India’s Maritime Interests: India is faced with a major challenge in gaining access to necessary energy resources. There is an expanding gap between oil and natural gas consumption and the production of these resources resulting in the country’s growing reliance on imports. India is now investing in oil and gas around the world, similar to what the Western world has been doing for decades. In 2007-2008 India was involved in 38 projects (37 blocks) in 18 countries primarily in South America, Africa, and Central Asia with an estimated total investment value of U.S. $7.5 billion.

The Cooperative Paradigm: The concept of sharing influence and power is gaining ground. A commonality of challenges and threats is being recognized as a prerequisite for cooperation. However, the inherent dichotomy between the sanctity of territorial waters and cooperation for advancement of maritime interests needs to be overcome.

The common requirements of maritime security include the protection of sea lanes. Given the size of the region, sea lane countermeasures need to focus in the littorals and choke points, and the need to combat asymmetric threats must be focused in the littorals. Multilateral arrangements are feasible only within political boundaries acceptable to the littoral states. With regard to the governance of maritime zones, non-traditional threats are inseparable from international security concerns. Exercising sovereignty and good governance is the fundamental responsibility of
coastal states. Good governance in the maritime zones is necessary not only for sustained economic development and environment, but also for maritime security.

Is IONS the way ahead? The IOR countries are widely spread and disparate in nature, and many states face maritime governance challenges. Regional maritime capabilities are also limited with only few states possessing an oceanic capability. Nevertheless, there are significant challenges in obtaining agreement on shared maritime threats. The more maritime-capable states would need to provide leadership and assist in capacity building. But will sovereignty issues be a roadblock? The initial response to IONS was extremely positive, and consensus emerged during the first meeting. However, progress since then has been disappointing. Participants need to demonstrate their political will, and the structure needs time to stabilize.

Conclusions

- Maritime trade retains importance
- The IOR is critical to sustaining the global economy
- Contemporary non-conventional threats at sea are considerable
- Safeguarding against maritime threats is a major challenge for IOR States
- A regional cooperative maritime structure is essential to ensure stability at sea
- The maritime dimension is critical to India’s view of significant sea dependence and India is ready to contribute to regional maritime security

A Regional Perspective on Indian Ocean Maritime Security Issues

Captain Raja Javed Afzal, Pakistan Navy, National Centre for Maritime Policy Research, Bahria University, Karachi, Pakistan

"Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters." Alfred Thayer Mahan

The presence of several of the world’s important choke points in the Indian Ocean is another topographic matter that influences its character/nature. These choke points play an important role in the global trade and energy flows.

- The Malacca Strait at its narrowest point is just 8 NM wide joining the Singapore Strait to Karimion Island. It is at the hub of global trade and is one of the world’s busiest sea lanes with more than 50,000 ships transiting each year.
- The Straits of Hormuz is 21 NM wide and facilitates the energy flows of the world’s economic giants. It is a complex area of navigation and approximately 1,500 small and large ships transit each year.
- The Suez Canal where navigation is difficult and not accessible for very large ships and oil tankers is extremely vulnerable to any crisis in the Middle East. Approximately 3000 small and large ships transit each year.
- The Strait of Bab al Mandab is 12 km wide at its narrowest point at the entrance to Red Sea from Gulf of Aden. It connects Europe to Indian Ocean and is considered as one of the world’s most important oil transit choke points.
- **The Sunda Strait** connecting the Java Sea to Indian Ocean is 24 km at its narrowest and presents complex navigation challenges due to the presence of sandbanks and other obstructions.

The Indian Ocean has many islands. Many of these islands are used as the basis of extensive EEZs claims as well as having other strategic significance.

![Map of Choke Points](image)

### Economic Importance of the Indian Ocean

- About 30% of world trade is handled in the ports of the IO.
- The IO accounts for 50% of the world’s oil production.
- Half of the world’s container traffic passes through Indian Ocean.
- Continental shelves cover about 4.2% of the total area of the IO and are reported to be very rich in minerals including tin, gold, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminum and cadmium although these resources have been largely not exploited, so far.
- 40 out of 54 types of raw materials used by U.S. industry are supplied by the IO.
- Several of the world’s top container ports, including Port Kelang and Singapore, are located in IO as well as some of the world’s fastest growing and busiest ports.
- The IO possesses some of the world’s largest fishing grounds, providing approximately 15% of the total world’s fish catch (approximately 9 million tons per annum).

### Energy Flows

The energy lifelines of the global economy transit through the IO.

- The Gulf / Arab states produce one-third of world oil
- 55% of known world oil reserves are present in IO
- 18% of the world’s liquid natural gas (LNG) transits through the Gulf
• 40% of the world’s natural gas reserves are in IO littoral states.

Political Background In the post-colonial era the newly independent states of Asia and Africa were brought in to the tough competition between the Super Powers during the Cold War. As a result, the geo-politics of the era raised a new array of rivalries, suspicions, competition and confusion in the IOR. The presence of the Super Powers brought a sense of insecurity to the littoral states. Security concerns dominated development and economic interests.

The Indian Ocean can be divided in to five sub-regions:
• East African Coasts on IO
• North Arabian Sea and the Gulf
• South Asia
• South East Asia
• Australia

Some security issues are common to all these areas including securing sea lanes, energy security, piracy, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, arms and drugs smuggling, and human trafficking.

The Presence of Extra Regional Forces The IO has been transformed into a playground for extra-regional players. Regional wars and crises particularly in the Gulf region have ushered in a new era of external interference. The safety and security of the Straits of Hormuz is of paramount importance as an energy corridor. The present state of flux in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran has made the situation in the IO even more volatile.

Environmental Security Not much attention has been paid to environmental security in the IOR even though coastal marine system and the quality of ocean water are deteriorating. Large quantities of pollutants are infiltrating the oceans from the discharge of land waste and ship-generated pollution. Ballast water is the source of 46% of oil entering the ocean due to marine transportation, either through accidents or deliberate discharges according to the U.S. National Research Council. Global warming is causing sea rise and loss of mangrove forests due to coastal pollution. Throughout the region there are threats of coastal flooding, shoreline erosion and human displacement. Conclusion: There is a dire need to take actions to prevent a future doomsday scenario.

The Prevailing Approach for the IO The management of IO maritime issues is being done mostly by extra-regional players. Many of the IO nations are developing states with varying capabilities. Most lack the financial and material capacity for good ocean management.

A Proposed Approach to IO Maritime Security IO maritime security should be collective in character without any one nation or group imposing its views on others. There is a need to take shared responsibility. We should be posturing for the future and we should be transparent about what we plan to do. Sensitivities need to be respected while focusing on issues having a direct bearing on security. The interests of the many parties must be carefully balanced.
Charting the Limits of Partnership in the Indian Ocean – the Role of China and India

Mr. Rory Medcalf, Lowy Institute, Australia

Firstly, it is inevitable that there will be a Chinese presence in the IO. Therefore the question is how we can work usefully with China in the IO and elsewhere against common non-state threats. We should strengthen coordination with India, the U.S. and others to work against potential state threats. However, Australia (and perhaps other nations) should also hedge against China in terms of major combat. China’s rise is certainly having a strategic impact on Australia’s interests.

Every nation has interests and ulterior motives; that is as expected and has to be accepted. There is no such thing as sincerity in international relations. It is always about a mix of altruism and self interest. Public goods, for example the threat to free trade from piracy and issues like illegal fishing, are a common interest. All our nations are trading nations and share common concerns about dealing with threats to trade.

The traditional dominance of the U.S. is coming to an end and there will be greater power sharing. The concept of nations like China and other East Asian nations “free riding” on U.S. security efforts is also coming to an end as evidenced by the current anti-piracy response. The U.S. is expecting other nations to do more to deal with the common security burdens. Trade in the IO will change in terms of who the chief players are, with China’s interests increasing.

Australia and some other regional nations may mistrust China’s motives, and India mistrusts China probably more so, but they will need to cooperate. As the relative weight of western power declines we are looking 20-30 years out before the Chinese defence budget achieves perhaps half the U.S. defence budget. India’s defence spending is about 40% of the Chinese budget or about one-fifth of the U.S. defence budget.

The interests that China and India have to protect are core interests, for example oil flows. China is not likely to outsource protection of the trade routes to the U.S. and/or India. There are both defensive and power projection capabilities that China and India are acquiring. The trick will be for India to work with the Chinese in terms of protecting sea routes and dealing with natural disaster relief and so on.

India is a leader in the IO and the leadership the Indian Navy is showing with IONS is welcomed. India’s maritime diplomacy in the IO and SE Asia is well ahead of China’s. India needs to take the initiative in establishing the environment for working with China in the IO.

Chinese ships deployed to Somalia should be used as an opportunity by the regional powers to engage China. Their presence is an experiment on China’s part in terms of global deployment and should be used an opportunity to develop interoperability with China. We need to share the security problem with China and socialise China in being able to do that.

The Chinese history of support to Pakistan is problematic. China is developing deployable capabilities like mercy missions. If China is going to be more active in IO capacity building, then other countries will need to do more also.
We have to get used to the Chinese presence in the IO, whether we like it or not. Some recommendations are:

- India can play a leading role. India should get on the front foot in accommodating “limited” Chinese involvement in the IO. India might consider offering China re-fuelling options for Chinese ships rather than being concerned about Chinese alleged moves toward basing.
- There is a need to separate military and security dialogue with China from ideological disputes like those over Tibet and Taiwan.

Australia is too low key in IO maritime security and should become more involved by observing what is happening and also helping shape the future of what occurs in the IO. Australia has a convening capacity that can be exploited for the common good.

The issue of shared values is also important. For example, in natural disaster relief responses some nations have worked well together, but China has not so far been engaged. In addition, there would appear to be scope for more cooperative arrangements in dealing with non-state threats and issues.

**Related Comments**

- What is the commonality of interests India has with China? China is India’s largest trading partner. India’s economy depends on China’s economy. (There was some disagreement among participants on this point of view because the trading relationship is so skewed.) Chinese access to a reliable energy supply is in all our interests.
- IO powers like India need to take the initiative to help shape Chinese involvement in the IO. The opportunity being presented involves dealing with common non-state threats.
- The assumption of the inevitability of a major Chinese presence in the IO may not be accurate. The potential of the PLA-N for strategic reach and sustainability for extended operations in the next 10-15 years is in doubt despite the expansion of Chinese naval capabilities. Maybe that will change in the next 25 years.
Indian Ocean Maritime Security Cooperation:
Employment of Navies and Other Maritime Forces

Professor PV Rao, Centre for Indian Ocean Studies, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India

The Maritime Security Environment
The maritime security environment in the IOR has been transformed fundamentally due to two major systemic changes: the collapse of the Cold War regime and threats from non-state actors. The stable security balance and maritime order guaranteed by Super Power competition has disappeared. IOR maritime security today is a sum total of several interrelated variables. The key variables are:

- Challenges to state and maritime order by non-state actors: terrorists, pirates, arms and drug smugglers, etc.
- Globalisation: a liberal free trade regime has increased sea-borne trade. Consequently, protection of vessels and SLOCs is the major concern of navies today.
- Energy Security: threats to energy supplies and assets demand greater naval vigilance.
- Extended maritime sovereignty zones: UNCLOS has added to naval responsibilities.

Individual navies alone are not able to stand up to the broad range of challenges that are now apparent. There is a greater need for cooperation at sea and with agencies ashore.

Naval Roles: New Patterns
Navies are redefining their roles and also their combat capabilities. While traditional roles remain the leit motif of Navies, the altered maritime environment is causing shifts in their conventional responsibilities and functions. The complexity of maritime threats (more from non-state than state actors) and the nature of maritime violence have created a new regime of maritime responses. The division between constabulary and high sea roles is eroding. Navies are increasingly playing a dual role of protecting nations in a traditional strategic sense and enforcing law and order, which includes looking more onshore.

Naval Diplomacy
Naval diplomacy is the employment of Navies as instruments of State Policy. Navies are engaged militarily (through the actual use of force – gunboat diplomacy) and politically to enforce a state’s maritime security objectives. On balance, the ‘cooperative’ roles of navies are more visible today than their ‘military’ roles.

Naval cooperation is integral to maritime security which broadly aims at reducing risks of competition and confrontation, minimizing the deployment of naval forces and ensuring a stable maritime security environment – “good order at sea”. Naval cooperation is the most preferred, frequent and visible tool of maritime security in the IOR. It was never so in the past. Navies today interact more for non-military purposes for reasons such as to ensure energy, environmental and sea-lane security. Naval cooperation is increasing in proportion to the rising threats to maritime security from non-state actors. There is a new scenario of increased inter-navy interaction today compared to previous periods. Navies of the IOR are interacting with external navies in a friendly fashion.

Naval Cooperation in the IOR: Patterns

Peacetime engagement of Navies can be classified as:

- Naval Interaction: Bilateral and multilateral in joint naval exercises (e.g., Milan, MALSINDO, CORPAT); fleet reviews (IFR 2001, IFR 2006); and port visits
• Naval Soft Power: Training naval personnel, hydrographic services, humanitarian relief and rescue operations
• Naval Conferences: Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), etc.

Most regional navies lack the necessary capabilities to discharge large national maritime security responsibilities, particularly sovereignty control. The extended rights and responsibility areas under UNCLOS have also become liabilities since many countries are unable to effectively police and manage these areas. While there is considerable goodwill among many regional and extra-regional navies, transforming that goodwill into genuine coordinated action is proving to be difficult in practice.

Other Maritime Forces Contemporary maritime threats have reinforced the need for the creation of new non-naval maritime forces. These include Coast Guards, Marine Commandos and Maritime Police Stations. Entities like the Malaysian maritime protection agency and the Australian border protection command bring together coastal maritime forces and navies for effective coordination of maritime security.

Conclusions There is a greater need for synergizing regional naval forces to combat commonly faced non-state threats. Current bilateral/multilateral agreements are limited largely to joint exercises. Joint operations to fight terrorists and pirates are largely not yet evident. Progress is hindered by problems of extradition of fugitives from a neighboring/host state to the aggrieved state. Failed states pose a far greater problem. As the Freedom of Seas is under increasing assault by non-state criminals, calls for a new law of the sea are being voiced. However, grandiose and overarching schemes of IOR maritime security cooperation are the least feasible. Most regional economic cooperative organisations, for example, have not really contributed very much. Bilateral relationships will generally be more effective.

Related Comments
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) maritime studies group has been very effective over the years. The focus has been on developing a product. The inclusiveness of CSCAP membership (including, for example, both China and Taiwan) is a big positive. Problems arise when attempting to transfer solutions from Track II to Track I. The lack of action is a major concern. Another limitation is that there is currently no similar organization to CSCAP that extends all the way across the IO and includes the East African and Middle Eastern states.
A Strategic Vision for Indian Ocean Maritime Security Cooperation

Dr. Probal Ghosh, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, India

Note: The aim of this presentation was to provide some ideas for IO maritime security cooperation in an “ideal world” in order to stimulate discussion.

Because of the plenitude of military, economic, religious and racial insecurities and threats, the Indian Ocean "might be dubbed a kaleidoscope of crisis and not merely an 'arc". (Ken Booth and William L. Dowdy)

The problem of maritime security in the Indian Ocean can be approached at three levels:

• Transparency building measures,
• Confidence building measures, and
• Security building measures.

The first two levels deal with the development of primarily bilateral treaties and low-level security regimes.

Security building measures involve the:

• Creation of a multilateral Indian Ocean Region Forum for security discussions
• Holding of an annual conference on maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region
• Creation of a systemic approach that prevents the hegemonic attempts/claims of regional and extra-regional powers

Security’s many conceptual variants (including national security, international security, global security, collective security, co-operative security, comprehensive security, human security, etc.) are characterized by murky conceptual parameters. The broadening of the concept of security incorporates non-military aspects such as socio-economic development or environmental protection and politics. Security has become more comprehensive. Complementary to this concept is the notion of cooperative security approaches, based largely on regional systems. Both concepts emphasize the significance of cooperation rather than competition, but this approach calls for re-organization and prioritization of national issues as well as harmonization of policies across territorial boundaries.

The co-operative approach The co-operative approach is preferred because it emphasizes and promotes consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism. Singly or combined, maritime forces have a positive effect with respect to maritime security, disaster management, and humanitarian assistance as well as with environmental management challenges and a host of other functions. Co-operation among regional organizations is, therefore, a force multiplier and is often most desirable, especially in this vast and relatively unpolic ed area of the world. Maritime cooperation exists in the IOR, but only at the sub-regional level, and not at the supra-regional level. A number of institutions exist, however, their accent is mostly on economics and trade and not on security. These institutions include:
IOR-ARC (Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation) Open regionalism of the IOR-ARC has four primary components:
  - Trade liberalisation
  - Trade and investment facilitation
  - Economic and technical co-operation
  - Trade and investment dialogue
It does not address defence and security co-operation in a direct manner, but, given its numerous references to ‘trade,’ that may yet occur since trade is built on maritime security.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) SADC has an active Standing Maritime Committee since its vision is to promote peace and prosperity in the SADC region through maritime military co-operation.

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) Military and maritime co-operation among the GCC States is characterised by a serious effort to create and develop a GCC defence force. The GCC States signed a Joint GCC Defence Pact, ratified during its 21st session on 31 December 2000.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ASEAN starts from a military maritime perspective. In 2003 the ASEAN leaders resolved that an ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, the primary one being the Security Community (followed by the Economic and Socio-Cultural Communities).

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) The ARF is the principal forum for security dialogue in Asia. The ARF “… provides a setting in which members can discuss current regional security issues and develop co-operative measures to enhance peace and security in the region.” In areas of defence and security, relationships among ARF nations appear to be “… strong and diverse.” Counter-terrorism co-operation, in particular, has expanded significantly since 11 September, 2001, and the Bali bombings of October 2002. CSCAP provides its inputs to the ARF.

Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The FPDA are a series of defence relationships established by bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore. One element is an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) for Malaysia and Singapore, based in Malaysia that hosts rotating detachments of aircraft and personnel from all five countries.

The Evolving Roles of the Navies The Alondra Rainbow Exercise was an example of excellent cooperation between organisations. A large number of organisations have various aspects and levels of responsibility for maritime matters as seen in the Tabar incident, another example of cooperation. The Mumbai blasts have affected the roles of the Indian navies and coast guards that are evolving as a result.

IOR-ARC Littorals Maritime Capabilities There are commonalities in maritime interests and threats including economic, military, political, and asymmetric challenges.
The Ideal Solution!

In seeking an “ideal solution” some basic parameters are needed:

- Prioritization and reorganisation of regional objectives must be in consonance with the overall aims of better maritime governance and cooperation.
- Track II negotiations have an important role in supporting the cause of Track I.
- Any initiative by any state risks being seen as a hegemonistic approach.

A multi-pronged approach is needed including efforts based on:

- The Panchayati system – a “congregation of elders in a village” who oversee things
- The 1000 Ship Navy model – a U.S. Chief of Naval Operations idea
- Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) – requires technology and commonality of systems recognizing that many states do not have the necessary capacity for this
- The body of existing Indian Ocean maritime initiatives including:
  - IONS
  - The associated “Forum for Indian Ocean Maritime Cooperation” (FIOMC) – a supporting Track II organization that would work in tandem with IONS.

Any multinational agency designed to deal with the maritime challenges of the region will intrinsically suffer from a Hierarchy of Relevance. This concept is based on the requirement that the overall objectives, individual components of the multiagency, and multinational security cooperation must be adapted to the different needs and paces of operations as well as to the degree of force that can be applied. National objectives must be tailored to fit the circumstances.

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

Visualized as a consultative and cooperative effort in finding a “common response” to the ever growing threat from asymmetric threats, the Indian Navy took the role of a facilitator and an “unobtrusive fulcrum” by inviting Naval Chiefs/Heads of Maritime agencies from the IOR littorals. The response was overwhelming; twenty seven Chiefs (or their representatives) attended the event with a majority endorsing the charter of the initiative in principle. The initial apprehensions of some littorals suspecting a “hidden agenda” fortunately gave way to willing acceptance and an appreciation for the way the event was conducted.

The IONS Approach

- The purpose of IONS is to be expanded to the next level of cooperation. Note: IONS currently only involves the naval chiefs so participation would need to be broadened.
- Allied governmental maritime agencies should be involved at their highest levels in a bottom up and/or top down approach.
- The aim is to achieve a high degree of interoperability in areas like MDA, information sharing for overcoming common (asymmetric) transnational maritime threats, handling natural disasters and better maintenance of order at sea. Information needs to be readily available and actionable. However, this is difficult to achieve in practice due to the lack of trust among participants. Therefore, trust needs to be built.
• The consensus method would be used and decisions would be implemented as “soft law” (informal agreements).

**The Types of Cooperation being sought include:**

• Basic Maritime Cooperation
  o Joint "Search and Rescue" doctrine and operations
  o Anti-piracy patrols and operations
  o Joint seminars/workshops on marine environment methodologies and approaches

• Advanced Cooperation (enhancing interoperability)
  o Joint/multilateral forces to counter asymmetric transnational challenges
  o Sharing of actionable, near real time information with respect to these challenges
  o Joint SLOCs protection force
  o Joint/multilateral disaster relief operations
  o Environmental protection/surveillance methodologies
  o Upholding UNCLOS and other international maritime conventions under UN auspices

• Broader Maritime Cooperation
  o Joint development of marine technology and marine resources including energy
  o Joint strategy for security of ports/harbors/shipping/marine national parks
  o Regional marine sciences programmes


**Key recommendation:** Create a “Forum for Indian Ocean Maritime Cooperation” (FIOMC). This initiative with a structured agenda would draw its sustenance from the Track II processes and work in tandem with the Track I IONS, but with a broader maritime charter. (Source: Speech by Admiral Arun Prakash during IONS Seminar, February, 2008)
Syndicate Presentations from Day 2–Identify Key Issues, Prospects and Options for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean

The following is a point summary of issues raised during presentations and discussions by the five Syndicate groups from Day 2 deliberations and the Plenary discussions on Day 3. The questions posed are presented at the beginning of each response.

**Question #1** *What are the key maritime jurisdictional issues for the Indian Ocean, both current and emerging? How will proposals like Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Marine Protected Areas impact and be managed? What are the maritime security implications? How will they be regulated and enforced, and by whom?*

**Key Jurisdictional Issues** that could be considered by topic as well as by region were:

- Law enforcement
- Customs
- Border protection
- Living resource management and protection
- Seabed resource management and protection
- Quarantine
- Trade/navigation protection

**Responses and Implications** Cooperation is important at varying levels:

- Regional cooperation
- Sub-regional cooperation
- Global cooperation
- Capacity building
- Enforcement cooperation
  - Alternatives to/additional measures for enforcement
    - Catch certification schemes
    - Port State control
    - Registry cooperation
  - Need for *practical solutions*, not discussions without end
    - Dealing with problems of a manageable nature, not necessarily an all-encompassing IOR solution
    - Address areas where progress can be made
      - Building on goodwill and past cooperation in disaster relief and SAR
      - Use initial progress to leverage more difficult results in the future
  - Cooperation can lead to agreement through a range of smaller steps
    - Rules of Engagement (ROE)
    - MDA cooperation
    - Communication on disaster response planning/oil spill preparedness
• Cooperation involving direct enforcement over other States is most unlikely
  o Practice to date suggests that States are reluctant to diminish their sovereignty
• Progress can be made through capacity building
  o Likely to be more effective in most cases unless dealing with a failed/failing State
  o Works best when tailored to the State or sub-regional issue
• Recognition of the value in inter-navy communication
  o IONS as one possible forum
  o There are many other opportunities – for example, attendance at staff colleges by exchange students
• Value in facilitating interoperability and improving direct communication between commanders
  o More effective than communication through governments
• Impact of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) depends on the degree of cooperation between States
• Impact of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) that go beyond national jurisdiction is nil and unlikely in the near future
• International law is flawed in providing solutions to problems like those faced in the IOR, however, it does facilitate incremental progress
• Progress could be made slowly and incrementally
  o Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), for example, includes regional and extra-regional states and is an idea that could be applied elsewhere
  o Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)

Conclusions
• Regulation – dependent upon good will by States and recognition of common interests
• Recognition that there are limits to what is possible with regulation and some individuals will not comply especially in the areas of:
  o Piracy
  o Criminal activity
  o IUU fishing
• Enforcement of existing regulations is necessary to deal with these problems
  o Legal solution versus the 50-calibre solution
  o There would always be a necessity for enforcement

Related Comments
• States are adding very large extended continental shelf areas to their jurisdictions. Response: it is not a problem as these extensions can only be used for exploiting the seabed. Therefore, no great deal of additional enforcement will be required. However, there may be conflicts over issues like bottom trawling of seamounts, etc.
RFMOs and MPAs beyond national jurisdiction are being proposed. Might they be problematic in the future? For example, the Indian Ocean Whale Reserve is, in effect, an MPA.

**Question #2** What workable options for maritime security cooperation currently exist? What role do (should) Indian Ocean littoral states and entities play? What role do (should) external states and entities play in Indian Ocean maritime security?

**What workable options for maritime security cooperation currently exist?**
- Four levels exist:
  - **Regional** – IONS, IOR-ARC, IOPSC
  - **Sub-regional** – SADS, IOC, ASEAN including ARF (CSCAP maritime working group), GOC, International Oceanographic Commission
  - **Multilateral** – CTFs 150, 151 and 152, MASINDO, MILAN, MALABAR, KAKADU, Five Power Defence Arrangements
  - **Bilateral** – numerous

**What role do (should) Indian Ocean littoral states and entities play?**
- Depends on capacity:
  - No capacity to play a role (i.e., Somalia)
  - All others have some capacity but to differing levels of capability
- Basic role of all is to undertake effective operations in their own waters for (e.g., develop a capable coast guard); all countries have this responsibility and obligation
- A number of countries also have sufficient capabilities to contribute to collective efforts, including:
  - India
  - Pakistan
  - South Africa
  - Australia
- Some States willingly undertake command roles in multilateral entities whereas others do it independently or bilaterally
- All should play a willing, positive and contributory role towards maritime security initiatives – individually and/or collectively There are important distinctions to be made between multilateral or regional ‘military’ cooperation and ‘law enforcement’ activities; law enforcement also involves complex, national, multi-agency cooperation and coordination issues
- All States should play leadership roles where possible
- What role do (should) external states and entities play in Indian Ocean maritime security?
- Assist in capacity building (e.g. training, MDA, developing common information sharing arrangements)
- Extra-regional states should be sensitive to concerns of regional states and encourage the enhancement of regional leadership roles in maritime security, including capability building in less well-endowed States
• Providing for the ‘common good’ (e.g., environment protection, anti-piracy, counter terrorism, counter narcotics, counter proliferation, SAR, disaster relief)

• In the event of a breakdown/development of a trouble spot, States could come together under an agreed umbrella for the conduct of unified operations and to achieve economy of effort – “coalitions of the willing?”

Some Solutions

• Need for whole-of-government approaches – harmonised and integrated activities by a range of agencies that have responsibilities and capacities to act

• Phased approach to building bridges amongst states – it is easier to pick non-controversial cooperative activities and issues and use them as building blocks

• Both top down and bottom up approaches are possible

• Use existing structures such as IONS to build a consensus for developing a workable forum

• Four-pronged existing organisational approach at regional and sub-regional levels – pick issues where both strengths and capabilities exist:
  o Navy
  o Coast guard/maritime law enforcement agencies
  o Ports and shipping
  o Marine science

• The idea of a supra organisation is probably not going to occur quickly, however, it could evolve over time.

Related Comments

Task forces organisations that have been operating in the NWIO could provide a basis for future cooperation. Perhaps they could be built upon. Regional states need to take the opportunity to exercise leadership of these often multi-national entities. Frameworks that have already been used could be employed elsewhere. For example, the development of common doctrine could be helpful in the future. However, current task forces are often comprised of mainly extra-regional nations. It needs to be recognized that these problems are not just naval issues and that all issues need to be better understood and managed more widely.

Question #3 Develop proposals and options for managing Indian Ocean maritime security. What outcomes should be sought? Who are the key players? Who will benefit; who will pay? What are the barriers to effective maritime security cooperation and how might they be overcome?

What outcomes should be sought?

The overall aim is to have a stable maritime regime in the region by having:

• Common/proper/effective implementation of UNLOSC provisions – vital but there are still states who are not party to the Convention (i.e., the U.S.)

• Respect for sovereignty and sovereign rights

• Cooperation and unity of purpose among players, which does not happen as often as it should

• Cooperative models for maritime enforcement
• Identification and cooperation against common threats
• Harmonisation of relevant legal frameworks
• Sustainable and precautionary approach

The outcomes that should be sought include:

• Transparency and due regard for national/regional sensitivities
• Cost sharing with due regard to what states can get out of it (i.e. The Malacca Strait)
• Capacity-building (strengthening weak states as a long term goal)
• Balance of interests between IONS and non-IONS states
• Enhanced role of intra-regional players – how can this be achieved?
• Strategic supremacy of regional players
• Engagement association of extra-regional players having maritime interests in the region
  (Some policies of extra-regional players could be seen as adversely affecting the region.)

**Specific and operational recommendations:**

• Consider IONS framework
• Ensure safety of SLOCs
• Control IUU fishing
• Control transnational crime
• Ensure energy supplies
• Develop an environmental protection regime
• Establish a common framework of search and rescue regimes
• Devise mechanisms to coordinate regional command, control and communications (C3) efforts
• Increase intelligence sharing concerning piracy, smuggling, etc.
  o What does this really mean?
  o What intelligence will be shared?
  o How much transparency will be possible?
• Share costs on commonly agreed projects, goals
• Improve information sharing (e.g., a freely accessible common regional database on maritime assets, maritime crimes, etc.)

Who are the **key players**?

**Key Players:**

• Regional governments and their maritime agencies
  o Coastal states
• Extra-regional governments which have maritime interests in the region
  o Major maritime powers, major exporter and importer states, user states
Secondary Players:
- Regional and other supra-national agencies (e.g., IMO, UNEP, FAO)
- Non-governmental organisations (e.g., Greenpeace, CI, WWF, TNC)
- Industry and other stakeholders (e.g., IMB)

Who will benefit? The Indian Ocean region and other user states

Who should pay?
This remains a problematic issue that currently has no easy answers. The maintenance of national sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction, as a principle, is a national responsibility. Stability of maritime regime in the high seas, however, is a common responsibility of the adjacent coastal state and user states. On the basis of this principle a cost-sharing regime should be established through any relevant regional and extra-regional forum. Alternatively, a system of voluntary contribution based on use and capacity should be developed. An example of such a system is the Coral Triangle Initiative, which has commitments of U.S.$250 million.

Barriers to effective maritime security cooperation
- The colonial history of the region leads to suspicions in regard to state-on-state defence mechanisms
- “Sea-blindness”–the general lack of awareness of the importance of the oceans and maritime issues which occurs in many states
- Strained bilateral relations and sovereignty and sovereign rights disputes in some countries of the region
- Reservations of regional powers over the role of extra-regional players in the IOR
- Differing state perceptions about common goals / threats / needs
- National, third party and legal limitations on information sharing
- Non-cooperating states
- Existence of weak/failed states
- Poverty in many of the states of the region that leads to a lack of capacity, which, in turn, leads to lack of inter-operability and an inward focus of security
- Sensitivity and obsession of states over sovereignty and sovereign rights

Proposals and options for managing Indian Ocean maritime security
- Build on existing cooperative measures
- Establish a regional Track II forum (informal in the first instance with a view to the establishment of a Track I multilateral forum)
- Look for models / lessons learned in the following areas:
  - Maritime security
  - Fisheries and resource management and protection
  - Transnational crime
- Look for lessons learned in other regions/regional organizations including:
o South Pacific, South China Sea, Bay of Bengal, Mediterranean, Arafura-Timor Sea (Australia-East Timor, Australia-Papua New Guinea, Australia-Indonesia)
o Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
o Bilateral agreements (India-Sri Lanka)
o Multilateral security arrangements (FPDA)

- Engage extra-regional players for their voluntary support

**Related Comments**

With regard to “sea blindness,” there was a view expressed that nations were currently showing a greater interest in matters to do with the seas than in the past. Another view, however, held that maritime awareness remains a problem in many countries – a concept that has been studied by CSCAP.

**Questions #4** How can the future maritime security interests of all IO rim states be best protected and promoted? What are the recommended options for enhancing maritime security cooperation for the Indian Ocean region into the future? How might these options be progressed? Who would need to be involved?

**Major Issues**

- Interests
- Options
- Methods
- Participants – this remains the most problematic issue and difficult to resolve.

**Maritime Security Interests** Assumption: there are many common interests, which fall broadly under the following headings:

- Oceans Governance
  - All of the non-traditional security issues
  - Long-term policy making as well as operational matters
- SLOC Security
  - A catch-all for traditional maritime security matters

**Options – Building up National Capacity**

- Prerequisite: An integrated national approach to maritime security involving all agencies and authorities with relevant responsibilities
- Problem: There is a lack of coherence in the current approach used in many, if not most, IOR countries. Many agencies do not communicate effectively, which is a problem not limited to the IOR.
- Potential solution: Can be provided by a single authority or a properly integrated organization, for example:
  - Kenya is taking some steps in this direction
  - Australian has had useful experience with its Border Protection Command. However, Australia lost its early focus on having a National Oceans Policy in which maritime security was one element.
Other Options – Multilateral Approach

- **Sub-Regional** based on geographic boundaries, or issues
  - The role of External Powers is a question – capacity building? operational?
  - Examples with potential to be emulated include:
    - SADC with 13 African nations is the only standing organisation in the region that has a maritime security element to it – the Standing Maritime Committee, which is involved in
      - Training
      - Hydrography
      - Task Allocation – who can do what
      - Equality of Membership
    - CTF 151 and CTF 150
      - Primarily external powers
      - USN-led which can possibly be a problem

- **Alternative Leadership Approaches**
  - UN? Is this a peacekeeping function?
  - An IOR nation?
    - To what extent does any one IOR state have the required capacity?
    - Who should do it? Who would provide a mandate?

- **Regionally Based**
  - Coordination is easier if organization was issues-focused such as for the IO Tsunami Warning System
  - Establishment of common norms (e.g., Rules for Hot Pursuit) could help
  - Potential for IONS to generate cohesion
    - The WPNS example – What has it achieved over the past 20 years?
    - The CUES (Code for Un-alerted Encounters at Sea) arrangement was a good outcome – but is it really used?

- **Bilateral** – May need to manage bilateral issues before multilateral arrangements are pursued

**Methods – a critical issue but also a very sensitive one**

- First must identify common interests to generate cooperation – often based on, or generated by, an incident, common threat, or crisis
- Useful Regional examples:
  - Malacca Strait States response to piracy
  - Establishment of Djibouti Anti-Piracy Code, 29 Jan 2009
    - Nine countries plus IMO
    - Plan for anti-piracy centre
    - But how much capacity was really available?
• Encourage information sharing
  o Some common interests may assist in this
  o Transnational crime could be a useful catalyst
  o Works elsewhere – but there are limits
    ▪ Example: Operation *Atalanta* (EU) and CTF 151

• Capacity Building – in the broad sense would involve
  o Training
  o Sharing capabilities
  o Sustainment
  o Contributing to operational capabilities, for example:
    ▪ U.S. assistance to Kenya involved providing patrol boats and security for the Port of Mombasa
    ▪ South Pacific Patrol Boat Project run by Australia for SW Pacific states

• Development of Legal Frameworks
  o Uses regulatory norms
  o Provides common approaches to issues such as fisheries and environmental laws, such as in the SW Pacific example

**Participants**

• The Littorals should drive most of the cooperative activity
• External Powers have a right to be involved – but which ones?
  o Those with territories in the region?
  o Those with commercial or other interests?
• Should participation be limited to:
  o The UN P5 – the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council?
  o Japan and China?
  o Groupings based on IMO, UNEP, FAO or some other organisation?
  o Who decides?

**Related Comments**

• The CTF 150/151 model is not the cooperative model to follow. Whatever is arranged should be led by IOR states. On the issue of external powers, there are no historic, economic, or security reasons why the external powers should be excluded from involvement. The issue is *how* should they be included and to what extent.
• For capacity building to be effective it is important to take comprehensive training to the regional states and provide it to the forces there.
Question #5 How should Indian Ocean littoral states’ navies, coastguards and other enforcement capabilities be developed? What roles should they be designed to perform and what opportunities might exist for regional collaboration?

Assumptions

Navies belong to sovereign nations. The fundamental security interests of those nations will drive how they allocate their resources and what their navies will do.

- Regional States should perform national maritime security roles.
  - Not all regional States are capable and/or willing to undertake these responsibilities.
- Regional States should collaborate for regional maritime security issues:
  - Not all regional States will agree on all issues (We told you so yesterday!)
  - There will be bilateral agreements between IO States where mutual interests coincide.
  - There will be bilateral agreements between IO and extra-IO States where mutual interests coincide.
- Major issue: Does the IO belong just to the IO states or is it part of the wider global community?
  - Non-IO States will respond to threats to their own national security interests.
  - Example, the U.S. Navy will retain ships in region, particularly in the north western IO indefinitely, and its presence will have an impact.
  - Other States will keep ships in the western IO on an as-need basis.
  - Many IO States are not concerned with SLOC security, so what happens when the piracy issue is fixed and the external powers reduce their involvement?

What roles should maritime forces in the region be designed to perform?

- For protecting direct national interests such as:
  - Sovereignty
  - Resources
  - Trade
  - Environment
  - SAR
- Having the capabilities to work collaboratively with other like minded countries

How should Indian Ocean littoral states navies, coastguards and other enforcement capabilities be developed?

- They should have interoperability as a primary consideration
- However, they will primarily be developed in accordance with national interests
- Should have advanced surveillance systems for those who can afford it

What opportunities might exist for regional collaboration?

- Where mutual interests coincide – bilaterally or multilaterally
- Joint maritime exercises ranging from low to high complexity
- Protocols for interoperability can be developed and could then drive common understanding

Related Comment

In the end the capacity of individual regional nations to provide for maritime security is all about money and people and national interests
Final Plenary Discussion–Comments and Issues

The following is a summary of remarks made during the final, open forum plenary session of the IOMSS.

**Indian Ocean Regionalism versus Globalism** A key issue that rose repeatedly during the symposium revolved around a classic dilemma of regionalism versus globalism in the IOR. Many of the IO nation-states lack the capacity for managing and protecting their maritime zones and discharging their responsibilities under UNCLOS. There are also strong individual and collective interests among IO littoral states with respect to maritime security within the region. Many external powers also have significant individual and collective interests in the IO region including freedom of navigation and trade flow as well as collective interests in and concerns about issues like regional and global environmental health.

Representatives of some IO states at the symposium expressed the view that the responsibility for IO maritime security should rest primarily with the IO states. While they want IO regional states to operate and manage maritime security in the IO, many IO states lack the capacity and resources to effectively carry out these missions. Representatives from some of the external powers stated that they also have interests in the IO, that they have the capacity and capabilities to assist in providing for maritime security, and that they have legitimate interests that need to be protected. To summarize, the external powers need to be involved and have the capacity to be involved. The seeds for maritime security cooperation and collaboration may lie in dealing with this dilemma.

A related issue involves common interests in non-military-type concerns such as the environment and resource management. These types of concerns may offer greater scope, at least initially, for states to cooperate and work collectively than would some of the more contentious national security matters, which will be much harder to solve. The “coalitions of the willing” (like CTF 150/151, etc.) currently are ad hoc and almost always convened to deal with crises like piracy or the humanitarian results of a tsunami. Longer term common interests like those related to environment protection and sea level rise, which have the potential to ultimately present even deeper crises unless effectively managed, are not being addressed. These issues will require the long-term collective commitment of regional and extra-regional players, yet the mechanisms to take effective actions are currently lacking.

**Related Comments:**

- There are common interests that require common actions and solutions. All the states that have interests (both internal to the IO and external) should be involved, but ideally, the IO littoral states should take the lead. It is hard to attack the whole problem of the IO since consensus will be difficult. Such issues would be better dealt sub-regionally and by specific topic (e.g., fisheries protection, piracy, etc.). One successful example is the MALSINDO cooperative approach used to counter piracy in the Malacca Strait.

- IONS has been suggested as a potential solution for improving maritime security cooperation in the IO. There have also been calls for the extra-regional powers to assist with regional maritime security and capacity building. Yet many of the extra-regional powers are not included in IONS. Basically, this suggests that IO regional states will define their security concerns and then seek assets and capacity building support from the extra-regional powers. However, those powers will not have a seat at the IONS table. Such an expectation may be
unreasonable and unrealistic. Besides the political issues there may also be misplaced regional concerns about re-colonisation.

- A future symposium of the IOMSS kind may be more fruitful by approaching IO sub-regional and specific issues. Also, it would be highly desirable to have participants from more of the external powers, (e.g., China and Japan) involved in the discussions.

- A number of attempts in recent years in Australia, India, and Pakistan to generate common approaches to dealing with maritime security have not met great success. Are common interests, in fact, lacking and, therefore, the impetus to move forward is just not there?

- The IO is quite different from the Atlantic For example, The idea of a standing naval force in Asia-Pacific region like the one in the Atlantic has been suggested in the past but without real progress. The IOR lacks homogeneity, and countries there are more cautious about multi-lateral activities. Exercise Kakadu, for example, developed from the WPNS. It started quite small and grew over time. The challenge is to find a framework that will work for the IOR. Through WPNS there have been successes over time as the levels of training and naval exercises and the range of participation has grown.

- An IO-wide activity similar to WPNS is possible if there is a continuity of committed leadership and a central core of nations and individuals who are prepared to drive it. There should be optimism rather than pessimism. At the naval level there is a good degree of common heritage and understanding. Therefore, the prospects of moving forward are perhaps more likely than in some other areas of maritime security interaction where the relationships and common understandings are not as well developed.

- Should there be a top down or bottom up approach? There are approximately 50 stakeholders in the IO plus 8-10 external powers. Consensus among them can be extremely difficult to achieve. It may be more fruitful to take a bottom up approach from a sub or sub-sub regional level, identify common issues, and encourage that they be solved first. Solutions could involve the provision of external support when it is asked for. Over time this approach could build confidence and encourage the regional states to stand on their own two feet. This would encourage, in due course, cooperation for dealing with bigger problems as well as fears, founded or unfounded, involving the external powers.

- IONS is a naval chiefs’ forum and useful for exchanges of informal views. However, when there is a substantive issue to be considered, the chiefs will be restricted by the policies of their governments and their involvement may be greatly reduced. Pakistan has tried something similar with 14 nations involved in an exercise of peace, harmony and friendship without any issues on the table. This type of activity and engagement in the region will build trust and promote transparency.

- The U.S. concept of a global maritime partnership recognised that problems at sea are global, and that no one nation can deal with them alone. Regional and sub-regional organisations should be the building blocks for such a partnership. Global issues in the IO will attract extra-regional involvement because so many have interests at stake there.

- Both regional overarching umbrella arrangements plus sub-regional arrangements are needed. While extra regional powers involvement is a fact of life, those powers should be promoting regional leadership and fostering the development of regional capacity.

- The need for cooperation extends far beyond just navies and must involve other areas of government and agencies with involvement in maritime security.
The question about IO cooperative arrangements is ultimately a political question rather than a technical question. In IO fisheries, for example, one of the major states involved in fishing activity, Taiwan, is not involved in any of the fisheries arrangements.

An association of extra-regional powers involved in IO regional security has to be accepted because the regional powers cannot succeed without them. The question is: What are the criteria upon which the involvement of the external powers will be decided? It is important that such criteria be laid down so that external capabilities and resources can be accessed. Likely areas for such involvement include dealing with disaster relief and dealing with choke point security problems.

IONS is a brave attempt at a large scale IO cooperative naval dialogue. There was wide consensus about the need for IONS among many of the littoral navies that were initially approached. While IONS included only navies, there was recognition of the need to eventually involve other agencies and also of the need to start somewhere. The initial draft IONS charter was a recommendation for consideration. The decision was taken initially to restrict it to the IO states navies, and then let them consider the draft charter and decide who else they might wish to invite to be involved. At the inaugural meeting it was decided that IO states would have membership in the forum and that the external powers with common interests in the region would participate in IONS, as is the case for WPNS.

IONS is a broad framework and it is expected that it will eventually also have sub-regional and local sub-arrangements. One of the Gulf States has agreed to be the chair of the next IONS meeting.

African countries have a large stake in the IO and have many maritime security problems. It is important that African states have a bigger involvement in maritime security considerations although it can be difficult to bring them to the table.

There may not be a single IO concept of maritime security but several sub-regional concerns. The nature of security is quite different in various parts of the IO. Is it really possible to have one body to cover all these diverse interests? Because of the diversity, it would be very difficult to have one body that could really address all the issues. Some countries are very sensitive in the post-colonisation era to external powers involvement. It has been suggested that perhaps African countries should form a naval task force like MALSINDO, but they do not have the capacity and the geography is vastly different. Therefore, to really address IO maritime security the countries who have the capacity and the interests (including the external powers) must be involved.

No contradiction exists between having a region-wide maritime security body and sub-regional groupings, with perhaps the sub-regions having a more operational focus.

One of the objectives of IONS was to encourage capacity building. Each sub-region has unique challenges, however, the capabilities to deal with all the challenges can be common. The East African naval chiefs were present for the initial IONS meeting, and the intention was to help them develop capacity.

Many perspectives have been presented during the course of the symposium. There has been wide agreement on what the regional security challenges are. There has also been consensus on the need for a region-wide forum to discuss the security challenges, with external involvement. The key question is on what basis should such a forum be built? It has been suggested that perhaps India could take a leading role. Alternatively, the three corners of the
IO – Australia, India and South Africa -- could form the core of a forum and build from there. Recognition of common security interests is certainly a necessary element. Energy security, the flows of energy via maritime trade from the IO could form the basis of that necessary common interest that engages both IO states and the external powers. The major stakeholders form around 23 states that have interests in securing energy flows.

- The acronym FIOMC is problematic – perhaps FIONAC might work better.

**Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and Fisheries** The world fish catch has continued to decline since 1987, and this decline is unlikely to change. A significant proportion of IO countries rely on near-shore fisheries for their protein needs, and thus, there are national issues having to do with fish stocks management. Most of the international fisheries concerns that are heard so much about involve the rich countries catching fish like tuna. Progressively, local fisheries are being dispossessed by external fishers to meet wealthy international markets.

There is a need to look beyond immediate security issues and look to the medium- to longer-term for what will become more pressing resource and environmental management issues. A range of conflicting views are being expressed. For example, some environmentalists are seeking to close off to fishing up to 30% of the seabeds and no-take areas, while fisheries’ interests assert that there is no role for MPAs in fisheries management. No single fishery in the world is demonstrably sustainable into the medium term. Wilful manipulation of UNCLOS EEZs has plundered fish stocks, with underdeveloped nations unwittingly complicit in some cases while receiving minimal compensation. Such fishing issues are, therefore, national food security issues as well as major regional and international concerns.

MPAs are meant to cover a range of management situations including areas for the sustainable management of living resources with a smaller number of zones set aside for scientific research or tourism purposes. The concept is to set up umbrella arrangements for long term resource and environment management. A whole series of regulations is evolving to create many new maritime security concerns that will need to be managed in the future.

**Climate Change and Sea Level Rise** The issue of climate change was little under discussed at the symposium. Several speakers referred to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) average prediction of a 59 cm sea level rise by the end of the century. The IPCC methodology was criticised by some as being very conservative because it does not factor in the melting of the major land-based icecaps. The Greenland icecap alone has potentially 5-6 metres of sea level rise in it. Such a sea rise will not happen immediately, however, some credible scientists are predicting more than a metre rise in the much shorter term – perhaps only a couple of decades. On the other hand, other views were expressed that indicated that the IPCC predictions are based on nothing more than computer models that have not been validated and sea level rise is overblown. If appreciable sea level rise does occur, portions of the IOR are potentially facing a catastrophic situation.

**Industry Stakeholders in maritime security** There is a need for these forums to understand the needs of and solicit the participation of industry, which includes maritime commerce, shipping, offshore oil and gas, and fishing interests. Ways of engaging industry in the discussion processes must be found they are major stakeholders in the outcomes.

**Beyond IONS – other maritime law enforcement agencies** Coastguards and maritime law enforcement agencies in the IO need to be involved in regional consultations on maritime security. A parallel group to IONS needs to address wider maritime security capacity building.
Perhaps a major working group could bring together regional and extra-regional countries to consider capacity building and also policy development.

**The Key Challenge for the Future**

- Determine how the IO community along with the extra-regional states and entities that have maritime interests in the IO can move forward to improve maritime security cooperation in to the future
- As a focus for future work, identify the options available for moving issues from Track II to Track I consideration

**Indian Ocean International Organisations** A suggestion was offered that it would be helpful to develop a comprehensive list of IO related international organisations. Many acronyms were mentioned by various participants’ in the IOMSS. (See Annex B for an initial effort.)
Annex A

Indian Ocean Maritime Security Symposium Participants

The following is a list of those who participated in all or part of the Indian Ocean Maritime Security Symposium.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, RAN(Retd)</td>
<td>Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Admiral David Shackleton, RAN(Retd)</td>
<td>Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Vice Admiral Rob Walls, RAN (Retd)</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral Brian Adams, RAN(Retd)</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral Allan Du Toit, RAN</td>
<td>Commander, Border Protection Command</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral James Goldrick, RAN</td>
<td>Commandant, Australian Defence Colleges; Commander Joint Education, Training &amp; Warfare, Australian Defence Force</td>
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Annex B

Indian Ocean Related International Organisations

The following is a list of international organisations that may have some relevance to Indian Ocean maritime security. The United Nations and many of its various sub-organisations (i.e. IMO, FAO, UNEP, UNSC) also clearly have roles to play. Only multi-lateral organisations have been listed here; there are also many bilateral arrangements. The list has been compiled from web-based sources. The completeness and accuracy of the information in this list cannot be guaranteed. Track I and Track II organisations are listed4.

The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)

The Association will facilitate and promote economic cooperation, bringing together representatives of government, business and academia. In a spirit of multilateralism, the Association seeks to build and expand understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensus-based, evolutionary and non-intrusive approach.

Members are Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The Seychelles announced its withdrawal from the Association in July 2003.

China, Egypt, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom are dialogue partners of the IOR-ARC. At present, only the Indian Ocean Tourism Organisation (IOTO) has observer status. http://www.iornet.com/iorarc/charter.htm

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

The objectives of SAARC are:

a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life;
b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials;
c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia;
d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems;
e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;

4 Track I diplomacy refers to official governmental diplomacy, or a technique of state action, which is a process whereby communications from one government go directly to the decision-making apparatus of another. Track I diplomacy is conducted by official representatives of a state or state-like authority and involves interaction with other state or state-like authorities: heads of state, state department or ministry of foreign affairs officials, and other governmental departments and ministries. Track II diplomacy is a specific kind of informal diplomacy, in which non-officials (academics, retired civil and military officials, public figures, and social activists) engage in dialogue. The informal nature of Track II diplomacy allows serious, sensitive and potentially dangerous issues to be discussed in an open, non-official forum.
g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common
interests; and

h) to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

Members: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan

Observers: China, Japan, European Union, Republic of Korea, United States of America, and
Iran

http://www.saarc-sec.org/

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The ASEAN Declaration states that the aims and purposes of the Association are: (1) to
accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and (2) to
promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the
relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations
Charter.

The member states are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

ASEAN candidate state: Timor-Leste.

ASEAN observer state: Papua New Guinea.

ASEAN Plus Three: ASEAN plus China, South Korea and Japan.

East Asia Summit: ASEAN Plus Three and Australia, India and New Zealand.

http://www.aseansec.org/

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The objectives of the ASEAN Regional Forum are:

1. to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of
common interest and concern; and

2. to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

The current participants in the ARF are: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of
Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste,
United States, Vietnam

http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/

Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)

FPDA is a series of defence relationships established by bilateral agreements between the United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore signed in 1971, whereby the five
states will consult each other in the event of external aggression or threat of attack against
Malaysia or Singapore. FPDA provides for defence co-operation and for an Integrated Air
Defence System (IADS) for Malaysia and Singapore. FPDA conducts regular combined air and naval exercises.

No specialist website was found.

**African Union (AU)**

Formerly known as the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the African Union was established with a view, inter alia, to accelerating the process of integration in the continent to enable it play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded as they are by certain negative aspects of globalisation.

The main objectives of the OAU were, inter alia, to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.


**Southern African Development Community (SADC)**

The members largely aim to coordinate their foreign policies, and aim to harmonize their trade and economic policies with a view to one day establishing a common market with common regulatory institutions.

Member states: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Seychelles.

[http://www.sadc.int/](http://www.sadc.int/)

**Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)** – also known as the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

The stated objectives are:

- formulating similar regulations in various fields such as economy, finance, trade, customs, tourism, legislation, and administration;
- fostering scientific and technical progress in industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal resources;
- establishing scientific research centers;
- setting up joint ventures;
• encouraging cooperation of the private sector;
• strengthening ties between their peoples; and
• establishing a common currency by 2010.

The member states are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php

The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)

Objectives are to promote sustainable development of its members that share similar geographical position, history and culture through:

• diplomatic cooperation;
• economic and commercial cooperation;
• cooperation in the field of agriculture, maritime fishing, and the conservation of resources and ecosystems;
• cooperation in cultural, scientific, technical, educational and judicial fields.

Members: Comoros, France (for Reunion Islands), Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. The Maldives is an observer.

http://www.coi-ioc.org/ (note: the website is in French)

Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)

The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) aims to increase naval cooperation in the Western Pacific among Navies by providing a forum for discussion of maritime issues, both global and regional, and in the process, generate a flow of information and opinion between naval professionals leading to common understanding and possibly agreement.

Members: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States, and Vietnam. Observers: Bangladesh, Canada, Chile and India.


Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

IONS provides a regional forum through which the 'Chiefs-of-Navy' of all the littoral states of the IOR can periodically meet to constructively engage one another through the creation and promotion of regionally relevant mechanisms, events, and activities. (Within the context of IONS, the term 'Chief-of-Navy' is used in a generic sense. Consequently, for such countries as do not possess a formally established 'navy', the term is applicable to the 'head of the principal maritime agency').

The primary aim of IONS is to sustain a regionally relevant, consultative forum within which the navies (and/or the principal maritime agencies responsible for maritime security) of the littoral States of the Indian Ocean Region, along with such other relevant maritime entities as may be agreed upon from time-to-time by the members, can discuss issues and concerns that bear upon
maritime security, with a view to arriving at agreed courses of action on trans-national issues, based upon a common understanding of the regional maritime security environment.

IONS Objectives are:

1. To promote a shared understanding of issues and concerns relevant to the Indian Ocean Region, which bear upon maritime security.
2. To strengthen the capability of all nation-states of the Indian Ocean Region to address present and anticipated challenges to maritime security and stability.
3. To establish and promote a variety of trans-national, maritime, consultative and cooperative mechanisms, designed to address and mitigate maritime security-concerns of the Indian Ocean Region.
4. To develop interoperability in terms of doctrines, strategies, procedures, organisational and logistic systems, and, operational processes, so as to promote the provision of speedy, responsive, and effective Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster-Relief (HADR) throughout the Indian Ocean Region.

The Indian Navy hosted IONS website does not currently list IONS members and/or observers. According to the website http://www.indiannavy.gov.in/ions_iors.htm 33 countries from Africa to Australia form the littoral States of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Media reports indicated that delegates from the following countries attended the inaugural IONS meeting in February 2008: India, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Eritrea, Brazil, Seychelles, Kuwait, Qatar, Mauritius, Malagasy, Myanmar, Oman, Sri Lanka, the UAE, Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt, Mozambique, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Malaysia, Maldives, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand and France.

http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/ion.htm

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)

CSCAP is a non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security issues in the Asia Pacific. CSCAP provides an informal mechanism for scholars, officials and others in their private capacities to discuss political and security issues and challenges facing the region. It also provides policy recommendations to various inter-governmental bodies, convenes regional and international meetings and establishes linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation. CSCAP is organised for the purpose of providing a structured process for regional confidence building and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia Pacific region. The functions of CSCAP are as follows:

(a) to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private capacities;

(b) to encourage the participants of such individuals from countries and territories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;

(c) to organise various working groups to address security issues and challenges facing the region;

(d) to provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies on political-security issues;
(e) to convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;

(f) to establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation; and

(g) to produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes of the organisation.

CSCAP membership includes almost all the major countries in the Asia Pacific. It has 21 full members of the Council: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Europe, India, Indonesia, Japan, DPR Korea, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, United States of America and Vietnam and one associate member: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

http://www.cscap.org/