Abstract
Our “war on terrorism ” is a narrowly
focused effort to roust out and round up a “network ” of criminal gangs
and to punish states that harbor them. But these gangs should more
properly be identified as military subcultures. Moreover they are not only
interlinked through informal relationships with each other but also
interwoven into a much larger movement —an insurgency within Islam. This
insurgency cannot be seen simply as a “radical ” Islamist movement. It
draws heavily on Saudi Wahhabist support, but many other Islamist groups
share the greater cause. And the cause also shares wide, if passive,
support among ordinary Muslims.
The greater goals of the insurgency are
the defense of Islam under attack and its renewal after generations of
corruption. The struggle, therefore, requires support. Military
subcultures like Al Qaeda are understood to be fighters and not ultimately
leaders, so their severe agenda is not necessarily anticipated as the
practical outcome of the struggle. Furthermore, the insurgency is
supported broadly because it has full authority under Islamic law and
tradition. Indeed, the movement ’s power can only be understood within
Islam ’s mystical, all-encompassing cultural context.
The historical implications are
straightforward. If the insurgency represents a period of renewal, then it
presages political-religious revolution according to the sanctions and
expectations of Islam, especially for Arabic-speaking societies. But the
U. S. response in the form of its war on terrorism refuses to confront
this.
This report, therefore, has three parts.
The first is a deconstruction of America’s strategic language so that we
can think in terms of an insurgency within Islamic civilization instead of
groups of “terrorists ” that are culturally marginal to that civilization.
The second part analyzes the insurgency.
Here, however, analysis will not take the form of a traditional
“intelligence” snapshot: toting up militant groups, listing their
financial backers, etc. That has already been done many times. The “intel
” approach creates, , in effect, a material manifest of the insurgency.
Intelligence analysis focuses on people, tools, and patterns of activity.
It encourages us to view terrorism in isolation from its larger context.
Instead, this report will explore the cultural context of the insurgency
by showing how the ethos of terrorist subcultures relates to and works
within the larger orbit of Islamic civilization.
The third part suggests a range of U. S. responses, once we have
deconstructed our strategic language and revised our understanding of the
enemy.
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Terror's Mask: Insurgency Within Islam
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