



You probably wonder why, with my operational background, I am the head of strategy for the Navy. Before this job, I served for 18 months as the head of our strategy team for the

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*Rear Admiral David Woods earned a B.S. degree from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981 and a master's degree in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College in 1997. In 1983, he was designated a naval flight officer. His shore assignments include: research officer, Naval Surface Weapons Center; aviation enlisted rating assignment officer, Bureau of Naval Personnel; EA-6B fleet replacement training officer and flight instructor, Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 129, Vikings; EA-6B wing readiness and requirements officer, Electronic Combat Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet; and EA-6B and airborne electronic attack requirements officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Air Warfare Division. His sea duty assignments include: VAQ-131 for deployments with Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 6 and CVW 2 and VAQ-138 for two deployments with CVW 9. Woods's commander command was with VAQ-132. His bonus commander command was with VAQ-129, the Navy's EA-6B Prowler Fleet Replacement Squadron. Woods's major command was as commander of CVW 11 for two deployments with Carrier Strike Group 11 in combat support of both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He served as deputy director, Combined Air Operations Center, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. He returned in September 2008 from a combat tour in Iraq as the commander of Joint Crew Composite Squadron 1. Woods's decorations include the Legion of Merit, a Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medals (four awards), Strike/Flight Air Medals (five awards), a USAF Aerial Achievement Medal, Navy Commendation Medals (four awards), Navy Achievement Medals (two awards), the 1995 National Navy League Vice Admiral John Perry Award for excellence in electronic warfare, and various other awards.*

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*Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) with Ms. Michèle Flournoy and Ms. Amanda Dory.

The Navy's new strategy, and that of our sister services, the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, came out in October 2007. It laid out exactly where we wanted to go. It defined the ends, the strategic imperatives, and the core competencies that we think that the maritime forces should deliver to the nation. During my first year and a half on the job, I was kind of doing missionary work. I am from Utah so I understand missionary work. It was my job to explain the new strategy to the citizens of our country as well as to citizens of other nations, and to conduct kind of the litmus test of that strategy to see if we got it right.

As Ms. Dory discussed earlier, over the last 18 months, we have gone through several higher-level strategy efforts, including the QDR, as I noted in my introduction. Specifically, the QDR updated our national defense strategy. In addition, the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and the Space Strategy have all been accomplished in the last 18 months.

The Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century went through a similar process in 2007. Based on our more recent efforts, we found that we got it about right. As the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) says, the recent strategic reviews validated the Navy strategy, even though it preceded all of those efforts. As you go through the collection of strategy documents, you will see some similar words and similar themes and ideas, not only regarding the security environment that we expect to face in the future, but also regarding what the nation expects the maritime forces to deliver.

For the last 10 years, we have been focused on the current fight in the Middle East. But as the NATO operations against Libya and the international response to the recent tsunami off Japan show, once the current fight is wrapped up, maritime forces are not going to be done. Moreover, the demand signal probably is not going down; it is going to be reoriented and focused elsewhere in order to deliver some of the strategic imperatives and core competencies that we articulated in our strategy.

If you looked across the globe a couple of weeks ago, you would have seen that the Navy had some 16,000 sailors on the ground, another 10,000 at sea, and two carrier strike groups supporting U.S. and allied operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom along with related activities in Bahrain, in Yemen, and on the African continent. You would also see the counter-piracy effort that is going on off the coast of Somalia and the dedicated assets and capabilities that go into that. Beginning just several weeks ago, the Navy has committed additional forces to support the no-fly zone that is part of Operation New Dawn. A great example of the Navy's inherent flexibility is that we were able to shift some of the Navy's electronic attack aircraft from flying combat missions over Iraq to flying combat missions enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya. For the affected units flying out of Aviano, Italy, just 47 hours elapsed between their last combat mission over Iraq and their first mission over Libya.

At the same time that all of these things were going on, the Navy was also responding to the tsunami-caused disaster in Japan. Sailors and Marines from the *George Washington* Strike Group and its escorts, and from the *Essex* Amphibious Ready Group, have been involved in a variety of humanitarian relief and disaster relief operations in Japan. The *Ronald Reagan* Strike Group and nine other ships also responded to that crisis and as of today are on station delivering humanitarian relief and assistance. The command ship *Blue Ridge* and naval forces from the Seventh Fleet and the Pacific Fleet are leading the joint task force that is providing overall command and control for the operations off of Japan. At the same time, our SSBNs are at sea providing a deterrent capability as the most survivable leg of our nuclear triad. The impressive U.S. response effectively demonstrates the operationalization of the maritime strategy. The capabilities available in those forces range from deterrence to sea control and include power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Moreover, the Navy is conducting all of those missions simultaneously.

Now let us spend a few minutes examining the question: how does the Navy respond to climate change, how do we move forward into the future, and how do we operationalize that? Climate

change will directly impact several of the strategic imperatives that we articulated in our 2007 strategy, in particular, our desire to limit regional conflict. As we have already heard, climate change will invariably heighten the competition for resources in the maritime environment, especially in the Arctic as it opens up. Those resources will not only include strategic materials like petroleum and important minerals, but also trade. As a result, the Bering Strait could well become a main trade route and another strategic choke point. And any time that there is competition, there is the potential for conflict.

Obviously, prevention of such conflict is a key component of the strategy guiding the employment of our Navy and other maritime forces. Our goal is to prevent local disruptions, whether in Japan or on our own shores as in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Such issues were brought home to me last month when I was taking a course attended by a number of allied officers, one of whom was from New Zealand. During one class he was talking about climate change and sea-level rise. He pointed out that the ocean would not have to rise very much before several of New Zealand's Pacific Island neighbors would be under water. The potential need to evacuate the entire population of an island state brings home the importance of climate change, especially in the maritime environment. So, it will be important that the Navy foster and sustain the essential cooperative relationships with our sister services and those of our allies.

We are doing that with Japan today. It is humbling to see the world's third largest economy brought to its knees in one fell swoop; it reminds one of the collapses of ancient civilizations, how they could perish so quickly. That level of disaster obviously is devastating. And, it shows the importance of the Navy being able to contribute to homeland and defense in depth—being able to take our mission-tailored forces and globally distribute them as required are important mission capabilities.

As we think about adapting the Navy's strategy and operations to climate challenges, it is clear that there is a need to apply the deliberate-planning process that the DoD and the Navy employ on a regular basis to the issues associated with climate change. You

will hear more tomorrow from Rear Admiral David Titley about the CNO's commitment to use Task Force Climate Change to kick start that planning process for Climate Change. And later today, you will see how we are doing the same thing on the energy side when Rear Admiral Philip Cullom talks about Task Force Energy.

We are taking deliberate planning steps to address not only climate change, but how we are going to operate in the Arctic. We have a capability based assessment underway to define what the infrastructure requirements are, not only for our shore-based facilities but for our operating forces. We have a 30-year ship-building plan that is looking at the next generation of surface ships and submarines. With the 50-year-old *Enterprise* out on deployment now, we are reminded that the follow-on to our *Ohio*-class ballistic missile submarines, the SSBNX, will be on deployment in the year 2080. Thus, given the lifetimes of our capital assets, it is clear that the Navy has to think about what the operating environment is going to be like far into the future.

So what is required to operate in the Arctic? What kind of hardening, what kind of propulsion, and what kind of systems will we need there? Moreover, we need to be concerned not only with our ships and our people, but also with the infrastructure that supports them by providing navigation, search and rescue, communications, and all of the other pieces that come into play.

So, that is where the Navy is headed. We realize that as we come out of the current fight, the demand signal is going to change for us. As we have seen from some of our recent activities, the demand for offshore options is likely to be an increasing one.

The climate is changing, and those changes will both increase the demands on our naval forces and impose challenges on employing them. As the Arctic opens and that region takes on increasing strategic importance for us, the demand signals will change. If we do not get out ahead of those changes with efforts like those being led by Rear Admiral Titley and by Rear Admiral Cullom, then the assets that we are buying today in anticipation of future operations will not be equipped to handle the extremes that we may be facing.