

UNRESTRICTED WARFARE SYMPOSIUM
2006

PROCEEDINGS ON STRATEGY,
ANALYSIS, AND TECHNOLOGY

14-15 MARCH 2006

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
RONALD R. LUMAN, EXECUTIVE EDITOR

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FOREWORD

**WELCOME AND
PERSPECTIVE ON
UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE**



FOREWORD – WELCOME AND PERSPECTIVE ON UNRESTRICTED WARFARE

Ronald R. Luman

It is my pleasure and privilege to welcome you to the first Unrestricted Warfare Symposium. I commend you for taking two days out of your busy schedules to address this topic in a collaborative fashion. I want to take just a few minutes to explain why I think we need to address “unrestricted warfare,” why we need to do it now, and the unique approach we are taking with this particular symposium.

A symposium is by definition, a meeting or gathering at which ideas are freely exchanged. Our format is designed to encourage such a free exchange and more than that, the *synthesis* of ideas. This particular symposium brings together some of our nation’s premier thought leaders to forge the intellectual foundation for success in fighting The Long War. By being here today, you are part of the formation of a new, integrated community of strategists, analysts, and technologists to address the critical challenge posed by practitioners of unrestricted warfare to our national security.

WHAT IS “UNRESTRICTED WARFARE”?

It is a term most recently brought to the fore by the book of the same title by Liang and Xiangsui¹. We observe it being practiced by both state and non-state actors, seeking to gain advantage over stronger opponents. To compensate for their weaker military

1 Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Panama City, Panama, 2002.

Dr. Ronald Luman is Head of the National Security Analysis Department at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Dr. Luman has a broad base of technical experience in applying systems engineering principles to ballistic missile accuracy, unmanned undersea vehicles, counter mine warfare, national missile defense, and intelligence systems.

forces, these actors will employ a multitude of means, both military and nonmilitary, to strike out during times of conflict. The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules; no measure is forbidden. It involves multidimensional, asymmetric attacks on almost every aspect of the adversary's social, economic, and political life. Unrestricted warfare employs surprise and deception and uses both civilian technology and military weapons to break the opponent's will. Liang and Xiangsui advocate the unrestricted employment of measures, but focused and restricted to the accomplishment of limited, tailored objectives—a disciplined approach. Among the many means cited in their description of unrestricted warfare are integrated attacks exploiting diverse areas of vulnerability:

- Cultural warfare by influencing or controlling cultural viewpoints within the adversary nation
- Financial warfare by subverting the adversary's banking system and stock market
- Media warfare by manipulating foreign news media
- Network warfare by dominating or subverting transnational information systems
- Psychological warfare by dominating the adversary nation's perception of its capabilities
- Resource warfare by controlling access to scarce natural resources or manipulating their market value
- Smuggling warfare by flooding an adversary's markets with illegal goods
- Terrorism

Skilled adversaries engaged in unrestricted warfare are unlike conventional nation-state military entities. Their canonical fighting units are: small, not big; cell-structured, not hierarchical military forces integrated within society, not apart; and globally operating, not regional. It is this last feature of global reach that makes this threat new and more potent than ever before.

Technology has enabled the few to impact the many. Unrestricted warfare is the next generation of conflict that is at the core of what is being called The Long War.

WHY DO AMERICANS REACT SO STRONGLY TO THE NOTION OF “UNRESTRICTED WARFARE”?

Perhaps because it runs so counter to our concept of fair play in conflict, even deadly conflict. Our national outrage on 9/11 was based in part on al Qaeda’s egregious violation of fair play in warfare by attacking innocent civilians en masse—our civilians.

“Technology has enabled the few to impact the many. Unrestricted warfare is the next generation of conflict that is at the core of what is being called The Long War.”

The American sense of fair play has come up against unrestricted warfare before. In World War I, for example, Alfred von Tirpitz, the German Grand Admiral, urged a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare against the British in the Battle of the Atlantic. In the first six months of 1915, German U-boats sank almost 750,000 tons of British shipping (about 300 ships). This continued off and on for the next two years until it was vigorously and publicly renewed in February 1917, emphasized by Kaiser Wilhelm II’s words to U-boat commanders as he issued new orders: “We will frighten the British flag off the face of the waters and starve the British people until they, who have refused peace, will kneel and plead for it.”² The order was that all allied or neutral ships were to be sunk on sight. In one month, almost a million tons were sunk—nearly 400 ships!

It was the unrestricted nature of the German U-boat attacks that was the tipping point for the American declaration of war against Germany. President Woodrow Wilson:

“The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been

2 <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWunrestricted.htm>

ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium... have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage that law been built up, always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded . . .

“The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of; but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind.”³

We face a similar challenge today, as we observe suicide bombings, beheadings, vehicle checkpoint murders, roadside IEDs, and of course the terrorism of 9/11, Madrid, and London.

WHY IS THE ADOPTION OF VARIOUS FORMS OF UNRESTRICTED WARFARE AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE FOR OUR ADVERSARIES?

Because it offers an immediate and powerful linkage between the tactical and strategic levels of warfare. Let me illustrate by reading you a portion of an article that appeared in *The Baltimore Sun* on October 27th:

HADERA, ISRAEL - *A Palestinian suicide bomber detonated explosives yesterday at an outdoor market in this central Israeli town, killing at least five people and wounding more than two dozen, Israeli police said.*

3 <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWunrestricted.htm>

The Palestinian faction Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility and called the bombing retaliation for the killing Sunday of Luay Saadi, an Islamic Jihad leader who was shot in Tulkarm, a West Bank town about 10 miles southeast of here.

Israeli officials, however, expressed doubt that a retaliatory attack could have been mounted so swiftly. Typically, suicide bombings involve a complex interplay of explosives procurers, recruiters, handlers and guides, requiring weeks of planning.

The Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, condemned the bombing, saying in a statement that it “harms the Palestinian interests and could widen the cycle of violence, chaos, extremism and bloodshed.” A few hours before the explosion, he had scolded militant groups for repeatedly violating a truce.

But Israel said the Palestinian leadership bore responsibility because it has refused to use its security forces to break up the factions...

Islamic Jihad has been trying to distinguish itself from Hamas, its main political rival, which since the cease-fire agreement has refrained from suicide attacks in Israel. Leading Islamic Jihad members say their group keeps carrying out attacks because it wants to sharpen its image as less willing to compromise than Hamas, which is increasingly transforming itself into a political party.⁴

A prescient story, in view of the election of Hamas to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority just three months later. From a strategic analysis point of view, it describes an event involving two non-nation state entities and one nation-state—an event that would be considered as little more than an incident in a conventional war context. But they are engaged in an unconventional conflict of an asymmetric, unrestricted nature, in which a tactical event (only six dead) has immediate implications

⁴ L. King and V. Bekker, “Palestinian Kills Self, at Least Five Others at Outdoor Market,” *The Baltimore Sun*, 27 October 2005, at <http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/bal-te.israel27oct27,1,5976726.story>

regarding the strategic balance of the region, with global implications as well.

So at the top level, I have touched on *three essential differences between conventional and unrestricted warfare*:

1. the impact that the few can have on the many,
2. the ease and quickness of the impact, which strongly couples the tactical and strategic levels of warfare, and
3. the shackles of fair play and international law are removed from one side only.

“So again, we are here to forge an integrated, collaborating community, and to mobilize our collective expertise to build new capabilities for our national security . . . Let’s get started.”

WHY ADDRESS THIS TOPIC NOW?

We have renamed the Global War on Terror as The Long War. But whatever we call it, we are five years into that war, and we have only just begun to adapt our offensive and defensive capabilities accordingly. It’s not that we have chosen not to adapt, it is simply that we haven’t yet laid the intellectual foundation to adapt carefully and responsibly in the face of limited resources. Unfortunately, this takes time. Our national security strategy needs the equivalent of the Cold War’s maxim of “contain communism,” it needs unbiased and insightful analyses to underpin our decisions, and it needs technologies that will be effective in fighting that war. The Quadrennial Defense Review lays down an important marker as a commitment to understanding and adapting capabilities to the Long War. But doing it in a responsible, effective, and defensible manner will come only through the synergistic application of strategy, analysis, and technological capabilities. We are here today to mobilize these three communities to lay the intellectual foundation necessary to counter those who would engage in warfare of an unrestricted nature.

What do the strategy, analysis, and technology communities need from each other?

- 1.** Strategists need insights from qualitative and quantitative analyses to guide the development of the full range of national security postures, which include tailored deterrence and adaptation of our offensive and defensive capabilities, as well as ensuring that we and our allies are resilient to attack. The strategy community also needs an appreciation of potential offensive and defensive effects that can be obtained through the full range of instruments of national power, enabled by technology—both in the kinetic and information domains.
- 2.** Analysts need to understand what we and our adversaries consider success in this unrestricted warfare context, including metrics that are more sophisticated than the traditional attrition of forces and control of territory. And they need innovative technological concepts to develop integrated architectures and systems that will successfully counter attacks and close areas of vulnerability.
- 3.** Finally, technologists need to understand our willingness to work beyond traditional disciplines rooted in physics to develop innovative means of achieving effects, and need guidance as to prioritized requirements for high-impact technologies, systems, and architectures that will advance our capacity to counter and defend against attacks of an unrestricted nature.

So again, we are here to forge an integrated, collaborating community, and to mobilize our collective expertise to build new capabilities for our national security, in this dynamic environment that we may call “unrestricted warfare.” Let’s get started.



KEYNOTE MESSAGE

**KEYNOTE MESSAGE***

Anthony Zinni

I really found the title of this symposium interesting. I hadn't heard anything referred to as unrestricted warfare. I had been following the struggle to define something other than major combat operations or conventional warfare as we know it. We've all been through the era of military operations other than war—the SASO era, Security and Stability Operations. The Pentagon code is irregular operations. Now, we have unrestricted warfare.

This is something other than the usual way we go to war. It's growing. We can't define it. It's a mixed, disparate bag of things that are hard to lump together. And we have difficulty coming to grips with it. I want to start with the strategic or conceptual level and then talk about the other dimensions of this topic.

Clearly, the world changed significantly in 1989 when the Soviet Union collapsed and the wall came down. Interestingly enough, this was the beginning of what might be considered to be a perfect storm—not only did the Soviet Union collapse, but a number of phenomena were allowed to develop in the world as a result of that lid popping off. One was globalism, the ability and the freedom to move around the world, the access to technology, the information age, which led to a whole series of events and changed the entire global situation significantly.

General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) is President of the International Operations for MIC Industries, has his own consulting business, and held numerous academic positions at prestigious universities. He's written numerous articles and op ed pieces and also co-authored a New York Times best seller with Tom Clancy entitled "Battle Ready."

*This paper is an edited transcript of General Zinni's message.

Oftentimes, when I speak to audiences out in the heartland of America about these sorts of things, I try to make the point that almost all the problems we face day to day have their origin somewhere else in the world—whether you have drugs on the street corner, which can be traced back to coca leaf and poppy growers somewhere, or you have a problem with illegal immigration and are confused about whether that is good or bad.

There are many kinds of globalization issues. We just saw the recent concern over the ports deal with UAE, but there are not only economic issues. For example, the Milosevic business has now highlighted international courts and the globalization of accountability. Whether it's global warming, climate changes, etc., the world has changed.

“ . . . This topic is like trying to define what an elephant is, with a bunch of blind men feeling it to provide the definition.”

The problem is, that during the Cold War, we had a strategic view of what we faced. We had some great strategic thinkers that prepared us for it and led us through it—the Marshalls and Trumans and Kennans of the world—and we had a clear understanding of where things stood. It was a much more dangerous time because, potentially, we could blow ourselves off the face of the planet. But there was a certain degree of order and understanding in the competition of East and West. A lid kept down any problems because we placed even the smallest nations and societies in one camp or another.

We never have understood this new world order or disorder that began in 1989. We have no strategic vision about how we fit in this world, how we achieve our goals, what our interests are, and what threatens us. That's my first point. This new world order is the strategic or basic cause of what we're talking about here today. We are faced with a disparate collection of threats out there that are hard to understand.

If you think about the way we're used to dealing with conflict, we had a series of conventions and understandings that were established in a world with a predominance of nation states. Sovereignty was the pre-eminent concept. All intercourse and interaction happened on a nation state basis. We defined entities, business, and interests in that way. That concept has eroded away since 1989.

Look at the argument now about "Buy America." We don't even know what Buy America means. If you go out and buy a Toyota, you'll find it's made in Merrifield, Ohio. You buy a Chevy, it's assembled in Mexico. What does Buy America mean? Does it restrict what we're able to do? Does it threaten our security? The current port management concern is a reflection of these same issues. The point of unrestricted operations or warfare or conflict is really the recognition that something threatens us that is not founded in the traditional way we go to war or the way we deal with conflict.

Yesterday, I was listening to the President's speech on Iraq. He said that the enemy knows he can't defeat us on the battlefield, so he chooses not to come out onto that battlefield and join us in battle. Of course, he isn't going to come out on that battlefield. To him, that battlefield is unfair. To us, fairness is coming out in the open, facing up to our technological superiority, wearing a uniform, and letting us vaporize you. That is based on convention. Well, no idiot is going to do that.

When I heard that speech, I was reminded of an incident in Vietnam when I was a young lieutenant. I remember reading in the Stars and Stripes that a battalion commander somewhere in Three Corps, in the middle of Vietnam, was so frustrated by losing troops to booby traps and ambushes that he mustered his entire mechanical force, put it in a clearing on the edge of this jungle, set up loudspeakers, and challenged the Viet Cong to come out and fight him like a man. And, of course, I imagine the Viet Cong in the jungles were laughing at him because his definition of fair play and the way to fight was nowhere near the way they were going to fight. They had defeated a conventional military force,

the French, in the Indochina War, and they understood how to make a level playing field on their own basis.

Now, in my mind, this topic is like trying to define what an elephant is, with a bunch of blind men feeling it to provide the definition. Wherever you grab hold of it, you are going to have a different view and a different perspective of what it is. There are many dimensions to this problem. I think that the tendency will be, although I hope not, to reduce it to the technical and tactical level.

Again, going back to the President's speech yesterday, I was amazed that the President of the United States was delivering a major speech on Iraq and where we are, which is obviously not a good place, and that his emphasis was on how we counter IEDs.

Think about that—the President of the United States, trying to reassure Americans after three years of involvement in this conflict, is reduced to a technical aspect, as if the key to victory is defeating the ability of the enemy to put IEDs in place. What struck me is there is something more to this conflict than that. This topic is going to have a strategic or conceptual dimension that it's important to come to grips with, it will have a tactical and technical aspect, and it will also have a moral aspect.

Yesterday, also on the news, I heard one of the senior correspondents who works for The New York Times and has been in Iraq almost since the beginning of the conflict. He was recapping the war as we approached this third anniversary of the conflict. He said that, in his mind, the most significant event that occurred in Iraq was the Abu Ghraib scandal. He referred to it as an arrow in the back of every soldier and Marine that was operating on the ground.

An arrow in the back. So, an observer to this conflict for three years felt that the worst thing that had happened was something that degraded our moral credibility and the moral credibility of those troops on the ground who are trying to win hearts and minds. Interesting, because we were driven to a point where we maybe compromised a little bit on the moral high ground and on

our standing. That's a vulnerability. That is part of our advantage, our symmetrical advantage, if you will.

If the enemy can move you off that platform, he gains an asymmetrical advantage because he can show the world that you are not what you say you are. So, this aspect must be considered, too. I would argue that, in many ways, we put ourselves in the most dangerous situation when we begin to question things like the Geneva Convention, the definition of torture, assassinations. Whether they are right or wrong in your mind, they require a debate because we lose image and power when we fall off that platform.

I have also thought about whether there is truly such a thing as totally unrestricted warfare. I came to the conclusion that there isn't. The closest I have seen to it was in Somalia where we had gangs and militias. Some of the gangs, called the Morians, were high on khat and had no allegiance and no political purpose. They were just thugs. But there was a set of conditions and rules. I can remember dealing with General Aideed; I would go to his headquarters once a day, and we would go over all the issues and points of conflict that we had. He had a radio station that was preaching a lot of hate and violence, and we had a radio station that countered it and did anti-Aideed broadcasts.

And I remember him at one time saying to me, "That damn radio station of yours—that's the problem." Our radio station was called RAJO, which in Somali means hope. He called it by another word, very close to it, that means trouble. I said, to him, "If you want us to lower the rhetoric on our radio station, lower the rhetoric on yours." He nodded his head up and down, and said "okay," and he toned down the rhetoric. And I thought, here's a warlord who probably morally and in any other sense doesn't feel bound or restricted, and his chief concern is about the rhetoric over a radio station and the effect it might have on the people he's trying to influence.

So even in that environment, we found leverage. Back in CENTCOM, when I was the commander in 1998, we were ready to attack Iraq in Operation Desert Fox. As we were working up to

this, there was a lot of publicity about the potential for us to attack or strike Iraq if the U.N. inspectors were thrown out. It was getting a lot of press, a lot of media attention. We were days away from a potential strike and the time when we thought the inspectors would pull the plug and leave.

Every time we had a workup, when tensions mounted and it looked like we might take military action, I would get a series of briefings. I began to get a series of briefings now from my J-6 about the attacks on all our systems, classified and unclassified. As attention was drawn to us and as tensions mounted, these things always ratcheted up—hundreds of computer attacks on our systems. Fortunately, our defensive systems were able to ward them off.

What struck me that day is that no shots had been fired, but in cyberspace, we were in conflict. No one knew who was hitting us. Was it some teenager in Oslo, Norway, who was trying to hack into our system? Was this attack designed by a potential enemy that we are ready to strike? We didn't know. But not a shot had been fired; no order had been issued. And yet here we were in a form of conflict, on the defense. One thought struck me during that briefing. Can you possibly have a conflict where there is no violence? Can you be in a conflict where the elements of the conflict are nonviolent, at least major portions of them?

The conflict can be on an information, economic, political, or diplomatic basis—social, cultural. Even when there is violence, it is minimized. The role of the military or the violence component is even smaller. On the way in today, I was listening on the radio to a proposed war game where there would be a violent attack of some kind, a violent element that begins a conflict. Those playing the game, countering it, could not use a violent response. They had to counter the attack through nonviolent means.

I think the intention there was to try and find a way for conflict resolution other than the use of violence. But I thought it was an interesting idea from another perspective. We know that the elements of power are diplomatic, informational, military, economic, social – cultural—the old DIMES acronym that I've been taught ever since I was at the War College.

But we tend to be one-punch fighters. We tend to fight via the military; we do not do well in any of those other dimensions. I would give you Iraq as a case in point. Diplomatically, if you look back at the first Gulf war, it was a masterstroke of the Bush 41 Administration to get a U.N. resolution, to create a coalition, and to set up a structure for containment under a U.N. resolution. It was a masterful work of diplomacy that minimized the violence and cost, and I would argue that the containment for us was very cheap.

Information or diplomacy in this present war has been horrible. We couldn't pull it off or we didn't give it the time in the United Nations. We have not had many diplomatic successes in this war. We lose the information battle. Right from the beginning, these groups we hired—the Lincoln Group, the Rendon Group—and all the ways we tried to propagandize have been amateurish, have not worked well, and have backfired on us. We send Karen Hughes to the Middle East on a listening tour to improve our image. Give me a break.

As I go out and talk to people, they laugh at this strategy. Economically, we have made tremendous miscalls. Remember Wolfowitz saying that the oil was going to be pumped, and it would pay for the war? We have done nothing for the economic development of this country—jobs and security and things that would win over the people. This war has been an economic disaster for us. On the social and cultural level and communicating with the people, sharing our ideals, hoping they will embrace democracy, it's been a failure.

We've equated democracy to an election, and elections bring us Hamas and Shiite fundamentalists. And if we keep pressing in places like Egypt, we will end up with the Muslim Brotherhood, and we'll wonder at what democracy can bring. So what happened? Why do we get ourselves in these situations? Is asymmetry something that the enemy can take advantage of because he creates the asymmetric advantage or because we give him one?

You know, one of the biggest problems we had in the Straits of Hormuz was the potential for an enemy like Iran to mine the straits. Now, you can't tell me the United States of America, if it dedicated the resources, couldn't develop an effective way to deal with sea mines—mine countermeasures. Why don't we? Well, because we choose to put our resources, rightly or wrongly, in other naval assets. Our mine countermeasure force was in Corpus Christi. I know the Gulf of Mexico was kept clear of sea mines, but the ability to deploy the force forward, to have the capability, is not unreasonable. And no one was really interested in it. We were willing to accept the vulnerability. We actually tried to convince our allies to take on the mine countermeasures business.

I am not here to argue whether that strategy is right or wrong, whether we should have carriers and frigates versus mine countermeasures ships, or anything else. What I'm saying is we have hard choices to make, and sometimes we choose the area that will allow an asymmetric advantage. We have to understand that. We choose the place where you can't get an asymmetric advantage. Where we choose to invest is where you will not have that advantage. We're going to dominate the air, we're going to dominate in conventional land warfare, we're going to dominate the seas and under the seas.

We should recognize that electing not to put resources in certain places creates asymmetric advantages. It was interesting in CENTCOM to contrast Iraq and Iran. In my time as the commander, we had the dual containment policy. In Iraq, the idiot Saddam Hussein elected to come at us symmetrically. In other words, he had a smaller version of us. We saw that in the Gulf War. He had republican guards with T-72 tanks, he had Mirage jets and other aircraft, he had conventional formations. We saw what happened to them during the Gulf War—they disintegrated. He learned a lesson in that one, creating the Fedayeen and some sort of plan to deal with us on possibly a non-conventional basis.

But when you looked across the Strait of Iran, you saw a nation that did not invest in those kinds of things. They had a conventional military that they probably felt was minimally adequate for their defense. They invested in the ability to put a lot of mines in that

war and bought three Kilo-class submarines. If they could flush us out early on, they could put mines in the water. They invested in fast patrol boats with cruise missiles that are hard to pick up on the radar that they could flush out. They invested in missile systems, and they also bought missile systems that they are now upgrading to the fourth generation—more accuracy, more range—because missile defense is an issue and a problem for us.

And their MOIS, their intelligence agency, obviously was funding and working terrorist groups around the world, but particularly, the Hezbollah and the Hamas that worked against our interests. It is a wonderful study in how they identified our weaknesses and where they could work against us asymmetrically. I would argue that when we are faced with these threats, we don't think about using that asymmetry against an enemy. We assume that someone who is going to work against us in an unrestricted way is invulnerable.

“As a lieutenant, I fought a war where we won virtually every battle and lost the war—Vietnam. It is possible to win everything at the tactical level. The frustration of the young soldiers, marines, airmen, sailors, everybody that we have in Iraq is that they can defeat this guy on the ground anywhere, anyplace, and yet they can't say they are winning.”

We mentioned the book by the Chinese authors. How can China go to total unrestricted warfare? It can't, if it has something at stake, something of counter value that we can engage. If an adversary totally goes to unrestricted warfare, it allows us then to move into realms such as the use of weapons of mass destruction and others that could seem justified. If you have something at stake, and you don't fight in some sort of limited way, some sort of constrained way, you then open yourself up. Even Osama bin Laden, I believe, is vulnerable. And we don't get it.

Think about this. We have engaged in the global war on terrorism, GWOT. The first time I heard this, I was called to a study at the Pentagon and they were talking about the new QDR,

the one previous to this one. They kept using this term GWOT. When I asked what it was, they said it was the Global War on Terrorism. And I said that we had declared war on a tactic. Imagine Woodrow Wilson saying that he had declared war on U-boats, or FDR saying that he declared war on kamikaze attacks. Why would we declare war on a tactic? Who are we fighting? What are we fighting?

Terrorism is a tactic that has been used by groups that actually became legitimized later on—the PLO. In the founding of Israel, there were terrorist acts by the Irgun and others. In our own Revolutionary War, the British called our style of fighting ungentlemanly and unchristian because we didn't fight fair and clean. And at that time, those activities could easily have been seen as terrorist. Even during the Civil War, the operations of Mosby and Cantrell and others were condemned by the North.

So we've declared war against a tactic. The problem with that is you then elect to fight at the tactical level. How do we measure success against al Qaeda? If you listen to the rhetoric from the Administration, it's number of terrorists killed, leadership taken down, cells taken down, finances broken. Wonderful for attacking an organization at the operational and probably the tactical level. But what has happened strategically? Has al Qaeda become a movement? Has it actually become greater in one sense because we are fighting at that level?

If you were to think about it in strategic terms, what does Osama bin Laden need? Where is he vulnerable? It strikes me that one thing he needs is the continuous flow of angry young men willing to blow themselves up. Where does the anger come from? It's not from religious fanaticism. I think, a recent study of suicide bombers over the past decades found that over 60 percent came from a secular background. The anger is probably social, economic, political, and he needs that anger.

If we were to stabilize the places that provide his recruits and eliminate that anger, would he have that continuous flow? The way we are conducting this war actually is enhancing this flow. The second thing he needs is a justification to blow your brains

out in a suicide attack. And he gets that by preaching an aberrant form of Islam that is not really challenged in any way. Where are the moderates, we keep saying. There are voices out there, mullahs and imams, that speak against it. But it doesn't get much attention, much traction.

He's demonstrated in just those two areas that he needs that anger to continue. He needs those destabilizing conditions to continue, and he needs to keep preaching his aberrant Islam to provide a rationale or a justification for what he is about to do. Where have we been effective in dealing with those issues? As a matter of fact, we have probably gone the other way and added to those problems. So despite the tactical victories, and we have done well tactically, can we defeat this thing in the long run?

As a lieutenant, I fought a war where we won virtually every battle and lost the war—Vietnam. It is possible to win everything at the tactical level. The frustration of the young soldiers, marines, airmen, sailors, everybody that we have in Iraq is that they can defeat this guy on the ground anywhere, anyplace, and yet they can't say they are winning.

As a matter of fact, a good case is made that they are losing. It is frustrating to know that you can dominate the terrain and control the people and still lose the war. Why? That enemy in Iraq needs one thing: they need a populace in which they can instill fear, apathy, or sympathy. Either the people are afraid of these so-called insurgents, or they don't care one way or another—they feel they are caught in between, which is what I saw in Vietnam. Or, they actually begin to sympathize and support the enemy's cause. This war would be over tomorrow if the Iraqi people lost those reactions. If someone in Baghdad or Sodor City or Samara or Fallujah picks up the phone, dials a hotline number, and says that the guy next door to him has a chop shop and he's making suicide bombs out of cars, we're there in a heartbeat and take him out.

If the people turned against these insurgents, they would be done. Look at the '80s, the terrorist groups in Europe – Beider Meinhoff, the Red Brigade. When the people finally cast off apathy

and turned against them, like the Red Brigade in Italy, they were done. In a short period of time, they were rolled up and cleaned up, their battle for hearts and minds, the control of the people, lost. In the 20th century, we saw the rise of what was called the People's War. It began with Lenin, was perfected by Mao, and was polished by Che Guevara.

How do you rise up and fight nation states, organize militaries with technological superiority? These revolutionaries honed it through a century into a fine art. Even though we claim there is a fourth generation of warfare, the insurgent groups still draw on those lessons. I think never in history have we had a concentrated way to define how to confront a massive nation state entity that has a technological and force superiority, and to deal with it.

It's worthwhile going back and studying them because we never successfully dealt with their strategies. In 1960, President Kennedy said that this is the way communism will confront us. We are not going to have a clash between the Soviet Union and the United States at the level that could blow us both off the planet, as the doomsday clock starts to tick ever closer to the midnight hour. The way they will engage us is through these insurgencies. So, he asked the military how many counterinsurgency forces they could create. He got a variety of answers. The Commandant of the Marine Corps said we have 189,000 Marines at this time; that's a counterinsurgency force. The Army said we will create one, and they created the Special Forces for foreign internal development and the concepts and doctrine for winning over hearts and minds. Difficult business. We've never really succeeded anywhere. I remember, as we were trying to find successful models, we always referred back to Malaya and the Brits against the communist terrorists—the only real model.

Has there ever been a case where a third country force moved into a country and resolved an insurgency or what Mao would call a people's war? It fails when the people aren't angry. Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia by the Bolivian rangers. In the last entries in his diary, he said he couldn't really stir up the revolution in Bolivia because the people weren't angry. There wasn't enough popular dissent and disagreement with the government, the sorts

of gut issues that allowed him to do what he did in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. Again, the key became the people.

The key is not a technological solution or a tactical solution. We don't do enough to understand how to use these other elements of power. We have an American way of war. To deny that would be foolish. One element of that way of war is leveraging technology—we want technical solutions. We don't look for mass. We don't look for long, drawn out conflicts. We want a technical solution.

When I retired from the military in 2000, before 9/11, the Pentagon was conducting a study about this transformation and defining it. I was on one of the study groups. I remember hearing an Air Force four star general, very close to the Pentagon, saying that the definition of transformation was going to be reliance on technology, on space information systems, knowledge-based systems, and high-precision weapons systems. As he looked over at me—a dumb Marine—he said the day of the ground forces is done.

He said we would probably need what he called gendarme units of maybe 500 people each to police the battlefield after all the DMP points had been serviced, and everything was taken care of through technology in the skies. I did consulting work for Joint Forces Command. The buzzword was knowledge-based operations. (By the way, if you want to make a name for yourself, pick three words that don't make any sense, put them together, and write a page on it—Rapid Decisive Operations, Vex Space Operations, whatever you want to call it—and you could be a hero.)

I remember one retired intelligence officer telling me that we were going to be knowledge-advantaged on the future battlefield. We were going to know almost everything we needed to know. Now I hear Iraq is an intelligence failure in almost every respect. We don't know who we're fighting, we didn't know they didn't have any WMD, we didn't know that they wouldn't accept Ahmed Shalaby, we didn't know that this present government would be elected, we didn't know that Iran would get involved. We didn't

know much, for a nation that was building a strategy on the concept of knowledge-based information. We went down the tubes big time in the first conflict and confrontation that was supposed to prove this theory—we didn't have the assets or the ability.

The other aspect of the American way of war is our presumed intelligence superiority and a diehard belief in the intelligence. If I had to go back and do it all over again, every time somebody passed along intelligence, I would want to know the source. I would not tolerate, "We can't tell you the source," or, "The source is not important." I want to know the source. Is it a curve ball? Is it some other idiotic reporting? How did it come about?

When I used to travel over to the region to see the senior leadership of the nations in CENTCOM's AOR, I would get a classified briefing book describing the people that I was going to meet. I read it religiously on the airplane—everything about the person's family, habits, vices, and everything else. When I finally met the people, I realized that 90 percent of what was in that book was bogus: a guy wasn't married, but he was described as married with three kids; he drank a lot, but he was a Muslim and he didn't drink when I met him. Sounds simple, but who knows how it was reported—maybe attachés running around at parties trying to gather up information and then remember it later. Whatever the system is, I don't think we should put that kind of reliance on it.

A better understanding of cultures and people is more important than relying on intelligence to give you the magic solution, the magic G-spot to tickle and make it all happen, because that magic spot doesn't exist.

Our other important characteristic is that we are casualty adverse. The only way we will take big casualties is if there is a major threat and attack, a clear threat to us. Otherwise, any casualties have to be justified. We do not like taking casualties unless the cause is right. Osama bin Laden made a big mistake on 9/11. He drew from what he saw in Vietnam, Beirut, the Kobar Towers, and many other places—we pulled out when we were attacked. What he didn't understand is that when he crossed that

line and attacked our homeland, he changed the equation. But if the attack and the threat are not clear, casualties are a factor.

We had a doctrine, the Powell doctrine and the Weinberger doctrine, that called for overwhelming force in the face of aggression. Since those doctrines were put in place, they have worked—until Iraq. We overwhelmed almost every situation. If we chose to stay a course and were willing to spend the time, we could do so with overwhelming force. Iraq reversed that. It disavowed those doctrines, and we tried to do it on the cheap. It played against the American way of war. We like things to be short duration. We are not good at long wars.

A long war becomes extremely difficult in a political system that turns over and is as charged as ours. The leadership, the focus, the justification needed to prosecute a long war are very difficult to pull off, unless we clearly see a major attack or threat to us. We desperately need a clear moral right for what we're doing. You step off that moral high ground, you direct that moral compass a little bit to the left or right, and you are in big trouble—not only at home, but elsewhere in the world. You change the definition of America.

de Tocqueville said that America is great because she is good. If she ever stops being good, she will stop being great. Those are words we ought to live by. When we create ridiculous, hypothetical situations about a captured terrorist with knowledge of an imminent danger and ask “Can I put the thumb screws on him?,” we are stepping off the moral high ground that is so important to us, that defines us as people, and that is essential to our beliefs and our self identity. It is the arrow in the back of the troops trying to win hearts and minds.

We need popular and international support. We don't send the king's subjects to war. We send our sons and daughters to war. The people have to be behind the conflict and the way we're conducting it. I remember, as we were getting ready to bomb Iraq, the foreign minister of Qatar came to me and said, “General Zinni, you have to go on Aljazeera TV.” I said, “You've got to be kidding me—I'm not going on Aljazeera TV.” He said, “You have

no choice. It's important before you do this that you show the human face of the United States military. In this region of the world, despite your presence and the time you've been here, the people don't believe you are human. They need to see that you are a living, breathing human being who cares about people and tries to avoid using force unless absolutely necessary.

I went on that Aljazeera TV show. The interviewer was a noted hard, tough interviewer. The first question he asked me was, "General Zinni, when you decide to take military action, to unleash all of that kinetic energy and start that violence, what are the moral considerations that go into that planning?" What a great question.

I talked to him about how we work, the role of our staff judge advocates, the rules of engagement, how we follow the just war theory, which basically is the underpinning of the way we make these judgments. I gave him examples of restricted target lists and how those target lists are reviewed. I even went so far as to tell him that in every one of our units, there is a chaplain responsible not only for the morality and the concerns of our people, but also for providing part of that moral compass.

The interviewer, I think, thought he was going to find me stumbling for words and say that there was no real way to factor moral implications into our planning. He was surprised, and he told me afterwards that there was an integral method to our planning. As much as those who had to deliver weapon systems and provide intelligence, someone was there to oversee the proportionality of the actions we were going to take, the moral justification of what we were going to do. I think that's an element that we have lost, and it is important to us. And it has to be considered in these situations.

We are now involved more and more in nation building. Nation building adds to the problem. You don't just need to defeat an organized military force for success. You have to rebuild from the ashes and the mess. You have to consider that you are going to be tasked with rebuilding a society. We went into Somalia to fix the humanitarian problem, but, to paraphrase Secretary Powell's

comment on the Pottery Barn, it's not if you break it, you own it, it's if you touch it, you own it.

As the most powerful nation in the world, as the super power, if we touch it, we own it. One week after we were on the ground in Iraq, just trying to get food out there and bring some order, I had a group of so-called intellectuals that came to see me and wanted to know where the jobs program was, when were we going to set up the economic institutions, square away the monetary system. I said, "Hey, we're busy feeding the skinny ones and shooting the fat ones. I'm not ready to get into that yet." And that wasn't even part of our mission. But it's become an expectation now.

If we touch it, with all the idealism that we bring, all the sorts of lofty intentions we have, we are going to have to rebuild that society or leave it as a failure and in defeat. That's the difficulty in walking away now from Iraq. It is at a stage when it is in the hands of the Iraqis, but we still can't extricate ourselves. And we will be stuck with that. I would argue again that what we face is an unstable part of the world that never before in history has been able to influence negatively the stable part of the world.

No longer do our great oceans protect us. We can't build a wall that stops illegal immigrants, that stops every terrorist attack, that prevents avian bird flu, that prevents environmental damage. Homeland Security's premise that we can wall ourselves in, isolate ourselves, go back to 19th-century thinking is out of touch with reality. We've got a messy world and the first world, the stable world, is going to be responsible for doing messy things to fix it, or we are going to live with the consequences.

The choice is not to defend ourselves against it; it's to be proactive and go to the cause, the source, and correct it as much as we can. It's not only the morally right thing to do, it's in our best interests and serves our purposes. That is the challenge that we face in this century. The Cold War is over. What threatens us is that mess out there that affects our health, our environment, our security, our political systems, our economic well-being.

We are the only superpower that can be a leader along with others to effect change. When somebody comes at us in an

asymmetrical way, where we have vulnerabilities, we have to find a way to get at him asymmetrically, to broaden out into that DIMES area. You know, if I had to weigh D-I-M-E-S, M gets a ten, D-I-E-S gets a one or a two. Think of the game as one where you resolve conflicts without counting on the military to be the sole source of resolution. That is the trick. Expand the battlefield into areas that the enemy can't cope with. These are usually nonmilitary areas.

Thank you very much for your attention. I will be glad to take questions.

Q: *John Shissler; JHU/APL – General, given the rules as you've described it, what are your thoughts on Goldwater Nichols [Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986] and the development process that we go through for military officers? One of the complaints when Goldwater Nichols was being debated is that it might lead to strategic monism and create a class of officers skilled in joint planning, but essentially having a very narrow view—a view that enhanced excellence, but within a very narrow scope. Is that a problem we are dealing with today?*

A: Well, let me give you my view of Goldwater Nichols. I thought that Goldwater Nichols was excellent legislation. It really was a continuation of the National Security Act of 1947, the modifications in the '50s, and then in the mid-'80s, the Goldwater Nichols Act. What the Goldwater Nichols Act said was that, in effect—and I'm giving you my version of it—we can no longer have a military that is so rigidly structured, that has this total top down direction. Deciding everything almost to the operational and tactical levels out of the Pentagon and in Washington won't work. We need to create the ability to have an understanding of the world in our unified command, especially our regional unified commands, We need an association to the region, an affinity for what goes on, a continuum of strategic thought and interaction, and an understanding of how our actions affect that strategy. In addition, it recognized that we can no longer be narrowly developed in one area.

We need to be joint, not only in a military context, but involved as CINCs, which was probably the high water mark of the

Goldwater Nichols period. That word is not too popular now, but as CINCs, we were involved in the political, the informational, the economic, the social, and cultural aspects, as well as the military aspect. We were the bridge to the diplomats, the economists, to those trying to work social and cultural interchange, to information operations. We were the connection. If you remember Dana Priest's book, *The Mission*, she outed us, called us the proconsuls in that part of the world. The good part of that is we understood the world. When there had to be a decision made in Washington about action, they came to us. We brought them context.

“Now, we’ve moved away from it again, and we’re back to centralized direction from Washington, where every wonk in town who has a bright idea creates a policy that has no relevance to the reality on the ground.”

George Tenant came to my headquarters one time and he told me he was coming down for some briefings. I didn't know what briefings he wanted – this is the Director of Central Intelligence. When he came down he said, “I want to understand your part of the world through your eyes. Tell me how I should understand CENTCOM's region of the world.” I said, “George, you see all of the intelligence, you read it, you've got the analysts. What are you asking me for?” He said, “I have the analysts, I see the intelligence, I don't know how to put it in context. What do I need to know?” I gave him eight items. I talked about the need to know and understand Islam; to understand what it is to be an Arab; to understand the desert, the geography, and the climate; to understand the colonial period in history and what that brought about. I told him what books to read, who to see, where to visit to get the texture to really understand it, to get that framework.

I remember when I testified before the Senate's foreign relation committee right before the beginning of the war in Iraq. We were talking about going in, and it sounded to me—because I was behind the panel of Douglas Feith and Mark Grossman, the State Department and Pentagon planners—like they thought we

could go in, cut off the head, take out the military, and wham, bam, it's over. I said, "Look, I've been in this part of the world 16 years. I can tell you it's not going to be over. You go in with too few troops, you're not going to control the situation, and you're going to have a mess on your hands. You're going to be involved in nation building for a long, long time."

Many of the decisions that I heard in that planning or lack of it are going to be disastrous. Senator Coleman from Minnesota asked, "Help me understand this. Look, what are you saying? We shouldn't take out Saddam Hussein? No matter what, we take out Saddam Hussein. It's got to be better if that's all we do, if we just accomplish that. You go out, bam, take him out and you come home, it's good." I said, "Senator, that's World War II thinking." We did that in Afghanistan. We went in and took out the Soviets. Big victory, their Vietnam. We walked away and left the Afghans with the Taliban and al Qaeda, with 500,000 refugees in Pakistan, with all sorts of chaos and instability and disorder, and with an image of the United States that wasn't too favorable. We took out the Soviets—how can you do something more noble than that? I tried to tell him, "You don't understand—we don't come home anymore." The old idea that we saddle up the boys, put them on the troop ship, and send them over; that they win, That we rebuild the society and come home doesn't happen. The CINCs stay there.

Whatever you do, the CINC lives with the aftermath. General Schwarzkopf wins in the desert and comes home to a ticker tape parade. Every CINC in CENTCOM has lived with the aftermath of that—good, bad, or indifferent—lived with the containment, lived with the issues like the ordinance left in the ground, the unburied ordinance, the unpaid telephone bills in Saudi Arabia. We don't walk away anymore. If we are going to have somebody out there that is going to be the focus, we have to give him the power and authority. It's being whittled away by this Pentagon.

The idea that SOCOM is a supported CINC is something that is unfathomable to me—the idea that somebody could come into your area of responsibility, conduct an action, and leave you stuck with it. You have to live with the consequences—a rendition, an

assassination. Whatever goes wrong, the guy who is handling the mess is the supporting outfit. It doesn't make sense to me. Why did we walk away from something that made complete sense in Goldwater Nichols? Where we had focus, we had knowledge.

We integrated every element of power. We had people that communicated with the bureau chiefs at the State Department and ambassadors on the ground who supported their efforts and gained their support for our efforts. Even as a CINC, we worked environmental issues out there. We worked disaster relief efforts. We worked counter drug operations. We built diplomatic relationships. The military-to-military relationships saved our butt out there. In Central Asia and in Pakistan, the only relationships we had were military to military.

In the end, when we needed something from [Pakistani President] Pervez Musharif, the President sent me out to convince him. When we wanted the Pakistanis to come down from Cargo Mountain so we wouldn't get a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, the President sent the CINC out to do business.

Now, we've moved away from it again, and we're back to centralized direction from Washington, where every wonk in town who has a bright idea creates a policy that has no relevance to the reality on the ground.

The practitioners out there, those in the military, those in the foreign service, the journalists, the aid workers, who can see the situation on the ground, shake their heads in disbelief. The only way we're going to get this problem resolved is to marry strategic thinking with those that have to implement it and understand the realities on the ground.



CHAPTER 1

**FEATURED
PAPERS**

1.1 A STRATEGY FOR A PROTRACTED WAR*

Thomas Mahnken

More than four years have passed since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, more than six since Usama bin Ladin declared war on the United States, and more than a decade since al Qaeda first attacked U.S. citizens. Yet, discussions of U.S. strategy in the so-called Global War on Terrorism remain vague, cloaked in euphemism.

BACKGROUND

More than four years have passed since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, more than six since Usama bin Ladin declared war on the United States, and more than a decade since al Qaeda first attacked U.S. citizens. Yet, discussions of U.S. strategy in the so-called Global War on Terrorism remain vague, cloaked in euphemism. Such an approach prevents the type of clearheaded assessment that must form the bedrock of rational strategy.

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As Carl von Clausewitz argued, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.” [1] This is no simple task. As Clausewitz notes, too often leaders either misunderstand the nature of the conflict or try to fight the war as they wish it were. In either case, the results can be disastrous.

This article is an attempt to answer a series of basic but vital questions that strategists need to ponder as they contemplate this conflict. Are we at war? If so, who or what is our enemy? What are their aims? What strengths and weaknesses do they possess? What, therefore, is the nature of this war? And finally, what can the United States do to win?

Its central argument is that the United States is engaged in a protracted war with adherents to a particularly virulent strain of Islam. They possess well-defined goals and formulate strategies to achieve them, although individual groups disagree over the priority of those goals and the most effective strategy. Although these networks have considerable strengths, they also have exploitable weaknesses, including their heterogeneity, conspiratorial nature, and need for sanctuary. Winning this war will require not only eliminating terrorist groups, but also dismantling their support structure and discrediting their ideology.

ARE WE AT WAR?

The question of whether we face an actual—rather than merely a rhetorical—war is of more than academic interest. It speaks to the role that strategy can play in this conflict. If what we face is a war, a violent clash of wills, then it should be amenable to strategic analysis. If not, then we must look elsewhere for answers, perhaps to the fields of anthropology or sociology.

Experts disagree as to whether we face a war. Jeffrey Record argues that the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) contains elements of “war and nonwar.” [2] No less of an authority than Michael Howard has argued that it is misleading to call the current

conflict a war, particularly since in his view, it cannot be “won” in the traditional sense. [3]

Of course, “winning” comes in many guises, from the complete and utter defeat of one’s enemy to reaching a *modus vivendi* with him. Plenty of counterinsurgents have “won” in the sense of transforming a military problem into a law enforcement one. The British government put down the communist insurgency in Malaya, just as the Philippine government, with U.S. assistance, defeated the Huks. More recently, the Peruvian government defeated the Shining Path, or *Sendero Luminoso*, and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, or MRTA, both of whose strategies featured the political use of terror.

A strong and indeed persuasive case can be made that this is a war in the classical Clausewitzian sense. It is, both for our adversaries and us, “an act of force to compel our adversaries to do our will.” [1] It is, to be sure, “a strange war,” one waged by irregular forces with unconventional means. [4] However, the fact that it is a violent clash of wills means that it is amenable to strategic analysis.

This war’s heroes and its battlefields alert us to its strangeness. The former include the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the U.S. and coalition armed forces, but also New York firefighters and policemen. They include intelligence officers operating in remote regions and urban areas to penetrate and disrupt terrorist networks. And they include Todd Beamer and the passengers of United Air Lines Flight 93, who struggled with their hijackers in a valiant attempt to save lives on the ground, as well as Rick Rescorla, who survived the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965 only to perish as he struggled to save lives in the World Trade Center.

This war already has its battlefields, and it will have more before it is over. Some—Tora Bora and Fallujah—are rather conventional. A student of mountain or urban warfare would instinctively grasp the problems that commanders faced as they fought these battles. But if these locations are battlefields, so too are the site of the World Trade Center, the field outside Shankesville, Pennsylvania, and the Madrid train station.

WHO OR WHAT IS OUR ENEMY?

If this is a war, then who or what is our enemy? This is a matter of critical importance. The identity of an adversary helps determine the nature of the war and the strategy that is required to achieve victory. Often the answer is self-evident: neither Franklin D. Roosevelt nor his military advisors had to agonize over the identity of our enemies in World War II (though they did have to decide whether Germany or Japan posed the greater threat). In other cases, however, the answer is difficult to ascertain, even in hindsight. Students of military affairs continue to argue, for example, over whether the main enemy the United States faced in Vietnam was the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese Army. [5]

Some hold that our enemy in the current war is “terrorism.” The *National Strategy to Combat Terrorism*, for example, states “the enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” [6] Caleb Carr echoes such a broad view, writing, “we are indeed engaged in a global war against terrorism, whoever practices it.” [7]

There are, however, several flaws in such a broad formulation. The first borders on the grammatical: one wages war on people, groups, and nations, not abstract nouns. Terrorism is a method, not a movement. Moreover, the very label is controversial. As Jeffrey Record has noted, “The GWOT...is a war on something whose definition is mired in a semantic swamp.” [2]

Second, the United States is not equally concerned with all terrorist groups. The Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatist group ETA, however repugnant morally, do not pose the same threat to the United States and its interests as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. By lumping all terrorist groups together, we risk diffusing our effort. Our resources, though substantial, are not unlimited. Eliminating the political use of terror is both laudable and unachievable.

An expansive definition of terrorism is not only wasteful, but also unwise. By adopting an expansive definition, the United States risks getting drawn into conflicts far removed from those

that should concern us. During the Cold War, the United States found itself drawn into a host of conflicts under the rubric of fighting communism. Some involved attempts by Moscow to use communist ideology to spread Soviet power and thus demanded a U.S. response. Others concerned communist movements that posed little threat to the United States and its interests, while still others involved nationalist movements that were mislabeled as communist.

“This war’s heroes and its battlefields alert us to its strangeness.”

Since 9/11, the term “terrorist” has replaced “communist” as the preferred epithet for describing our adversaries. As its use has expanded, its value has been debased. Too often, the use of the term distorts and simplifies, as is best seen in the wholesale confusion of insurgency with terrorism. The effect of such muddled thinking is evident in Iraq, where the United States faces a complex insurgency, one that includes Islamic terrorists, to be sure, but also Iraqi Sunni rejectionists, former Ba’athists, and common criminals. By lumping together these disparate—and sometimes conflicting—groups and labeling them all “terrorists,” we blur distinctions and in the process rob ourselves of strategic options.

The expansive view of terrorism is thus unhelpful strategically. It is impossible to develop a coherent strategy to defeat an abstraction, be it “communism” or “terrorism.” It obscures rather than highlights features of our enemy that we can exploit.

On the other hand, there are those who support a narrow definition of our adversary, arguing that the United States should focus its attention on al Qaeda. Such a view is, however, too restrictive. Al Qaeda’s boundaries are fuzzy. It is unclear, for example, whether Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, was a formal member of al Qaeda or, in the words of the 9/11 Commission, a “terrorist entrepreneur.” [8] And what of groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf Group, which are allied with and yet distinct

from al Qaeda? Indeed, the very success of the United States and its allies in decapitating al Qaeda has caused it to become a looser, more amorphous network.

“ . . . the United States is engaged in a protracted war with adherents to a particularly virulent strain of Islam.”

Our real enemy is broader than al Qaeda but represents only one facet of international terrorism. It is a particularly virulent strain of Islam. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, “The enemy is not just ‘terrorism,’ some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism—especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.” [8] The threat comes from adherents of Salafism—a particularly retrograde, extreme, and exclusionary fringe of Islam. We face what Marc Sageman has termed the “global Salafi jihad.” [9]

The U.S. government has been moving toward a more precise articulation of our enemy. The Defense Department’s classified *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, for example, reportedly defines the threat facing the United States as “Islamic extremism.” [10] In recent public statements, however, administration officials have begun portraying the current war as a “struggle against violent extremism,” a formulation with all the obfuscation of “global war on terrorism.” [11]

President Bush identified our adversary most explicitly in his speech to the National Endowment for Democracy on October 6, 2005. As he put it:

Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Islamo-fascism . . . This form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent, political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom. These extremists distort the idea of jihad into a call for terrorist murder against Christians and Jews and Hindus -- and also against Muslims from other traditions, who they regard as heretics. [12]

That U.S. leaders have been so reluctant to call our enemy by its name is understandable. Officials are reluctant to invoke the name of Islam for fear of alienating Muslims, including current and potential allies. They are wary lest they bring on a full-fledged confrontation between the West and Islam. What is needed, however, is a label that identifies our enemies both to the U.S. public and within the Islamic world. Until we come up with such a label, it will be impossible to have a mature discussion of strategic options.

WHAT ARE OUR ENEMIES' AIMS?

What are the goals of Salafist Islamic groups such as al Qaeda? There is a widespread—and misleading—tendency to view such terrorist groups as irrational. In fact, they are quite strategically rational, in that they possess well-defined goals and formulate and execute strategies to achieve them. Indeed, even a cursory review of jihadist publications reveals a sophisticated discussion of strategic alternatives. Ayman al-Zawahiri's *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*, for example, offers a reminder of the need for strategy to serve the ends of policy:

If the successful operations against Islam's enemies and the severe damage inflicted on them do not serve the ultimate goal of establishing the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world, they will be nothing more than disturbing acts, regardless of their magnitude, that could be absorbed and endured, even if after some time and with some losses. [13]

Clausewitz would doubtless approve of Zawahiri's understanding of strategy, if not his goals. Indeed, al Qaeda supporters have been known to look to strategic theorists such as Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung for guidance on how best to wage war. [14]

Although not a state, al Qaeda has engaged in its own variety of diplomacy. At times, its behavior has been quite sophisticated, such as when Usama bin Laden offered to abstain from attacking European states after the March 11, 2003, Madrid bombing as long as they withdrew their troops from Iraq, a call Ayman al-Zawahiri repeated after the July 2005 London attacks. Al Qaeda's leadership

has made appeals to U.S. allies and Muslim fence sitters. Indeed, bin Laden even appeared to weigh in on the side of John Kerry during the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign. [15]

Salafist groups such as al Qaeda have a range of objectives, some explicit, others implicit. These include the eviction of the United States from the Islamic world, the overthrow of “apostate” regimes, and the restoration of the caliphate in the heart of the Islamic world. However, jihadist leaders disagree on both the relative priority of these aims and the best strategy to achieve them. There are disputes within Salafist circles over the importance of liberating Muslim lands, such as Kashmir and Mindanao; resisting occupation, as in Bosnia and Chechnya; and overthrowing secular governments of Muslim populations, as in Egypt and Algeria. Some appear to favor attacks on “apostate” regimes, such as those in Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia (which they term the “near enemy”), while others favor attacks on the United States (the “far enemy”). Still others want to focus upon the cleansing the Islamic ummah of “apostates and heretics.” Jihadist groups also differ over where the caliphate should be established, with some favoring Saudi Arabia, others Egypt, and still others Southeast Asia. Such differences have important implications for both Salafist groups and the United States.

One of the best articulated—but not the only—strategy is that of Usama bin Laden’s ally and second-in-command, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri. As articulated in 2001, the jihad should follow a two-phase strategy:

[In the first, the] jihad would... turn things upside down in the region and force the U.S. out of it. This would be followed by the earth-shattering event, which the West trembles at the mere thought of, which is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Egypt. If God wills it, such a state in Egypt, with all its weight in the heart of the Islamic world, could lead the Islamic world in a jihad against the West. It could also rally the world Muslims around it. Then history would make a new turn, God willing, in the opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world’s Jewish government. [13]

Zawahiri cautions against quick victory, writing,

“This is a goal that could take several generations to achieve.” [13]

In Zawahiri’s view, success requires the control of a state:

The jihad movement must adopt its plan on the basis of controlling a piece of land in the heart of the Islamic world on which it could establish and protect the state of Islam and launch its battle to restore the rational caliphate based on the traditions of the prophet...

Armies achieve victory only when the infantry takes hold of land. Likewise, the mujahid Islamic movement will not triumph against the world coalition unless it possesses a fundamentalist base in the heart of the Islamic world. All the means and plans that we have reviewed for mobilizing the nation will remain up in the air without a tangible gain or benefit unless they lead to the establishment of the state of caliphate in the heart of the Islamic world. [13]

As he has written, the quest to establish a Muslim state cannot be confined to the region and cannot be postponed. As he writes, “It is clear ... that the Jewish-Crusader alliance will not give us time to defeat the domestic enemy then declare war against it thereafter. The Americans, the Jews, and their allies are present now with their forces.” [13] In his view, because the United States backs apostate regimes, it represents a legitimate target. Attacks on the United States will yield one of two favorable results: either they will force the United States to withdraw its support from these regimes, causing them to fall, or they will provoke a disproportionate American response that will galvanize the Muslim world:

The masters in Washington and Tel Aviv are using the regimes to protect their interests and to fight the battle against the Muslims on their behalf. If the shrapnel from the battle reach[es] their homes and bodies, they will trade accusations with their agents about who is responsible for this. In that case, they will face one of two bitter choices: either personally wage

the battle against the Muslims, which means that the battle will turn into clear-cut jihad against infidels, or they reconsider their plans after acknowledging the failure of the brute and violent confrontation against Muslims. [13]

More recently, in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, penned in July 2005, Zawahiri articulated a four-stage strategy for creating a caliphate, using Iraq as a springboard. In his view, Salafists first need to expel American forces from Iraq. Once this happens, Zawahiri urges his affiliates in Iraq to establish a caliphate over as much of the country as possible. From there, he urges them to extend the jihad to neighboring countries, with specific reference to Egypt and the Levant. Finally, he envisions a war against Israel [16].

As noted above, Zawahiri's writings are illustrative of Salafist thought; they are not definitive. They show conclusively, however, that leaders of such groups conceive of this conflict strategically. It is important to understand the development of jihadist strategic thought, for only through study can we uncover weaknesses in their strategies that can be exploited.

One particular vulnerability arises from the fact that al Qaeda's leadership provides only broad inspiration and strategic guidance to Salafist groups; detailed planning and execution of most jihadist attacks occur at the local level. Although this arrangement reduces the vulnerability of such operations to disruption, it can also limit their coherence. Indeed, in some cases they may prove strategically counterproductive. Jihadist attacks against "apostate" regimes, for example, kill Muslims. Far from garnering support, such attacks run the risk of increasing the legitimacy of the existing government and reducing popular sympathy for Salafist groups. For example, Salafist attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia and Egypt have spurred those governments to action, leading to a crackdown on the jihadist support infrastructure in these countries.

For understandable reasons, Western analysts tend to focus upon the Salafists' grievances with Christians and Jews. That animus is, however, only one facet of the conflict. Salafists also target other, more moderate, strains of Islam, as a string of attacks

on Sufi targets in Pakistan and Iraq demonstrate. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, for his part, has declared “full-scale war” on that country’s Shi’a majority. Such an approach, which drew rebukes from Ayman al-Zawahiri as well as Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi’s spiritual mentor, has the potential to drive a wedge between Salafists and less radical jihadists.

Just as it is misleading to view terrorist groups as irrational, it would be dangerous to view them as hyper-rational. Even a cold, calculating leader can take actions that yield unintended and even counterproductive consequences. Moreover, leaders must address their actions to different constituencies, both foreign and domestic. The need to satisfy one group may conflict with the need to satisfy others. Salafists undertake actions that are meant to influence not only their enemies, but also supporters and potential recruits. Operations designed to appeal to one group may, in fact, alienate others. For example, Salafist attacks on the Iraqi army and police may simultaneously alienate Iraqis and incite al Qaeda supporters outside the country. Although the logic behind such actions may be obscure, it is not necessarily absent.

WEIGHING THE BALANCE

There is a strong and understandable tendency in strategic planning to prepare for the worst case, focusing on an adversary’s strengths and our weaknesses. However, the formulation of sound strategy requires a true net assessment, one that considers not only our adversary’s strengths and our weaknesses, but also our capabilities and his vulnerabilities. Although it is risky to underestimate an enemy, it is equally dangerous to overestimate a foe. The price of underestimation is overconfidence; that of overestimation is foregone strategic options.

Much has been written about the strengths of Salafist Islamic groups such as al Qaeda. Because they are covert and networked, their cells are difficult to identify and destroy. They are able to tap into a reservoir of support in the Islamic world. Their franchise structure makes them quite adaptive.

By contrast, too little has been written about the inherent weaknesses of terrorist groups. First, the global Salafist jihad is being waged by a number of heterogeneous groups operating under an overarching ideological banner. Although they have shared similarities, they also have significant differences, and some are better organized than others. Moreover, the lack of strategic control means that individual groups may engage in actions that are ultimately self-defeating.

“The catastrophic threat at this moment in history . . . is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism . . . ”

Second, terrorist groups are by their nature conspiratorial. They are also prone to factionalism, infighting, and even implosion. There is ample evidence, for example, of rivalry within the leadership of al Qaeda and associated groups. Their clandestine nature also makes it difficult for them to develop connections with local populations when not operating through local subcontractors. [17]

Third, such groups require a sanctuary to thrive. As Ayman al-Zawahiri admitted, “A jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and organizational matters.” [13] Al Qaeda’s presence in Sudan and particularly Afghanistan during the 1990s allowed disparate radical elements to coalesce and forge a group identity. Al Qaeda currently enjoys some degree of freedom in the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and in Afghanistan’s border regions. It has also increasingly turned to the internet to recruit and train terrorists. Its lack of a sanctuary on a par with Afghanistan nonetheless limits its range of activity.

Much has also been written about the inherent weaknesses of the United States. As an open, democratic society, it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to monitor the activities of citizens and noncitizens alike. On the other hand, too little has been written about the distinct advantages we enjoy as a nation. The United

States has among its citizens natives of every nation on earth, people who can speak more eloquently about the virtues of democratic government than any Washington bureaucrat or Madison Avenue advertising executive. Similarly, we have citizens who claim nearly every language in existence as their native tongue.

To the extent the United States has underperformed as a nation, it has been in mobilizing these resources. Clausewitz argued that net assessment was a precondition for understanding the nature of a war and developing sound strategy. As he put it, "One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed." [1] The Salafists' center of gravity is support for their cause in the Islamic world. Without people willing to incite, fund, and ultimately die for their cause, the global Salafist jihad cannot continue. Conversely, political will represents the U.S. center of gravity. Unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Salafists cannot destroy the United States. The best they can hope to achieve is to inflict so much damage that the U.S. government chooses to withdraw from the Islamic world.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THIS WAR?

One of 20th century's most able strategists, Winston S. Churchill, drew a distinction between short and long wars. Speaking in some of the darkest days of World War I, he noted optimistically:

The old wars were decided by their episodes rather than by their tendencies. In this war the tendencies are far more important than the episodes. Without winning any sensational victories, we may win this war. We may win it even during a continuance of extremely disappointing and vexatious events . . . Some . . . are hypnotized by German military pomp and precision. They see the glitter, they see the episode; but what they do not see or realize is the capacity of the ancient and mighty nations against whom Germany is warring to endure adversity, to put up with disappointment and

mismanagement, to recreate and renew their strength, to toil on with boundless obstinacy through boundless suffering to the achievement of the greatest cause for which men have ever fought. [18]

Beyond his soaring rhetoric, Churchill reminds us that in protracted wars, battlefield triumph brings success, not victory. The 9/11 attacks (and, for that matter, the liberation of Afghanistan) were “episodes.” Something more will be needed to achieve ultimate victory.

The intractability of the conflict, combined with the inability of either side to destroy the other, means that this will be a protracted war. In some respects, it resembles previous protracted conflicts, like the Peloponnesian War, the Punic Wars, and the Cold War. Unlike those wars, however, this conflict is highly asymmetric. The Peloponnesian War was waged by coalitions of Greek city-states, while the Cold War occurred between two superpowers and their allies. Whatever their differences—and they were significant—the belligerents in past protracted wars had much more in common than our current adversaries and we do.

This protracted war has several facets that are distinct and yet linked. First, it is a war between the Salafist Islamic network and the United States. Second, it is a war between individual Salafist groups and regimes in the Islamic world that they see as apostate. Third, it is an insurgency within the Islamic world. [19] And finally, it is—at least for the jihadists—a “clash of civilizations.” Overall, however, it is best characterized as a protracted, global insurgency. It is a war in which both power and ideas play a central role.

It is hazardous to predict the course of a protracted war. The southern leaders who launched the American Civil War could hardly have imagined that the conflict would end in the defeat of the Confederacy and the devastation of the South. The monarchs who launched World War I could hardly have imagined that it would lead to their ouster and the wholesale reconstitution of Europe. History is a strong antidote to those who see outcomes as preordained.

Still, the study of past protracted wars does point to the elements of a successful strategy. First, coalitions play an important role in determining success or failure in such conflicts. The Peloponnesian League, and ultimately Persia, gave Sparta an edge over Athens and the Delian League during the Peloponnesian War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization clearly gave the United States an edge over the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Coalitions—on both sides—will affect the course and outcome of this war as well.

Coalitions clearly play an important role for the United States. We require access to partners' territory to seek out and destroy terrorist cells or to assist them in doing so themselves. We also need bases to allow us access to neighboring areas. And cooperation with foreign intelligence services is crucial. Coalition partners bring with them important expertise. Egyptians, for example, have much greater insight into their own Salafist groups than do Americans. More basically, the existence of a broad international coalition against terrorism helps legitimize our actions against Salafist groups.

The U.S. government should think of ways to forge alliances with groups within states as well. There are some precedents for such activities. The United States was able to enter into a *de facto* coalition with the Northern Alliance and Pashtun tribal groups in Afghanistan, and to use that coalition to oust the Taliban and evict their al Qaeda guests. There may be other places where subnational groups can give us access and exploit fissures in local societies to our benefit.

Less commented upon is the fact that Salafist groups require coalitions for their long-term success. These take several forms. Some involve states. During the 1990s, Sudan, then Afghanistan, provided al Qaeda a sanctuary that the group used as a base of operations. While no state currently provides such a safe haven, it is conceivable that one could emerge in the future in, say, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt. The bigger problem is the presence of Salafist networks in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Certainly, these underground cells have less freedom of action in these states than their counterparts did in Sudan or Afghanistan. On the other

hand, they are more difficult to identify and strike. Salafists also are able to exploit failed states, such as Somalia, and ungoverned areas, such as parts of Indonesia and the Philippines.

Al Qaeda is itself a coalition. It is both an international movement and a collection of national and regional movements brought together under the banner of the World Islamic Front Against Crusaders and Jews. Indeed, even they speak in these terms. As Ayman al-Zawahiri has written:

A fundamentalist coalition is taking shape. It is made up of the jihad movements in the various lands of Islam as well as the two countries that have been liberated in the name of jihad for the sake of God (Afghanistan and Chechnya). If this coalition is still at an early stage, its growth is increasingly and steadily increasing. It represents a growing power that is rallying under the banner of jihad for the sake of God and operating outside the scope of the new world order. [13]

This coalition includes Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Algeria's Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et la Combat (GSPC), and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq.

This protracted war will challenge the cohesion of our coalition and that of our adversaries. In long wars, disputes over aims or strategy, or both, often weaken coalitions. Perceptions of inequalities of burden or risk over time can also damage them. The invasion of Iraq demonstrated the fragility of the U.S.-led coalition. Yet, the Islamic world is hardly united. Indeed, it is riven by competing ethnic, political, and sectarian identities. The Salafists face considerable barriers in trying to build and maintain their own coalition. One of the most important tasks facing the United States over the long term is to hold our coalition together while preventing Salafist Islamic groups from expanding their coalition and eventually fracturing it.

Second, public support is key to the long-term effectiveness of both the United States and Salafist groups. Military success or failure will win or lose hearts and minds, breeding respect if

not love. The U.S. government must take pains to provide the American people tangible proof during the course of the war that we are making progress and that the United States will eventually prevail. Conversely, U.S. strategy should seek to deny the Salafists the incremental victories they need to sustain and build support over the long term. It should portray Salafists as losers rather than heroes. Should they prove inept or ineffective, they will lose support.

Incremental dividends are important for the Salafists as well. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks demonstrated the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland and increased significantly the profile of such groups. Their long-term viability depends upon repeated demonstrations of their effectiveness.

Iraq has become a battlefield in the global Salafist jihad. Indeed, Zawahiri has congratulated Zarqawi on “fighting in the heart of the Islamic world, which was formerly the field for major battles in Islam’s history, and [which] is now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era.” The presence of large numbers of U.S. forces presents opportunities for jihadists to inflict damage on the United States in the heart of the Muslim world. Should the Salafists force the United States out of Iraq or cripple the new Iraqi government, they will achieve an incremental victory. The establishment of a moderate and pluralistic Iraq, by contrast, would be a victory for the United States.

Withdrawal from Iraq is not an attractive option for the United States. The jihadists portray the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the late 1980s as a major victory, one that emboldened them to take on the world’s remaining superpower. They similarly invoke the U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and Lebanon as signs of American weakness. The U.S. government must be mindful of how our troops leave Iraq. We must do so in victory, both real and perceived, both in the United States and—perhaps more importantly—in the Islamic world.

CHARTING THE COURSE OF THE WAR

As Clausewitz noted, wars have a tendency to escalate. This is particularly true of protracted wars, where passion and the

thirst for victory combine to expand the scope and increase the intensity of a conflict. The Peloponnesian War, which began with limited attacks, ended with the overthrow of Athenian democracy. The Punic Wars famously concluded with the utter destruction of Carthage.

The current war could escalate in a number of ways. First, it could intensify in terms of the means employed to prosecute it. One justifiable concern is that a Salafist group could obtain and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

Second, it could escalate in terms of the passions involved. An overly zealous prosecution of the GWOT could, for example, drive more and more Muslims into the Salafist camp. This war could, in other words, become a true clash of civilizations, pitting the Islamic world—or a substantial part of it—against the West.

Third, the war could escalate geographically. Although Salafist Islamic groups have a presence in many areas, Salafist activity is most pronounced in three: Central Asia (centered on Afghanistan and Pakistan), Southwest Asia (centered on Iraq), and Southeast Asia (centered on Indonesia). The July 2005 London bombings are evidence that Europe is becoming an active theater as well.

In the future, other areas, such as North and Sub-Saharan Africa, could also become active. Salafist Islamic groups could also gain a new sanctuary and sponsor. We need to understand which theaters they consider primary and which they see as secondary. We also need to understand which targets, such as Madrid and London, the jihadists see as particularly lucrative.

One of the key decisions that policy makers will face will be when to open a new theater of war. On the one hand, expanding the scope of operations may yield incremental victories that could shorten the war. On the other hand, expanding the scope of the war would further divide limited, even scarce resources. Moreover, a theater might assume a disproportionate weight in the overall effort. Although success in Iraq, for example, is now of central importance, it cannot help but siphon off resources that could be used elsewhere.

Although it is impossible to predict with any confidence the course or outcome of this war, it is worthwhile exploring scenarios that could influence its conduct. They are necessarily speculative, meant to serve a heuristic rather than prescriptive purpose. A wide range of scenarios can be envisioned, but three in particular stand out as worthy of analysis. The first would be a Salafist nuclear attack on a U.S. city. Such an act would not only kill or wound thousands, it would also serve as a tangible demonstration of the continuing ability of al Qaeda to strike the United States. As such, it would likely shake confidence in the United States and could boost support for Salafist groups within the Islamic world.

A massive attack on the United States would also stoke a demand for vengeance among the U.S. public. The U.S. government would be under considerable pressure to retaliate, perhaps including even the use of nuclear weapons. One possibility would be for the United States to strike at the source of the nuclear weapon or at states that have supported our enemies, regardless of the origin of the specific attack. This, in turn, could lead to a further escalation of the conflict in the Islamic world.

A second scenario worth considering would be the rise to power of a Salafist regime in the Islamic world, either through an election, a *coup d'état*, or a civil war. In the Cold War, the United States faced the combination of a military superpower and a powerful transnational ideology. The fact that there is no Islamic superpower in the current war is a significant benefit to the United States. Salafist Islamic groups lack even the sanctuary offered by the Taliban in Afghanistan, let alone a nuclear-armed power. If one were to emerge, such a development could change the nature of the war markedly.

Salafist groups would seize upon such a revolution as tangible evidence that time was on their side, raising morale among their supporters. The existence of a Salafist state would also increase significantly the resources available to radical Islamists. A radical Saudi Arabia would put its vast oil wealth at the disposal of Salafist groups, while a radical Pakistan could provide Salafists the nuclear weapons they crave.

Such a scenario might not be an unalloyed tragedy, however. It is likely that the advent of a Salafist state would lead to disputes over leadership of and legitimacy in the Salafist world, much as the establishment of the Soviet state affected the international communist movement. Moreover, like their Soviet predecessors, the insurgents-cum-statesmen would have to balance efforts to spread the revolution with the need to defend their state. Admittedly, control of Afghanistan through the Taliban did not make Usama bin Laden more statesmanlike. A Salafist state might more closely resemble revolutionary Iran, which militantly tried to push its revolution abroad through conventional military power, terrorism, and subversion until it was soundly defeated on multiple fronts.

Not all scenarios need be so bleak. A more positive, though still challenging, scenario would involve the capture or killing of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Such an event would be an important incremental U.S. victory against Salafist Islam. The ensuing succession struggle could result in the further decentralization of the Salafist network. It could also lead to the ascension of a Salafist leadership with a strategy that differed from bin Laden's. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, for example, has consciously targeted the Shi'a in a bid to promote sectarian violence, a strategy that bin Laden and Zawahiri have rejected. His ascent, or that of someone with similar proclivities, could exacerbate tensions within the Islamic world.

Killing or capturing bin Laden and Zawahiri might not, however, be an unalloyed good. It might, for example, give U.S. allies whose opposition to Salafist Islam has been at best lukewarm the opportunity to declare victory and reduce or eliminate their support.

TOWARD A STRATEGY

Three types of strategy are at least theoretically feasible: accommodation, containment, or elimination. [20] In practice, however, the range of strategic choices is narrower.

Accommodation with al Qaeda is infeasible, at least in the near term. Given the expansive aims of Salafist groups, it is hard to see how accommodation could make sense as a strategy. The United States is unlikely to abandon friendly regimes and withdraw from the Islamic world. If we did, such a move would likely stoke rather than quench the appetite of the Salafists.

The United States and its allies may, however, be able to accommodate some affiliated groups, such as those that renounce violence and agree to work peacefully within the political system. Indeed, this is the path that some jihadist groups have already taken.

There may also be areas where it makes sense to eliminate some irritants, as the Bush administration did when it decided to withdraw U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War.

Containment is also infeasible. It is hard to see how containment, developed during the early Cold War to deal with the Soviet Union, could fruitfully be applied to terrorist networks. Unlike the situation during the Cold War, there exists between the United States and Salafist groups no mutual deterrence to moderate behavior. Indeed, there is no superpower to enforce discipline in the Islamic world. More fundamentally, the oil wealth of the greater Middle East makes “containing” Salafist Islam to that region infeasible.

As a result, the only feasible strategy will couple a campaign to destroy Salafist networks with efforts to reduce recruitment and counter Salafist ideology. Capturing and killing terrorists is important, but it will have a negligible impact if they are replaced by new recruits. What is far more important in the long term is to dry up the source of those recruits. In the Cold War, for example, the United States and its allies had to not only deter a Soviet attack, but also weaken the economic underpinnings of the Soviet system while working to discredit communism.

First, the United States needs to undermine the appeal of Salafist ideology. Al Qaeda's leadership clearly sees this war as a battle over the hearts and minds of Muslims. In his July 2005 letter to Zarqawi, Zawahiri writes about the need to maintain popular support and urges Zarqawi to stop beheading hostages. He also urges Zarqawi to begin building a broad-based political movement that would include not only Salafists, but also other schools of Sunni jurisprudence. The United States needs to prevent the Salafist jihad from metastasizing into a broader political movement. Rather, we should work to undermine and marginalize it.

Second, we should exacerbate tensions within the Salafist community. We know of significant disputes within al Qaeda, for example, over hierarchy, succession, ideology, aims, and strategy. [21] The most recent, and most public, such conflict is that over Zarqawi's brutal tactics. Zarqawi has declared war on the Shi'a and justified killing civilians, a position renounced by many, including other Iraqi insurgent groups. To the extent we can, we should encourage such debates because they expose al Qaeda's extremism and could undermine the theological basis of its tactic of suicide bombing. Revulsion over suicide attacks has the potential to de-legitimize the activity and divert potential recruits away from it.

Although Salafist groups espouse a global revolution, they also have local political agendas. The United States and its allies should seek ways to sharpen the conflict between national and pan-Islamic identities. In 2001, the United States was able to pit Afghans against al Qaeda's "Arabs." There are signs in Iraq today of splits between Iraqi insurgents and "foreign fighters." Such an approach should be pursued more systematically.

Another tension is that between those who seek to overthrow local regimes and those more interested in striking the United States and its non-Muslim allies. Ayman al-Zawahiri's account of the history of the Salafi Islamic movement reflects such tensions:

Another important issue is the fact that these battles that were waged under non-Muslim banners or under mixed banners caused the dividing lines between friends and enemies to become blurred. The Muslim youths began to have doubts about who was the enemy. Was it the foreign enemy that occupied Muslim territory, or was it the domestic enemy that prohibited government by Islamic shari'ah, repressed the Muslims, and disseminated immorality under the slogans of progressiveness, liberty, nationalism, and liberation? [16]

The development of democratic political institutions in the Muslim world would likely reduce the strength of the Salafist jihad by bringing groups with local grievances into the political process.

The United States needs to think of better ways to exploit the heterogeneity of the Islamic world. Individuals have multiple identities, of which religious affiliation is but one. Often, national identity and religious identity are in opposition. Moreover, in some states, such as Indonesia, Islam forms a veneer covering a rich pre-Islamic civilization. It is also important for the United States and its allies to engage those parts of the Islamic world that do not share the Salafist ideology. These areas need to be supported and strengthened.

Third, the United States needs to work to undermine the trust that binds together terrorist networks. Salafist Islamic terror networks are the product of a secretive, conspiratorial worldview. The difficulty of penetrating such a mindset makes it difficult to win hearts and minds. On the other hand, the paranoia of such groups can be turned against them. To the extent possible, we should foment mistrust among Salafists. Groups whose attention is focused inward of necessity spend less effort on planning terrorist attacks.

Finally, it is worth remembering that war is interactive. In a protracted war, both sides must adapt to succeed; often it is the side that does the best job of adapting that is the eventual winner. The aftermath of World War II and the Cold War, for example, led

the United States to accept a sustained international presence and a large standing army. This war will change us as well, likely in ways that we can scarcely imagine today.

To return to the beginning, it is worth asking once again what victory in this war will look like.

“Victory will include dismantling the global Salafist jihad into its constituent parts and reducing those parts to the level of a nuisance, groups that can be tracked and handled by local law enforcement groups.”

Like communists in the early 21st century, Salafists of the future will still exist, particularly in the more backward corners of the globe, but will inspire bemusement rather than terror.

Such an outcome is not, however, inevitable. Nor is it a near-term possibility. This war will not be won, if it is to be won, by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party. It will be won, if it is to be won, by the full resources of the nation. It is thus imperative that we craft a sustainable, bipartisan strategy for waging this war. We need to gird ourselves for a long war, cognizant of the dangers we face but also confident in our ability to prevail.

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Q: *Peter Sharfman, Miter Corporation – I guess this is more of a comment than a question. As I understood General Zinni's remarks, especially at the beginning, his long answer to the one question, this isn't really about identifying an enemy and defeating that enemy. This is about identifying situations in the world which, because the world is so globalized, we can't afford to ignore; which generate political forces which would do us harm.*

And so it's not about finding an enemy and rendering that enemy powerless; it's about playing a major part, although doing the whole job, of managing the evolution of the world in directions that throw up weak forces that threaten us rather than directions that throw up strong forces that threaten us. I don't know whether you would call that a war or not. But it seemed to me that your analysis, starting by saying that this is a strange sort of war, failed to draw the conclusion that it is therefore a strange sort of victory that we should be looking for.

Prof. Thomas Mahnken – Well, I think the idea that we're not going to defeat our adversaries on the battlefield, that they will sort of fade away, seems to me to be a strange sort of victory. But look—as to the characterization as to whether or not this is a war or not, I think you see two different perspectives. One, very much as General Zinni characterized it, is you have economic problems, you have political problems, and these can spill over and become problems for us that we need to deal with. The other, and this is my view, is that those circumstances certainly exist, and they promote groups of individuals who have political aims and use military force against us and against others to achieve those aims. That is a war. At least from that perspective, that is a war in the classical sense. So, in that sense, yes, we do face a war because we just don't face bad people who were mistreated by their parents or were malnourished or something. We face a determined set of adversaries who have a political program and who are using military force to achieve that.

Now, in countering them, military force is only one of the tools. That is why I think characterizing this as an insurgency is a valuable lens through which we should view this because the use of military force is only a small part of countering insurgency. You need to use military force, but you also need to develop the

institutions that ultimately deal with the insurgency. So, I think the conditions are important. I think economic development is important. I think political reform is actually extremely important. I think there actually is a strategic rationale for democracy promotion, and we could talk about that.

But I wouldn't leave out the military part, and I wouldn't leave out the fact that we face adversaries who think strategically, who are not irrational, who are actually quite rational, and who have aims and are using force to achieve those aims. Because if we ignore that, again, we're trying to develop a strategy with one arm tied behind our back. Our adversary's strategy contains contradictions that we can exploit, as I tried to point out in a couple of ways, to ultimately defeat them. Other questions?

Q: *Jerry Yonas, Sandia – This is going to be a protracted global war. It is likely that over many decades nuclear weapons will proliferate and will wind up in the hands of the adversaries. So, one could realistically imagine a detonation of a nuclear weapon somewhere in the world. How would that affect your strategy?*

Prof. Thomas Mahnken – Excellent point. I mentioned just in passing that, in a protracted war, you need to think about that war evolving in unexpected ways. Certainly, that is the case in protracted wars. The monarchs who launched World War I could scarcely have imagined that the war was going to wind up with their overthrow and the remaking of Europe.

I think one of the scenarios that is worth thinking about is what happens if a nuclear weapon is used, maybe not just somewhere in the world, but specifically against the United States. I think, just as a thought experiment, that one of the things that is likely to happen is that—not to be too pat about it—it's going to make lots of Americans extremely mad. It will make them mad at the people who perpetrated it. It may also make them mad at their own government.

Again, depending on what the context is, it could lead to a major rewriting of the rules of the game. The real answer is, we don't know until it happens. But it could lead to further escalation of passions. And, particularly if we are positing a nuclear weapon

with no return address, it could lead to—just hypothetically—we don't know where this came from, but we know that there are a lot of extremists in Pakistan, and that's a good enough a return address for us. I don't know.

I can't give you the answer, but it certainly is something that is worthy of some sustained intellectual effort to think it through. All I can say is that it would significantly change the nature of this war, and we need to be thinking more about it. For no other reason, leaders need to be thinking about it because these types of events tend to unleash all sorts of forces over which they have very little control. Other questions?

Q. *Sir, my name is Charles Knighten and I'm from CENTRA Tech. Sir, I fully appreciate your comment about analysis currently being mass production. I think we've all seen that. Analysis is kind of a lost skill. We kind of measure intelligence by volume rather than from its quality. My question is, we understand we need to grow analysts now, but what will we do about the leadership, the decision maker? How do they use intelligence? I think that's a lost art as well.*

Prof. Thomas Mahnken – Well, thanks for asking the easy question. One of the courses I teach at SAIS is about intelligence and policy making, and this is one of the central difficulties. Decision makers, by and large, are smart people, very experienced people. In some cases, particularly now in this time period where the analytical workforce is rather young, on average, we actually have a lot more experience in the analysts who are providing them information. So, it's a challenge.

We live in a system where elected political leadership runs the show. I think the best thing that analysts can do is to follow their convictions, follow the evidence, and try to be as persuasive as they can. Sometimes, political leaders or career leaders, professional leaders in terms of the military, will pay attention, and sometimes they won't. And sometimes they will be right, and sometimes they will be wrong. I don't know.

I think one of the things that we do know about expert judgment, expert political judgment is that—somewhat paradoxically—the higher you get in any system, the more you are seen as an expert,

and the less you actually pay attention to outside information. You tend to trust your own expertise, and you have a stake in things, and you tend not to want to change your view. That's true in national security, but it's also true in all fields, really. It has to do with human cognitive psychology, more than anything else.

So I don't know that there is a satisfying answer to your very apropos and challenging question, except that we are in the process as a nation of rethinking or thinking about what this is all about. We still have the baggage, if you will, of the Cold War, of previous experience. Over time, that will change. I don't know that in the end, one group or another—analysts, policy makers, just plain public citizens—has a monopoly on wisdom as to the nature of the era we're in and where it's going. We're kind of all in this together. One last quick question?

Q: *Yes, I'm Eric Thorsos from the Applied Physics Laboratory at the University of Washington. One of the elements feeding this conflict is the religious schools or madrassas that are indoctrinating young boys. Do you think that countering or making fundamental changes in this will be necessary to have a victory in this conflict?*

Prof. Thomas Mahnken – A question about madrassas. Look, there are people who are far more knowledgeable about this than I. My understanding is that the madrassas really don't play the type of role or certainly the type of powerful role that is often portrayed in shaping people's views. We'll talk about terrorist networks later on in the conference and see how it comes up there. Kind of more broadly, because part of the nature of this war is that it's an insurgency within the Islamic world, ultimately there is only so much that the United States can or should do. Much of what needs to happen needs to happen within the Islamic world, and that includes what education means, the content of education, and so forth. I think some of the most damning statistics that are out there are the statistics on Arab development showing, for example, the extremely low rates of translation and publication of books in the Islamic world. So I think the madrassas are only a symptom of a larger problem, which is some real intellectual problems with parts of the Islamic world and dealing with modernity.

But in the end, as I said, the United States can certainly make a lot of enemies trying to fix these problems, and we may not be able to make a lot of friends. A lot of this needs to be done at arm's length. Thank you for your time, and I don't want to get between you and lunch.

1.2 MODERN WARFARE EVOLVES INTO A FOURTH GENERATION

Thomas X. Hammes

Fourth-generation warfare (4GW), which is now playing out in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, is an evolved form of insurgency. Those who wage it do not seek military victory; they seek to convince the enemy's political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. This type of insurgency is rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.

Evolving over the last 70 years, 4GW has become the dominant form of warfare. Evolving out of Mao's concept of People's War, 4GW has changed in concert with the political, economic, social, and technical changes in society as a whole. In particular, 4GW organizations have evolved into true networks, with elements residing both in real and cyber space.

Fourth-generation wars are the only type of war the United States has lost (Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia). Fourth-generation wars also defeated the Soviets (Afghanistan, Chechnya), the French (Vietnam, Algeria), and the Israelis (Lebanon). Without question, it has been the most successful form of warfare of the last 50 years.

This form of warfare makes use of all of society's networks—political, economic, social, and military—to carry on the fight.

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Organized to ensure political rather than military success, it is very difficult to defeat. Fourth-generation wars tend to be very long—measured in decades rather than months or years. Political, protracted and networked, 4GW also provides a way for flexible nation states to apply all aspects of national power without exposing themselves to America’s dominant conventional military forces.

A fourth-generation war is fought across the entire spectrum of human activity—political, economic, social, and military. Politically, it involves transnational, national, and sub-national organizations and networks. Strategically, it remains focused on changing the minds of decision makers.

“ . . . we have to learn to fight the fourth-generation wars our enemies see as the only possible way to defeat us. We must understand that nations, as well as movements, can use 4GW to neutralize western military power.”

Operationally, it uses different messages for different target audiences, but all are focused on breaking an opponent’s political will. Tactically, it targets materials present in the society under attack—for example, industrial chemicals, liquefied natural gas tankers, or fertilizer shipments. In Iraq and Afghanistan, 4GW insurgents have used leftover munitions, commercial items (garage door openers, TV remotes, cars, trucks, etc.) to create the improvised explosive devices and car bombs that have fundamentally changed how coalition forces operate.

4GW adversaries are not invincible, e.g., Malaya (1950s), Philippines (1950s), Oman (1970s), El Salvador (1980s), but winning requires coherent, patient action that encompasses the full range of political, economic, social, and military activities. The West cannot force its opponents to fight the short, high-technology wars we easily dominate. Instead, we have to learn to fight the fourth-generation wars our enemies see as the only possible way to defeat us. We must understand that nations, as well as movements, can use 4GW to neutralize western military power.

INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared the end of major combat in Iraq. While most Americans rejoiced at this announcement, those who study history understood that it simply meant the easy part was over. In the months that followed, peace did not break out, and the troops did not come home. In fact, Iraqi insurgents struck back hard. Instead of peace, each day Americans read about another soldier killed, car bombs killing dozens, civilians assassinated, and Iraqi unrest. Almost three years later, the violence continues as the Iraqi authorities struggle to provide security for their people and work to rebuild their country. Unfortunately, Iraq has become the scene for yet another fourth-generation war.

The Iraqi insurgents have no unifying political agenda except a desire to drive the Coalition out of Iraq. They are using all aspects of society from competing in elections to economic attacks on and threats against the pipelines. The insurgents are assessing a tax on the entire world's economy by raising the price of oil. Socially, they are stressing the religious and cultural differences between the Arab Sunnis and Shias and between the Arabs and Kurds. They clearly hope such attacks will weaken the Iraqi government while simultaneously bringing economic and political pressure to bear on the United States.

At the same time things were degenerating in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan also moved into 4GW. Decisively defeated in the conventional campaign by a combination of U.S. firepower and Northern Alliance troops, the anti-Coalition forces have gone back to the style of warfare that succeeded against the Soviets. The war in Afghanistan has settled into a classic 4GW contest. The government and its allies are trying to bring effective governance to the people through the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Their long-term efforts have decidedly improved the conditions in the areas they operate. Unfortunately, U.S. and government casualties have increased each year as the remnants of the Taliban moved to areas the government does not control and continue a long-term guerrilla campaign.

During the same period, al Qaeda and its affiliates managed a series of high-profile attacks in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Spain, and Britain. They are promising a major attack on the United States. Despite the Bush administration's declaration of victory in Iraq and Afghanistan, the war on terror has not been an entirely one-sided fight.

As debilitating and regular as these 4GW attacks are, this kind of warfare is not new or surprising but has been evolving around the world over the last seven decades. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have moved from third-generation warfare (3GW), America's forte, to 4GW. It is much too early to predict the outcome of either fight, but the anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq are attempting to fold their 4GW tactics into integrated 4GW strategic campaigns. At the same time, al Qaeda is maintaining its own strategic campaign to defeat the United States and our allies.

Waging a modern form of insurgency, the practitioners of 4GW use all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince an enemy's political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. This type of insurgency is rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.

4GW does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the soft networks of social, cultural, and economic ties; disinformation campaigns; innovative political activity; and constant low-level terrorist actions against a wide range of targets, it attempts to destroy the enemy's political will directly. Finally, fourth-generation wars are lengthy—measured in decades rather than months or years.

Our opponents in various parts of the world know 4GW is the only kind of war America has ever lost. And they know we have lost three times: Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria and the USSR in Afghanistan. It continues to bleed Russia in Chechnya and the U.S. in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas where we are engaged

in the global war on terror. This record of defeat of major powers by much weaker fourth-generation opponents makes it essential to understand this new form of warfare and adapt accordingly.

Fortunately, there is nothing mysterious about 4GW. Like all wars, it seeks to defeat the enemy. Like all wars, it uses available weapons systems to achieve that end. Like all wars, it reflects the society that spawned it. Like all generations of war, it has evolved in consonance with society as a whole. It evolved because practical people solved specific problems related to their fights against much more powerful enemies. Practitioners created it, nurtured it, and have continued its development and growth. Faced with enemies they could not possibly beat using conventional war, they sought a different path.

RECENT RECORD OF UNCONVENTIONAL VERSUS CONVENTIONAL WAR

Since World War II, wars have been a mixed bag of conventional and unconventional. Conventional wars—the Korean War, the Israeli-Arab wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973, the Falklands War, the Iran-Iraq war, and the first Gulf War—have ended with a return to the strategic status quo. While some territory changed hands, and, in some cases, regimes changed, each state essentially came out of the war with largely the same political, economic, and social structure with which it entered. In short, the strategic situation of the participants did not change significantly.

In sharp contrast, unconventional wars—the Communist revolution in China, the First and Second Indochina Wars, the Algerian War of Independence, the Sandinista struggle in Nicaragua, the Iranian revolution, the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s, the first Intifada, and the Hezbollah campaign in South Lebanon—display a markedly different pattern. Each ended with major changes in the political, economic, and social structure of the territories involved. While not necessarily for the better, the changes were distinct. Even those unconventional wars where the insurgents lost (Malaya, Philippines, Oman, El Salvador) led to significant changes. The message is clear for anyone wishing

to shift the political balance of power: only unconventional war works against established powers.

WAR EVOLVES

Mao Tse-Tung was the first to define modern insurgency as a political struggle and use it successfully. Clearly not the first guerrilla, Mao drew heavily on Sun Tzu in developing his approach to war. There are also some indications he was influenced by Michael Collins' campaign to free Ireland from British occupation. But I credit Mao as the originator of 4GW because he was the first to write his theories down in a simple, usable form that virtually became "the book" for insurgents worldwide. Prior to Mao, guerrillas focused on the military aspects of fighting an opponent. Mao shifted the emphasis to the political arena. He changed it from a form of war focused purely on military attrition to one focused on directly attacking the will of the enemy decision makers.

Each practitioner since Mao has learned from his predecessors or co-combatants in various places in the world. Then, usually through a painful process of trial and error, each has adjusted the lessons to his own fight. Each added his own refinement. The cumulative result is a new approach to war. The anti-coalition forces in Iraq, the Taliban, the Chechens, and the al Qaeda network are simply the latest to use an approach that has been developing for decades.

For the last 50 years, 4GW has been the dominant form of war. Over this period, insurgency evolved into 4GW. Mao's original concept called for three phases in an insurgency: political organization to build a power base, insurgency to "change the correlation of forces" between the insurgent and the government, and a final conventional campaign where the insurgent formed regular forces to defeat the weakened government forces.

Today, 4GW practitioners no longer plan on a final military campaign. They plan to directly break the will of the enemy decision makers. With the loss of will, the enemy withdraws, and the insurgents sort out amongst the various groups how the country will be run.

4GW has evolved to take advantage of the extensive networks inherent in a modern society to attack the will of enemy decision makers directly. Studying the unconventional wars of the last 50 years shows the strategic, political, operational, and tactical characteristics of 4GW.

STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF 4GW

Strategically, 4GW attempts to directly change the minds of enemy policy makers, but not through the traditional method of superiority on the battlefield. The first- through third- generation objective of destroying the enemy's armed forces and his capacity to regenerate them is not how 4GW enemies plan to defeat their opponents. Both the epic, decisive battles of the Napoleonic era and the wide-ranging high-speed maneuver campaigns of the 20th century are irrelevant to 4GW.

4GW victories are accomplished through the superior use of all available networks to directly defeat the will of the enemy leadership—specifically, to convince them that their war aims are either unachievable or too costly. Specific messages are targeted to policy makers and to those who can influence them. Although tailored for various audiences, each message is designed to achieve the basic purpose of war, i.e., change an opponent's political position on a matter of national interest.

The fights in Iraq and Afghanistan show these characteristics. In each, the insurgent is sending one message to his supporters, another to the mass of the undecided population, and a third to the Coalition decision makers. The message to supporters is, "we are defending the faith and their country against outside invaders." The message to uncommitted or pro-coalition countrymen is, "this is a fight between us and the invaders. Stay out of it or you will get hurt. You know the Americans will eventually leave and we will still be here." Finally, their message to the Coalition, particularly to Americans, is, "unless you withdraw, you are engaged in an endless and costly fight."

4GW is not bloodless. In fact, as we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestinian areas, most 4GW casualties are civilians. Further, many casualties are not caused

by military weapons but rather by materials available within the society. This aspect is an essential feature of 4GW that we must understand: the 4GW opponent does not have to build the warfighting infrastructure essential to earlier generations of war.

As displayed in the Beirut bombings, the Khobar Tower bombing, the Northern Ireland campaign, the African Embassy bombings, the 9/11 attacks, the rail attacks in Spain and Britain, and the ongoing bombing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, 4GW practitioners are making more and more use of materials available within the society they are attacking. This allows them to take a very different strategic approach. It relieves the adversaries of the strategic necessity of defending core production assets, leaving them free to focus on offense rather than defense. It also relieves them of the logistics burden of moving supplies long distances. Instead, they need move only money and ideas—both of which can be digitized and moved instantly.

The importance of the media in shaping the policy of the participants will continue to increase. We saw a demonstration of this when U.S. interest in Somalia, previously negligible, was stimulated by the repeated images of thousands of starving Somali children. Conversely, the images of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets ended that commitment. The media will continue to be a major factor from the strategic to the tactical level. In fact, worldwide media exposure can quickly give a tactical action strategic impact.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

In the political arena, 4GW fighters will exploit international, transnational, national, and sub-national networks for their own purposes. Internationally there are a growing variety of “networks” available – the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Bank, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and dozens of others. Each organization has a different function in international affairs, but each has its own vulnerabilities and can be used to convey a political message to its leadership and from there to targeted capital cities. While these international organizations may not be capable of directly

changing the minds of national leaders, they can be used to slow or paralyze an international response.

The prime objective of the 4GW practitioner is to create a political paralysis in both the international organizations (not usually a difficult task) and in the target nation (difficulty varies with the nation being targeted.) However, in addition to mounting normal political attacks, 4GW planners can influence other aspects of the target society. They know that the security situation in a country has a direct effect on the ability of that nation to get loans. The international marketplace is a swift and impersonal judge of credit worthiness. The attacker thus has a very different avenue for affecting the position of a nation—the mere threat of action may be enough to impact the financial status of the target nation and encourage them to negotiate. Therefore, if the objective is simply to paralyze the political processes of a target nation, there are a number of ways to create that effect.

In Iraq, attacks on oil production infrastructure have painfully illustrated this tack. The Nigerian rebels have also used the threat to oil production to force negotiations on the Nigerian government. The fact that oil prices were at an all-time high gave the rebels more leverage because each day's delay increased the costs to the Nigerian government. As the world becomes ever more interconnected, the potential for varied approaches of attack increases, with the reinforcing effects.

A coherent 4GW plan will always exploit transnational elements in a variety of ways. The vehicles may include not only extremist belief-based organizations like Islamic Jihad, but also nationalistic organizations such as the Palestinians and Kurds, mainline Christian churches, humanitarian organizations, economic structures such as the stock and bond markets, and even criminal organizations such as narco-traffickers and arms merchants. The key traits of transnational organizations are that none are contained completely within a recognized nation state's borders, none have official members that report back to nation states, and they owe no loyalty to any nation—and sometimes very little loyalty to their own organizations.

The use of such transnational elements will vary with the strategic situation. But they provide a variety of possibilities. They can be a source of recruits. They can be used—at times unwittingly—as a cover to move people and assets. They can be an effective source of funds—charitable organizations have supported terrorist organizations as diverse as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and al Qaeda. During the 1970s, for example, Irish bars on the east coast of America often had jars where patrons could donate to the ‘cause.’ The purported purpose of the money was to provide support to Irish families, when in fact much of it went directly to support IRA insurgent operations.

“Traditional diplomatic channels, both official and unofficial, are still important but are no longer the only pathway for communication and influence.”

At times, entire organizations can be used openly to support the position of the 4GW operator. Usually this is done when the organization genuinely agrees with the position of one of the antagonists, but false flag operations are also viable. Such support can lend great legitimacy to a movement and even reverse long-held international views of a specific situation.

Increasingly, insurgents are becoming transdimensional organizations. They are operating seamlessly across both real and cyber space. As the West has succeeded in closing training facilities and destroying cells around the world, al Qaeda has moved onto the web for recruiting, indoctrination, training, education, planning, and arranging travel. They have created virtual terrorist universities as well as training camps online.

National political institutions are primary targets for 4GW messages. Insurgents fighting the United States—whether the North Vietnamese, the Sandinistas, or the Palestinians—know who controls the purse strings. If the Congress cuts off funds, the U.S. allies lose their wars. Thus, Congressmen have been targeted with the message, “the war is unwinnable and it makes no sense to keep fighting it.” The Sandinistas even worked hard to make

individual Congressmen part of their “network” by sponsoring trips for Congressional aides and mainline church groups to insurgent-held areas in Nicaragua. The goal was to convince their guests that Somoza’s government was indeed corrupt, so that they would actively lobby other Congressional aides and the Congressmen themselves to cut off aid to Somoza. Nongovernmental national groups are also major players in shaping national policies—churches, diaspora associations, business groups, and even lobbying firms. We must assume 4GW opponents will continue these efforts.

Sub-national organizations can represent both groups who are minorities in their traditional homelands, such as the Basque and those who are self-selecting minorities, such as the Sons of Liberty and the Aryan Nation. These groups are in unusual positions: they can be either enemies or allies of the established power, depending upon who best serves their interests. Even more challenging, because they are not in fact unified groups, one element of a sub-national group may support the government while another element supports the insurgent.

Political alliances, interests, and positions among and between insurgents will change according to various political, economic, social, and military aspects of the conflict. While fluctuating positions has been a factor in all wars (Italy changed sides in the middle of World War II, the biggest conventional war of all time), it will be prevalent in 4GW. It is much easier for nonstate entities (tribes, clans, businesses, criminal groups, racial groups, sub-national groups, and transnational groups) to change sides than it is for nation states or national groups. A government usually ties itself to a specific cause and has to convince decision makers or its people to support it. Thus, it can be very awkward for that government to change sides in mid-conflict without losing the confidence of its people. Often, the act of changing sides will lead to the fall of the government. In contrast, nonstate entities get involved only for their own needs, and if these needs shift, they can easily shift loyalties. In Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and innumerable skirmishes in Africa, alliances shift like a kaleidoscope.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL TECHNIQUES

To impact this wide variety of networks effectively, the 4GW operational planner must seek different pathways for various messages. Traditional diplomatic channels, both official and unofficial, are still important but are no longer the only pathway for communication and influence. Other networks rival the prominence of the official ones. The media have become a primary avenue, as has been painfully obvious in places like Vietnam, the West Bank, and Iraq. Fortunately, the media's sheer diversity and fragmentation make it much more challenging for either side to control the media message.

Professional lobbying groups have proven effective, too. An increasingly important avenue is the internet and the power it provides grass roots campaigns. Whether it's the international campaign to ban landmines or Zarkawi's terror campaign in Iraq, the internet provides an alternate channel for high-impact messages unfiltered by editors or political influence.

A key factor in a 4GW campaign is that the audience is not a simple, unified target. It is increasingly fragmented into interest groups that may realign or even shift sides depending on how a particular campaign affects their issues. During Intifada I, the Palestinians tailored different messages for different constituencies. The Israelis used the same technique during al Aqsa Intifada, and the anti-Coalition forces are doing so today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The United States has been slow to understand the importance of communications, influence, and messages in 4GW. Long after the insurgents had developed a nationwide campaign, U.S. military spokesmen kept insisting that the insurgent attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq were "militarily insignificant"—this at a time each attack was on the front page of major daily newspapers in the United States and Europe. While the actual casualties may have been few, each story reached the decision makers in Congress and the public. Even worse, U.S. efforts to develop a coherent message to the Arab world have been pathetically ineffective.

To succeed, the 4GW operational planner must determine the message he wants to send, the networks best suited to carry those messages, the actions that will cause the network to send the message, and the feedback system that will tell him if the message is being received.

In Bosnia, the seizure of UN hostages by Serb forces during NATO's bombing campaign of 1995 was the first step of such a cycle. The media were used to transmit images of the chained peacekeepers throughout Europe and beyond. Then, the Serbs watched television to determine the response of the various European governments. It allowed them to commit the act, transmit it via various channels, observe the response, and then decide what to do. All this occurred much faster than the bureaucratic reporting processes of NATO for the same cycle.

Operationally, the practitioners of 4GW will pursue a variety of avenues to ensure their tactical techniques lead to the strategic goals. Given that the target of all 4GW actions is the will of enemy decision makers, tactical events will be selected to target an audience with the message the insurgent is trying to send.

During Intifada I, the Palestinians made an operational decision to limit the use of violence. They confronted the Israeli Army not with heavily armed guerrillas but with teenagers armed only with rocks. By doing so, they neutralized U.S. support for Israeli action, froze the Israeli defense forces, and influenced the Israeli national election, which led to the Oslo Accords.

Similarly, the series of bombings conducted by the Iraqi insurgents throughout the fall and winter of 2003-2005 carefully targeted the organizations most helpful to the Coalition Provisional Authority—police, UN, NGOs, coalition partners, the Kurdish political parties, and Shia clerics. Each event was tactically separated by time and space, but each was tied together operationally to attack America's strategic position in the country. This seeming coordination is apparently an example of a self-organizing network.

In Iraq, the United States has found no evidence of a central direction of the insurgency; yet, the pattern of attacks has

represented a coherent approach to driving the Coalition out of the country. How could this be? With no coordination, how could the insurgents seem to be reinforcing each other's actions?

While we do not know for sure, we do know the insurgents could track each attack and, to a degree, measure its effectiveness by monitoring the Iraqi, U.S., and international media. Those attacks that succeeded were quickly emulated; those that failed ceased to be used. The insurgents show many of the characteristics of a self-organizing network. Each attack is designed to prevent a stable, democratic government from emerging. Not all attacks have succeeded, but they have kept UN presence to a minimum and have driven many NGOs out of the country. Further, the Coalition is shrinking, and the insurgency has clearly affected the price of oil. And of course, the threat of instability spreading to the rest of the Gulf increases the upward pressure on oil prices.

"4GW organizations . . . do not see themselves as military organizations but rather as webs that generate the political power central to 4GW. . . . Thus, these organizations are unified by ideas."

The bombing techniques have now moved out to Afghanistan, where the insurgents are adopting many of the tactics seen in Iraq. Whether these actions have been by direct communication with Iraqi insurgents or through observation of results through the media, we cannot determine.

To complicate matters, 4GW includes aspects of earlier generations of war. Even as Israelis struggled with the Intifada, they had to be constantly aware of major conventional forces on their border. Similarly in Vietnam, the United States and, later, South Vietnam had to deal with aggressive, effective fourth-generation guerrillas while always being prepared to deal with major North Vietnamese conventional forces. Clearly, 4GW seeks to place an enemy on the horns of this dilemma. Just as clearly, this approach is intentional, going all the way back to Mao.

Action in one or all of these areas will not be limited to the geographic location (if any) of the antagonists but will take place worldwide. From New York to Bali to Madrid to London, al Qaeda and, increasingly, its nonaffiliated adherents have forcefully illustrated this scope to their enemies. Though some elements will be more attractive as targets, no element of American society, no matter where it is located in the world, is off limits to attack. The Bush administration's actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere against the al Qaeda network show that effective counters to 4GW must also be worldwide.

The range of possible 4GW opponents is broad. It is important to remember that such an opponent does not need a large command and control system. At a time when U.S. forces are pouring ever more money and manpower into command and control, commercial technology makes worldwide, secure communications available to anyone with a laptop and a credit card. It also provides access to 1-m-resolution satellite imagery, extensive information on U.S. troop movements, immediate updates on national debates, and international discussion forums. Finally, it provides a worldwide, fairly secure financial and communication networks network. In fact, with the proliferation of internet cafes, one doesn't need either the credit card or the laptop. All one needs is an understanding of how email and a browser work and some very basic human intelligence (HUMINT) tradecraft.

At the operational level, all that an opponent has to move is ideas and funds. He can do so through a wide variety of methods from email to "snail mail" to personal courier to messages embedded in classified advertisements. He will try to submerge his communications in the noise of the everyday activity that is an essential part of a modern society. He will disguise the movement of material and funds as commerce by using commercial sources and vehicles. Even ancient personal trust-based systems are used to move large sums of money outside of western financial systems. His people will do their best to merge into whatever civil society they find themselves in. As a result, it will be extraordinarily difficult to detect the operational level activities of a sophisticated 4GW opponent.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Tactically, 4GW takes place in the complex environment of low-intensity conflict. Every potential opponent has observed Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Afghanistan. They understand that if America is provided with clear targets, no matter how well fortified, those targets will be destroyed. Just as certainly, they have seen the success of the Somalis and the Sandinistas. They have also seen and are absorbing the continuing lessons of Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They will not fight us with conventional means.

In attempting to change the minds of key decision makers, antagonists will use a variety of tactical paths to get their message through to presidents, prime ministers, members of cabinets, legislators, and even voters. Immediate, high-impact messages will probably come via visual media—and the more dramatic and bloody the image, the stronger the message. Longer term, less immediate, but more thought-provoking messages will be passed via business, church, economic, academic, artistic, and even social networks. While the messages will be based on a strategic theme, they will be delivered by tactical action, such as guided tours of refugee camps, exclusive interviews with insurgent leaders, targeted kidnappings, beheadings, car bombings, and assassinations.

Tactically, 4GW will involve a mixture of international, transnational, national, and sub-national actors. Because the operational planner of a 4GW campaign must use all available tools, we can assume that we will have to deal with actors from all these arenas at the tactical level as well. Even more challenging, some will be violent and others will be nonviolent. In fact, the very term noncombatant applies much more easily to conventional conflicts between states than 4GW involving state and nonstate actors. Nonviolent actors, while legally noncombatants, will be a critical part of tactical actions in 4GW. By using crowds, protestors, media interviews, internet web sites, and other “nonviolent” methods, 4GW warriors can create tactical dilemmas for their opponents. Dealing with the distractions they create will require tactical resources in police, intelligence, military, propaganda, and political spheres.

Tactical military action (terrorist, guerrilla, or, rarely, conventional) will be tied to the message and targeted at various groups. The August 19, 2003, bombing of the UN facility in Iraq convinced the UN it was too costly to continue to operate in Iraq. The August 19, 2004, burning of the southern Iraq oil facilities had an immediate effect on the per-barrel price of oil. These were two tactical actions with very different messages for very different target audiences; yet, they both support the strategic goal of increasing the U.S. cost of staying in Iraq.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) IN 4GW

Only by looking at current conflicts as 4GW events can we see America's true vulnerabilities to a WMD attack. Even a limited biological attack with a contagious agent, such as plague, will result in a shutdown of major segments of air travel, shipping, and trade. Smallpox will require a total quarantine of the affected areas until the incubation period has passed. The potential for billions of dollars in losses to disrupted trade is obvious—as well as years of continuing loss due to subsequent litigation.

Further, WMD attacks may not focus on physical destruction but rather on area denial or disruption. The ability of a single person to shut down Senate office buildings and post offices with two anthrax letters is a vivid example of an area-denial weapon. Disruption can easily be even more widespread. The use of containerized freight to deliver either a WMD or a high-yield explosive will have more far-reaching and costly effects on the international trade network than the shutdown of international air routes. Security for airliners and air freight is easy compared to the problem of inspecting seaborne shipping containers. Yet, containers are the basic carrier for the vast majority of international trade today, and we have no current system to secure or inspect them. By taking advantage of this vulnerability, terrorists can impose huge economic costs on our society for very little effort. Worse, they don't have to limit their actions to the containers; they can use the ships themselves. Ships flying flags of convenience do so to avoid government efforts to regulate or tax them. It is logical to assume the same characteristics will appeal to terrorists.

Finally, for simple chemical attacks, terrorists don't even have to provide the materials. The 1984 Bhopal chemical plant disaster killed more people than 9-11 and left many more with serious long-term injuries. While Bhopal was an industrial accident, it serves as a precedent for a devastating chemical attack.

The necessary existence of chemical plants and the movement of toxic industrial chemicals to support our lifestyle ensure that the raw material for a chemical attack is always present in our society. In addition to recognizing the potential for chemical attack, it is fairly certain that terrorists are today exploring how to use liquid natural gas tankers, fuel trucks, radioactive waste, and other available material for future attacks. These are just a few of the resources available to an intelligent, creative opponent.

TIMELINES, ORGANIZATIONS, OBJECTIVES

4GW timelines, organizations, and objectives are very different from those of conventional war. Of particular importance is that timelines are much longer. Failure to understand that essential fact—long duration—is why many observers fail to fully appreciate the magnitude of the challenge presented by a 4GW enemy.

When the United States has to fight, our preference is to wage short, well-defined wars. For the United States, a long war is five years. That in fact is how long we had a major involvement in Vietnam—from 1965 to 1970. We came in when the war was already being fought and left before it was over. Even then the U.S. public thought we had been at war too long. Americans want short wars.

Unfortunately, 4GW wars are long. The Chinese Communists fought for 28 years (1921–1949). The Vietnamese Communists fought for 30 years (1945–1975). The Sandinistas fought for 18 years (1961–1979). The Palestinians have been resisting Israeli occupation for 39 years so far (1967–2006)—some would argue they have been fighting since 1948. The Chechens have been fighting over 10 years—this time. Al Qaeda has been fighting for their vision of the world for 20 years, ever since the founding of Maktab al-Khidamar (MAK) in 1984. Numerous other insurgencies in the world have lasted for decades. Accordingly, in a 4GW fight, the United States must plan for a decades-long commitment.

From an American point of view, this time scale may well be the single most important characteristic of 4GW. Leadership must maintain the focus of effort through numerous elections and even changes of administration to prevail in such an effort.

Next, we need to understand that 4GW organizations are different. Since Mao, 4GW organizations have focused on the long-term political viability of the movement rather than on its short-term tactical effectiveness. They do not see themselves as military organizations but rather as webs that generate the political power central to 4GW. Thus, these organizations are unified by ideas. The leadership and the organizations are networked to provide for survivability and continuity when attacked. And the leadership recognizes that their most important function is to sustain the idea and the organizations—not to simply win on the battlefield.

4GW adversaries focus on the political aspects of the conflict because they accept that war is ultimately a political act. Because the final objective is changing the minds of the enemy's political leadership, the intermediate objectives are all milestones focused on shifting the opinion of the various target audiences. They know that time is on their side.

Westerners in general and Americans in particular are not known for patience. We are not a people who think in terms of decades. 4GW enemies do not seek immediate objectives but, rather, a long-term shift in political will of their enemies. They will accept numerous tactical and operational setbacks in pursuit of that goal.

The noted military strategist, Colonel Harry Summers, recounted in his book, *A Strategic Analysis of the Vietnam War*, that he told a North Vietnamese Colonel the U.S. had never been beaten on the battlefield. The North Vietnamese replied, "That may be so but it is also irrelevant."¹ Because of the long timelines and lithe political nature of 4GW, the objectives are different. 4GW opponents do not seek the defeat of the enemy forces; they seek the erosion of the enemy's political will. They can win even if the enemy's military force is largely intact. It is essential to understand that 4GW opponents do not focus on swift battlefield

victories. They focus on a long-term strategic approach. They focus on winning wars not battles.

RESPONSE TO 4GW

4GW opponents are not invincible. They can be beaten but only by coherent, patient actions that encompass all agencies of the government and elements of the private sector. 4GW encompasses the fields of diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic and social development. Our efforts must be organized as a network rather than in the traditional vertical bureaucracies of our federal departments. Finally, this interagency process will have to exert its influence for the entire duration of the war—from the initiation of planning to the final withdrawal of forces.

Besides dealing with the long timelines of 4GW, developing genuine interagency networks is the most difficult problem for America fighting a 4GW opponent. It will require fundamental changes in how our national security leadership trains, develops, promotes, deploys, and employs our personnel across the federal government.

“4GW opponents are not invincible. They can be beaten but only by coherent, patient actions that encompass all agencies of the government and elements of the private sector.”

While the details of changes to our personnel system exceed the scope of this paper, it is obvious that our current system, which is based on 19th-century bureaucratic theory, cannot support 21st-century operations. In particular, we need to be able to:

- Train personnel in a genuine interagency environment. From the classroom to daily operations to interagency training exercises, our personnel must be able to think and act as part of a network rather than a hierarchy.
- Develop personnel through the equivalent of military joint tours. And like the military, these tours must be an essential step for promotion.

- Deploy interagency personnel from all segments of the U.S. government overseas for much longer tours. The current 3–12 month overseas tours in a crisis cannot work in fights lasting decades.
- Operate as interagency elements down to the tactical level. This means abandoning the agency-specific stovepipes that link operations overseas to their U.S. headquarters. The British War Committee system used in the Malaya Emergency provides one model that eliminated the stovepipes and ensured unified effort at every level of government. Starting in peacetime, we have to train our people link effectively into the interagency process and then reward those who do so. Our current process of rewarding those who work entirely within a specific agency prevents effective networking.
- Eliminate the detailed, bureaucratic processes that characterize peacetime government actions, particularly contracting and purchasing. Quite simply, we have to trust our people and hold them accountable. Longer tours will be essential to ensure that our people understand the specific situation well enough to make decisions so that they can legitimately be held accountable for their actions. The current short tours mean no one masters his or her job, the records are incomplete, and accountability cannot be maintained.
- Develop procedures for fully integrating the wide range of international organizations, NGOs, allies, and specialists necessary to succeed against an adept, agile insurgent.

Obviously, these are major challenges. Fortunately, we are not without modes to work with. A presidential directive of a previous administration—Presidential Decision Directive 56—provides an excellent starting point. Based on lessons learned from U.S. involvement in multiple crises and complex contingencies during the 1990s, it provides guidance for both training and operations in an interagency environment that can be adapted for the purpose of waging 4GW.

Yet, this is only a starting point. In the same way that the Services had to learn to fight jointly to master 3GW, the entire government must learn to operate in a genuine interagency fashion to master 4GW. There are no simple, one-department, one-dimension solutions to these wars. Even with a fully functioning interagency process, we will have to assume fourth-generation wars will continue to last a decade or more.


CONCLUSION

As the great German military strategist, Carl Von Clausewitz, once observed: “[T]he first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”² Fourth-generation war, like its predecessors, will continue to evolve in ways that mirror global society as a whole. As we continue to move away from a hierarchical, industrial-based society to a networked, information-based society, our political, socioeconomic, and technological bases will evolve too.


With this evolution comes opportunity and hazard. The key to providing for our security lies in recognizing these changes for what they are. In understanding the kind of war we are fighting, we must not attempt to shape it into something it is not. We cannot force our opponents into a third-generation war that maximizes our strengths. We have seen they will fight the fourth-generation war that challenges our weaknesses. Clausewitz’s admonition to national leaders remains as valid as ever; we must ensure it guides our planning for future wars.

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1. C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 88.
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 **Editor's Note** – T. X. Hammes also displayed a video clip from, “In the Name of the Father”, a movie about the “Guildford Four” who were believed to be Irish Republican Army (IRA) members wrongly convicted of bombing an English pub in 1974, but later released. The film clip illustrates how Irish villagers, IRA sympathizers and insurgents, were able to overcome British troops despite superior weapons and military training. Hammes points out how an organized group of civilians including women and children, can effectively win battles against conventional weapons using unrestricted warfare. Further, he notes that the insurgents are highly motivated because they are successful at undermining the enemy because they can predict their conventional warfare strategies.

***Q:** I just want to bring your discussion back to the film clip that you started with. There was something very interesting in that, which relates to your talk. During that scene, you had an IRA brigade commander standing on the rooftop and the British not shooting at him. This was part of British counterinsurgency policy in Northern Ireland—that they knew who the Army council were and didn't go after them because they understood that if you take out the center, you fracture the network. If you fracture the network, it heals. This is exactly the opposite approach from that taken by the IDF in Israel and one of the reasons that Hamas was destroying [them]]. I just wanted to throw that out there and ask you to comment on it.*

 **Col. T. X. Hammes** – Good question. The guy standing on the roof is the brigade commander. First off, he wouldn't be on the roof. But that's why the first thing in a network attack is to exploit the network. They know who this guy is, and they pick up the new members, everyone introduced to him. You can have a portfolio on him, tendencies and things he can do. The problem, if you kill him, he is replaced by an unknown, and then they all get much more cautious about how they operate. It just makes it a harder enemy to defeat. And then you've got to think that the asymmetrical aspect you are talking about this morning is very, very important. The correct solution is rarely kinetic. That's really painful for a Marine to say, because kinetic is so much more fun.

1.3 RESILIENCY TO UNRESTRICTED WARFARE: THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

Stephen E. Flynn

The United States has been living on borrowed time—and squandering it. In our fifth year since the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, the Bush administration has chosen to emphasize the use of military operations overseas over an effort to reduce America’s vulnerability to catastrophic terrorist attacks. The primary explanation for this is that there is an abiding sense of cynicism in Washington over the ability to safeguard the myriad soft targets that are attractive to our adversaries. The general view is that such efforts would be too costly and inherently futile because terrorists will not be deterred by effective defenses. Instead, the White House has favored muscular efforts abroad to combat terrorism and has passed along to the private sector the responsibility for critical infrastructure protection and assigned the emergency preparedness mission to governors, county commissioners, and mayors.

But there is strength in not just being able to throw a punch but being able to take a punch. Al Qaeda and its imitator organizations do not have unlimited resources to sustain attacks on U.S. soil. Accordingly, they need to husband their assets. This reality translates into their having a very low tolerance for failing their missions. If they launch an attack they will likely leave a forensic trail which can put their organization at substantial risk. That risk

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will be worth taking if they can count on achieving catastrophic results. However, if potential targets in the United States are resilient enough to not produce cascading consequences, the downside risk of attacking them provides a deterrent.

The case for pursuing national resiliency also has a strategic rationale. This is a lesson I learned from Admiral William Crowe, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who served on a homeland security task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations that I directed in the fall of 2002. In a discussion of what needed to be done to prevent another 9/11-style attack, Admiral Crowe pointed out that we should not treat al Qaeda as if they were omnipotent. Terrorists by themselves cannot successfully destroy the dominant elements of power that the U.S. possesses. "The biggest danger," he said "is not what terrorists can do to us, but what we can do to ourselves when we are spooked."

"There is strength in not just being able to throw a punch but being able to take a punch."

The U.S. response in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, highlighted the risk of self-inflicted harm. Within hours all commercial aviation was grounded and our borders and ports were effectively closed to all inbound traffic. As a result of a handful of terrorist commandeering four domestic airliners and turning them into missiles, the U.S. government essentially imposed a blockade on our own economy.

The recent controversy surrounding the acquisition of five U.S. container terminal leases by Dubai Ports World illustrates just how high the risk of overreaction remains. The politically-hyped security concerns raised by this commercial transaction has fueled a flurry of draconian legislative measures including one by Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, to require U.S. ownership, management, and operation of all critical infrastructure designated by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department

of Defense. Another bill would suspend all proposed mergers, acquisitions, of takeovers by foreign persons until certain determinations can be made. The proposed "S.O.S. Act" would require within one year that the contents of every container be scanned, inspected, and sealed before they are authorized to be loaded on a U.S. bound ship. If there had been a real terrorist attack on a U.S. port instead of just the political controversy resulting from a commercial transaction to acquire five leases from a London-based marine terminal operator, many of these ill-considered bills would already have become laws.

Americans should not have to face a Faustian bargain between foregoing investing in appropriate protective measures in advance, and costly knee-jerk reactions after the fact. Prudent investments in safeguarding that which is most valuable and currently vulnerable can translate into depriving our adversaries of a big self-inflicted bang for their buck. To accomplish this, the federal government should be taking the lead in engaging the private sector in a collective effort to confront the threat of catastrophic acts of terror and natural disasters at home. Unfortunately, while the post-9/11 case for homeland security is seemingly a straightforward one, Washington has demonstrated an extraordinary degree of ambivalence about making any serious effort to tackle this mission. The premise behind the Bush administration's strategy of preemptive use of force is that as long as the United States is willing to show sufficient grit, it can successfully hold its enemies at bay. Throughout the 2004 presidential campaign, the president and vice president asserted that the war on terror had to be waged at its source. In the words of Vice President Dick Cheney: "Wars are not won on the defensive. To fully and finally remove this danger [of terrorism], we have only one option -- and that's to take the fight to the enemy."¹ On July 4, 2004, President Bush made the point this way: "We will engage these enemies in these

1 Remarks by the Vice President at the 123rd Coast Guard Academy Commencement, New London, Connecticut, May 19, 2005; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040519-5.html>.

countries [Iraq and Afghanistan] and around the world so we do not have to face them here at home."²

While it has acknowledged in principle the need to improve critical infrastructure protection, in practice it has placed the burden for doing so primarily on the private sector that owns and operates much of that infrastructure. But this delegation of responsibility fails to acknowledge the practical limits of the marketplace to agree upon common protocols and to make investments to bolster security. As a result the transportation, energy, information, financial, chemical, food, and logistical networks that underpin U.S. economic power and the American way of life remain virtually unprotected. If the federal government does not provide meaningful incentives to make U.S. infrastructure more resilient and create workable frameworks for ongoing public and private partnerships to advance security, future terrorist attacks with profound economic and societal disruption are inevitable.

Consider the case of the harbor shared by Los Angeles and its neighbor Long Beach which is arguably America's most important seaport. Its marine terminals handle over 40 percent of all the ocean-borne containers shipped to and from the United States³. Its refineries receive daily crude oil shipments and produce one quarter of the gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products that are consumed west of the Rocky Mountains. It is a major port of call for the \$30 billion ocean cruise industry⁴. Just three bridges handle all the truck and train traffic to and from Terminal Island where most of the port facilities are concentrated⁵. In short, it is a tempting target for any adversary intent on bringing their battle to the U.S. homeland.

2 President Bush Celebrates Independence Day, West Virginia Capitol Grounds, Charleston, West Virginia, July 4, 2004; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040704.html>.

3 Randal C. Archibold, "Dockworkers' Union Calls for Cleaner Air at Seaports," *The New York Times*, January 1, 2006.

4 See <http://geography.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=geography&zu=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aapa-ports.org%2Findustryinfo%2Fstatistics.htm>.

5 Interview with the Captain of the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach, Captain Peter Neffenger, U.S. Coast Guard on May 11, 2005.

Yet there is no one in the Pentagon who sees it as their job to protect Los Angeles and the nation's other busiest commercial seaports from terrorist attacks. These ports do not deploy the navy ships, troops, munitions, and the supplies needed for overseas combat operations. Lacking such "defense critical infrastructure," the Department of Defense (DoD) has decided that the responsibility for safeguarding them is not their job. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy maintains no active minesweepers or salvage ship on the West Coast to quickly reopen commercial harbors should a ship be targeted and sink in the channel.

So when it comes to securing commercial seaports, local port authorities bear the bulk of the burden for protecting these critical economic lifelines with nominal support from a small cadre of Customs and Border Protection Agency inspectors and Coast Guard personnel. For Los Angeles, this translates into the security for 7500 acres of facilities that run along 49 miles of waterfront being provided for by minimum-wage private security guards and a tiny port police force of under 100 officers⁶. The situation in Long Beach is even worse with only 12 full-time police officers assigned to its 3000 acres of facilities and a small cadre of private guards provided by the port authority and its tenants. The command and control equipment to support a new joint operations center for the few local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities that are assigned to the port will not be in place until 2008. In the four years since September 11, 2001, the two cities have received less than \$40 million in federal grants to improve the port's physical security measures. That amount is equivalent to what American taxpayers spend in a single day on domestic airport security⁷.

But the fallout from a terrorist attack would hardly be a local matter. For instance, should al Qaeda or one of its imitator organizations succeed in sinking a large ship in the Long Beach channel, the auto-dependent southern California will literally run out of gas within two weeks. This is because, as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlighted, U.S. petroleum refineries, are operating at

6 See <http://www.portoflosangeles.org/about.htm>.

7 Interview with the Captain of the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach, Captain Peter Neffenger, U.S. Coast Guard on May 11, 2005.

full throttle and their products are consumed almost as quickly as they are made. If the crude oil shipments stop, so too do the refineries and there is no excess capacity or refined fuels to cope with a long term disruption⁸.

The rationale for tepid federal efforts to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorists attacks at home, is the oft-stated contention that the "best defense is a good offense." Targeting terrorism at its source is an appealing notion. Unfortunately, the enemy is not cooperating. As the March 2004 attacks in Madrid, July 2005 attacks in London, the August 2005 attacks in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, and October 2005 attacks in Bali, Indonesia, have made clear, there is no central front on which al Qaeda and its radical jihadist imitators can be cornered and destroyed. Terrorist organizations are living and operating within jurisdictions of U.S. allies and do not need to receive aid and comfort from rogue states. According to the U.S. Department of State's annual global terrorism report, the number of terrorist incidents was at a record high in 2004, despite the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.⁹ There is mounting evidence that the invasion of Iraq is fueling both the number of recruits and the capabilities of radical jihadist groups.¹⁰

The reluctance of the White House and the national security community to adapt to the shifting nature of the terrorist threat bears a disturbing resemblance to the opening chapter of World

8 Ibid.

9 U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, Released by the Office of the Coordinator on Counterterrorism, April 27, 2005; <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45321.htm>. The report does not include the specific figures but states in its overview: "Despite ongoing improvements in U.S. homeland security, military campaigns against insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan, and deepening counterterrorism cooperation among the nations of the world, international terrorism continued to pose a significant threat to the United States and its partners in 2004." However the *Washington Post* reported that Congressional aides briefed on the U.S. Department of State statistics confirmed that the number of serious terrorist incidents tripled in 2004. Susan B. Glasser, "U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise In Terrorism State Dept. Will Not Put Data in Report" *Washington Post* (Apr 27, 2005): A01.

10 *Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action* with Richard A. Clarke, et. al., (New York: Century Foundation Task Force Report, 2004)

War II. In September 1939, the German army rolled eastward into Poland and unleashed a new form of combat known as “blitzkrieg.” When Poland became a victim of the Third Reich, London and Paris finally abandoned their policies of appeasement and declared war. The British and French high commands then began to execute war plans that relied on assumptions drawn from their experiences in World War I. They activated their reserves and reinforced the Maginot Line, defenses of mounted cannons stretching for 250 miles along the Franco-German border. Then they waited for Hitler’s next move.

The eight-month period before the fall of Paris came to be known as “the phony war.” During this relatively quiet time, France and the United Kingdom were convinced they were deterring the Germans by mobilizing their more plentiful military assets in an updated version of trench warfare. But they did not alter their tactics to respond to the new offensive warfare that the Germans had executed with such lethal results in eastern Europe. In May 1940, they paid a heavy price for their complacency: Panzer units raced into the lowlands, circumvented the Maginot Line, and conquered France shortly thereafter. The British expeditionary forces narrowly escaped by fleeing across the English Channel aboard a makeshift armada, leaving much of their armament behind on the beaches of Dunkirk.

Instead of a Maginot Line, the Pentagon is executing its long-standing forward defense strategy, which involves leapfrogging ahead of U.S. borders and waging combat on the turf of U.S. enemies or allies. Meanwhile, protecting the rear -- the American nation itself -- remains largely outside the scope of national security even though the September 11 attacks were launched from the United States on targets within the United States.

Al Qaeda has demonstrated that by directing terrorist attacks on major urban areas and the critical foundations of modern life, they can generate a very “big bang for their buck.” They have also placed the United States at the top of its target list and made clear

that they want to carry out a more devastating attack than those on New York and Washington.¹¹

Defenders of the Bush administration's war on terrorism are quick to point to the absence of another 9/11-style attack on U.S. soil as vindication for placing overwhelming emphasis on an offense-oriented strategy. To be sure, there is ample evidence that the war in Iraq has been attracting foreign insurgents and al Qaeda sympathizers to Baghdad versus to Main Street. However, this is likely to prove to be a short-term reprieve that poses a longer-term danger. Beginning in June 2003, Iraq's energy sector became a primary target for insurgents. By mid-July 2005 nearly 250 attacks on oil and gas pipelines had cost Iraq more than \$10 billion in lost oil revenue. Successful attacks on the electrical grid has kept average daily output at 5 to 10 percent below the pre-war level despite the \$1.2 billion the United States has spent to improve Iraqi electrical production.¹²

“ . . . terrorists will want to make sure that they pick meaningful targets where the attack proves to be worth all the organizational effort to carry it out. . . . The most tempting targets for terrorists remain those that can produce widespread economic and social disruption.”

In some ways the situation in Iraq is analogous to what happened during the decade-long conflict from 1980-1989 against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The foreign participants who join the mujahideen in that conflict became the hardened foot-soldiers who would ultimately transform themselves into al Qaeda. But unlike Afghanistan where the combatants waged war in a pre-modern society, in Iraq insurgents are refining their skills to sabotage critical infrastructures. Accordingly, when these foreign insurgents eventually return to their native lands, they

11 “Official: Voice on Tape is bin Laden’s,” CNN (Nov 13, 2002) <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/11/12/binladen.statement/>

12 See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right* (New York: Times Books, 2005):

will do so with the experience of successfully targeting complex systems that support economic and daily life within advanced societies.

Even if the United States had not chosen to invade Iraq, there is an alternative explanation for why there has not been another attack on American soil besides ascribing success to U.S. counterterrorism operations abroad. As a practical matter, sophisticated attacks on the scale of the 9/11 attacks take time. Since al Qaeda has proclaimed that it wants to surpass the destruction and disruption associated with toppling the World Trade Center towers, meticulous planning is required. Deploying the complex organizational structure to carry out those plans can take several years. This is because it typically involves deploying a three-cell structure where the members of each cell are isolated from one another to provide the best chance to survive should any one cell be compromised.

An al Qaeda-style operation will involve a logistics cell to attend to such things as locating safe houses, providing identity documents, and finding jobs for the operatives so they can blend into the civilian population. There is also a surveillance cell that is charged with scoping out potential targets, probing security measures, and conducting dry runs. Finally there is an attack cell which may include suicide bombers who are charged with executing the attack.¹³

Establishing this organizational capacity is a painstaking process, particularly within the United States where al Qaeda must work from a much smaller footprint of operatives and sympathizers than it has in Western Europe or countries like Indonesia. It is also a resource that must be carefully husbanded since using it will likely translate into losing it. This is because it is impossible to carry out an attack without leaving some forensic clues that expose terrorist cells to enforcement action. Accordingly, going after what would seem to be a plentiful menu of seemingly soft targets like shopping malls or sporting events

¹³ Testimony of Stephen E. Flynn, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing on "The Security of America's Chemical Facilities" 109 Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C. April 27, 2005)

can produce plenty of short-term media attention. But if these attacks cannot be sustained over time because the authorities are able to track down and destroy the terrorists' organization, the long-term economic consequence are likely to be modest. As a result, terrorists will want to make sure that they pick meaningful targets where the attack proves to be worth all the organizational effort to carry it out.

In short, it would be foolhardy to act as though the 9/11 attacks were an aberrant event where al Qaeda got lucky because America's guard was temporarily down. The sad truth is that the U.S. guard was never really up, and despite all the political rhetoric, little has changed in recent years. The most tempting targets for terrorists remain those that can produce widespread economic and social disruption. However, the White House has declared that safeguarding the nation's critical infrastructure is not really a federal responsibility. According to President Bush's 2002 National Homeland Security Strategy, "The government should only address those activities that the market does not adequately provide, for example, national defense or border security. For other aspects of homeland security, sufficient incentives exist in the private market to supply protection."¹⁴ Unfortunately, this expression of faith has not been borne out. According to a survey commissioned by the Washington-based Council on Competitiveness just one year after September 11, 92 percent of executives did not believe that terrorists would target their companies, and only 53 percent of the respondents indicated that their companies had increased security spending between 2001 and 2002.¹⁵ With the passing of each month without a new attack, the reluctance of companies to invest in security has only grown.

The lack of enthusiasm for CEOs to provide leadership when it comes to developing the means to safeguard critical infrastructures should not be surprising. This is because survival

14 *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*, The White House (July 2005): 64 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html>

15 *Creating Opportunity Out of Adversity: Proceedings of the National Symposium on Competitiveness and Security*, Council on Competitiveness, (Dec 2002): 19

in the marketplace has required that they be responsive to four globalization imperatives: how to make critical infrastructures: (1) as open to as many users as possible; (2) as efficient as possible; (3) as reliable as possible; and (4) their use as low cost as possible. Since the conventional view of security is that it involves raising costs, undermining efficiency, is at odds with assuring reliability, and applies constraints on access, there has been a clear disincentive for the private sector to make it a priority. As a result, we entered the 21st century with networks that have an extraordinary capacity to generate wealth but with few meaningful safeguards should they come under attack.

The challenge of elevating the critical infrastructure protection priority and crafting a tidy security division of labor between the private and public sectors is complicated by two additional factors. First, safeguards that only apply within U.S. borders will not work since America's critical infrastructures are dependent on their links to the rest of North America and the world. Second, the United States competes in a global marketplace and it must be mindful of not unilaterally incurring costs that place U.S. companies and the U.S. economy at a competitive disadvantage.

Private sector concerns about maintaining their competitiveness in the face of the growing security imperative are legitimate. Security is not free. A company incurs costs when it invests in measures to protect the portion of infrastructure it controls. If a company does not believe other companies are willing or able to make a similar investment, then it faces the likelihood of losing market share while simply shifting the infrastructure's vulnerability elsewhere. If terrorists strike, the company will still suffer the disruptive consequences of an attack right alongside those who did nothing to prevent it. Those consequences are likely to include the cost of implementing new government requirements. Therefore, infrastructure security suffers from a dilemma commonly referred to as the "tragedy of the commons."

Take the case of the chemical industry. By and large, chemical manufacturers have a good safety record. But security is another matter. Operating on thin profit margins and faced with growing overseas competition, most companies have been reluctant

to incur the additional costs associated with improving their security. Now let us imagine that the manager of a chemical plant looks around his facility and gets squeamish about the many security lapses he finds. After a fitful night of sleep, he wakes up and decides to invest in protective measures that raise the cost to his customers by \$50 per shipment. A competitor who does not make that investment will be able to attract business away from the security-conscious plant because his handling costs will be lower. Capable terrorists and criminals will target this lower-cost operation since it is an easier target.

In the event of an incident, particularly one that is catastrophic, two consequences are likely. First, government officials will not discriminate between the more security-conscious and the less security-conscious companies. All chemical plants are likely to be shut down while the authorities try to sort things out. Second, once the dust clears, elected and regulatory officials will scramble to impose new security requirements that could nullify the proactive plant owner's earlier investments. Given this scenario, the most rational behavior of the nervous manager would appear to be to keep tossing and turning at night while focusing on short-term profitability during the day.

“Americans and private sector leaders must demand that Washington make homeland security generally and critical infrastructure specifically, a priority. And the entire nation, not just the national security establishment, must be organized for the long struggle against terrorism.”

The only way to prevent the tragedy of the commons is to convince all the private participants to abide by the same security requirements. When standards are universal, their cost is borne equally across a sector. As taxpayers or as consumers, Americans will end up bankrolling these measures, but what they will be paying for is insurance against the loss of innocent lives and a profound disruption to their society and the economy.

The problem boils down to this: the design, ownership, and the day-to-day operational knowledge of critical systems rest almost exclusively with the private sector. But security and safety are public goods whose provision is a core responsibility of government at all levels. The government is unable to protect things that it has only a peripheral understanding and limited jurisdictional reach and the market will resist providing public goods if doing so puts them at a competitive disadvantage by eroding their profits or sacrificing their market share.

Certainly, 9/11 created a general sense among public and private sector players that the security imperative requires far more attention than it had been receiving. But the reality is that there still remain disincentives for the private sector to cooperate with government entities on this agenda. Some of the structures in place, such as the laws and regulations that guide the interaction within and among these sectors, remain static. For instance, anti-trusts laws put severe constraints on the ability of industry leaders to come together and agree to common protocols. Also, companies that make a good faith effort to undertake industry-generated anti-terrorist measures potentially risk open-ended liability issues should terrorist succeed at defeating those measures. After the post-mortem, public officials are likely to be the first at the head of the queue insisting that private sector entities be held accountable for not having done enough.

While there are practical barriers to having the private sector assume the bulk of the responsibility for the post-9/11 security mandate, leaving it to the public sector alone to map the path ahead holds little promise as an alternative. When the government announces requirements or “best practices” after a lengthy deliberative process with nominal industry input, they almost always miss the mark. More often than not, the proposed or mandated safeguards reflect a poor understanding of the design and operation of critical infrastructures and the real vs. perceived vulnerabilities. This is because many of the most critical issues span multiple agency jurisdictions and these agencies rarely work well together. The results end up being a mix of unacknowledged gaps and redundant requirements.

If improving homeland security requires that the U.S. government reconsider many of its assumptions and priorities, it also requires a population that acknowledges that security must become everyone's business. The starting point for engaging civil society in this enterprise is a willingness to accept that there will never be a permanent victory in a war on terrorism by overseas military campaigns. Terrorism is simply too cheap, too available, and too tempting to ever be totally eradicated. And U.S. borders will never serve as a last line of defense for a determined terrorist. What is required is that everyday citizens develop both the maturity to live with the risk of future attacks and the willingness to invest in reasonable measures to mitigate that risk.

This is not a defeatist position. Improving the United States' protections and its resilience to withstand acts of catastrophic terrorism has both tactical value in preventing these attacks and strategic value in deterring them in the first place. Radical jihadist groups do not have unlimited resources. When they strike they want to be reasonably confident that they will be successful. They also want to inflict real damage that will generate political pressure to adopt draconian measures in response to a traumatized public.

Today's terrorist masterminds know that the main benefit of attacks on critical infrastructure is not the immediate damage they inflict, but the collateral consequences of eroding the public's trust in services on which it depends. Certainly this lesson has not been lost on Osama bin Laden. In a video tape broadcast on al Jazeera on November 1, 2004, bin Laden claims: "for example, al Qaeda spent \$500,000 on the event, while America, in the incident and its aftermath, lost - according to the lowest estimate - more than \$500 billion. Meaning that every dollar of al Qaeda defeated a million dollars by the permission of Allah, besides the loss of a huge number of jobs."¹⁶

What if the next terrorist strike were on the American food supply system? The attack itself might kill only a handful of people, but without measures in place to reassure the public

¹⁶ <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm>

that follow-on attacks could be prevented or at least contained, consumers at home and abroad would become distrustful of a sector that accounts for more than 10 percent of U.S. GDP. Similarly, a dirty bomb smuggled in a container and set off in a seaport would likely kill only a few unfortunate longshoremen and contaminate several acres of valuable waterfront property. But if there is no credible security system to restore the public's confidence that other containers are safe, mayors and governors throughout the country, as well as the President, will come under withering political pressure to order the shutdown of the intermodal transportation system. Examining cargo in tens of thousands of trucks, trains, and ships to ensure it poses no threat would have devastating economic consequences. When containers stop moving, assembly plants go idle, retail shelves go bare, and workers end up in unemployment lines. A three-week shutdown could well spawn a global recession.

As long as catastrophic terrorism is assured of generating a huge bang for the buck, current and future U.S. adversaries will make it the first arrow they reach for in attacking the country. Their confidence in their ability to inflict real damage on the world's sole superpower will be directly proportional to the unwillingness of private and public leaders to acknowledge the risk of market failures associated with excessive reliance on unprotected networks that are sophisticated, concentrated, and interdependent. Given the futility of taking on U.S. military forces directly, attacking these networks is not irrational. In warfare, combatants always seek to exploit their adversary's weaknesses.

However, if terrorist attacks were likely to be detected, intercepted, contained, and managed without doing any measurable damage to the American way of life or quality of life, their value as a means of warfare would be depreciated. Since such acts violate widely accepted norms, they will almost certainly invite not just American, but also international, retribution. Most adversaries would probably judge this too high a price to pay if striking civilian targets holds little chance of causing the desired mass disruption.

A focus on critical infrastructure protection can also improve the effectiveness of more conventional counterterrorism measures. By bolstering the security of critical networks in advance of possible attacks, adversaries must put together more complex operations to target them successfully. The resultant need for terrorists to raise more money, recruit expertise, and lengthen planning cycles and rehearsals would be a boon for intelligence services and law enforcement officials. This is because such pre-execution activities elevate the opportunities for infiltration and raise the odds that terrorist groups will attract attention.

There is an added bit of good news that comes from placing greater emphasis on homeland security. The most effective measures for protecting potential targets or making them more resilient in the face of successful attacks almost always have derivative benefits for other public and private goods. For instance, bolstering the tools to detect and intercept terrorists will enhance the means that authorities have to combat criminal acts such as narcotics trafficking, migrant smuggling, cargo theft, and violations of export controls. The risk of an avian flu pandemic and diseases such as SARS, AIDS, West Nile, foot-and-mouth, and mad cow have highlighted the challenges of managing deadly pathogens in a shrinking world. Public health investments to deal with biological agents or attacks on food and water supplies will provide U.S. authorities with more effective tools to manage these global diseases. Measures adopted to protect infrastructure make it more resilient not only to terrorist attacks, but also to acts of God or human and mechanical error. They also invariably reinforce U.S. values that are respected around the world, whereas reliance on aggressive military measures invariably puts those values at risk.

How much security is enough? Answering that question requires both some clarity about the threat a security measure is designed to counter and identifying the appropriate point at which an additional investment in a security measure yields only a marginal return. Asking the private sector to decide independently where this line should be drawn is impractical since they lack access to intelligence and because they need good-Samaritan

safeguards should their efforts fall short at deterring every terrorist incident. Only the federal government has access to the threat information and only the federal government can establish liability limits.

In the end, the threshold for success will be when the American people can conclude that a future attack on U.S. soil will be an exceptional event that does not require wholesale changes in how they go about their lives. This means that they should be confident that there are adequate private and public measures in place to confront the danger and manage its aftermath. In other words, homeland security should strive to achieve what the aviation industry has done with safety. What sustains air travel despite the periodic horror of airplanes falling out of the sky is the extent to which the industry's long-standing and ongoing investments have convinced the public that it is safe to fly. Public confidence can never be taken for granted after a major jet crash, but private and public aviation officials start from a credible foundation built upon a cooperative effort to incorporate safety into every part of the industry. In the immediate aftermath of airline disasters, the public is reassured by the fact that the lessons learned are quickly compiled and released and that the government and the industry seem willing to take whatever corrective actions are required.

Ongoing and credible efforts to confront risk are essential to the viability of any complex modern enterprise. Aviation safety provides helpful reference points for how to pursue security without turning the United States into a nationally-gated community. First, it demonstrates that Americans do not expect their lives to be risk-free; they just rightfully expect that reasonable measures be in place to manage that risk. Second, managing risk works best if safeguards are integrated as an organic part of a sector's environment and if they are dynamic in adapting to changes in that environment. Third, government plays an essential role in providing incentives and disincentives for people and industry to meet minimum standards. Bluntly stated, security will not happen by itself.

When it comes to critical infrastructure protection, the issue, then, is to engage the private sector to develop standards and

create effective mechanisms for their uniform enforcement. This is a task that necessitates a much different kind of institutional framework than setting up a new federal Department of Homeland Security. What it requires is the creation of a structure that allows the private sector and civil society to participate as equal partners in the process of designing and implementing security for the U.S. homeland.

Admittedly, it will not be easy to muster the political will to admit the post-9/11 error of placing so much emphasis on projecting military might abroad, while neglecting efforts to build greater U.S. resilience at home. But now is not a time for timidity.

Americans and private sector leaders must demand that Washington make homeland security generally, and critical infrastructure specifically, a priority. And the entire nation, not just the national security establishment, must be organized for the long struggle against terrorism.



CHAPTER 2

ROUNDTABLE

**UNDERSTANDING
UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE**



2.1 ASSESSING AL QAEDA PERFORMANCE AND THREAT

Fawaz A. Gerges

Although al Qaeda took its war to the United States on September 11 and flexed its muscles by carrying out spectacular, coordinated attacks, success for its Islamist ideological program remains a distant dream, if not an illusion. In this paper, my goal is to measure al Qaeda's losses and gains against its own expectations as stated in its publicly broadcast messages and internal communiqués.

INTRODUCTION

Although on September 11, al Qaeda took its war to the United States and flexed its muscle by carrying out spectacular, coordinated attacks, success for its Islamist ideological program remains a distant dream, if not an illusion. Today, my goal is to measure its losses and gains against its own expectations as stated in its publicly broadcast messages and internal communiqués. Taking stock of the network's rhetoric and reality provides us with a balance sheet of its breakthroughs and setbacks and helps us assess its performance since September 11 and its continuing threat by gaining further insight into the long-term viability of its political and military strategy. The aim of this analysis is to contextualize the position and weight of the bin Laden network within Muslim politics as well as examine the efficacy and

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weakness of the American war on terror. Three sets of conceptual questions deserve special scrutiny.

The first line of questions has to do with the effect of al Qaeda's actions on the jihadist movement. Has the globalization of jihad stopped the internal rivalries and struggles that have roiled militant factions since the late 1990s, or has it exacerbated them further? Has the targeting of the "far enemy," as Ayman al-Zawahiri advocated, offered jihadis a way out of the bottleneck of political disunity and disarray in which they found themselves in the late 1990s? How did the majority of jihadis outside Afghanistan respond to 9/11? Did they join al Qaeda and fight against the United States, or did they condemn bin Laden and Zawahiri for "declaring war on the entire world" without considering the potential repercussions on the jihadist movement and *the ummah*, or worldwide Islamic community?

A related second set of questions asks to what extent has the call for war against the "far enemy" resonated with ordinary Muslims? Has al Qaeda succeeded in inciting a critical mass of young Muslims into taking arms against the "head of the snake"—America—and its allies? Have global jihadis dragged America and other Western states, as they had dreamed, into "an open battle with the *ummah*"? Finally, how has the expansion of the war on terror played into the hands of international jihadis like bin Laden and Zawahiri? Has it given them a new lease on life? In other words, has the expansion of the war revived al Qaeda after it fell into a coma by 2002? I do not have time to comprehensively examine all these issues; rather, I will briefly touch upon them and highlight the main points and conclusions, which I have fleshed out in greater detail in my recently published book, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

EFFECT ON THE JIHADIST MOVEMENT

Let me go directly to the first line of questions and say that instead of rushing to defend their transnationalist cohorts, local jihadis or what I call "religious nationalists," who represent the overwhelming majority of radical Islamists, dreaded the coming

war with the far enemy and decided not to take sides. Indeed, one of the major miscalculations made by bin Laden and Zawahiri was the expectation that in attacking America they could rally their estranged jihadi cohorts back into the fold as well as mobilize the *ummah* against pro-Western Muslim rulers and their superpower patron—the United States. They had anticipated a response similar to that which was prompted by the Russian invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1970s. The goal was thus to generate a major world crisis—provoking the far enemy “to come out of its hole,” as Seif al-Adl, al Qaeda’s overall military commander, wrote in a 2005 document, and attack Muslim countries. Presumably, such a reaction would reinvigorate and unify a splintered, war torn jihadist movement and restore its “credibility” in the eyes of its peers and beleaguered people elsewhere.

When the United States invaded Afghanistan, al Qaeda found itself alone facing the brunt of the American armada. Rather than welcoming a wave of seasoned jihadis and fresh volunteers to serve in the Afghan theater, they received only a modest trickle of recruits. President Bush’s invasion differed greatly from the Soviet campaign in the late 1980s. When Russian troops descended upon Kabul, the call to war echoed from almost every corner and mosque in Arab and Muslim lands; tens of thousands of Muslim men flooded into Afghanistan to resist the occupation with the blessings of the religious and ruling establishment. In contrast, there was deafening silence when the United States declared war on the Taliban and al Qaeda. Although many Muslims criticized America’s impulsiveness and reliance on force, they stopped short of calling for collective jihad; no religious authority lent its name to legitimize the repulsion of the foreign troops.

Al Qaeda’s greatest failure was thus its inability to tap into the natural base of tens of thousands of like-minded jihadis—religious nationalists—who live throughout the Muslim landscape. Since September 11, Western analysts and Western security services have focused on al Qaeda’s sleeping cells and sympathizers, but little has been said about the other huge pool of religious nationalists who, if they had joined the al Qaeda network, could

have qualitatively escalated and expanded the theater of military operations and increased the security risks manyfold. Had bin Laden and Zawahiri succeeded in coopting and enticing the deactivated army of religious nationalists into the al Qaeda network, they could have replenished its depleted ranks and fielded lethal brigades in many parts of the world.

This failure goes to the heart of whether al Qaeda speaks for and represents the bulk of Islamists or is a fringe creature born out of the internal mutations and inner rivalries within the worldwide jihadist initiative. Prior to the events of 2001, bin Laden and Zawahiri launched an ambitious campaign to control the movement and change its direction. Unable to rally the disparate factions and put an end to internal bickering and entropy, they plunged into a confrontation with the United States, hoping that it would serve as a galvanizing and unifying experience.

As we shall see, their gamble did not pay off: neither the *ummah* nor the bulk of jihadis were on the same wavelength as al Qaeda. Indeed, the main jihadist groups in the Middle East and elsewhere went public and pinned the blame squarely on bin Laden and Zawahiri, holding them personally accountable for endangering the very survival of their ideology. Instead of expressing solidarity with their besieged and entrapped associates on the Afghan–Pakistani border, the prominent Islamic figures openly condemned al Qaeda for exacerbating the problems facing other jihadist groups. Since the end of 2001, jihadis of different persuasions, both transnationalists and religious-nationalists, have engaged in a bitter quarrel that reveals deep and wide rifts. This intra-Islamist tug-of-war has hardly been noticed, let alone critically examined in the West and the United States, in particular. Three points are thus worth highlighting. First, jihadis who usually hibernate underground and tend to be highly secretive for the first time exposed their dirty laundry in public and provided an authentic view into the tensions raging within their own community. As the walls of secrecy collapsed, so did the pretense of solidarity and altruism. Second, the public squabbling between Islamists (fleshed out below) has shown the depth of existing fault lines and new political trends developing between factions. The debate

sheds light on how jihadis have coped with the September 11 earthquake and its aftershocks and what lessons, if any, have been learned. Finally, the response to al Qaeda is a useful barometer for measuring its relative weight within the jihadist movement.

Since September 11, more than a dozen books, memoirs, and diaries, written by leading Islamists, some of whom have played pivotal roles in the jihadist movement, have presented a devastatingly comprehensive critique of al Qaeda. Far from being marginal or on the fringe, these detractors, who are acquainted with its inner circle, are former associates of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their cohorts, and had previously fought with them against common enemies—“impious” Muslim rulers and godless communists. Their analysis is important because it comes from within the community, not from outside it. It lays bare the pretensions and assertions of al Qaeda’s leaders regarding their war against the Far Enemy, and offers a dramatically different alternative for overcoming the existential crisis facing the jihadist movement.

In a nutshell, the core of the critique is a direct assault on what religious-nationalists view as the shortsightedness and colossal miscalculations of bin Laden and Zawahiri. Although these veteran militants are highly critical of American diplomacy, they say that killing American civilians has proven to be disastrous for Islamism and the *ummah* itself. In their view, attacking the Far Enemy empowered hardliners in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, enabling them to unleash America’s unrivaled power against Muslim countries, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq. They also contend that pro-Western Muslim rulers now feel emboldened to crack down harder against all Islamists and former jihadis, not just al Qaeda operators.

Some of bin Laden’s inner circle publicly criticized his “catastrophic leadership” and underestimation of American willpower. The Arabic-language newspaper *Asharq al-Awsat* published a rare critical document about him, entitled “The Story of the Arab Afghans: From the Entry to Afghanistan to the Final Exodus with the Taliban,” written by a senior member of the al Qaeda Shura Council who is considered a leading theoretician

in the organization. Although the editors did not disclose his name at the request of the former jihadis who negotiated the publishing deal, the author is Abu al-Walid al-Masri, one of the most veteran Arab-Afghans; he was based in Qandahar and supervised *The Islamic Principality*, a newsletter regarded as the mouthpiece of Mullah Omar, the deposed Taliban ruler.

Abu al-Walid al-Masri saw September 11 as a calamity. He was among the most senior of the Arab-Afghans to break with bin Laden over 9/11 and to take his grievances public. Abu al-Walid had worked closely with both Mullah Omar and bin Laden. He paints a dark portrait of bin Laden as an autocrat, running al Qaeda as he might a tribal fiefdom. He criticizes him for ignoring the advice of many of the hawks and doves around him, wrongly assessing the United States as much weaker than it proved to be. Bin Laden had assumed that the U.S. would retreat after two or three engagements, based on the actions of the U.S. Marines "fleeing" Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in the 1990s that led the U.S. forces to leave in a "shameful disarray and indecorous haste." But as Abu al-Walid notes, after September 11, matters "took an opposite turn compared to what bin Laden had imagined." Instead of buckling under his three painful blows, America retaliated and destroyed both the Taliban and al Qaeda."

Al Qaeda members knew better than to challenge bin Laden, Abu al-Walid revealed. "You are the emir, do as you please!" he reported them as telling their leader. That attitude, a bin Laden aide wrote, turned out not only to be wrong but dangerous. "It encourages recklessness and causes disorganization, characteristics that are unsuitable for this existential battle in which we confront the greatest force in the world, USA. It is therefore necessary to consider the real nature and the size of this battle as well as to prepare for it in a way that takes into account its danger and, consequently, to mobilize the mujahedeen and the Muslim masses for an extended, long-term battle that requires great sacrifices. It was necessary to prepare for the worst scenario that could come of this battle rather than dreaming of an easy victory."

By stifling internal debate and underestimating the enemy, bin Laden was personally responsible for the defeat, rendering al Qaeda's final years in Afghanistan "a tragic example of an Islamic movement managed by a catastrophic leadership. Everyone knew that [he] was leading them to the abyss and even leading the entire country to utter destruction, but they continued to bend to his will and take his orders with suicidal submission." At certain points Abu al-Walid takes ad hominem shots at bin Laden, pointing to his "extreme infatuation" or "crazy attraction" to the international media. Bin Laden basked in the limelight and exaggerated his strength and capabilities. It is no wonder, Abu al-Walid tells us, he entangled the Taliban in regional and international conflicts against their will and brought about the destruction of the Islamic emirate; Afghanistan was lost because of bin Laden's reckless conduct culminating in the attacks on the United States.

What seemed to fuel Abu al-Walid's anger was that bin Laden "was not even aware of the scope of the battle in which he opted to fight, or was forced into fighting. Therefore," he concluded, bin Laden "lacked the correct perception and was not qualified to lead." He cited an old Arab proverb to explain the "catastrophe:" "Those who work without knowledge will damage more than they can fix, and those who walk quickly on the wrong path will only distance themselves from their goal." Abu al-Walid could not forgive bin Laden for abusing the hospitality of his hosts, the Taliban, and bringing the temple down on their heads.

The Afghanistan catastrophe demonstrated one essential principle according to Abu al-Walid: "The fundamentalists finally discovered from their experience in Afghanistan something of which they remained oblivious for several centuries: that absolute individual authority is a hopelessly defective form of leadership, an obsolete way of organization that will end in nothing but defeat." His verdict is damning: bin Laden's authoritarian style of leadership was responsible for pitting jihadists against America, which, in his opinion, is "beyond present capabilities of the whole [Islamist] movement."

Abu al-Walid argued that things went deeper than that. What happened in Afghanistan demonstrated the very intellectual bankruptcy of the jihadist project; "It may be that the Islamic movement had already suffered from an intellectual as well as an organizational defeat before it even had started its battle against America (otherwise known as the Great Satan). Jihad is a bigger and a more serious issue that should not be left to the jihadist groups alone. Jihad is more than just an armed battle. Narrow-minded mentalities towards the issues such as religion and politics are incapable of developing their conflict with America, which represents the pinnacle and height of 'devils' intellectually and militarily."

In the Muslim world today, Abu al-Walid's withering criticism of bin Laden has been echoed by other seasoned jihadists, including the Egyptian al-Jama'a al-Islamiya, the largest jihadist organization in the Arab world. Whereas at the height of its strength in 2001 al Qaeda membership never exceeded 10,000 people, al-Jama'a fielded over 100,000 fighters in the 1990s. Of all the Islamists, al-Jama'a senior leaders, most of whom have been in prison in Egypt since the 1980s and 1990s, presented the most comprehensive critique of bin Laden's global jihad. Since early 2002, they have released eight manuscripts in Arabic, two of which deal specifically with the September 11 attacks. These are vital historical documents, shedding light on the thinking of the biggest and most influential jihadist organizations in the region. Unfortunately, neither of the two manuscripts has been translated into English, and they have not received the attention they deserve. The first, authored by Mohammed Essam Derbala and reviewed and approved by the entire leadership, is titled "Al Qaeda Strategy: Mistakes and Dangers" and the other, authored by Nageh Abdullah Ibrahim, is titled "Islam and the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century." Both were serialized in *Asharq al-Awsat*.

Derbala, one of the leaders of al-Jama'a, is currently spending a life sentence in prison for his role in the 1981 Sadat assassination. He drew on religious texts to show that al Qaeda's attacks violated Islamic law, which "bans killing civilians" of any

religion or nationality. Derbala and his associates denounced al Qaeda for preaching that American and Muslim interests would never meet and that “the enmity is deeply embedded and the clash is inevitable.” They cited several cases in the 1990s when the United States had helped to resolve international conflicts, with results that had benefited Muslims: American military and financial assistance in the Afghan war tipped the balance in favor of the mujahedeen against the Russian occupiers; from 1990 to 1991, the United States helped Kuwait and Saudi Arabia expel Iraqi forces in 1995, American military intervention put a stop to the persecution and massacre of Bosnian Muslims by Serbs, and in 1999 the United States led a NATO military campaign forcing Serbia to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

All these examples showed clearly, al-Jama’s senior leaders asserted, that American and Muslim interests can and do meet. History has shown that there is nothing inevitable about a clash of cultures or religions between Islam and the West because, in their view, Islam is a universal religion, fully integrated with other civilizations. They reprimanded bin Laden for advocating war between *dar al-iman*, or House of Belief, and *dar al-kufr*, or House of Unbelief, calling it misguided and based upon a misreading of the *ummah’s* capabilities. “The question is, where are the priorities? Where are the capabilities that allow for all of that?” they ask. Instead of embarking on what they regard as a blind suicidal approach, they called for engagement with the West based on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence.

Derbala views the last 60 years of American policies toward Arabs and Muslims as, on the whole, “negative” and “oppressive.” Nonetheless, he rejects armed confrontation as a useful solution. Instead of deterring the United States, he maintains, “al Qaeda boosted the anti-Islamic wave in America and the West” and widened the cultural gap between Muslims and Westerners. Derbala rejects bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s assertion that the West is waging a crusade against Islam and Muslims: “Some claim that there is a crusader war led by America against Islam. However, the majority of Muslims reject the existence of crusader wars.” “Religious motives” may influence American policy toward

Muslim nations, he adds, “but these are not crusader wars.” Rather, “[realpolitik] interests remain the official religion of America, and those interests determine its international relations.”

Thus, “al Qaeda’s policy helped crusading and anti-Muslim forces in America and the West to advocate a total war against Islam.” If al Qaeda proved capable of mastering anything, it was “the art of making enemies” rather than following Prophet Mohammed’s example of “neutralizing enemies.” Al Qaeda had declared war on the whole world and was trying to ignite a clash of civilizations without possessing the means to wage—let alone prevail in—a global struggle. Echoing Abu al-Walid, Derbala insists that jihad must not be waged without honest assessment of costs, benefits, and capabilities. “Al Qaeda has to understand that jihad is only one of the Muslims’ duties. Jihad is a means, not an end.” Making jihad for the sake of jihad, as al Qaeda has done, is counterproductive because it produces the opposite of the desired results—the downfall of the Taliban regime and the slaughter of thousands of young Muslims. Surely, the *ummah* is much worse off now, Derbala points out, because of al Qaeda’s foolish and reckless conduct.

What I find most fascinating about the document is the way in which Derbala uses the very terms bin Laden and Zawahiri have adopted to justify their actions. He accuses them of violating the Shariah itself, waging “illegitimate jihad” by superimposing their own views on those of the Prophet. He comes close to calling the al Qaeda chiefs “apostates,” employing their own rhetoric against them. Still, bin Laden and Zawahiri could cut their losses, Derbala concludes, if they halt their jihad and concede their errors; otherwise, they will meet a fate similar to that of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (IGA), a criminal gang that forsook Islam and met defeat at the end of the 1990s.

The main author of a second al-Jama’a manifesto, Nageh Abdullah Ibrahim, also serving a life sentence, writes that Muslims must relinquish myths maintained by extremists like himself for decades. According to Ibrahim, September 11 and its reverberations exposed the need for Muslims to face reality head on and make difficult decisions if they want to catch up with the

rest of humanity; they can no longer afford to postpone reforms in a world whose social, political, and economic interactions are evolving quickly, leaving them further and further behind: “Standing still would mean suicide,” he acknowledged.

A real renewal of Islamic thought, Ibrahim posits, would enrich the education of young Muslims and make them less vulnerable to easy conspiracy theories, such as those that were spun around September 11. “Conspiracy theory retards the Arab and Muslim mind by holding it back and restricting its ability to rationally resolve problems.” Instead of viewing foreign affairs as based on state interests and power relations, Ibrahim laments that the Arabs’ conspiratorial lens scapegoats the West for “all of our tragedies and neglects our own strategic errors.” Those strategic errors—not the West—he writes, are the real villains behind the decline of the *ummah*. He concludes that Islamists and nationalists are equally responsible for conspiracy mongering and leading young Muslims astray.

Ibrahim, Derbala, and the others cited their own experience fighting the Egyptian government to show the pitfalls of engaging in jihad without considering conditions at home and abroad; jihad not only failed to achieve their goals, but more importantly it lost them public support. Their error resulted, Ibrahim stressed, from forgetting “that armed struggle or jihad was never an end in itself, and Islam did not legislate fighting for the sake of fighting or jihad for the sake of jihad.” Jihad is only one of Islam’s duties; Muslims must not overlook other “prophetic” choices such as *al-solh*, or peace-making, practiced by the Prophet Mohammed throughout his life. By neglecting *al-solh* as a “strategic choice,” all jihadists—and they include themselves—have made grave errors that endanger their movement’s very survival.

Bin Laden, Ibrahim argues, violated the fundamental precepts of Islamic wisdom, which require that faith be yoked to strength, justice, and tolerance. Even as he preached the value of piety and faith, bin Laden should have either listened to his own internal counsel or tried to understand his adversaries. In the end, he fell victim to hubris, relying on an ambition “to fight the entire world simultaneously, though he does not possess real

power and cannot find a shelter or a government to assist him ... Nevertheless," Ibrahim points out, "he wants to fight America on 9/11, the Russians in Chechnya, India in Kashmir, as well as carry out military operations in Muslim lands in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Morocco, Indonesia, and elsewhere." Had bin Laden paid adequate attention to his humble capabilities, he would have refrained from declaring war on the world. Because it lost touch with reality, rationality, and the essence of Islam, al Qaeda caused the downfall of two Muslim regimes—in Kabul and in Baghdad. Ibrahim sees little difference between bin Laden's al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's dictatorship: one destroyed his own network, the other destroyed the Iraqi state.

Of all the Islamist critiques, al-Jama'a's remain the most daunting and the most damning. Derbala, Ibrahim, and their imprisoned colleagues condemn bin Laden and Zawahiri's religious justification for attacking the Americans, reminding them that Islam has always practiced—not just taught—"peaceful coexistence" as a permanent way of life. "Religious coexistence" is a strategic not a tactical interest in Islam, particularly when Muslims migrate to foreign lands and are welcomed by native inhabitants. What makes the crime of the September 11 suicide bombers uniquely un-Islamic, Ibrahim writes, is that the U.S. government had admitted them as guests. The attacks were a betrayal of the most fundamental spiritual obligation, the one practiced in shops, cafes, and homes throughout the Arab world. Had the bombers read the Sunnah (containing the deeds of the Prophet; the second source of Islam after the Qur'an), they would have respected "peaceful coexistence."

Speaking from his prison cell, Karam Zuhdi, the emir of al-Jama'a, gave a series of interviews to the Egyptian weekly magazine *Al-Mussawar* and to *Asharq al-Awsat*, in which he offered an even more pointed critique of 9/11 and al Qaeda. According to Zuhdi, bin Laden and Zawahiri did not understand that the bipolar American–Russian rivalry had been replaced by a unipolar U.S.-dominated system. Failing to recognize America's global supremacy, al Qaeda dragged the *ummah* into a confrontation it neither desired nor had the capability to pursue. Refusing to

accept this failure, bin Laden became “obsessed with killing Americans, Christians, and crusaders without distinctions.”

“What is the alternative to all this mayhem?” the imprisoned leaders ask. The United States should of course pursue a more just foreign policy, and Muslim states should empower their citizens by extending freedom and democracy to everyone. Jihad should be activated only against foreign aggressors and occupiers. One cannot blame the decline of the *ummah* on the enemies of Islam as bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their cohorts claim.

Al-Jama’a’s powerful and sometimes personal critique of 9/11 reveals that a civil war still rages among jihadists. The credibility and legitimacy of al-Jama’a leaders cannot be questioned even by al Qaeda. Zuhdi, Derbala, Ibrahim, Osama Hafez, Assem Abdel-Maged, and the rest who signed and blessed the two documents from which I have quoted extensively above, were founding fathers of a major wing of the jihadist movement. While students at Asyut University in the late 1970s, they published one of the first manifestos of violent jihad, entitled “Chapters from the Charter of Islamic Political Action.” They paid their dues in blood and sweat and have languished in prison for decades.

Nor are they alone. Other Islamist leaders have condemned al Qaeda’s internationalization of jihad, notably Montasser al-Zayat, who in the early 1980s served time in prison with Zawahiri and Kamal for involvement in the Sadat assassination. An attorney who defends Egyptian Islamists, Zayat has been privy to the inner circle of jihadists in Egypt as well as in other Middle Eastern countries. He published two personal memoirs, which as I indicated earlier, reveal in harrowing and intimate detail the strength of the bond between the jihadists who had been sent to prison. Yet, both are also highly critical of al Qaeda’s attack on the United States. Zayat also published his diaries, to clear his name and prove his jihadist credentials after Zawahiri’s post-9/11 memoir, *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*, had raised doubts about Zayat’s loyalty to the cause. Zawahiri had accused his old comrade of suspicious connections with Egyptian security officials.

Zawahiri and Zayat split because Zayat argued for al-Jama'a's 1997 ceasefire initiative among jihadists, including Zawahiri's Tanzim al-Jihad. Zayat had become the messenger of the peace initiative, which had been first proposed by al-Jama'a imprisoned leaders, who were struggling to end the state of war between Islamists and the Egyptian government.

I interviewed Zayat in his Cairo law office in 1999 and in 2000. Though careful and measured in his speech, he was not an especially modest man; he seemed to enjoy the limelight. Most of our conversations revolved around his clients' peace proposal and the difficulties he was facing both from the rejectionists in the government and the Zawahiri camp. Both sides were bent on undermining the ceasefire he had helped broker. He told me he was prepared to show me new al-Jama'a manifestos, calling on their foot soldiers to lay down their arms and end their insurgency so I could publicize them. I politely declined. Zayat's objective was to tell the world—in a way that the Egyptian government could not ignore—that a profound shift had taken place in the thinking within the jihadist movement(s). They had to break through the wall of hostility by the hardliners within the government and Tanzim al-Jihad. While Zayat acknowledged that Zawahiri and his militant allies opposed the ceasefire initiative, he was still at that point circumspect in his criticism of his former associates.

But after September 11, Zayat was less circumspect about Zawahiri and al Qaeda. His diaries portray Zawahiri as a reckless opportunist with no moral scruples. Drawing on conversations with hundreds of Islamists and jihadists over the previous 20 years, he reproaches Zawahiri for opening a second front against a far superior enemy. How could Zawahiri commit such a fatal strategic error and disregard the primacy of establishing an Islamic state in Egypt? The answer, in his view, is simple: egoism. Zayat also makes no effort to mask his contempt toward bin Laden. But at least bin Laden was more consistent than Zawahiri, for all along he had been struggling to expel the Americans from the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Zawahiri on the other hand was nothing but an overambitious, vain, irresponsible tactician who cared less about the future

of Tanzim al-Jihad than about magnifying his own image and status through an unholy alliance with bin Laden. And for what? Zawahiri turned Tanzim al-Jihad from an organization “aimed at building an Islamic state in Egypt into a branch within al Qaeda, subordinating a well-established organization to a new experimental one, which subsequently caused considerable harm to Islamist groups and activists throughout the world.”

To reassure his Islamist friends, Zayat stresses his loathing of American foreign policy, which he sees as hostile to Arabs in particular and Islam in general. Resistance to American imperialism remains for Zayat a religious duty. Yet, any effective strategy of resistance must be informed by costs, benefits, and the balance of power, whereas 9/11 was driven by a simplistic desire for revenge. The consequences have proven disastrous for the entire Islamist movement. All bin Laden and Zawahiri accomplished, Zayat and his allies believe, was to unify the international community against what had been a vigorous return to Islamic fundamentals. Who would have thought, Zayat asks, that European governments, which had historically granted political asylum to radical and militant Islamists, would no longer take them in, but repatriate them to their home countries to face trial, torture, and persecution?

Zayat believes that, in their rage, Westerners have not merely undertaken to counterattack militarily, but have become bent on the total elimination of the Islamist movement. Along with its allies, the United States has launched a total war against all militant Islamists, seeking to destroy them not just as a military but as a political force. He and like-minded jihadists view this campaign as an effort to eliminate the Islamist menace altogether. The movement’s ability to withstand the American storm, Zayat maintains, will depend on the willingness of its leaders to reflect critically on what went wrong; they must take stock and quickly repair the damage inflicted on the movement by Zawahiri and bin Laden, who forced the jihadist caravan off track. In short, if they are to survive, Islamists must construct a long-term strategy to resist the onslaught by the new imperial power.

Zayat does not lay out a blueprint for militant Islamism. His conclusions are vague and lacking in specific remedies. Yet, after the publication of his critical memoir, no knowledgeable observer could deny that he has revealed the fault lines among jihadists. One hardline cleric, Omar Mahmoud Abu-Omar, also known as Abu Qatada, attacked Zayat for being motivated by revenge against Zawahiri, dismissing his memoir as a “deviant case” and “evil analysis.” Abu Qatada, a Palestinian preacher who has lived in Britain since 1993—sometimes called bin Laden’s “spiritual ambassador in Europe”—is currently under house arrest under a British law introduced after September 11, permitting the detention without trial of foreigners deemed a danger to national security.

The majority of Islamists and jihadists, however, have echoed Zayat’s view of 9/11: it was a catastrophic blunder. In his own diaries serialized in *Al Hayat* Hani al-Sibai, an alleged leader of the Jihad Group who is in exile in Britain (the Egyptian government sentenced him to death), is bluntly critical of al Qaeda and 9/11. He has written that the global jihad movement led by al Qaeda has since its birth in 1998 proven “disastrous” to the Islamist program and the *ummah* itself. Like Zayat, Sibai called the decision to shift operational priorities and attack the United States unwise and based neither on rational analysis nor on consultation with the rank and file.

Except for al-Jama’a chiefs, who stress moral and ethical factors in their condemnation of 9/11, most Islamists’ criticisms are based on pragmatic considerations. In his rebuttal of al Qaeda and 9/11, Osama Rushdi, who was in charge of al-Jama’a media or propaganda committee and a senior member of its consultative council, comes close to coupling the moral with the political. In several interviews with the Arab media, Rushdi made the point that although al Qaeda justified its attacks on the United States in religious terms, those terms had nothing to do with Islam. Islam does not sanction killing civilians or violating legal and moral percepts, he stressed, because that would threaten international harmony and coexistence. Osama Rushdi made it clear that he opposed al Qaeda’s internationalization of jihad and its so-called

“blessed terrorism.” If al Qaeda members truly respect the rules established by the Shariah for pursuing jihad, he insisted, they should reflect on their errors and correct them before it is too late.

Criticizing American foreign policy is easy, Rushdi acknowledged. He preferred to address al Qaeda jihadists whom he held accountable for the current crisis: “Does hostility to America justify utilizing all means to attack it and harm its citizens regardless of their legitimacy and the inherent benefits and costs? Do the ends justify the means in this struggle, or should the means be as justifiable as the end?” The greatest threat facing the jihadist movement, he warned his former associates, lies in “self-inflicted wounds.” For too long, jihadists and Islamists have neglected to build institutions, preferring to grant “blind obedience to the charismatic leader who surprises his companions with abrupt decisions to the extent that they find out about them in newspapers”—a direct reference to the fateful decisions taken by bin Laden and Zawahiri.

The predominant public responses to September 11 by the first generation of jihadis was to condemn al Qaeda. Privately, they confided their fury toward bin Laden and Zawahiri, whose actions appeared “senseless” and self-destructive,” supplying ammunition to their internal and external enemies alike. The general realignment within the jihadist family has turned decidedly against the global jihad. (Iraq is an exception, as we will see.) If jihad’s major figures—Abu al-Walid, Sibai, Zuhdi, Rushdi, Derbala, Ibrahim, Zayat, and many, many others who have avoided making public statements—do not take al Qaeda’s bait, who will? Where will al Qaeda recruit and replenish its rapidly depleting ranks? The bulk of jihadis have remained on the sidelines in the unfolding struggle between al Qaeda and the international community, even as they have waged a public relations campaign against bin Laden’s “blessed terrorism.”

Instead of closing ranks against “the enemies of Islam,” as bin Laden and Zawahiri had hoped, September 11 destroyed any possibility of bridging the gulf between local and international jihadis. Al Qaeda is unquestionably the real loser, for it

desperately needs loyal allies and revolutionary legitimacy; its supposed natural partners not only deny it that recognition but attack it relentlessly. The most recent pronouncements by Zawahiri and bin Laden confirm that their appeals to Muslims to rise up and join the fight have largely fallen on deaf ears. Neither the *ummah* nor the army of deactivated local jihadis are willing to fight alongside al Qaeda, however much they empathize with its grievances against the international order and American foreign policy in particular.

“Al Qaeda now faces a war on two fronts: within and without. I would argue that the war within will ultimately prove to be the decisive factor in determining the future of the network.”

Like other former jihadis, leading mainstream Islamists—Muslim Brothers, independents, and clerics—condemned al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States as harmful, not just to Americans but to Islam and Muslims—for example, Hassan al-Turabi formerly, head of the Islamic National Front and now People’s Congress in Sudan who in the early 1990s hosted bin Laden, Abu Hafz, Abu Ubaidah, Zawahiri, Seif al-Adl, and their families and cohorts in Sudan and welcomed them as fellow revolutionaries. Turabi was not the only Islamist leader who criticized al Qaeda’s globalization of jihad and killing of American civilians. The spiritual founding father of Lebanon’s Hizbollah, Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, challenged al Qaeda’s claim that its attacks on the United States could be religiously sanctioned. In dozens of interviews and lectures since September 11 Fadlallah, considered one of the most prominent and prolific radical Shiite clerics, called al Qaeda’s bombings “suicide” not “martyrdom operations,” i.e., they were doctrinally illegitimate. Indeed, he did not mince any words about being staunchly opposed to U.S. foreign policy. However, in interviews and writings, he consistently argued against killing American citizens, who were not responsible for their country’s international policies—and might even oppose them: “We must not punish individuals who

have no relationship with the American administration or even those who have an indirect role.”

Bin Laden and Zawahiri are in deep trouble when a revolutionary cleric like Fadlallah unequivocally repudiates their tactics and calls on believers to exercise restraint and not be driven by irrational anti-American sentiments. This shows the extent of al Qaeda’s isolation and fringe status even within the radical religious camp. If they cannot coopt this constituency, who can? The religious establishment? Al Qaeda has no real friends or supporters there. For example, Sheikh Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, a reformist and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, the oldest Islamic institution of learning, was one of the first clerics to condemn al Qaeda and dismiss bin Laden’s jihad credentials as “fraudulent.” On September 13th 2001, one of the leading Muslim scholars, Yusuf al-Qardawi, issued a fatwa that condemned the “illegal jihad” and expressed sorrow and empathy for its American victims: “Our hearts bleed because of the attacks that have targeted the World Trade Center, as well as other institutions in the United States.” Qardawi, who has a huge Muslim audience and is widely listened to and read, wrote that the murders in New York cannot be justified on any ground, including “the American biased policy toward Israel on the military, political, and economic fronts.” Leading religious scholars and clerics, including the muftis of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere, echoed Qardawi’s condemnation of al Qaeda and declared their opposition to all those who permit and engage in the killing of noncombatants. The point I want to part on is that the overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrates that al Qaeda has failed to make major inroads into Muslim society and build up a critical social constituency that would sustain it in the long term.

The main point is that an internal struggle is shaking the jihadist movement to its very foundation. The social forces employed against al Qaeda represent a broad ideological spectrum, ranging from former militant Islamists to leftists and the nationalistic mainstream, all openly opposed to the global jihad. Fault lines have emerged within the bin Laden network itself, as suggested by dissenting voices such as Abu al-Walid al-Masri, whose statements

reveal the depth of inner tensions within the movement. Indeed, it would appear that al Qaeda has united leading social forces against its cause. One of the major criticisms leveled against bin Laden and Zawahiri and now Zarqawi by former jihadi associates is that they have mastered the art of making enemies internally and externally.

Al Qaeda now faces a war on two fronts: within and without. I would argue that the war within will ultimately prove to be the decisive factor in determining the future of the network.

It is doubtful that al Qaeda can withstand a prolonged internal and external war of attrition and survive intact. In fact, the multiple internal conflicts among jihadis call to question the very functioning of the jihadist enterprise as a whole, not just transnationalist organizations like al Qaeda and its affiliates in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere. We are likely to witness mutations and fragmentations—violent spasms similar to those that have roiled the jihadist movement since the late 1990s. But, it is very unlikely that the jihadist architecture can be reconstituted systematically as it was in the 1970s, 1980s, and the 1990s. Al Qaeda could be seen as a last effort to bankroll the jihadist enterprise and invest it with new human and political capital. The “Abu Abdullah contracting company”—al Qaeda—is almost bankrupt, with few willing Muslim investors left.

EFFECT OF EXPANSION OF WAR ON TERROR

It would be shortsighted, however, to pen al Qaeda’s obituary because it has proven itself to be highly adaptable and responsive to new challenges. In particular, the expansion of the American “war on terror” with the invasion and occupation of Iraq provided al Qaeda with a temporary lease on life, a second generation of young recruits, and a powerful mobilization tool for its outreach activities to the *ummah*. Statements by al Qaeda’s top chiefs show they view the unfolding confrontation in Iraq as “a golden and unique opportunity” for the global jihad movement to achieve its long-term goals. The war with the international community did not go well for bin Laden; the American-led invasion and occupation of Baghdad has allowed him to stay in business

longer than expected. The topic of al Qaeda in Iraq is beyond the scope of this article, but the Zarqawi network and the bin Laden organization appear to be committed to a similar agenda, and like bin Laden, Zarqawi has mastered the art of making enemies and turning Arab public opinion against his network. After initially flirting with the mujahedeen or resistance fighters pitted against the coalition forces and the new Iraqi government, more and more Arabs are having second thoughts about Zarqawi's indiscriminate terror tactics and costly program that are drowning Muslim societies in blood.

I don't know if we have reached a turning point yet against the Zarqawi network, but his actions have certainly alienated Sunni Arab communities inside Iraq, Jordan, and elsewhere. As one radical Islamist told me, "Zarqawi's umbilical cord is tied to the American military presence in Iraq; the longer the Americans stay, the longer the Zarqawi phenomenon will endure."

Let me summarize by saying that despite overwhelming evidence, there is little recognition in the White House that the expansion of the war on terror has damaged America's standing in the world, prolonged its fight against al Qaeda, and weakened its deterrence. Contrary to the received wisdom in the United States, the dominant Muslim response to al Qaeda reveals that few activists and ordinary Muslims embraced its global cause. Although ordinary Muslims may empathize with al Qaeda's grievances against the international order, particularly U.S. foreign policy, they are unwilling to commit to war and fight on bin Laden's behalf.

EFFECT ON ORDINARY MUSLIMS

Public surveys and interviews with young Muslim activists indicate clearly that few are willing to join the global jihad network—a salient point missed by American commentators and senior policymakers, who concentrated on al Qaeda and international jihadis and overlooked both the faultlines among the jihadist movement and the vast societal opposition to its cause. Had they tuned in to the internal struggles roiling Muslim lands they would have had second thoughts about the military

expansion of the war on terror; they would have realized that—though quite deadly—al Qaeda is a tiny fringe organization with no viable and entrenched social constituency. Had they listened carefully to the multiple critiques of al Qaeda by Muslim clerics and opinion makers they would have had an answer to their often-asked question: Where are the Muslim moderates? Had they observed the debates and actions of former jihadis and Islamists they would have known that the jihadist movement is being torn apart, that al Qaeda does not speak for or represent religious nationalists or the Muslim public at large. American commentators and policymakers would also have realized that the internal encirclement of al Qaeda, i.e., identifying and neutralizing its constituency, is the most effective means of hammering a deadly nail into its coffin. The way to go is not the declaration of a worldwide war against an unconventional, paramilitary foe with little or no social base of support, nor is it to settle scores with old regional dictators. That is exactly what bin Laden and his cohorts had hoped the United States would do—lash out militarily and angrily against the *ummah*, As Seif al-Adal, al Qaeda's overall military commander, recently put it, "the Amercians took the bait and fell into our trap."

Entrapped or not, we must recognize that this war cannot be won on the battlefield, that the most effective means to complete the internal encirclement of the global jihad ideology is through Muslim and Arab hearts and minds. Osama bin Laden and his militant Islamist cohorts are waging an ideological war for Muslim hearts and minds, one they consider as important as their military campaign and one they may be losing.

Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, are desperately seeking to convince Muslims, particularly radical Islamists, that al Qaeda is winning its war against America. Such conviction, they reason, would incite their sympathizers to attack U.S. interests worldwide. "War in Iraq is raging with no letup," bin Laden declared on the latest audio tape, "and operations in Afghanistan are escalating in our favor." The tape, which surfaced last month after bin Laden's absence for more than a year, addresses the American people, both threatening them with fresh attacks and

offering *hudna*, or long-term truce, if the United States withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Bin Laden knows that Americans won't buy his truce offer and are not convinced by his reasoning for targeting their country. In reality, the tape was for Muslim ears: Bin Laden's proposition is meant to establish him in the eyes of his putative constituency as a legitimate leader—like President Bush—concerned with wartime diplomacy. The tape also answers Muslim critics who faulted him for violating Islam's fundamental rule of war: Americans were not thoroughly warned before the 9/11 attacks. These subtexts are the tape's real messages. Bin Laden is a fugitive; he needs to assure his supporters who were anxious about his fate that all is well. A U.S. airstrike in Pakistan last month that targeted Mr. al-Zawahiri reportedly killed four principal al Qaeda figures. Mr. al-Zawahiri survived, but the al Qaeda cohort is being closely tracked. Al Qaeda cannot win if its top leaders spend most of their time hiding, just trying to survive. If nothing else, the bin Laden tape says, "We are winning because we are alive."

BOTTOM LINE

Al Qaeda's grand failure is its inability to win the war for Muslim minds. One of the major miscalculations of bin Laden and Zawahiri was believing that attacking the United States would mobilize Muslims against their pro-Western rulers and against those rulers' superpower patron. While public surveys, as suggested earlier, show many Muslims sympathize with al Qaeda's foreign policy grievances against the United States, most oppose its terrorism and are unwilling to kill or be killed on its behalf. Al Qaeda has thus failed since 9/11 to reinvigorate and unify a splintered, wartorn jihadist movement and restore its credibility in the eyes of the worldwide Muslim community. Many Islamists and former jihadis, even within bin Laden's wing of the movement, view 9/11 as a calamity. Since the late 1990s, an intense struggle has torn the jihadist tribe apart. This civil war, which has hardly been noticed let alone critically examined in the United States deepened and widened after 9/11. The jihadist tribe is split between the ultra-militant wing, which includes al Qaeda,

and a nonviolent faction that commands greater numbers and political weight.

This civil war has been overshadowed by the war in Iraq, which was a godsend to al Qaeda because it diverted attention from its zero-sum game and lent it an air of credibility. Bin Laden and Zawahiri have successfully tapped into the widespread Muslim opposition to the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. The war in Iraq proved to be a powerful recruiting tool for al Qaeda and gave it time to regroup. The Iraq war merely has postponed the inevitable shift of power toward activists who oppose violence in the service of politics. The indiscriminate violence of the followers of al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has turned Arab and Iraqi public opinion against global jihad.

There are daily reports of armed clashes between homegrown Iraqi fighters—the overwhelming majority of the insurgency—and the Zarqawi network. Sunni tribal leaders and clerics have reportedly promised to chase Zarqawi extremists out of their villages and towns. They say they have so far arrested more than 300 foreign “infiltrators” and terrorists of the Zarqawi network. The widening rift and bloodletting between the two camps does not bode well for the survival of al Qaeda in Iraq. This promising development does not mean the United States is winning in Iraq either. Al Qaeda still benefits from America's woes in that war-torn country.

Although the Bush administration pays lip service to the war of ideas, it has not taken effective, concrete measures to win Muslim minds. The most urgent requirement is to set an orderly, gradual timetable to extract American troops from Iraq. Next, the United States must earnestly and actively promote reconciliation and peace between Palestinians and Israelis and invest considerable sociopolitical and economic capital in the rule of law and democracy in Muslim lands.

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2.2 THE OBJECT BEYOND WAR: COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE FOUR TOOLS OF POLITICAL COMPETITION

Montgomery McFate and Andrea V. Jackson

The state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (that is, considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?

—Max Weber¹

In 1918, Max Weber, the father of modern sociology, asked these questions; the answers reveal a key to conducting effective counterinsurgency operations (COIN). In the most basic sense, an insurgency is a competition for power. According to British Brigadier General Frank Kitson, “[T]here can be no such thing as [a] purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”² U.S. Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22,

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Counterinsurgency Operations, defines insurgency as “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. *Political power is the central issue in an insurgency*” (emphasis added).³

In any struggle for political power there are a limited number of tools that can be used to induce men to obey. These tools are coercive force, economic incentive and disincentive, legitimating ideology, and traditional authority.⁴ These tools are equally available to insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. From the perspective of the population, neither side has an explicit or immediate advantage in the battle for hearts and minds. The civilian population will support the side that makes it *in its interest* to obey. The regard for one’s own benefit or advantage is the basis for behavior in all societies, regardless of religion, class, or culture. Iraqis, for example, will decide to support the insurgency or government forces based on a calculation of which side *on balance* best meets their needs for physical security, economic well-being, and social identity.

The central goal in counterinsurgency operations, then, is to surpass the adversary in the effective use of the four tools. According to British Brigadier General Richard Simpkin, “Established armed forces need to do more than just master high intensity maneuver warfare between large forces with baroque equipment. They have to go one step further and structure, equip, and train themselves to employ the techniques of revolutionary warfare to beat the opposition at their own game on their own ground.”⁵ Beating the opposition requires that counterinsurgency forces make it in the interest of the civilian population to support the government. How? To win support counterinsurgents must be able to selectively provide security—or take it away. Counterinsurgency forces must become the arbiter of economic well-being by providing goods, services, and income—or by taking them away. Counterinsurgency forces must develop and disseminate narratives, symbols, and messages that resonate with the population’s preexisting cultural system or counter those of the

opposition. And, finally, counterinsurgents must co-opt existing traditional leaders whose authority can augment the legitimacy of the government or prevent the opposition from co-opting them.

To use the tools of political competition effectively, the culture and society of the insurgent group must be fully understood. Julian Paget, one of Britain's foremost experts on the subject, wrote in 1967 that "every effort must be made to know the Enemy before the insurgency begins."⁶ For each key social group, counterinsurgency forces must be able to identify the amount of security the group has and where it gets that security, the level of income and services that group has and where it gets that income, ideologies and narratives that resonate with the group and the means by which they communicate, and the legitimate traditional leaders and their interests.

In most counterinsurgency operations since 1945, insurgents have held a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak the language, move easily within the society in question, and are more likely to understand the population's interests. Thus, effective counterinsurgency requires a leap of imagination and a peculiar skill set not encountered in conventional warfare. Jean Larteguy, writing about French operations in Indochina and Algeria, noted: "To make war, you always must put yourself in the other man's place . . . , eat what they eat, sleep with their women, and read their books."⁷ Essentially, effective counterinsurgency requires that state forces mirror their adversary.⁸ Past counterinsurgency campaigns offer a number of lessons about how to conduct (and how not to conduct) counterinsurgency using the four tools of political competition. These lessons have potential relevance for current operations in Iraq.

COERCIVE FORCE

In his 1918 speech "Politics as a Vocation (Politik als Beruf)," Max Weber argued that the state must be characterized by the means which it, and only it, has at its disposal: "A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."⁹ While the most direct source of any state's political power is coercion,

or the right to use or threaten the use of physical force, it is not necessarily the most effective mode of governing. Governments (such as totalitarian regimes) that base their power purely on coercion play a dangerous game, because citizens who are the object of this unmediated power often view it as illegitimate and are frequently willing to engage in acts of resistance against the state.

Legitimate governance, on the other hand, implies a reciprocal relationship between central authority and citizenry. To be considered legitimate by the populace, the government must monopolize coercive force within its territorial boundaries to provide its citizens with the most basic human need—security.¹⁰ Where the state fails to provide security to its citizens or becomes a threat to them, it fails to fulfill the implicit contract of governance. In certain circumstances, citizens may then seek alternative security guarantees in the form of an ethnic or political allegiance with a group engaged in an armed struggle against a central authority.¹¹ In some cases, this struggle might develop into an outright insurgency.

The government's legitimacy becomes a center-of-gravity target during an insurgency, meaning insurgents will attempt to demonstrate that the state cannot guarantee security within its territory. The "central goal of an insurgency is not to defeat the armed forces, but to subvert or destroy the government's legitimacy, its ability and moral right to govern."¹² Insurgents have a natural advantage in this game because their actions are not constrained by codified law. States, however, must not only avoid wrongdoing but any appearance of wrongdoing that might undermine their legitimacy in the community. Thomas Mockaitis points out: "In counterinsurgency an atrocity is not necessarily what one actually does but what one is successfully blamed for."¹³ During an insurgency, there are three ways to conserve state legitimacy: using proportionate force, using precisely applied force, and providing security for the civilian population.

PROPORTIONATE FORCE

In responding to an insurgency, states naturally tend to reach for the most convenient weapon at their disposal—coercive force. Most states focus their military doctrine, training, and planning squarely on major combat operations as a core competency, often leaving them unprepared for counterinsurgency operations. Since 1923, for example, the core tenet of U.S. warfighting strategy has been that overwhelming force deployed against an equally powerful state will result in military victory.¹⁴ Yet, in a counterinsurgency, “winning” through overwhelming force is often inapplicable as a concept, if not problematic as a goal. Often, the application of overwhelming force has a negative, unintended effect of strengthening the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing recruiting, and demonstrating the brutality of state forces. For example, in May 1945 the Muslim population of Sétif, Algeria, rioted and killed 103 Europeans. At the behest of the French colonial government of Algeria, General Raymond-Francis Duval indiscriminately killed thousands of innocent Algerians in and around Sétif in reprisal. The nascent Algerian liberation movement seized on the barbarity of the French response and awakened a mostly politically dormant population. “Sétif!” became a rallying cry of the Algerian insurgency, an insurgency that led to 83,441 French casualties and the eventual French withdrawal from independent Algeria.¹⁵ As this example indicates, political considerations must circumscribe military action as a fundamental matter of strategy.¹⁶

Because state military institutions train, organize, and equip to fight wars against other states, they have a natural tendency to misread the nature of the adversary during counterinsurgencies. Charles Townsend noted: “If the nature of the challenging ‘force’ is misunderstood, then the counter-application of force is likely to be wrong.”¹⁷ This misunderstanding can result in a use of force appropriate against another state’s army but counterproductive when used against an insurgent group. For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) historically viewed itself as an “army” and construed its activities as a “war” against British occupation. Thus, any British actions that implied that the conflict was a war

provided effective propaganda for the IRA . According to the *Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21*, “recognition [by military authorities] of the IRA as belligerents may ipso facto be said to involve the Imperial government in the recognition of an Irish Republic.”¹⁸ Identifying the conflict as a war would have legitimized Sinn Fein and threatened the political legitimacy of the British government and of the Union, itself. As Lloyd George said in April 1920: “You do not declare war against rebels.”¹⁹

The use of excessive force may not only legitimize the insurgent group, but also cause the state to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population. For example, in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, on 30 January 1972 the British Army Parachute Regiment arrested demonstrators participating in an illegal, anti-internment march. Believing that they were being attacked, soldiers opened fire on a crowd of civil-rights demonstrators. According to a sergeant who witnessed the debacle, “acid bottle bombs were being thrown from the top of the flats, and two of our blokes were badly burnt. . . . It was very busy, very chaotic. . . . People were running in all directions, and screaming everywhere.”²⁰ The soldiers responded to the rioters as if they were an opposing army. According to one British Army observer, “The Paras are trained to react fast and go in hard. That day they were expecting to have to fight their way in. . . . In those street conditions it is very difficult to tell where a round has come from. [T]hat section, quite frankly lost control. For goodness’ sake, you could hear their CO [commanding officer] bellowing at them to cease firing, and only to fire aimed shots at [an] actual target.”²¹ As a result of the overkill in Londonderry on what is now known as Bloody Sunday, the IRA came to be seen as the legitimate protectors of their own communities. The British Army, on the other hand, became a target of the people it had intended to protect. For the government to retain legitimacy, the population must believe that state forces are improving rather than undermining their security.

PRECISELY APPLIED FORCE

A direct relationship exists between the appropriate use of force and successful counterinsurgency. A corollary of this rule

is that force must be applied precisely. According to British Army Colonel Michael Dewar, counterinsurgency “operates by precise tactics. Two weeks waiting in ambush and one kill to show for it is far better than to bomb a village flat.”²² Force must be applied precisely so that it functions as a disincentive to insurgent activity. If the state threatens individuals through the imprecise application of force, the insurgency may begin to look more appealing as a security provider.

Certain senior U.S. military commanders in Vietnam understood the need for precise application of firepower, although they never implemented its use. When General Harold K. Johnson became U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 1964, he proposed an approach to the war in Vietnam radically at variance with General William Westmoreland’s attrition-based body-count approach. During his early trips to Vietnam, Johnson was disturbed by the enormous amount of firepower being “splashed around,” of which only 6 percent was actually observed.²³ In 1965 Johnson commissioned a study titled “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN).”²⁴ The study was drafted by 10 officers from diverse backgrounds, including Colonel Don Marshall, a cultural anthropologist by training, who later directed General Creighton Abrams’ Long-Range Program Plan.²⁵ The PROVN study carefully examined the unintended consequences of indiscriminate firepower and concluded that “aerial attacks and artillery fire, applied indiscriminately, also have exacted a toll on village allegiance.”²⁶ Operations intended to protect villagers were having the opposite result of harming and alienating them. Johnson noted a new rule to be applied to this type of warfare: “Destruction is applied only to the extent necessary to achieve control and, thus, by its nature, must be discriminating.”²⁷

The PROVN study has implications for operations in Iraq. The main focus of Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) has been the destruction of insurgent and terrorist networks. Lacking quality information on the identity of insurgents, MNF-I has engaged in raids on neighborhoods where they suspect weapons caches might be. These untargeted raids have a negative, unintended effect on the civilian population. One young Iraqi imam said: “There are

too many raids. There are too many low-flying helicopters at night. Before, people wanted to go to America. Now they do not want to see Americans anymore. They do not want to see any more Soldiers. They hate all of the militaries in their area."²⁸ To avoid causing resentment that can drive insurgency, coercive force must be applied accurately and precisely. Each use of force should be preceded by the questions: Is the action creating more insurgents than it is eliminating? Does the benefit of this action outweigh the potential cost to security if it creates more insurgents?

PROVIDING SECURITY

One core state function is to provide security to citizens within its territory. Security is the most basic precondition for civilian support of the government. In regard to Vietnam, Charles Simpson pointed out that "the motivation that produces the only real long-lasting effect is the elemental consideration of survival. Peasants will support [the guerrillas] if they are convinced that failure to do so will result in death or brutal punishment. They will support the government if and when they are convinced that it *offers them a better life*, and it can and will protect them against the [guerrillas] forever."²⁹

To counter an insurgency the government must establish (or reestablish) physical security for its citizens. Establishing physical security for civilians was the basis of the defensive enclave strategy, also known as the "oil spot" strategy, advocated by Major General Lewis W. Walt, Lieutenant General James Gavin, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, and others during the Vietnam War. In a recent *Foreign Affairs* article, Andrew Krepinevich reaffirms this approach: "Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, Coalition forces should concentrate on providing security" to the civilian population.³⁰

Such an approach is difficult to carry out because of force-structure requirements, and because using soldiers as police conflicts with the operational code of the military. Westmoreland, for example, ultimately rejected the oil spot strategy on the grounds that "the Marines should have been trying to find the enemy's main forces and bring them to battle," an activity which

was presumably more martial than drinking tea with villagers.³¹ Such a strategy is also difficult to conceive and implement because most Americans live in communities with effective policing and cannot imagine a world without security guarantees. One 101st Airborne Battalion commander noted: “establishing a secure environment for civilians, free from the arbitrary threat of having your personal property appropriated by a man with a gun, should be the main task of COIN. But we messed it up because it’s such an understood part of our own social contract—it’s not a premise that we debate because we’re mostly just suburban kids.”³²

“To avoid causing resentment that can drive insurgency, coercive force must be applied accurately and precisely. Each use of force should be preceded by the questions: Is the action creating more insurgents than it is eliminating? Does the benefit of this action outweigh the potential cost to security if it creates more insurgents?”

There are three ways to provide civilian security in a counterinsurgency: local, indigenous forces working with regular military forces; community policing; and direct support. In Vietnam, the U.S. Marine Corps’ (USMC) Combined action Program (CAP) was highly effective at providing civilian security by using local, indigenous forces as well as regular military forces. In every CAP unit, a Marine rifle squad was paired with a platoon of local Vietnamese forces. Using a local village as a base, CAP units trained, patrolled, defended, and lived with indigenous forces, preventing the guerrillas from extracting rice, intelligence, and sanctuary from local towns and villages. In addition to providing valuable intelligence about enemy activity, CAP units accounted for 7.6 percent of the enemy killed while representing only 1.5 percent of the Marines killed in Vietnam.³³ In Malaya, under the Briggs Plan, the British administration replaced soldiers with civilian police who gained the trust of the community by building long-term relationships. The British also developed an information campaign to portray the police as civil servants, whose job it was

to protect civilians. By 1953, these efforts reduced violence and increased trust in the government.³⁴

During 2003, the 101st Airborne Division provided security to the civilian population of Mosul. With more than 20,000 Soldiers, the U.S. force in Nineveh province had excellent civil affairs, patrolling, and rapid-reaction coverage. As the largest single employer in northern Iraq, the 101st Airborne was a powerful force for social order in the community.³⁵

The Coalition has designated Iraqi Police as the main force to provide security to Iraqi citizens. Despite vigorous recruiting and training efforts, they have been less than effective in providing security for the population. As of August 2005, the town of Hit, with a population of over 130,000, entirely lacked a police force.³⁶ Iraqis interviewed between November 2003 and August 2005 indicated that security and crime, specifically kidnapping and assault, remain their greatest concerns.³⁷ In many Iraqi towns, women and children cannot walk in the street for fear of abduction or attack. Incidents such as minor traffic accidents can potentially escalate into deadly violence. In many towns police patrol only during the daytime with support from the Iraqi army or Coalition forces, leaving the militias and insurgents in control at night. Residents view the police as a means of legitimizing illegal activities rather than as a source of security: police commonly accept bribes to ignore smuggling (from Iran and Turkey), black market activities, kidnappings, and murders. For a price, most police officers will arrest an innocent man, and for a greater price, they will turn the suspect over to the Coalition as a suspected insurgent. In August 2005 in Mosul, a U.S. officer reported that for \$5,000 to \$10,000 a detainee could bribe his way out of Iraqi police custody.³⁸

In most areas of the country, local preexisting militias and ad hoc units form the core of local police forces. These units tend to be overwhelmingly dominated by a single ethno-religious or tribal group, which frequently arouses the animosity of local populations from different groups. Many of these forces freely use official state structures to serve their own interests. One American military officer, when discussing the Sunni Arab police from east

Mosul (90 percent of whom are from the al Jaburi tribe) said: “I don’t know if the police are about peace and security, or about their own survival and power.”³⁹

In some areas of the country, self-interested militias previously engaged in insurgent activities against Saddam Hussein’s regime now provide questionable security services to the population. Some, like the Badr Brigade or the peshmerga, have been integrated into the new Iraqi Security Forces.⁴⁰ In other areas, the Interior Ministry has deployed Public Order battalions to maintain government control. Intended to augment civilian police during large-scale civil disobedience, these units are not trained to provide police services and have been heavy-handed in their application of coercive force. In Falluja, the Public Order battalion currently functions as a *de facto* Shiite militia, extorting business owners, dishonoring women, and raiding homes indiscriminately.⁴¹ According to a USMC officer, using Shiite police in predominately Sunni areas leads to resentment among the population: “We’ve had problems. There are inevitable cultural clashes.”⁴²

State failure to provide security may cause citizens to accept alternative security guarantees from nonstate actors, which can be a major driver of insurgency.⁴³ For example, the British failure to provide security to republican communities in Northern Ireland during Loyalist attacks in 1968 resulted in the Irish Republican Army’s reemergence as a paramilitary organization and its assumption of certain police functions within its communities. The same dynamic has taken place in Iraq. According to one Iraqi insurgent, the failure of U.S. forces to provide security motivated him to take up arms: “My colleagues and I waited to make our decision on whether to fight until we saw how they would act. They should have come and just given us food and some security. . . . It was then that I realized that they had come as occupiers and not as liberators, and my colleagues and I then voted to fight.”⁴⁴

In some areas of Iraq, insurgent groups and militias have established themselves as extragovernmental arbiters of the physical security of the population and now represent a challenge to the state’s monopoly on coercive force. For example, Muqtada al Sadr’s Mehdi army is the sole security provider for the population

of Sadr City, a district of Baghdad with an estimated population of 2 million.⁴⁵ In Haditha, Ansar al Sunna and Tawhid al-Jihad mujihadeen govern the town, enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic law in their court system, and use militias to provide order. If Haditha residents follow the rules, they receive 24-hour access to electricity and can walk down the street without fear of random crime. If they disobey, the punishments are extremely harsh, such as being whipped with cables 190 times for committing adultery.⁴⁶ In the border town of Qaim, followers of Abu Musab Zarqawi took control on 5 September 2005 and began patrolling the streets, killing U.S. collaborators and enforcing strict Islamic law. Sheik Nawaf Mahallawi noted that because Coalition forces cannot provide security to local people "it would be insane [for local tribal members] to attack Zarqawi's people, even to shoot one bullet at them. . . ." ⁴⁷

Until the Coalition can provide security, Iraqis will maintain affiliations with other groups to protect themselves and their families. If they fear reprisal and violence, few Iraqis will be willing to work with the Coalition as translators, join the Iraqi Security Forces, participate in local government, initiate reconstruction projects, or provide information on insurgent and terrorist operations. According to an Iraqi police officer, "The people are scared to give us information about the terrorists because there are many terrorists here. And when we leave, the terrorists will come back and kill them."⁴⁸ Currently, cooperation with the Coalition does not enhance individual and family security and can even undermine it. For Iraqi civilians, informing on other Iraqis can eliminate enemies and economic competitors, but informing on actual insurgents is likely to result in the murder of the informant and his family.⁴⁹ Throughout Iraq, translators working with Americans regularly turn up dead. City council members and senior police officials are assassinated. These strong security disincentives for cooperation with the Coalition and the Iraqi government have a negative combined effect. Iraqis have little incentive to provide information to the Coalition, and the lack of intelligence makes accurate targeting of insurgents difficult. To develop intelligence, Coalition forces conduct sweeps and raids

in suspect neighborhoods. Sweeps greatly undermine public support for the Coalition and its Iraqi partners and thus create further disincentive for cooperation.

IDEOLOGY

In *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*, Kitson notes that ideas are a motivating factor in insurgent violence: “The main characteristic which distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily concerned with the struggle for men’s minds.”⁵⁰ Insurgencies fight for power as well as an idea, whether it is Islam, Marxism, or nationalism. According to USMC General Charles C. Krulak, to fight back “you need a better idea. Bullets help sanitize an operational area. . . . They don’t win a war.”⁵¹

While compelling ideas are no guarantee of victory, the ability to leverage ideology is an important tool in a counterinsurgency. Mass movements of all types, including insurgencies, gather recruits and amass popular support through ideological appeal. Individuals subscribe to ideologies that articulate and render comprehensible the underlying reasons why practical, material interests remain unfulfilled.

“My colleagues and I waited to make our decision on whether to fight until we saw how they would act. They should have come and just given us food and some security. . . . It was then that I realized that they had come as occupiers and not as liberators, and my colleagues and I then voted to fight.” —Iraqi insurgent

Recruits are often young men whose ambitions have been frustrated and who are unable to improve their (or their community’s) lot in life.⁵² A mass movement offers a refuge “from the anxieties, bareness and meaninglessness . . . of individual existence . . . , freeing them from their ineffectual selves—and it does this by enfolding them into a closely knit and exultant corporate whole.”⁵³ The insurgent group provides them with identity, purpose, and

community in addition to physical, economic, and psychological security. The movement's ideology clarifies their tribulations and provides a course of action to remedy those ills.

The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A cultural narrative is an "organizational scheme expressed in story form."⁵⁴ narratives are central to the representation of identity, particularly the collective identity of groups such as religions, nations, and cultures. Stories about a community's history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked and are often the basis for strategies, actions, and interpretation of the intentions of other actors. D. E. Polkinghorne tells us: "narrative is the discourse structure in which human action receives its form and through which it is meaningful."⁵⁵

Insurgent organizations have used narratives quite efficiently in developing legitimating ideology. For example, in *Terror's Mask: Insurgency Within Islam*, Michael Vlahos identifies the structure and function of the jihadist narrative.⁵⁶ According to Vlahos, Osama bin Laden's depiction of himself as a man purified in the mountains of Afghanistan, who begins converting followers and punishing infidels, resonates powerfully with the historic figure of Muhammad. In the collective imagination of bin-Laden and his followers, Islamic history is a story about the decline of the umma and the inevitable triumph against Western imperialism. Only through jihad can Islam be renewed both politically and theologically. The jihadist narrative is expressed and appropriated through the sacred language of mystical heroic poetry and revelations provided through dreams. Because the "act of struggle itself is a triumph, joining them to God and to the river of Islam . . . , there can be no defeat as we know it for them."⁵⁷ narratives thus have the power to transform reality: the logic of the narrative insulates those who have absorbed it from temporal failure, promising followers monumental, inevitable victory.⁵⁸

To employ (or counter) ideology effectively, the cultural narratives of the insurgent group and society must be understood. William Casebeer points out that "understanding the narratives which influence the genesis, growth, maturation, and

transformation of terrorist organizations will enable us to better fashion a strategy for undermining the efficacy of those narratives so as to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist groups.”⁵⁹

Misunderstanding the cultural narrative of an adversary, on the other hand, may result in egregious policy decisions. For example, the Vietnamese view their history as continued armed opposition to invasions in the interest of national sovereignty, beginning with the Song Chinese in the 11th century, the Mongols in the 13th century, the Ming Chinese in the 15th century, the Japanese during World War II, and the French who were eventually defeated at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954.

After establishing the League for Vietnamese Independence, better known as the Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh wrote: “. . . national liberation is the most important problem. . . . we shall overthrow the Japanese and French and their jackals in order to save people from the situation between boiling water and boiling heat.”⁶⁰ The Vietnamese believed that their weak and small (nhuoc tieu) nation would be annihilated by colonialism, a cannibalistic people eating system (che do thuc dan), and that their only chance for survival was to fight back against the more powerful adversary.⁶¹ When the Viet Minh began an insurrection against the French, however, U.S. policymakers did not see their actions as a quest for national liberation but as evidence of communist expansion.⁶² U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson frequently told visitors to the White House that if we did not take our stand in Vietnam, we would one day have to make our stand in Hawaii.⁶³ U.S. failure to understand the Vietnamese cultural narrative transformed a potential ally into a motivated adversary. Ho Chi Minh said: “You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours. But even at those odds, you will lose and I will win.”⁶⁴

“For Iraqi civilians, informing on other Iraqis can eliminate enemies and economic competitors, but informing on actual insurgents is likely to result in the murder of the informant and his family.”

Insurgent organizations in Iraq have been effective in leveraging preexisting cultural narratives to generate anti-imperialist sentiment. Current events resonate powerfully with the history of successive invasions of Iraqi territory, including the 13th-century sacking of Baghdad by Genghis Khan's grandson Hulegu, the invasion of Tamerlane of Samarkand in 1401, and more recently, the British Mandate. Abu Hamza, an Egyptian cleric, has described U.S. President George W. Bush as "the Ghengis Khan of this century" and British Prime Minister Tony Blair as "his chambermaid," concluding that "we are just wondering when our blood is going to be shed."⁶⁵ Capitalizing on this narrative of foreign invasion and domination, insurgent groups have generated pervasive beliefs that undermine the Coalition. Two such notions are that the Coalition intends to appropriate Iraq's natural resources and that America wants to destroy Islam. Unfortunately, some of our actions tend to confirm these narratives; for example, protecting oil refineries rather than the Baghdad museum after major combat operations ended indicated to Iraqis what U.S. priorities were.⁶⁶

Despite the general appeal of the anti-imperialist narrative to the general Iraqi population, the insurgency in Iraq currently lacks an ideological center. Because of ethno-religious divisions in the society, the resurgence of tribalism following the occupation, and the subsequent erosion of national identity, insurgent organizations are deploying ideologies that appeal only to their own ethno-religious group. Various Sunni Arab insurgent groups, for example, feel vulnerable within the new Shia-dominated regime and would prefer an authoritarian, secular, Sunni government. Other Sunni Arab insurgents are using extremist Islam to recruit and motivate followers.⁶⁷ They claim that the secular nature of the Ba'ath regime was the root cause of its brutality and corruption. Among the Shia, the Sadr Movement employs the narrative of martyrdom of the Prophet's grandson, Imam Hussein, at Karbala in 681 A.D., as a way to generate resistance against the Ba'ath Party; against secular, democratic forms of government; and against other Shia Arab leaders (like al Hakim and al Jaffari) who are viewed as proxies of Iran. The Shia construe their persecution for opposing outside influences (including modernization, capitalism, communism,

socialism, secular government, and democracy) as martyrdom for making the “just choice” exactly as Imam Hussein did.⁶⁸

To defeat the insurgent narratives, the Coalition must generate a strong counternarrative. Unfortunately, the Coalition’s main themes—freedom and democracy—do not resonate well with the population. In Iraq, freedom is associated with chaos, and chaos has a particularly negative valence expressed in the proverb: better a thousand years of oppression than a single day of anarchy. The aversion to political chaos has a strong basis in historical reality: Iraq’s only period of semidemocratic governance, from 1921 until 1958, was characterized by social, political, and economic instability. Current Iraqi skepticism regarding the desirability of democratic governance is accentuated by the continued declarations that the current system, which is quite chaotic, is a democracy. After witnessing unlawful, disorderly behavior, Iraqis will occasionally joke: “Ah, so this is democracy.”⁶⁹

Democracy is also problematic as an effective ideology because Islam forms the basis for conceptions of government and authority (despite the secular views of many Iraqis). The Islamic concept of sovereignty is grounded in the notion that human beings are mere executors of God’s will. According to the Islamic political philosopher Sayyid Abul a’la Maududi, “Islam, speaking from the viewpoint of political philosophy, is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy. [Islam] altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the viceregency (khilafah) of man.”⁷⁰

ECONOMIC INCENTIVE AND DISINCENTIVE

To win the support of the population, counterinsurgency forces must create incentives for cooperating with the government and disincentives for opposing it. The USMC Small Wars Manual advocates this approach, stressing the importance of focusing on the social, economic, and political development of the people more than on simple material destruction.⁷¹ Although counterinsurgency forces typically have a greater financial capacity to utilize economic incentive and disincentive than do

insurgent organizations, this tool of political competition is not used as frequently as it could be.

VIETNAM

The “land to the tiller” program in South Vietnam offers an example of effective use of economic incentive in a counterinsurgency. The program was intended to undercut the Viet Cong land program and gain the farmers’ political support.⁷² Unlike the concurrent communist land reform program that offered only provisional ownership rights, the program transferred actual ownership of the land to peasants. Between 1970 and 1975, titles were distributed for 1,136,705 hectares, an estimated 46 percent of the national rice crop hectareage.⁷³ The old landlord-tenant system, which motivated many of the agrarian political movements in South Vietnam, was eliminated. The land to the tiller program effectively undercut the support for the Viet Cong by attacking one of the communists’ main ideological tenets (that the capitalist system harmed peasants) and by 1975 dramatically reduced support for the insurgency in South Vietnam.⁷⁴

ANGOLA

Economic benefits were also a component of Portuguese counterinsurgency efforts in Angola. After the onset of the conflict, the Portuguese government invested in industrial development, boosting Angola’s iron ore production from its 1957 rate of 100,000 tons a year to 15 million tons by 1971.⁷⁵ The Portuguese also expanded social services: within 8 years, the number of primary school students increased from 100,000 to 400,000. The Portuguese Army built schools and functioned as teachers in areas where there were no qualified civilians.⁷⁶ By establishing mobile clinics staffed by army doctors, the Portuguese were able to meet World Health Organization standards for proper health care by 1970.⁷⁷

Compulsory labor was abolished in 1961 along with the requirement that farmers plant cash crops, such as cotton, to be sold at state-controlled prices. Programs such as these negated the guerrilla’s claims that Portugal was only concerned for the welfare

of white settlers, and by 1972, lacking any factual basis for their claims, the guerrillas could no longer operate inside Angola.

MALAYA

Direct financial rewards for surrender can also be used as an incentive. During the Malayan Emergency that occurred between 1948 and 1960, the British began bribing insurgents to surrender or to provide information leading to the capture, elimination, or surrender of other insurgents. Incentives for surrender ranged from \$28,000 for the Chairman of the Central Committee, to \$2,300 for a platoon leader, and \$875 for a soldier. A guerrilla leader named Hor Leung was paid more than \$400,000 for his own surrender as well as the surrender of 28 of his commanders and 132 of his foot soldiers.⁷⁸ Statements by insurgents who had accepted amnesty urging their former comrades to surrender were broadcast from airplanes over the jungle; these “voice flights” were so effective that 70 percent of those who surrendered said that these recordings contributed to their decision to surrender. During the 12 years of the emergency, a total of 2,702 insurgents surrendered, 6,710 were killed, and 1,287 were captured as a result of information gained from the rewards-for-surrender program. One observer called the program “the most potent propaganda weapon in the emergency.”⁷⁹

To date, economic incentives and disincentives have not been used effectively in Iraq. Although the Coalition and its Iraqi partners have pledged \$60 billion toward reconstruction, the average Iraqi has seen little economic benefit. The U.S. government appropriated \$24 billion (for 2003-2005 fiscal years) for improving security and justice systems and oil, electricity, and water infrastructures. As of May 2003, only \$9.6 billion had been disbursed to projects.⁸⁰ U.S. funds for infrastructure repair were channeled mainly through six American engineering companies, but the cost of providing security to employees resulted in unexpected cost inflation, undermined transport capacity, and made it difficult to ensure the completion of projects by Iraqi subcontractors. As of March 2005, of the \$10 billion pledged in international community loans and \$3.6 million pledged in

grants, the Iraqi government has only accessed \$436 million for debt relief and \$167 million in grants.⁸¹

High unemployment, lack of basic services, and widespread poverty are driving the insurgency in Iraq. Unemployment is currently estimated at 28 to 40 percent.⁸² In Sunni Arab areas, however, unemployment figures are probably much higher, given that Sunnis typically worked in the now disbanded Ba'ath state apparatus. As a result of the collapse of the Iraqi educational system over 20 years of war and sanctions, a large group of angry, semiliterate young men remain unemployed. For these young men, working with insurgent organizations is an effective way to make a living. According to General John Abizaid most cases of direct-fire engagements involve very young men who have been paid to attack U.S. troops. Indeed, the Ba'ath loyalists running the insurgency pay young male Iraqis from \$150 to \$1,000 per attack—a considerable amount of money in a country where the average monthly household income is less than \$80.⁸³ In Iraq, where a man's ability to support his family is directly tied to his honor, failure by operating forces to dispense money on payday often results in armed attacks. One Marine noted: "If we say we will pay, and we don't, he will go get that AK."⁸⁴

Economic incentive could be used to reduce support for the insurgency in Iraq either by employing young men in large-scale infrastructure rebuilding projects or through small-scale local sustainable development programs. Small-scale sustainable development could be kick-started by distributing \$1.4 billion worth of seized Iraqi assets and appropriated funds through the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP).⁸⁵ Typically, local military commanders award CERP as small grants to serve a community's immediate needs. Military units, however, must cut through miles of red tape to distribute funds and often lack the economic background necessary to select projects most likely to encourage sustainable local economic growth. Because Iraq is an oil economy, it is susceptible to what is commonly known as the "Dutch Disease," an economic condition that limits the ability of oil economies to produce low-cost products and that results typically in a service driven economy.⁸⁶ Thus, CERP funds should

not be expended to reconstruct factories (which were an element of Saddam Hussein's state-controlled command economy and did not produce goods for export), but to develop small-scale local enterprises such as tea shops, hair salons, and auto-repair services.

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

The fourth tool available to insurgents and counterinsurgents is the ability to leverage traditional authority within a given society. Max Weber identifies three primary types of authority:

1. Rational-legal authority, which is grounded in law and contract, codified in impersonal rules, and commonly found in developed, capitalist societies.
2. Charismatic authority, which is exercised by leaders who develop allegiance among their followers because of their unique, individual charismatic appeal, whether ethical, religious, political, or social.
3. Traditional authority, which is usually invested in a hereditary line or in a particular office by a higher power.

Traditional authority, which relies on the precedent of history, is the most common type of authority in non-Western societies.⁸⁷ according to George Ritzer, "Traditional authority is based on a claim by the leaders, and a belief on the part of the followers, that there is virtue in the sanctity of age-old rules and powers."⁸⁸ Status and honor are accorded to those with traditional authority and this status helps maintain dominance. In particular, tribal and religious forms of organization rely on traditional authority. Traditional authority figures often wield enough power, especially in rural areas, to single-handedly drive an insurgency. During the 1948 and 1961 Dar'ul Islam rebellions against the Indonesian government, for example, several Islamic leaders were kidnapped or executed without trial by the Indonesian military. A village

leader described how “the anger of the Ummat Islam in the region of Limbangan, because of the loss of their bapak (father or leader) who was very much loved by them, was at that time a flood which could not be held back.”⁸⁹ After a series of missteps, the Indonesian military recognized the importance of these local traditional authority figures and began to use a combination of coercion and amnesty programs to remove, village by village, support for the Dar’ul Islam in West Java, eventually defeating the insurgency.⁹⁰

Throughout the Vietnam War, insurgent groups leveraged traditional authority effectively. After Viet Minh forces overthrew the Japanese in a bloodless coup in 1945, official representatives traveled to the Imperial Capital at Hué to demand Emperor Bao Dai’s abdication.⁹¹ Facing the prospects of losing his throne or his life, Bao Dai resigned and presented Ho Chi Minh with the imperial sword and sacred seal, thereby investing him with the mandate of heaven (*thien minh*)—the ultimate form of traditional authority.⁹² Subsequently, Ho ruled Vietnam as if he, too, were an emperor possessed of a heavenly mandate, even replicating many of the signs and signals of Vietnamese traditional authority.⁹³ Like many political systems that operate on the principle of traditional authority, the character of the leader was of paramount concern.⁹⁴ Thus, Ho cultivated and projected the virtuous conduct of a superior man (*quant u*) and stressed the traditional requisites of talent and virtue (*tai duc*) necessary for leadership.⁹⁵ Widely seen as possessing the mandate of heaven and having single-handedly liberated Vietnam from the French, Ho had little opposition inside Vietnam. Although some senior U.S. military officers recognized that many Vietnamese considered Ngo Dinh Diem’s government to be illegitimate, the dictates of policy trumped an honest assessment of the power of traditional authority in Vietnam, which would have made the futility of establishing a puppet government in South Vietnam immediately apparent.⁹⁶

The U.S. failure to leverage the traditional authority of the tribal sheiks in Iraq hindered the establishment of a legitimate government and became a driver of the insurgency. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 created a power vacuum that

resurgent tribes, accustomed to political and legal autonomy, quickly filled. One young tribal leader observed: “We follow the central government. But, of course, if communications are cut between us and the center, all authority will revert to our sheik.”⁹⁷ Tribes became the source of physical security, economic well-being, and social identity. Shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, for example, religious and tribal leaders in Falluja appointed their own civil management council, prevented looting, and protected government buildings.⁹⁸ Because Coalition forces have been unable to reestablish a legal system throughout the country, tribal law has become the default mode of settling disputes. According to Wamidh Nadmih, a professor of political science at Baghdad University, “If you have a car accident, you don’t sort it out in the courts anymore; even if you live in the city, you sort it out in the tribe.”⁹⁹

The fall of Saddam Hussein unintentionally retribalized Iraq, but, ironically, the implicit policy of Paul Bremer’s administration in Iraq appears to have been de-tribalization. According to a U.S. Army officer: “The attitude at the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) was that it was our job to liberate the individual from the tyranny of the tribal system.”¹⁰⁰ Tribes were viewed as a social anachronism that could only hinder the development of democracy in Iraq. According to a senior U.S. official: “If it is a question of harnessing the power of the tribes, then it’s a question of finding tribal leaders who can operate in a post-tribal environment.”¹⁰¹ The anxiety motivating the antitribal policy was, in the words of one official, the “ability of people like the Iranians and others to go in with money and create warlords” sympathetic to their own interests.¹⁰² As a result, an opportunity to leverage traditional authority was wasted in Iraq. Thus, although U.S. Army military-intelligence officers negotiated an agreement with the subtribes of the Dulalimi in Alanbar province to provide security, the CPA rejected the deal. According to one officer, “All it would have required from the CPA was formal recognition that the tribes existed—and \$3 million.”¹⁰³

Instead of leveraging the traditional authority of the tribes, Coalition forces virtually ignored it, thereby losing an opportunity

to curb the insurgency. According to Adnan Abu Odeh, a former adviser to the late King Hussein of Jordan, "The sheiks don't have the power to stop the resistance totally. But they certainly could impede its development by convincing tribesmen that it's a loser's strategy or they could be bribed to capture or betray the member of the resistance."¹⁰⁴ The key to securing Iraq is to make it in the interest of the tribes to support the Coalition's goals. Ali Shukri, also an adviser to the late king and now a member of Saint Anthony's College at Oxford, notes: "There are two ways to control [the tribes]. One way is . . . by continually attacking and killing them. But if you want them on your side, what will you give them? What's in it for them? To the extent that the tribes are cooperating with the [U.S.] right now is merely a marriage of convenience. They could be doing a lot more—overnight, they could give the Americans security, but they will want money, weapons, and vehicles to do the job."¹⁰⁵

BEYOND THE WAR

In the Clausewitzian tradition, "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" in which limited means are used for political ends.¹⁰⁶ U.S. War Department General Order 100 of 1863 reflects this rule: "The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war."¹⁰⁷ The object that lies beyond the war is the restoration of civil order, which is particularly essential in a counterinsurgency where the government's legitimacy has been weakened or possibly destroyed. General Harold K. Johnson noted: "[M]ilitary force . . . should be committed with the object beyond war in mind. [B]roadly speaking, the object beyond war should be the restoration of stability with the minimum of destruction, so that society and lawful government might proceed in an atmosphere of justice and order."¹⁰⁸ The restoration of civil order in Iraq requires a guarantee of security; a guarantee of political and economic participation; the reconstruction of civil institutions destroyed by decades of repression and dehumanization; and the generation of a national ideology and a set of symbols around which people feel proud to organize. The four tools of political competition – coercive force,

ideology, economic incentive and disincentive, and traditional authority – can be employed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to attain the object beyond war. But like every counterinsurgency, the conflict in Iraq requires soldiers and statesmen alike to take a leap of imagination. Success depends on the ability to put oneself in the shoes of the civilian population and ask: How would I get physical and economic security if I had to live in this situation? Why would I accept the authority claimed by the powers that be? In the words of Max Weber, “When and why would I obey?”¹⁰⁹

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effort, of the Irish guerrilla [and] both determined that next time, guerrilla [tactics] should be used by the British instead of against them" (M.R.D Foot, "The IRA and the Origins of SOE," in *War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J. R. Western, 1928-71*, ed., M.R.D. Foot [London: Pal Ellele, 1973]).

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2.3 SHADOWS OF GLOBALIZATION: A GUIDE TO PRODUCTIVE DETERRENCE

Michael E. Vlahos

A less-examined aspect of globalization is the evolution of alternative communities and their politics. This development represents the dark side of world integration: the shadows of globalization. Not only is it a force for disintegration, but it is also the source of future national security threats to a U.S.-orchestrated world system.

Globalization's dynamic is cultural mixing. In it, the process of world integration breaks down old ways of life. Alternative communities emerge out of the breakdown of the old—as *new social and political concepts*. We have difficulty understanding these new concepts because they often appear to us as primitive, deviant, or criminal.

The authenticity and robustness of many alternative communities make them the kernel of potential successor societies. Therefore, we cannot simply seek their destruction; in many cases, we must strive to achieve constructive relationships with new groups and movements—no matter how uncomfortable this may be for us.

This realization leads us in the direction of a more holistic strategy to these world shadows, a strategy of *constructive deterrence*.

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NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

When the East Roman Empire was faced with the sudden emergence of Islam in the seventh century, Byzantine Romans were at a complete loss as to how to describe this new and overwhelming phenomenon. On the surface, the new Arab state seemed to East Romans not unlike the Germanic successor states that had emerged within what had been the Western Roman Empire. They called Muhammad “king” and expected familiar continuities in the former Roman Middle East. On the other hand, Romans had no idea what to make of an Islam still in the process of emerging. The best they could do was to place an alien new faith and its identity into familiar biblical terms. They called those who did not yet call themselves “Muslims” the “sons of Hagar” or “Hagarenes,” as in, the progeny of Abraham and Hagar.

We use “not” words to describe things that we deeply believe should not be: non-state actors, failed states; temporary autonomous zones; irregular asymmetrical, unconventional conflict.

Thus, Romans embraced what seemed familiar—an Arab successor kingdom—and made familiar, or at least recognizable, what was alien. They found words they understood to describe what was happening. Furthermore, these words allowed them to contextualize a catastrophic transformation of the eastern Mediterranean world. They also had ready narratives that explained even catastrophic developments. Some, for example, saw the rise of an Arab super state in apocalyptic terms, where Islam was the tool of God’s wrath. Others saw events as fitting into an age of adversity, with deliverance yet far away. By structuring and explaining adverse events, both of these narratives were strangely comforting.

No such age of adversity tasks us today, but we can yet feel transformations on a global scale. Like the Romans of late antiquity, we too have narratives to explain them, the bad as

well as the good. For us, the “good” still seems to prevail in our world. Our predominant narrative after all is “globalization.” We declare that we are in the mature, perhaps the final, period of an historical process, driven still by us, of world integration. Its very title—globalization—seems to assure that this outcome is also historically inevitable.

In this narrative, the “bad” consists of those who resist globalization. Like the old Romans, we too have words to describe the bad, words that help convince us that the bad is but a temporary and fleeting phenomenon. We must put up with it, but it will not last. It will certainly not stand in the face of the goodness of globalization.

To reinforce this conviction, we fittingly label the bad as being the opposite of the good. We use “not” words to describe things that we deeply believe should not be. Thus, those places where globalization is not thriving are the opposite of a global polity organized around nation states: they are “nonstate actors,” or simply “failed states.” However, they are not simply illegitimate but ephemeral; they are “temporary autonomous zones,” soon to be reabsorbed into the body of the good. Likewise, the security threats they pose are also described in opposite terms. Fighting such people is “irregular” warfare, or it is “asymmetrical,” or “unconventional” conflict.

We not only describe this counternarrative as illegitimate and ephemeral, we also call much of it deviant and criminal. The nonglobalizing world is where terrorism and radical ideologies thrive. We see only our narrative, where cultural convergence, economic integration, and the world triumph of American-style democracy are all inevitable. Our narrative assumes that our story is the only real story, that resistance to globalization is simply ornery, deviant behavior. Because world integration is unquestionably good, resistance to it is unquestionably bad.

But reality is different. There is integration everywhere but there is also disintegration everywhere. The world is not just coming together but also coming apart.

How can both be happening at once? Because what we think of as an assured outcome can also be an unpredictable process—and the unpredictable is in the mixing. Mixing is really what “globalization” is about: throwing peoples and cultures together, come what may. That means old things being torn down: old ways of life, old ways of doing business, cherished values, ancient traditions. Mixing means the ending of things. But it also means the coming of new things.

What are the new things? They are simply alternative approaches to human society. They are “new” in their creative reworking of established cultural frameworks. They may represent much older things revived, but they can also be new syntheses of different traditions and institutions.

In human culture, there is little that is wholly “new,” but much of what emerges can be surprisingly creative and different. It is deceptive to see endings without also seeing beginnings. Yet, not all new things are equally desirable. New things can seem so frightening that they instantly threaten the established order of things. This is surely the case today.

If we look hard enough we can see what this word “alternative” really means:

- *Opting out.* People leave established society and form autonomous groupings. In El Salvador, there are 39,000 gang members, representing an urban opting out that has become a crisis of governance in that society. In San Salvador, for example, an entire city quarter is called “Vietnam” (think Watts + *Blade Runner*). There is also nonviolent departure, like cult communities today seeking their anonymity in the American West or in the Muslim ghettos of the European Community.
- *Realization.* Peoples with long lineages and equally long histories of external repression push for traditional fulfillment—either formal independence or simply the assurance of being left alone. Thus, Zapatistas and The ULFA of Assam share the goal of local realization. But realization can also be starkly unconventional. Two states

of Mexico and one of the largest in Brazil are now fully beyond central state control. In Brazil, 20 percent of the major urban areas are in the hands of *favelas* and also beyond state control. This is a new form of governance: the narco-principality.

- *Piety*. Faith is the dominant maker of meaning in alternative communities. Outside the Muslim World, these communities seem to go along with what is established, yet they represent societies apart—whether Protestant evangelicals in Latin America or Christian groups in China who zealously follow the early martyrs. Their numbers are large and growing. They represent alternative paths, but also a direct threat to established rule—even to the established way of life. To these should be added globally networked communities of militant action, from antiglobalization to al Qaeda.
- *Resistance*. Fighting works. It is negotiation through violence. Drug principalities use it aggressively to test and transcend the limits of eroding state authority. But the resistance of other movements actually seeks to transform society itself. Hence, the tenacious commitment of Christian evangelicals in China and Africa and Latin America. Resistance is a deliberate choice, whether violent or nonviolent. It is rooted not only in the belief that resistance brings success, but also that world change—as *never before*—favors alternative movements.

What binds these trends is the urgent energy of new societies and governance. Because they inhabit spaces outside the mainstream, they are easy to miss. Certainly, their larger significance easily eludes us. Moreover, those in active resistance—that challenge us directly—are often movements whose legitimacy, *even existence*, we wish to deny. Thus, many alternative movements are not simply “not us”—they are the incarnation of “against us.” Their continuing existence threatens the established order because the act of their existence posits rival models, models that grow in authority over time.

Alternative movements offer what every society and its polity offer: security, legal arbitration, safe transactions, social welfare, and education. If they do it differently, the point is they still do it—like all normal societies. This is the key to understanding their popular appeal. No matter how strangely “alternative,” they nonetheless do what societies do, and they have popular support. Paradoxically our efforts to disestablish them on the basis of their deviance may actually elevate their authority, perhaps even help to legitimize them.

U.S. engagement in the Muslim World highlights this problem. New social and political formation has been developing there for years, but aggressive American intervention has accelerated it. The most visible new social and political formation is in the Muslim World:

- *Opting out.* Hidden from us in the Arabian Desert is the realm of the “07s” (their telephone code). There, and elsewhere in Saudi and Yemen and Egypt, are scores of towns governed by clerics and defended by their own civil militias. This Muslim opting out is all but invisible to us—the “temporary autonomous zones” that demarcate new human spaces in Islam. Their counterparts are everywhere from Nigeria to Aceh to Waziristan to Jolo.
- *Realization.* In Hezbollah and Hamas we see the emergence of Lebanese Shi’a and “Palestinian” nations. Scholars of Late Antiquity call this *ethnogenesis*. How did wandering groups of Goths in just three generations establish working, legitimated kingdoms in the Roman Empire? In Iraq, realization has an urgency that not only overturns the former nation state but also its very claim on identity. As Shi’a and Kurd attain long-awaited legitimacy, their model works its transforming magic on those left out: Sunni, Turkmen, Assyrian.
- *Piety.* Crushed by the regime in the 1990s, the Brotherhood went quietist in Egypt. But, in submission, they crafted a parallel Islamic Egyptian nation. They provide what the state will not: health care and education and the very

organization of meaning and identity that defines society. Such authority likewise abides with Sistani in Iraq, but he has the sinews of a new, “rightly guided,” state with which to fashion Shi’a realization. Islamic piety, in contrast to alternative Christian movements, directly engages Muslim meta-identity: its *ummah*. Thus, the struggle of every community and tribe becomes the struggle of all Muslims.

- *Resistance*. Muslims also differ in how they enshrine resistance—intimate and infinite—as the forever-path of piety and realization. Thus, Chechen and Bangsamoro “Republics” have a centuries-long provenance. Yet, only recently has Muslim resistance become a path to real goals. Moreover, the West’s Internet offers an electric venue to spread the word of deliverance—as if History itself is at hand. In the Muslim World, new political and social formation necessarily has an active fighting component and a sacred expectation of both global and local realization.

The urgency these alternative communities present is their successful assertion in the face of the American model of globalization. On a micro level, they represent authentic solutions to human needs, needs that are not being met by macro U.S. policy. In aggregate, these alternative communities represent a countervision to globalization itself—at least, globalization as American policy imagines it to be.

CHALLENGES

How can America confront the challenge of alternative communities?

America’s most active nonstate engagements today are in the Muslim world. Here, unwittingly, U.S. engagement has accelerated Islamist alternatives in two ways. It has opened up space for change where new political and social formation can incubate. But also, forcefully creating change space has inevitably diminished the authority of the entire established order.

This change is in part a U.S. goal—to encourage the replacement of authoritarian regimes with democratic successors. But the act of driving change has also encouraged the advancement of different political and social formation.

Is this just a regional or Islamic problem? Is U.S. global engagement encouraging new social formation globally? We need a framework for understanding alternative governance globally because the essential message—rising new human spaces—is global in scope and impact. But how do we take its measure? The questions we must answer strike at the very authority of America's world vision:

Can traditional establishments under pressure from alternative communities effectively respond to their challenge? How long can such establishments stay effective as competing designs gain increasing authority? This is not simply a question for ruling elite societies in the Third World like Egypt, but also, for example, for the old-order societies of Western Europe. Today, we are watching restive Muslim communities challenge not only the habits but the very authority of the state.

Does the rise of alternative communities offer continuity—by creating a new cultural synthesis—or does the rise of new society and politics mean that old identity and authority simply unravel? We can ask this question by suggesting, for example, what Arabian polity might succeed the House of Saud. This is ultimately a question of successful synthesis of traditional and new elements. It is not simply a reformed state, but a resynthesized polity. Paradoxically in this process, old orders can adapt and accommodate, ensuring that much of an old way of life will continue.

If an old order cannot anoint a successor, what happens to a society that then truly decomposes? How can its people reconstitute and revive their world? The slew of what we call “failed states” in Africa is really a wholesale failure of post-colonial transition. Their narrative has been one of mutant Western and tribal graftings that have been unable to create the legitimacy necessary to found working successor states. Without either

continuity or a new source of legitimacy, society has no basis to create something new.

The intention here is not to predict shocking or calamitous things but, rather, to offer a practical approach to the shadows of globalization as they emerge into the light. It is practical in the sense that it offers a different approach to the current DoD “irregular warfare” charter. Rather than seeking to strip alternative communities of legitimacy, or even actively seeking their eradication, Americans need to see the security threat they pose in the context of authentic social and cultural developments.

Today’s Defense paradigm stresses an entire mission lexicon of irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stability operations, and foreign internal defense. But these terms really describe an eradication campaign. On the surface, it seems as though it defends our “good” narrative of globalization, but, in reality, it means the destruction of alternative communities. How do we frame a constructive policy toward new communities that does not reflexively see such human developments as bad?

We must deal with new societies. The issue is not only insurgents to be eradicated but also real communities. How can we develop relationships with alternative social and political formation so as to encourage its integration into the established world?

There will be groups we must pluck out or isolate because they are unswervingly committed to our destruction. When is their deconstruction or eradication the best choice? What are the choices if this course is unwise or even impossible?

Whether developing working relationships or wiping them out, we must somehow approach the problem in terms of the “larger emerging.” We need to work out how we wish to respond at the meta level. Is it possible to frame a practical—rather than a rhetorical—strategy for the diverse and elusive global phenomena of alternative human places?

IDENTIFYING THE SHADOWS

The dominant American paradigm of globalization is important. As suggested earlier, some wish only to opt out, while others are committed to active resistance. This suggests a typology of “alternatives”:

Emerging “nationalities” – Islamic Republic of Iraq, Kurdistan, Hamas, Hezbollah

Ethno-insurgencies – Tamils, Sunni Iraq, Assam, Aceh, Sulu/Jolo, Chechnya, Kashmir

Narco-principalities – Sinaloa, Quintana Roo, Brazilian favelas, Afghan warlords

Parallel nations – Egypt, El Salvador, Waziristan

Parallel communities – Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Tatars, European Muslim ghettos

Decomposition of legitimacy and continuity - Africa

Global networked communities of militant action – Antiglobalization, al Qaeda

ACCELERATING DECOMPOSITION

An essential component to the “challenge” we face is the potential for political–cultural decomposition. This means that states and places that we have come to think of as permanent are fragile things—and fragile things under pressure can come apart. What happens when they break apart? I have run a series of JHU/APL seminars with in-country experts on exactly this possibility:

Major contingencies – Saudi Arabia, Pakistan

Pinprick unraveling – Philippines, Russia, Latin America

Political change as civilizational revolution – Egypt

Unmanageable humanitarian crises – Africa

Global communities connecting locally – al Qaeda and Arabian successor states?

A WAY AHEAD?

All of these challenges of course suggest growing threats to U.S. world system management. In the end, there may be little the United States can do. The global growth of nonstate societies and politics is organic, driven by the decomposition of traditional and established structures of rule around the world. What we need to see, however, is how U.S. initiatives—especially American interventions in the Muslim world—also actively encourage nonstate growth.

We need to acknowledge that the United States is no longer simply the world's detached "system administrator," as one wag puts it. Rather, America is also now the indispensable world authority and thus the conferrer of world legitimacy. In this sense (among others), we may be said to resemble ancient Rome. Nonstate actors may thus increasingly seek symbolic legitimacy through, among other instruments, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the United States may be increasingly drawn into legitimating relationships with nonstate movements and alternative communities.

Like nation states, nonstate actors understand the existential value of leveraging the U.S. and its local clients. Above all, they see how leverage translates into value in the pursuit of fundamental goals—especially in negotiating terms of legitimization and protected status. Their recognition underscores how the United States has become the source of nonstate legitimization and its final guarantor. The downside to this authority is that it actively encourages nonstate actors to seek symbolic weapons' leverage—especially WMD—to gain U.S. legitimization. We are entering not simply a different world (from what we expected) but a world that both offers and demands from us different relationships with nonstate actors.

We can best approach these relationships by understanding who they are and what they hold dear. We will know where and how to hurt them if they hurt us. But even more critically, we will figure out how to use such insight primarily as strategic barter.

We also need to understand where they are going. We will begin to track their evolution toward more normal societies. We will come to see whether we can live and work with them—or *not*. Part of achieving this insight will come from a better understanding of how to work “deterrence” as an integral part of a larger U.S. strategy.

DETERRENCE AS AN ELEMENT IN A HOLISTIC STRATEGY (CONSTRUCTIVE DETERRENCE)

Our approach to potentially hostile nonstate actors has been, if not simply to destroy them, then to “deter” them. As we frame this goal, we naturally hark back to our successful deterrent relationship with the Soviet Union—which we understand as one of “compellance.” We believe that we succeeded with the Soviets and kept the peace through the threat of punishment.

But this was not the actual U.S.–Soviet relationship. The basis of the relationship was not rooted in “compellance” at all. Rather, it was about legitimization, cooptation, and codependence. The Cold War was easily framed as a war relationship: *war could come at any time*, we all said. But it was really an unequal partnership relationship. The Soviets saw their situation as fragile. What they needed most was legitimacy, inside and out. The United States, in contrast, was the dominant power and the world-source of legitimacy.

“Yet the Soviet experience should remind us that deterrence is part of a strategy of cooptation and legitimization in which the threat of punishment serves both as a symbolic and a legitimating role. If we are to apply “deterrence” constructively to nonstate actors, we need to understand not only how to compel but also to co-opt.”

What we saw as deterrence “working” was really cooptation working. Our buyoff was really letting them buy in. We anointed them by making them titular equals. Inasmuch as their status was formally adversarial, they “competed” in world affairs. But their

worldview and behavior had truly transformed from the days of the Comintern. They joined our system and accepted our rules.

And this worked powerfully to our advantage. From their standpoint, we gave them everything they wanted. But the status and perks that went with being the world's other "superpower" came at a price. On one level, it was unbearably expensive for the Soviets, which, of course, eventually cost them the war decades down the line. But at another level, the Soviets also gave up their strategic freedom of action and the advantage of the strategic initiative. No longer were they the "lean and hungry" revisionist newcomer on the world scene, fomenting revolution, playing at the dangerous—but high-payoff—margins, striking fear into the heart of the decadent Capitalist West. Buying into the U.S. offer meant giving in and giving up. That the price was right—even extravagant—did not change the strategic enormity of the transaction.

If the Cold War worked because we gave the Soviets what they wanted—legitimacy—then the elaborate nuclear architecture that was "deterrence" became primarily symbolic rather than determinative. In other words, the weapons and the words and the summits can be seen in retrospect as day-to-day rituals of affirmation. Thus, deterrence played a key role, both institutionally and symbolically, in affirming the U.S.–Soviet relationship, but deterrence was not its true foundation. Constructive deterrence—as the term is used here—was the basis of America's strategic relationship with the Soviets.

CONSTRUCTIVE DETERRENCE WITH NONSTATE ACTORS

We continue to think of deterrence in mythological terms as "compellance." Thus, "deterrence"—as we use the term in a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) context—is deeply problematic. We understand deterrence as flowing from the same dynamics that characterize a war—and as an extension of war. Rather than defeating the enemy in battle, our notion of deterrence uses the threat of punishment to "compel" the enemy to submit (accept our terms). A recent DoD document emphasizes punishment as the preferred tool of "compellance:" 1-Deny "divine rewards,"

2-Deny “proper religious burial,” 3-“Denounce and ridicule” terrorist *perps*. Success therefore is measured by the degree of submission.

Yet the Soviet experience should remind us that deterrence is part of a strategy of cooptation and legitimization in which the threat of punishment serves *both as a symbolic and a legitimating role*. If we are to apply “deterrence” constructively to nonstate actors, we need to understand not only how to compel but also to co-opt.

We should also understand that “nonstate actors” mean people coalescing into communities. These communities reject state authority and are often in active rebellion against states. Yet, these communities are everywhere and take every human social form. Today, Salafist social networks like al Qaeda threaten us most urgently. But even their challenge, widespread and difficult as it is, represents only one of hundreds of communities that we might confront in the years ahead.

What are the key questions we need to answer in terms of the growth and proliferation of alternative societies? How widespread is nonstate group emergence? How strong is its momentum, and why is it so strong in a world we have assumed is rushing inevitably toward integration and globalization? What role is the United States playing in actually accelerating the development of alternative societies? Why do we not understand that this is a global phenomenon, and that we are intimately involved in its development? What if there are specific examples of those we wish to deter who are in the process of evolving into leadership or at least representative positions in larger movements and societies? This last is a problem of seamless integration between fighter groups and their communities.

“Terrorists and WMD” are thus only a small piece of the problem we face—the global emergence of militant nonstate communities. Think of a global phenomenon complicated by the growing appeal of WMD. Acquisition of WMD may indeed become essential to strategies of resistance and group realization. Strategies will develop in sophistication, not necessarily tied to

use but, rather, to achieving deterrence or legitimization. This process will accelerate as smaller nation-states acquire WMD and make it a successful part of their strategy. Small-state leveraging of WMD, moreover, will instantly create a shining model to nonstate communities whose goals suddenly seem within reach.

All of this, of course, is *prospective*. It supposes a broad and continuing growth of nonstate communities, and it expects that there will be a growing demand for WMD: a continuing migration of WMD models from “superpower” to regional power to smaller state to nonstate. We simply do not know how emerging nonstate societies will value and seek to leverage WMD. Much of its value too will be tied to how we define and use WMD in our relationships—a definition that itself is still evolving.


To move toward a strategy of constructive deterrence we need to fully “operationalize” a dialectical relationship:

- “Deterrence” is best applied to a maturing—and better yet, a codependent—relationship.
- Deterrence is mischaracterized as “compellence.” The stick is critical, but a stick is meaningless without its essential partner, the carrot.

THE NONSTATE WAY AHEAD

Deterrence is useful when it characterizes what helps make a difficult relationship function, i.e., when it creates a mutual relationship mindset with privileges and responsibilities agreed to by both parties. Even without WMD in the equation, the conflict-picture of nonstate actors globally posits—potentially at least—a wider world revision of the America-centric vision of globalization. In other words, effective “grand tactics” in the form of constructive deterrence may preserve American interests locally for some time yet only accelerate broader revisionism. If nonstate actors truly represent successful models for successor communities (and eventually, even states), the challenge may well be beyond the reach of any U.S. policy or any effective U.S. military intervention.

Ultimately we need to think of U.S. government activity vis-à-vis nonstate actors *as a global phenomenon*. This view means approaching the broader nonstate phenomenon in each community: intelligence, foreign affairs, national security, and executive policy-making. This, in turn, suggests an intra-agency assessment effort, identifying how each community can address the challenge of nonstate actors—of alternative movements and societies—through a range of responses. Taken together, as a holistic approach, this strategic effort might be thought of as productive deterrence.



2.4 DISCUSSION GROUP INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Mary Habeck

INTRODUCTION

Although the roundtable discussion on Understanding Unrestricted Warfare yielded many insights, which are reviewed here, the discussion raised as many questions as it offered solutions. A fundamental question underlies all of the issues the roundtable considered essential to understanding unrestricted warfare: How precisely can we define unrestricted warfare? The question persisted throughout the discussion, which did not produce a definitive answer. Finding a precise definition is a pervasive issue that should play in the background of every conversation about unrestricted warfare; the community continues to debate what it means. Keeping that in the background, the following are the major challenges in understanding unrestricted warfare.

INSIGHTS

FOCUSING ON THE CULTURE

Some major insights of this first roundtable concerned the influence of culture on unrestricted warfare—specifically, finding ways of exploiting or manipulating cultural aspects tailored to each particular culture that may be involved in unrestricted

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warfare threats. Ways of countering unrestricted warfare cannot come from the outside but must come from within each culture itself. There was significant agreement on the roundtable about the role culture plays in the generation of conditions for unrestricted warfare: It plays a unique role in each particular culture in which unrestricted warfare occurs, and it is essential to identify specific parameters of each culture and to exploit those characteristics to effect changes that will lessen the unrestricted warfare threat.

EMPHASIZING HUMAN ASPECTS

The second overarching issue the roundtable identified was the need for more emphasis on human aspects in general. Technology and technological solutions seem to fit in with the American way of thinking about and conducting warfare. Devising technical fixes for warfare challenges is our conditioned approach. The discussion group proposed a strong argument for thinking first about the human dimensions of the problem and how to implement human solutions rather than thinking first about technological solutions—and when the technological fixes do not work, only then trying to find a human solution to the problem.

EXPLOITING CULTURAL WEAK SPOTS

In discussing the cultural aspects, the roundtable put forth the argument that unrestricted warfare specifically attacks the American way of war. Unrestricted warfare tactics are designed to exploit the weak spots within our culture.

ORIGINATING FROM WEAKNESS OR STRENGTH

One point of contention centered on the assertion that people turn to unrestricted warfare when they find themselves in a weak position. Many in the discussion group refuted that point and asserted that unrestricted warfare is not just something to which the weak resort; rather, it can be the first choice even for those in a position of strength. The U.S. itself has engaged in unrestricted warfare at various times in its history and has not viewed it as something that should be condemned as an act of desperation.

ARISING FROM COMPLEX NETWORKS

The roundtable asserted that unrestricted warfare may be facilitated by complex networks; that is, it might be a property of complex networks that emerges when groups of people form a community of interest that allows them to encourage each other to engage in acts of unrestricted warfare that individually they might not consider doing.

ATTACKING THE WILL TO RESIST

Unrestricted warfare, as with warfare in general, attacks the will of the enemy to resist, but it attacks it more insidiously than other forms of warfare. Traditional warfare erodes the enemy's ability to resist by attacking and defeating military forces, conquering the enemy's capitol, or taking the enemy's territory. Unrestricted warfare, on the other hand, uses nontraditional means designed to affect directly and personally the will of the people in an enemy nation to wage war.

DEFINING WARFARE AND ITS DURATION

The U.S. has a restricted notion about what constitutes warfare. U.S. warfare planning and policy define warfare as conforming to specific criteria, and anything that falls outside those criteria is unrestricted warfare. Likewise, the U.S. has a restricted notion of how long wars should last. Conventional thinking limits the warfare time frame to 2 to 4 years. When a war exceeds the preconception of the normal amount of time a war should last, resistance to continuing the war begins to grow. We must expand our concept of a war's duration, especially if we are facing a prolonged war.

SUPPORTING THE WILL TO RESIST

The discussion of a war's duration led to further discussion of the problem of public opinion and war. Because unrestricted warfare attacks our will to resist, a major unanswered question that the roundtable felt has not been addressed directly is: How do we support our will to resist through public opinion during a prolonged war?

DEFINING WINNING AND UNDERSTANDING A CHANGING WORLD DEMOGRAPHY

What exactly would it mean to win this war? Although we may be able to define ways that we may have won the war in Iraq, we need to find ways to determine if we have won the global war on terrorism. In the next 20 to 30 years, the changing world demography will be a huge issue that will need to be central to our planning. We are not used to thinking in a time frame of 20 to 30 years when we think about warfare, but in that time the demography of the entire world will change in ways that may favor the people we are fighting in this war.

CHANGING THE BUREAUCRACY

In discussing how to fight this war, it may be dreaming to believe we can change the entire bureaucracy, but several aspects of it need to change. For example, when the challenge is creating nations, a functional common ground is lacking between a State Department focused on discussing diplomatic issues and a Defense Department specialized in fighting wars.

DEVELOPING STRATEGY

The roundtable suggested the following actions for implementing a strategy for countering unrestricted warfare:

- Develop a grand strategy. This may be easier to say than to do.
- Clearly define the problems:
 - Who is the enemy?
 - What is this war about?
 - How do we know when we win?

Although we may have answers to these questions, they are still not clear to the American people.

- Exploit narratives and myths. From the discussion of cultural perspectives, it is evident that we need to devise

ways to exploit the narratives and myths within specific cultures involved in unrestricted warfare.

- Develop a true international approach. This means not just building interagency agreements. Finding ways to truly cooperate internationally takes more than just saying a particular country supports us in general or these two countries have joined our efforts; it requires actually sharing definitions—for instance, of what the war is about—on an international level.
- Focus on international informational aspects of the war. We must disseminate information, not just to the American people, but also beyond our borders—and we must get the right messages to the right people.

ANALYZING UNRESTRICTED WARFARE

The roundtable suggested the following actions for analyzing unrestricted warfare:

- Define terms and align points of reference.
- Expand the focus beyond deterministic analysis.
- Use culturally specific cost-benefit analyses. What seems to us to be a tremendous cost may not be significant to another culture. What may seem to us to be a minor benefit may be a huge benefit for the other culture. When the goal is to make this war too painful for them to continue fighting it, we need to understand that what we think is painful may not be so for them.

DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGY AND MAKING SMALL CHANGES

Throughout this conference, the conversation has emphasized the need not to focus entirely on technology but also to consider the human aspects. However, technology is still important in this war, and there are viable technological solutions for some of its issues. We cannot completely ignore the need to exploit technology; the distinction is that we need to exploit it in very specific ways for unrestricted warfare, not just in terms of general warfighting. When the fight is against those who use

unrestricted warfare, strategy must drive the technology. Using small technological changes can achieve large payoffs that make a significant difference in the battlefield; tiny tactical successes can create large strategic victories.



Q: *This is for Professor Gerges. I am interested in your observations about the arguments in the Islamic extremist community and your observation that dozens of books have been written opposing the use of unrestricted warfare by bin Laden and others. How does that relate to broad popular attitudes within the Islamic world?*

In other words, the phenomenon you described, is it essentially an elite phenomenon, or is it something that draws upon and in some way reinforces broad popular views? What is the relationship between that and the way the broad Islamic population thinks about these issues?

▬▬▬ **Prof. Fawaz Gerges** – I think Michael [Dr. Michael Vlahos] focused on the larger picture, and I really want to take off from there. The larger picture is the so-called revival thinking that is taking place, not just in the Muslim world, but throughout the international system. Again, another note of qualification: I am not suggesting at all a criticism of American foreign policy.

I think the truth is that when it comes to American foreign policy, regardless of what we think, there are no differences between liberals, conservatives, Islamists, and jihadists. This is the tragedy in which the United States finds itself in that part of the world. There is not much support for American foreign policy.

But having said so, I spent about 60 percent in my book on this so-called war within—not just the war within the Muslim community worldwide, but the war within the Islamist movement and the jihadist movement. How many of us know that the bulk of jihadists did not agree with the premise of targeting the far enemy or attacking American civilians, in particular? On this particular score, we have tens of thousands of pages by leading Islamists. I can go on and on and on to show that the jihadist movement does not accept the use of violence in the service of politics.

The bulk of the jihadists who target the near enemy basically do not accept the premise of this powerful fringe that is Osama bin Laden and the Egyptian Islamic jihad. Are they targeting the far enemy, the United States, or basically canceling the distinctions between civilian and military targets? And no, it's not an elitist phenomenon. In fact, if you take a look at the leading Islamists, the revival movement—I'm talking about the hard liners, such as Sheikh Fadlallah, Hassan al-Turabi, the leading Muslim Brotherhood—I show that the day after 9/11, the bulk of the Islamist movement, the jihadist movement, the opinion makers, not only denounced al Qaeda on 9/11, but tried to salvage—as Mary [Prof. Mary Habeck] said—that classical Islamic discourse, which Osama bin Laden and the hardliners within al Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic jihad have tried basically to hijack. The point is not to lump all jihadists and Islamists and Muslims with al Qaeda.

The disturbing news is that recent polls in America show that an increasing number of Americans now look at Islam and Muslims as being violent. This is highly disturbing because we need to understand that while the bulk of jihadists and Islamists and Muslims are deeply critical of American foreign policy, they intrinsically oppose the use of violence against the far enemy—the United States—and, of course, Americans. This is really an across-the-board phenomenon. The jihadists I interviewed after 9/11 basically tell me—and many researchers, American researchers, and others—that by attacking the United States, al Qaeda not only endangered the very survival of the Islamist and the jihadist movement, it endangered the very existential interests of the Muslims. I'm really not saying anything original at all, I'm just reading the sources that have been published and written in Arabic and other languages.

Q. Peter Lohman, Systems Planning Analysis – This question is for Professor Gerges and Dr. Vlahos. You talked specifically about ways that the U.S. can build partnerships, build human rights, and resolve regional conflicts as a way of countering the jihadist ideology. But how do we do that and ensure that the transformation that Dr. Vlahos talked about doesn't go in the opposite direction that we intend, as in Iraq or as in


Hamas being elected in Palestine? How do we ensure that our actions are going to get the outcome that we desire?

☰ Prof. Fawaz Gerges – One of the things about Iraq is that it is what it is, but it also should be a broader lesson to us about the role that we play when we intervene and become a powerful participant in change. The dominance of the narrative that we had going into Iraq—that we could assert transformations that would achieve what we desired, and then to have achieved essentially the opposite of that, has not really been worked through by us yet. We haven’t really taken it onboard. I think we need to understand the complex nature of change in the ummah, but also the concatenated nature of change.

I think that one of the things that we did in going to Iraq—and this is just a sensation I have, but it operates at meta levels within the Muslim imagination—we not only created a laboratory for change and let change happen in terms of a model for Islamic revival but we also, I think, by the power and force of our intervention, essentially announced to Muslims that history was at hand, that the time of deliverance was near.

In other words, we unknowingly helped to unlock elements in the great Muslim myth or mythic cycle. And as such, I think we’ve done much more to advance this kind of transformational change in the Muslim world than simply what we’ve achieved in terms of creating a model of revolutionary change in revival in Iraq. That is something that we need to think through a lot more because it’s a striking illustration of the way in which we, as a participant, can have such an impact—yet an impact that is the opposite of what we intend.


☰ Dr. Michael Vlahos – I think that the critical question to me is the following: does al Qaeda represent a tiny social fringe in the Muslim world, or does it really represent a viable social movement? The reason that I zero in on this in particular is the great debate taking place within the Islamist and jihadist movement. And the reason why I focus a great deal on the civil war that is roiling the jihadist movement is to show that within the jihadist and the Islamist movement, al Qaeda represents one of the tiniest fringes.

 **Prof. Fawaz Gerges** – Just an example—and again, I am going into the qualitative—at the height of its power, al Qaeda, according to Western intelligence services, did not really exceed 10,000 fighters. That is not suggesting that al Qaeda is not dangerous. I am not suggesting that al Qaeda is not brutal. I'm not suggesting that we should not really go after al Qaeda—that is not the question. The Egyptian Islamic group, al-Gama'a, numbered over 100,000 fighters in the mid-1990s. Egyptian jihad, Islamic jihad numbered about 25,000 fighters at one particular point.

Just to show you in terms of numbers. If al Qaeda represents a tiny social fringe, a social movement that can really endure, survive in the long term, then what is the most effective means to hammer a deadly nail in the coffin of al Qaeda? Is the most effective means to declare an all-out war against a tiny fringe movement in the name of whatever, in the name of Islamic radicalism? Or is it basically to find intelligence means and ways to internally encircle al Qaeda and basically deliver the deadly nail in its coffin?

I think what has happened is that our objectives got mixed. By going into Iraq (I don't need to tell you—even our intelligence services, not just myself and Michael are saying so), al Qaeda was in a coma by the end of 2002, and the truth is our invasion has revived al Qaeda. As Michael said, you are talking identity politics here. Muslims and Arabs do not see the American venture—project Iraq—as basically spreading democracy. They are seeing it as an attack against Muslims, against the Muslim ummah. You are talking about, in many ways, pouring fuel on the raging fire or rather a raging revival in the Muslim world.

Q: *Lesla McComas, JHU/APL – This is for Dr. McFate. I really enjoyed your talk. I read something recently that suggested that there is a failing within Islam, that democracy is fundamentally incompatible with the religion. Can you comment on that and how that might play into the narrative of the Muslims?*

 **Dr. Montgomery McFate** – I think that that's a huge debate, from what I understand, in the Islamic world right now and among Islamic legal scholars. There are two schools. There is one school

that says it's incompatible because there is a notion in Islam that all authority comes from God and that manmade authority here on earth is wrong and inappropriate. There is another school of thought that says, no, in fact, manmade authority in the service of God is legitimate. So this is something that is still up for grabs.

My view on this is if people have a strong cultural narrative about the meaning of something or they have a concept that is part of a belief system, and if we are going to wage unrestricted cultural warfare or cultural shaping, whatever you would like to call this battle of ideas, you have to use what is there. Just because something is up for debate and it has not been resolved doesn't mean that it can't be appropriated and utilized to serve America's national interest.

Q: *Brad Andrew, Army G2 – I also have a question for Dr. McFate. How do we change our doctrine if you accept that construct, influenced by the experimentation, the modeling, things of that nature? Many of us have worked very hard for Unified Quest '06 coming up to be studying the overarching question of irregular warfare in complex environments. I know that you are a senior mentor and participating in that exercise. Can you tell me how you are going to bring to bear the nonkinetic aspects of that question that is being posed in the experiment, the nonphysical aspects, such as the culture that you expressed today. Because we've got a great deal of difficulty using the experimental base to address those types of issues.*

Dr. Montgomery McFate – I'm going to do whatever they allow me to do. I'm not going to wage a single-woman war against TRADOC [The US Army Training and Doctrine Command]—that would be foolhardy. But that said, I think that Unified Quest, both this year and last year, has really made an effort to incorporate a lot of nonkinetic DIME [Diplomatic Information Military and Economic]-type activities and concepts. I think that that's an absolutely outstanding and radical departure for most of the war gaming that I have ever been involved with over the course of my career.

I can only hope that game designers will become more sophisticated in terms of how they allow these unintended

consequences to play out as part of the game. All war games are only as good as the conceptual basis that underlies them. I think a lot of the existing concepts need to be rethought because we are far too focused on very narrowly construed concepts of what political, economic and social reality is like.

I know [Dr. Michael Vlahos] doesn't like this term, but in most of the failed states where the United States is probably going to undertake operations at some point in the future, it is not these formal systems and processes that matter. It is informal systems and processes; it's the black market; it's traditional authority. These things matter, and they are not incorporated into the conceptual basis of a lot of war gaming and other models and experiments that go on right now. So I think that we need to take a look at that, and I'm going to write a letter to TRADOC right away.

Q: *My name is Brad Doyle, and I'm a student at the Naval War College and a technologist with the Naval MDC Walker Center; this is for the panel as a whole. The acronym DIME—I have two specific thoughts or questions on that. The informational and the economic—they are considered instruments of power. I happen to think that it's a terminology mixup, that we really should start thinking in terms of demographics instead of economics and civil power instead of informational. The word information is like declaring a war on terrorism as a tactic.*

To me, information is not an instrument, it's rather the civil power. I think back to Martin Luther King—civil change. Demographics, to me is much more comprehensive than economic. I think about all the people out there in America who are always hung up on the economic instrument of power as opposed to the military instrument. So I'd like to know what you think of that idea, that we might be better on the home front in explaining national security and strategy and policy if we change the terminology.

Prof. Fawaz Gerges – I have some thoughts on information, and this gets into the whole problem of trying to think of the operation of a nation in terms of power alone. One of the most striking, self-imposed limitations that the United States has at the moment, and has had for some time, is that we think only in terms of power, and we have forgotten words like authority and legitimacy. One of the greatest strengths the United States has is


its ability to confer legitimacy on a group. Our absolutely greatest leverage with nonstate actors, for example, is that we hold the keys to their legitimacy, the thing they most desire. When it comes to all sorts of smaller entities and larger entities that want to operate in the system that we are at the apex of, much like Rome was, legitimacy is something that we have the authority to grant. So, we have an entire capacity in our national arsenal that is unused. It is unapprehended. And that, I think, gets to the whole use of the word information because we can understand things that are not material, things that we can't use and we can't make go boom.


We understand those simply in the thing closest, the thing that is their most material representation, which is information, rather than looking more broadly at what a nation is in its relationships with others and the basis of those relationships. The fact is, we have relationships with everybody, including al Qaeda, whether we like it or not. And we should like it because the more capacity we have to develop a relationship, the more leverage, the more squeeze, we have with other peoples.

I would like to actually make a follow-up point to Michael's, which is that the M in DIME, military activity against an adversary, can, in fact, confer legitimacy on that adversary. I believe that one of the points made by pretty much everyone on this panel is that our activities in Iraq and against al Qaeda have given them a kind of power, a kind of legitimacy, that they didn't have before.

It's useful in this matter to take instruction from Margaret Thatcher and also from Lloyd George, who both said the same thing, which is that the state does not negotiate with terrorists. And the reason that that was a rule for the British is because negotiation and also attack does confer legitimacy on an adversary.

Just a final point. Do I have two seconds?

 **Dr. Ronald Luman** – No, I'm going to use the privilege of the chair just for one second, and just ask Mary the question that I think is of interest to a lot of us who are dealing with some more mundane issues. Mary, given that we are in Iraq, how would you define victory? I'll give you an easy one.

 **Prof. Mary Habeck** – I really have always seen Iraq, if it's going to be a project, as a political and social project and not a military project. Having said that, victory would therefore be defined as creating a legitimate government, one that is viewed as legitimate by the people, the vast majority of people in Iraq, that can self-sustain.

A photograph showing a group of women, likely in a conflict zone, looking through a wooden fence. They are wearing headscarves and have their hands clasped near the fence. The image is overlaid with a dark red tint.

CHAPTER 3

ROUNDTABLE

SUPPORTING DETERRENCE AND WARFIGHTING



3.1 TAILORED DETERRENCE: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE ANALYTICAL AGENDA*

Charles D. Lutes

EDITOR'S SUMMARY

Colonel Lutes introduces the concept of “tailored deterrence” from a strategy and policy perspective. To forestall crises by preventing the enemy from taking actions antithetical to U.S. interests, tailored deterrence focuses on highly contextual, integrated, proactive, and preemptive strategies tailored to specific enemies. Unlike bipolar Cold War-era nuclear deterrence, tailored deterrence in unrestricted warfare does not assume mutual rationality based on a shared set of values or norms; it has to be founded on what Colonel Lutes calls contextual rationality, which requires us to understand the rationales of particular enemies’ behaviors and objectives given the context in which they exist. Lutes discusses the burdens that reaching this kind of understanding places on our analytical system. He recommends a process of elucidation to develop a contextual profile, estimation to compare options and model system dynamics, and—after implementing a particular strategy—evaluation to analyze effects and develop measures of success. He concludes by calling for a renaissance of the kind of multidimensional thinking that the existential threat of nuclear annihilation brought about during the Cold War: if URW is an equivalent existential threat, we need a new generation of luminaries to achieve effective deterrence.

Colonel Charles D. Lutes, USAF, is a senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. His expertise includes weapons of mass destruction proliferation, counterterrorism, military planning, military strategy, and strategic concept development.

*This paper was produced from Col. Lutes’ slides and a transcript of his presentation.

THE NEW CHALLENGES

I was somewhat surprised that I was asked to sit on the analyst panel because I really consider myself as coming from a strategy and policy background. So, I am going to talk to you about the term “tailored deterrence,” which had a renaissance here in the latest QDR. I will also point out some analytical challenges, as I see them, from a strategy and policy perspective.

One of those challenges is how we think about deterrence against a whole range of adversaries, some of whom may employ unrestricted warfare techniques and tactics and do not adhere to the previous set of rules or norms that are familiar to us from the Cold War environment.

TAILORED DETERRENCE

I want to remove a major impediment to understanding what deterrence means in this context. Notice that it does not include the word “nuclear” here. I want you to take your white-out or your delete button and get rid of that word “nuclear.” This is not about nuclear. That is a capability or a means by which we may have created deterrence in the past. Deterrence is really about preventing your enemy from taking actions that are antithetical to your own interests. In a strategic sense, it could be about preventing WMD use. More broadly, deterrence is about preventing the kind of adversary aggression or coercion that threatens the vital interests of the United States.

“Now we seek to move to more proactive or preemptive strategies using integrated approaches that forestall crises before they occur.”

The 2006 QDR outlined a number of major shifts from 20th- to 21st-century warfare. I have listed a few of them as a scene setter because I think they help us out on this topic (Figure 1). Several of these are about our moving from a predictable bipolar environment to a set of diverse security challenges. Nation states have not gone away, but they may challenge us in different ways.

Some actors, such as decentralized terrorist networks and WMD smugglers and insurgents, may operate outside of what we have traditionally defined as the international system.

<u>From...</u>	<u>To...</u>
• A time of reasonable predictability	• An era of surprise and uncertainty
• Single-focused threats	• Multiple, complex challenges
• Nation-state threats	• Decentralized networked threats from non-state enemies
• Responding after a crisis (reactive)	• Preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive)
• 20th century processes	• 21st century integrated approaches
• Focusing on inputs	• Tracking outputs (results)
• “One size fits all” deterrence	• Tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-term competitors

Figure 1 2006 QDR: Major Shifts in 21st Century Warfare

Now we seek to move to more proactive or preemptive strategies using integrated approaches that forestall crises before they occur. The last bullet in Figure 1 calls for a move from the linear U.S.–Soviet style deterrence relationship to one that is more tailored for this diverse set of challenges. This idea of tailored deterrence in the 2006 QDR report was actually born during the 1990s after the Cold War, when deterrence thinkers were trying to figure out what to do. They realized that there was a fallacy in the Cold War deterrence concept (Figure 2). Dr. Keith Payne coined the term, “the fallacy of Cold War deterrence.” The fallacy was in the assumption of rationality on both sides—that leaders on all sides of the deterrent equation would adhere to it. This assumption led to the conclusion that adversaries would behave in predictable and understandable ways. In other words, they would exhibit reasonable behavior.

- **Fallacy of Cold War deterrence**
 - **Assumption of rationality versus reasonable behavior**

- **Post- 9/11 security environment**
 - **Multiple adversaries in a complex international system**
 - **Peer/Near-Peer/Emerging peer competitors**
 - **Rogue actors**
 - **Terrorists and other violent extremists**

Deterrent policies must be ‘tailored’ to specific antagonists and contexts to ‘get inside’ the decision-making process of the challenger.

Figure 2 Roots of the Tailored Deterrence Concept


The flaw in that argument is that rationality is dependent upon a shared set of values or norms, an assumption that clearly breaks down in the case of actors that might use unrestricted warfare. More important, this leads to surprise and shock in the system when it does not behave as expected. For example, Islamic extremists that employ suicide bombers do not act in ways that are sensible to us if we judge them by Western standards.

If you think about it, a suicide bomber does not cross a busy intersection blindfolded because he wants to die. He only wants to die for a purpose. By understanding that purpose, we can begin to understand how to deter. In other words, we need to be able to walk in the sandals of our enemies to understand their objectives and their context. I call it contextual rationality. They behave in understandable ways given the context in which they exist. This kind of understanding places a great burden on our analytical system.

In the post-9/11 security environment, we suddenly realized that nation states are not necessarily the only entities with the means for employing warfare. Therefore, the apparent rise of

new actors also placed emphasis on thinking about deterrence in new ways. Again, the main idea here is that deterrence policies are highly contextual. They need to be tailored against specific enemies, and we need to get inside the decision-making loop of those enemies.

Figure 3 is from Pentagon briefings given in the runup to the QDR to show current Pentagon thinking about deterrence theory. The classical definition of deterrence is appropriate for a Soviet style—or today a Chinese style—government with centralized decision-making capability. I doubt that this is even an accurate portrayal of a state like China, but for rogue states such as North Korea or Iran, perhaps there are actors further down in the system that you might be able to influence.



Presented by Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
IFPA-Fletcher Conference, 17 Dec 2005

Figure 3 Tailoring Deterrence to Diverse Actors

We have talked about the network nature of violent extremists or terrorist groups and the support they get from the populace, whether it is actually direct support or just tolerance. Although these are challenges for understanding how to deter multilevel actors, they are also opportunities because you may be able to break the nodes down into various parts. The problem with this formulation, I think, is that it tends to keep you in a stovepipe—

I think the buzzword is “cylinder of excellence.” It keeps you locked into a vertical hierarchy of thinking, and it does not take you across levels.

My simplistic view of the international system is that at the same time we are deterring North Korea, we also need to be deterring Iran, and we may need to deter China, and we may need to deter or deal with al Qaeda and Hezbollah. In some ways, they are all acting in concert, although it may not be at a strategic level. For example, a shipping company in one of the nation-state systems may be supporting one of the nonstate actors in another system. The key lies in the social networks. Figure 4, a slide Colonel Thomas X. Hammes drew up, shows the real complexity of this problem.




Figure 4 Deterrence in a Complex and Dynamic Strategic System

ELUCIDATE, ESTIMATE, AND EVALUATE

I want to talk a little bit about the analytical challenge as I see it. I am not an analyst, and I don't even play one on TV. But I see at least three major rules that I would need as a strategist or analyst (Figure 5).




Figure 5 Analytical Roles for Tailored Deterrence

The first one is to describe the system—or as I call it, *elucidate*—from the Latin root, which means to shed light upon. That means we need to build contextual profiles. A lot of qualitative analysis we have discussed here is not about getting more intelligence or more information but about developing understanding. Elucidating requires reaching out to people who have lived in that context and understanding who they are and what they are about. It means painting a picture of what the system is and what goes on inside of it.

“... we need to be able to walk in the sandals of our enemies to understand their objectives and their context. I call it contextual rationality. They behave in understandable ways given the context in which they exist. This kind of understanding places a great burden on our analytical system.”

Once we have that kind of understanding, we need to think about ways in which to affect that system. What kind of options do we have to affect that system? In deterrence theory, we focus on a few options. We talk about affecting an enemy's system through punishment, which was the classic deterrence theory—you threaten to annihilate the enemy should he step over the line. Today, maybe that option is not relevant. Another option is to deny benefits or at least deny enemies the ability to obtain their objectives. Perhaps we should look a little more closely at that option. We also have an option of inducing restraint through other means, perhaps a few carrots as well as sticks. Anyway, we want to take these options and compare them.

Once we have painted this contextual profile, we can use systems dynamics models from the top down and complexity and agent-based models from the bottom up to understand these interactions by melding them to form if-then scenarios. How does a particular interaction affect not just that system but also all the other systems in the environment? Once we implement the strategy, we need to analyze the effects and evaluate what we have done—again, by looking at the system.

Figure 6 is a deterrent framework from Keith Payne, one of today's modern deterrence thinkers at the National Institute for Public Policy. He paints a framework for how to get at the system—the kind of information and understanding you would need to deter. Many of the steps in this framework are very difficult to achieve. In some ways, this is a linear framework. The good news is that we need much of this information to fight the enemy in a war, although it requires detailed system information and many dynamic analytical tools.

A Deterrence Framework (Payne)

- **Step 1: Identify antagonists, issue, objectives, actions**
- **Step 2: Identify factors affecting adversary's decision-making**
 - Degree of rationality and predictability
 - Leadership characteristics
 - Values and cost/risk structure
 - Adversary's options
 - Beliefs about costs to U.S.
 - Communications
 - Credibility of U.S. threats
- **Step 3: Construct strategic profile of adversary with respect to the crisis in question**
- **Step 4: Assess susceptibility to deterrent policies**
- **Step 5: Identify available U.S. deterrence policy options**
- **Step 6: Identify gaps between deterrent requirements and available options**

Requires detailed system information
and dynamic analytical tools

Figure 6 Describing the System: Elucidation

To define *estimation*, I want to return to the idea of complexity theory and the effects on systems dynamics. Bob Jervis at Columbia University is one of the deterrence thinkers who have talked of it in terms of system effects (Figure 7). To estimate these multilevel effects with modeling and simulation, not only do we have to deal with systems dynamics and agent-based interactions, but we also have to remember that the actors in this system are human. We have to be able to meld these kinds of modeling techniques with actual human behavior and provide strategists and policy makers a good concept of what will happen—what those real humans on the other side of the equation will be able to do.

Jervis's observations of system effects:

- **Indirect and delayed effects: *emergent properties***
- **Relations are often not bilaterally determined: *complex***
- **Interactions, not additivity: *nonlinear***
 - Results cannot be predicted from separate actions
 - Strategies depend on the strategies of others
 - Behavior changes the environment
- **Outcomes do not follow from intentions**

In order to estimate multi-level effects, modeling and simulation will need to consider:

- Systems dynamics
- Agent-based interactions
- Human behavior

Figure 7 Comparing Options: Estimation

Finally, ***evaluation*** (Figure 8). Strategists excel at defining objectives; unfortunately, they do not adequately define the measures of success. I think that analysts must have measures of success defined clearly, but they usually stop at defining the objectives. It is not sufficient to say that the best measure of deterrence is whether the enemy takes a particular action against which we are trying to defend ourselves. By that measure, we get an A plus against al Qaeda because they have not attacked the United States since 9/11—or at least since the anthrax attacks. But that can turn to an F minus very quickly in the blink of an atom.

- **Strategy defines the objective, but not the measures**
- **Metrics and measures of success**
 - How do we know we've achieved the desired behavior?
 - Can we establish cause and effect?
 - By what standards do we judge the efficacy of our deterrent capabilities?
 - How much do the measures and metrics differ for each context?

Figure 8 Analyzing Effects: Evaluation

An essential part of the challenge in this complex environment is establishing cause and effect. When we take a particular action, how do we know that it will cause a change in the system?

A NEW GENERATION OF THINKERS

I would like to share with you some closing thoughts, or, as I call them, BFOs – blinding flashes of the obvious. I hope that I have made the case that tailoring deterrence presents a complex analytical challenge, in large part because the problem itself is nonlinear. The set of solutions and the tools for analysis have to account for the dynamism inherent in the system.

As Keith Payne says, the goal is to reduce the margin of ignorance. In particular, the analytic community has to be able to help articulate a set of tested policy options that enable U.S. decision makers to make reasoned choices in reducing the overall risks to U.S. interests. If our decision makers are to think broadly about a complex set of challenges, our analytical system has to be robust enough and broad enough to match.

Finally, I think we need a new generation of thinkers, great thinkers. The Cold War brought out some of the best and brightest, such as Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and particularly Thomas Shelling, for instance, who recently won a Nobel Prize—not for deterrence theory, for which he is widely known in the security realm—but for game theory. In fact, his book, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*, actually had the core nuggets of complexity theory some 20 or 30 years before it was articulated as complexity theory. In addition, he wrote extensively on the psychology of how to quit smoking. So, we need more of these kinds of great thinkers about many topics.

I have talked about some of the excellent work of Keith Payne and Bob Jervis, but I am not sure we have the same kind of impassioned debates that we had in the 1950s and 1960s. It may have been that during that time, the threat of Soviet annihilation seemed to be such an existential threat that it brought out the greatest thinkers. I submit to you that if we really believe that we are in a time of unrestricted warfare, in which there is also an existential threat, we need to call for the same kind of thinking. We need those kinds of luminaries out there. Thank you.



3.2 NECESSARY CHANGES FOR ANALYSIS IN AN ERA OF UNRESTRICTED WARFARE

Charles Crossett and Benjamin Kerman

The methods and techniques that an analyst currently uses to evaluate tactics and systems in warfare are insufficient for assessing their success against unrestricted warfare. The inherent broadness of potential tactics and their unpredictable use by the adversary require a shift in the fundamental assumptions and values by which we scrutinize modern warfare. Success is measured less by physical parameters such as territory and attrition than by ideological tenets, the domestic public's perception of safety and vulnerability, and the options available for further military action. Warfare analysis must integrate new scientific disciplines such as the behavioral and knowledge sciences to reform its worldview and derive new measures of effectiveness. A holistic perspective has historical precedent from the beginnings of operations research during World War II. We must relearn the lessons quickly to provide systems and technologies of consequence to our forces.

THE IMPENDING CRISIS

The American soldier in the field today is incredibly well armed, protected, trained, and informed. With the equipment at his disposal, the soldier is able to assault a building, destroy

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a tank, locate a Howitzer over the next hill, or know about key intelligence gathered moments before. When faced with conventional forces, he can dominate the action with technology and battlespace awareness.

However, the technological advantage has not offered complete success in the current Iraqi situation. The soldier is still under attack from simple explosive devices. He is insulated from the population, fearful of its infiltration by an invisible enemy. The technology gives them safety and a means to fight back when the threat is recognizable. However, the prowess of equipment, knowledge, and firepower has not translated to operational stability or defeat of the insurgency.

New systems are introduced each day to aid the soldier, slowly shifting away from equipment built for tanks and conventional warfare to gear built for guerilla warfare. However, they are mostly experiments. Their effectiveness is largely unknown, and their performance is understood only through an analytic value system that favors power, speed, and accuracy. The larger operational significance of this warfighting toolset has yet to be assessed.

For example, new sensors are being examined for the detection of roadside explosive devices. The sensor may be excellent at detecting an explosive device, but at what distance must it find the device to save the soldier's life? Is its performance enough to save civilian lives if utilized with different tactics or procedures? What is the most effective intervention point in the chain of bomb making, emplacement, and detonation?

NEW CHALLENGES TO WARFARE ANALYSIS

Operational analysis of warfare has always shown promise in evaluating options and trading orthogonal factors in the pursuit of optimal solutions. It has been successful in enabling the understanding of conventional warfare operations and the application of technology in such conditions. Unrestricted warfare, however, presents challenges to the current methods and techniques of warfare analysis and the evaluation of systems. Unrestricted means, such as guerilla warfare, present the analyst with factors that are at odds with our current method of evaluating

operational value and success. The tactics of this type of warfare are designed by small groups for attacking a large conventional force. Engagements are not direct, and attacks are aimed at specific vulnerabilities of the larger force. The large, conventional force can find no obvious opposing force to overwhelm or physical space to conquer. Power is rendered moot.

Thomas Hammes calls it “4th Generation Warfare.” [1] The evolution of guerilla warfare is based on recognition of the overwhelming disparity between force sizes and capabilities. By choosing this type of engagement, the adversary is trying to tip the balance of power so that he may survive until the larger opponent decides that the harassment is not worth the expense in resources or lives. This often involves applying propaganda, terror, and coercion to break the will of both military and population to engage an elusive enemy.

“As was made evident in Vietnam and is becoming apparent in Iraq, the occupation of territory and a low relative attrition rate do not necessarily equate to long-term success in the face of nonconventional forces.”

The conflict in 4th generation warfare is ideological in nature, intended to influence and affect the nonmilitary population of both sides. The beliefs and behaviors of the participants and the affected nonparticipants become critical factors in the options available to warfare.

Some insurgencies have been defeated through dominating physical force, when the guerilla forces can be contained and removed before their ideological tenets are absorbed and acted upon by the general population. The Banana Wars of the early 20th century demonstrate such insurgency failures [2]. However, history is rife with cases of insurgencies that succeed in outlasting the will of the larger force, such as the FLN in Algeria.

Another characterization of unrestricted means of warfare is the decidedly multifaceted approach described by Cols. Liang and Xiangsui [3]. The entire spectrum of information warfare, media

manipulation, economic means, diplomatic maneuvering, and other actions provide an opportunity for harassment, diversion, and direct or indirect attack. Again, the goal of this form of warfare is nonmilitary attack, rather than the conventional style of warfare in which the United States has a technological and power advantage.

Warfare analysis must undergo a fundamental shift to be useful in the evaluation of operations, tactics, and systems within this type of nonphysical warfare. The current focus on system performance and its aggregate effects on physical warfare will not translate into measures of effectiveness that will apply to unrestricted warfare. Threat characterization and perceived performance measures will not lend insight into how to stabilize territory, defeat ideologies, protect economic interests, understand the efficacy of media campaigns, or protect the homeland interests. Conventional warfare metrics are based on territory measures and attrition; they cannot describe success in unrestricted warfare.

There has been a growing realization that warfare analysis has not been able to completely and confidently integrate the new possibilities afforded by technology. Prior to 2001, the analytic community struggled with the concept of “information dominance” and how to value the speed and accuracy of intelligence, battlespace awareness, and a networked force in a quantitative measure of better warfighting performance. The solution was normally interpreted as better performance in physical warfare. Better intelligence leads to quicker and more precise kills. Battlespace awareness was translated into a lower rate of loss because the more aware force was considered a better-defended force.

Unrestricted warfare requires the consideration of deterrence, the options for action, and the “hearts and minds” of the adversary, the American soldier, and the noncombatant populations on both sides. The physical manifestation of information does not account for such cognitive and behavioral dimensions.

We must not forget the effects of physical warfare, projection of power, and the dominance of space and lanes of control. All of

these still bear heavily upon the fight against adversaries employing unrestricted means. We must understand how to incorporate the informational and behavioral aspects in order to understand how to win, and what tools we need for the fight.

In the scientific disciplines, a common worldview is necessary to bound the “normal” pursuit of that science. Such a Kuhnian paradigm [4] enables a community to interpret data and potential theories in a way that allows them to be solved. For example, the modern particle physicist explores new types of subatomic behavior based upon a fundamental principle of atom-based matter and its organization into a collection of subatomic particles. However, each scientific discipline comes across anomalies in data or behavior that do not fit within the current theoretical scheme, and resist explanation. The anomalous information is sidelined, waiting for new discoveries or new theories.

“The tactics of unrestricted warfare are aimed not only at the ability to conduct warfare, but also at manipulating the perceptions of civilian populations. These tactics attack less the capacity to conduct warfare than the willingness to do so.”

Until 1905, the physicist’s worldview had the earth swimming in a sea of aether, where distance and time were immutable and Newtonian mechanics ruled. A series of experiments by Michelson and Morley, the most notable in 1879, led to a new mathematical treatment of the speed of light by Lorentz. However, it was the concept of special relativity that challenged the worldview of fixed time and space. A revolutionary shift in fundamental perspective proffered new ways of connecting data and interpreting exhibited behaviors.

Such a dramatic revolution in *Weltanschauung* is required in operations research applied to warfare. Conventional warfare analysis provides a great wealth of information and insight. Nevertheless, new measures and techniques are required to consider effectiveness of tactics and systems against unrestricted

warfare. Moreover, those measures and techniques have to arise from a different fundamental assumption of value.

SHIFTING OUR WORLDVIEW

In deconstructing the measures of effectiveness used in warfare analysis today, one finds that they are derived from two fundamental goals: the taking and holding of territory and the attrition of military forces. These measures are predicated on active military action and do not include population defense or political will.

As was made evident in Vietnam and is becoming apparent in Iraq, the occupation of territory and a low relative attrition rate do not necessarily equate to long-term success in the face of nonconventional forces. The tactics of unrestricted warfare are aimed not only at the ability to conduct warfare, but also at manipulating the perceptions of civilian populations. These tactics attack less the capacity to conduct warfare than the willingness to do so. For this reason, homeland defense and the stability of America's standard of life are far more attractive targets to our adversaries.

Therefore, warfare analysis must switch from considering mostly active warfare to considering also the defensive posture and the willingness to engage and sustain. The value system from which effectiveness must be derived must clarify the choice between defense and offense. We need to develop the ability to compare the value of protecting an asset to the value of removing the enemy's capacity to attack. Strategic assessments have grappled with these issues in the nuclear and diplomatic arenas. It is imperative that warfare analysis understand these issues quantitatively with respect to stability and homeland defense operations.

One can defend a valued asset in four ways. The first is totally passive; the strategy is simply to absorb the attack or event. The second way is to moderately defend against attacks, with a high latency of an active response. Threats are not closely monitored in this mode, but the environment is scanned for the presence of an attack underway.

A third mode of defense is to defend an asset heavily against known and unknown threats, while maintaining an active posture to watch for the immediate outbreak of an attack. Vigilance is valued, and planning is conducted for prepared reactions and recovery. This method of defense consumes a large portion of the intelligence gathering and defensive system allocation. The resources required for reaction and perhaps an active counterattack are ready to go but seldom used.

The last mode of response is to actively search out those threats and actively avert the attack before it can be conducted. This mode, along with the active reaction of the third defensive mode, includes all of the active means of warfare that we know how to analyze. Preemptive or reactive military action requires power projection and / or overwhelming force. It also requires predictive intelligence, predicated on following threats to those assets that we have strategically chosen to actively or proactively defend.

The first two modes of defense require robust protection or reconstruction. Infrastructure and assets placed into this category will have to absorb attacks, and American values (the current standards of life and our capability to act globally) must be maintained after such an attack.

America historically has relied on the military's ability to prevent attacks before they threaten the homeland. Since 9/11, great effort has been made in making America's infrastructure sufficiently robust to be able to absorb attacks. In choosing between active measure and robust redundancy, America must thoroughly understand the variety of options available. Warfare analysis must be able to relatively compare the costs and benefits of infrastructure redundancy, intelligence gathering, predictive analysis and military measures. Homeland defense and military action overseas must both be considered in the spectrum of options.

The immense variety of tactics and targets associated with unrestricted warfare presents conventional analyses with a serious conundrum: the tactics may fall into categories that the military

is unaccustomed to managing. Many of the tactics may involve attacks that appear to be nothing more than police actions. Other attacks can be understood as diplomatic or economic maneuvering. In a conflict without a clear military enemy, dealing with such attacks is problematic. Traditionally, the military has left such things to other organizations. As the lines are blurred, these tactics will have a direct impact on the military's domain; it will become unclear where the military's boundary can be drawn.

A common strategy in an unrestricted warfare is to expand the time domain of the conflict. No longer can a campaign be understood by the sum of its battles. Be it an insurgency force or otherwise, its ability to prolong a war often allows the smaller force to outlast the will of the larger force. For the larger power, it is often the case that the value of victory of a given conflict is finite. Therefore, the cost of the conflict, in assets and lives, can exceed the value of victory.

The smaller force can hope to extinguish the desire and will of the larger force to continue to engage in war in one of two ways. It can attempt to make the cost of victory for the larger force too high as happened in Vietnam. By forcing the United States to escalate its involvement and exposing the American soldiers to harm, the Vietcong diminished the perceived value of victory in Vietnam to less than its cost in the eyes of the American public.

“The analytic community must face the prospect that a fundamental shift in value perspective and success metrics is required to address the inherent aspects of guerilla, information, and other nonphysical forms of warfare.”

The smaller force has another strategic option at its disposal: it can hope to directly degrade the value of victory for the larger force. This strategy was common during the decolonization period of the 20th century. Gandhi's passive resistance movement in India directly affected the value of retaining India for Great Britain. He systematically attacked the mercantile interests that India provided its mother country. The boycott of all foreign

textile products had a massive effect. A great aspect of the value of having a colony is that it is a market for the mother country's products. In the absence of this market, the value of retaining the colony is diminished.

Warfare analysis must broaden itself to consider information and perception and their impacts that they have on the effectiveness of a fighting force. Further, as the domain of warfare widens, the analysis must be able to consider the multitude of factors and problems in concert with each other. No single aspect of warfare is sufficient to help the analyst understand and define victory.

RECREATING THE CIRCUS

This new perspective must be translated into measures of effectiveness useful in the study of tactics and systems. The connections between knowledge, human behavior, decisions, and physical environment are still nascent; we are not yet able to translate them into a dynamic environment such as warfare with any surety. To begin to understand how the community can find metrics that capture the influence of such factors, we can look again to a historical analogy. For operations research was itself born within a very new and unknown environment of warfare, where new systems brought about effects and capabilities without a clear understanding of their implications.

During WWII, the Royal Army and Navy both conducted studies in which operational data were collected and analyzed together with lab test results of new technologies. Teams of analysts, culled from the scientific fields, laid the foundations for new quantitative methods and techniques that allowed complex scientific data and operational choices to be connected [5].

One particular team, headed by Patrick Blackett, was an exceptionally eclectic mix of specialists known as "Blackett's circus." Blackett was already a well-respected astrophysicist, and received the Nobel Prize for Physics soon after the war. His team helped the British forces understand the current conditions of the war, and the proper use of new technologies and tactics without knowing their exact effects.

The circus, which consisted of three physiologists, two mathematical physicists, one astrophysicist, an army officer, an ex-surveyor, two mathematicians, and a general physicist, assisted in the introduction of radar-sighted guns for coastal defense. The laboratory tests were not reproducible in the field. Taking a very holistic approach, since they had no radar or radio expertise, the team soon found the sources of clutter that were affecting the operations of sites in the field.

Blackett's circus and other teams across Britain and the U.S. used operational data and a comprehensive set of multidisciplinary problem-solving skills to create new understandings of the connections between the technological and the operational. While the problems at hand were understandable in the physical domain, it required a data-intensive look at possible influences, the exploration of relationships, and eventual mathematization using techniques from various fields to achieve success.

Small pockets of teams are involved in this exploratory exercise in the current Iraqi engagement. Their problems are immediate tactical issues that pertain to the specific situation faced by our forces. It is hoped that this type of holistic and data-intensive casework will provide the same rich and useful underpinnings, similar to Blackett's, to an expansion of the effort across the analytic community.

The broader threat environment that the United States faces with unrestricted warfare, including its Global War on Terrorism and homeland defense, requires a more concerted, directed, and larger effort to reform the foundational precepts of how we gauge success and therefore how we evaluate tactics and system performance. More "circuses" should be convened within the labs and the military, bringing together anthropologists [6], historians, cognitive scientists, experts from the information and knowledge sciences¹, warfare analysts, system analysts, and warfighters to address the effect of unrestricted warfare on our

1 For the purposes of this paper, "knowledge sciences" are loosely defined as those pertaining to the understanding of translation of information and data into actions or behavior, including the cognitive disciplines (such as cognitive psychology) as well as the cultural disciplines (such as anthropology).

worldview. Such groups will begin to develop new metrics to address defensive operations against unrestricted tactics. New methods and quantitative techniques will be required to allow evaluation of systems and tactics against those measures. In addition, operational data may have to be collected to allow complete quantitative regard to analysis in an unrestricted warfare domain.

The time is right for a multidisciplinary look at current warfare challenges stemming from unrestricted tactics. The analytic community must face the prospect that a fundamental shift in value perspective and success metrics is required to address the inherent aspects of guerilla, information, and other nonphysical forms of warfare.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that this essay will stimulate a larger conversation about the applicability of current warfare analysis to the unrestricted warfare domain. The analytic community has already started addressing insurgency and information warfare issues. However, the conversation is not yet broad enough to allow a fundamental rethinking of the value system by which we gauge success or effectiveness.

Unrestricted warfare specifically uses means that circumvent the strengths of our current defensive machine. By understanding the strategic values that motivate the adversary to use this type of warfare, and the strategic values we wish to base our defenses upon, we may derive new and more useful metrics. These measures should allow us to evaluate and discern effective new systems, technologies, tactics, and operational concepts that will allow us to withstand both current and emerging threats.

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3.3 DISCUSSION GROUP INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

L. Dean Simmons

The Symposium's Analysis Roundtable examined the role of analysis in supporting deterrence and warfighting against unrestricted warfare threats. Over 2,000 years ago the great Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu advised (*Reference 1*):

He who knows the enemy and himself will never in a hundred battles be at risk; He who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes win and sometimes lose; He who knows neither the enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle.

So, how are we to gain this critical knowledge of ourselves and our enemies? The analysts assembled for this Roundtable offered some advice.

PROFESSOR ANDREW LOERCH: USING ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT DECISION MAKING IN URW

Historically, the activities now designated as operations research originated in World War II with a multidisciplinary group of smart people assembled to work on complex problems in air defense associated with the use of the newly invented radar technology. No established methodologies or standard models were available to this team. Instead, they sought to understand

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the underlying phenomenology, relying heavily on observation and data collection. Their initial models were simple.

As we confront the threat posed by adversaries employing unrestricted warfare methods, the analysis community once again faces new and different problems that do not fit the standard paradigm. Given our lack of knowledge of the processes that we are being asked to analyze, we have to collect data and seek understanding before anything else. We need to recognize that for many problems, our standard models no longer apply, and we'll have to build new tools. It is also likely that we'll have to apply methodologies used in other fields, such as social networks or law enforcement.

To accomplish these tasks, we and our sponsors will need to fund research to bring as many smart people as possible to bear on the wide variety of URW-related problems. Of course, we can and must continue to use our existing tools and capabilities to examine problems that will exist regardless of whether we are dealing with URW or conventional conflicts – in areas such as logistics, strategic mobility, or multi-attribute decision making.

COL CHARLES LUTES, USAF: TAILORED DETERRENCE

With the end of the Cold War and the appearance of adversaries that seem, at least at first glance, to be undeterrable, the United States needs new thinking on deterrence and how to apply it against such foes. The concept of tailoring deterrence to different adversaries is a potential means of countering those intent on using URW against the United States. Implementing this approach will impose a complex challenge and will require the development of new analytical techniques. These tools will be essential if analysts are to provide decision makers with reasoned options for risk management.

PROF. JAMES WIRTZ: POTENTIAL ISSUES FOR WAR GAMING

War gaming is another approach for dealing with problems in unrestricted warfare, although its application in this arena would necessitate additional foresight and planning. Before beginning such a game, the players would need to decide whether one or

the other of the opponents would be likely to undertake URW. If URW is to be included, the unrestricted player should not be limited by organizational preferences, strategic choice, laws of war, or even rationality. Whether war gaming could be used to determine the overall effectiveness of URW or the applicability of deterrence to a particular URW adversary are open questions.

MAJ. TIMOTHY KRANER: AL QAEDA IN IRAQ: DEMOBILIZING THE THREAT

An experienced intelligence analyst illustrated the application of target system analysis techniques to identify means to counter al Qaeda in Iraq. Techniques from Social Mobilization Theory were used to examine political opportunities, mobilizing structures, action repertoires, frames, and narratives for the al Qaeda forces. The approach proposed by Baylis (*Reference 2*) is a way to identify an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Such a strategy will feature a coordinated, multidimensional approach and will include military, political, and socioeconomic elements, as well as a cultural–ideological “War for the Muslim Mind” to gain the support of moderate Muslims. International efforts were proposed as a way to eliminate regional and global supporters, close safe havens, and provide border security.

MR. CHUCK CROSSETT: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS, TACTICS, SYSTEMS, AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR UNRESTRICTED WARFARE

To conduct assessments in these areas, the analysis community will need to identify appropriate success metrics beyond the criteria used to characterize outcomes in conventional warfare (typically, attrition for one or both sides and territory gained or lost). Because unrestricted warfare adversaries will likely attack across a much broader set of national resources than in conventional warfare, assessments of URW will also require new measures of effectiveness that show capability versus both offensive and defensive options. The teams assigned to carry out the analytical assessments for URW should include experts in the knowledge and behavioral sciences as well as in physics and engineering. Similarly, the assessment tools used must be expanded to

incorporate mathematical and quantitative techniques from these other disciplines.

ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS

The participants in the Analysis Discussion Group offered some additional insights, which generally fell into the two broad categories of strategy and analysis. Under strategy, the group made two points:

- A clearly stated overall strategy is needed for the Long War. Without one, analysts are unable to measure progress or the value of our systems or tactics.
- It is important to recognize that in an unrestricted conflict, tactical actions can, and often do, have strategic implications. If a decision or system application proves counterproductive at the strategic level, it may be unwise to employ it at the tactical level, regardless of any seeming tactical advantage that might ensue.

When discussing analysis issues, the participants noted that the term “analysis” has different meanings for different communities, and that all types of analyses are needed to understand and solve the problems posed by unrestricted warfare. They made several recommendations:

- Identify appropriate goals for our analyses so that decision makers can narrow their focus.
- Ensure that the analysts are using the appropriate metrics to measure quantities of interest.
- Analysts need to account for the human element where appropriate and to recognize the significant variability it introduces.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Over the course of the discussion, a number of unanswered questions arose. In particular, the group debated whether we are currently engaged in an unrestricted war and, if so, with whom? Some argued that we were clearly engaged in an unrestricted

conflict with either al Qaeda and other Salafist Islamic extremists, or the Iraqi insurgents, or all of those. Others contended that the publication of the book by Liang and Xiangsui (*Reference 3*) indicated that China might perceive itself to be an unrestricted adversary. Granting that we are indeed currently engaged in an unrestricted war, several suggested that the Symposium might have addressed more of the subelements within URW, rather than focusing so heavily on the unrestricted aspects of the wars against terrorism and the Iraqi insurgency. Along similar lines, the question arose as to whether there are any common threads across the categories of unrestricted warfare.

Two broad, and perhaps unanswerable, questions were asked during the session:

- Are the organizational structures within the government, and, particularly, within the Department of Defense, appropriate for fighting URW and other 21st-century threats?
- Has the United States chosen to rely too heavily on technology?

SUGGESTED ACTIONS

The Discussion Group then turned to the task of identifying suggested actions for the Strategy, Analysis, and Technology communities. Three proposals were advanced:

STRATEGY

First, and most important, strategists need to aid in the development of an identifiable national strategy and the supporting doctrine to guide efforts against URW adversaries (such as those being engaged in the global war on terrorism). In conjunction with this effort, strategists need to define what it means to win both the global war on terror and the conflict in Iraq and to identify suitable metrics to measure success.

Second, strategists can assist the Department of Defense in enhancing the problem-identification and problem-solving skills of both military and government personnel by helping to structure

suitable education and training programs and by identifying the appropriate resource levels for these programs.

Third, strategists should assist in ensuring that our approach to intelligence collection is truly multidisciplinary and that our leaders are involved throughout the intelligence cycle. The U.S. intelligence community needs to rectify its preferential bias for technical intelligence over other intelligence means. Leadership must be involved throughout the intelligence cycle to ensure that their specific intelligence needs are met.

ANALYSIS

The analysis community must recognize that analysis exists in a variety of forms, all of which have different needs. The policy analysts who support strategic assessments will need different tools and data than the analysts carrying out intelligence assessments. And, the systems and cost-effectiveness analysts who conduct the Department's essential capabilities assessments and analyses of alternatives will require yet another set of tools and other types of data.

Given these differences, analysts must recognize that data-collection needs are specific to the problem being studied. Differences in geographic settings must be accommodated, as well as differences in the specific disciplines involved in the assessment. Resource constraints must also be taken into account, whether imposed by monetary, schedule, or personnel limitations.

As indicated by several of the Roundtable participants, the analysis community needs to develop new analytic techniques. The combination of agent-based modeling and systems dynamics may offer particular advantages for assessing the suitability of tailored deterrence options. In addition, wargaming capabilities must be improved to accommodate the key aspects of unrestricted warfare.

TECHNOLOGY

The technology community must be able to accommodate rapidly changing and adaptive threats to tip the balance in our favor. The goal of these efforts should be to make us more proactive and less reactive. It is particularly important to identify technology solutions that can be immediately useful to our soldiers in the field.

Along related lines, several technology areas were assessed to require immediate attention. Leaders in small units need improved capabilities for sharing information, thereby enhancing their situational awareness. According to several participants, much information exchange is currently accomplished using chat room features of existing classified computer networks. Improved surveillance and reconnaissance support for counter-IED operations was also assessed to be a high-priority need.

Over the longer term, the technology community should begin to develop education technologies to support the needs of both the broader public and the military. Education and training need to be paced at a level appropriate for each individual student rather than an entire classroom. Advanced graphics and information presentation techniques might be employed to maintain interest levels.

CONCLUSION

The task of adjusting to unrestricted warfare will not be easy for the analysis and technology communities. Both the problems and the necessary adjustments to our tools and methods will be difficult. As the future unfolds, we would be well advised to heed this bit of wisdom from T. E. Lawrence – the famous Lawrence of Arabia – who, in his autobiography, observed (*Reference 4*):

To make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.

The same will hold true with respect to analysis and technology to support deterrence and warfighting of unrestricted warfare threats.

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Q: *Tom McNalley, U.S. Army – Several speakers have talked about deterrence. I wonder; how do you propose deterring terrorist networks?*

Col. Charles Lutes – After 9/11, the conventional wisdom was that terrorists are undeterrable. We proceeded with that assumption without really questioning it. I do not have the answer to it, but I can tell you that now there is an impetus in the Department of Defense and in the Pentagon to rethink that assumption.

As I mentioned earlier, our traditional notion of deterrence was centered on the idea of punishment. How can you punish someone who is willing to die for his cause? If you expand the idea of deterrence to incorporate the denial of the benefits that the enemy may gain from taking a particular action or obtaining a particular objective, you can look at deterrence in a whole new light. I think we are going to have to seek means other than punishment to deter hostile actions. As I said before, if a terrorist knows he cannot obtain his objectives, he is not likely to carry out that action.

Q: *Marcus Bauer, APL – I have a question for Professor Wirtz about game theory. If you suppose that the opponent gets the first move, is there any way to incorporate predictive intelligence information into the game beforehand? How do you include intelligence?*

Prof. James J. Wirtz – That is a good question. Historically, in these scenarios, the weaker opponent is going to seek surprise and very often achieve it. This happens not because the intelligence community does not collect information about what is about to transpire, but because it is not properly analyzed, understood, or communicated to senior decision makers. Even if it is, it is

often dismissed out of hand as being unrealistic, irrational, or not something that we would do. So, as much as I hate to say it, I think if you actually game this, you are going to have to give the enemy the first move and assume that the intelligence community operators are not going to respond in an effective way to prevent it. Perhaps in Day 2 of the game scenario, you could add intelligence to the gaming equation, but realistically you want to give the opponent the first move. Blue gets to take a coffee break on opening day—that is about all you can do.

Q: *Julio Dias, Lawrence Livermore International Laboratory – As was discussed earlier, our core values in assessing measures of effectiveness need to incorporate assessment of the U.S. government's vulnerability to URW. Given the definitions of unrestricted warfare that we now have—such as the Chinese book and some of the definitions put forth today—where within U.S. bureaucratic structures do you feel the assessment effort of our government's vulnerability to URW belongs? Does it belong in the Defense Intelligence Agency or other government agencies or does it belong at our academic institutions? Can you comment on that, please?*

Dr. Dean Simmons – I think that is an excellent question. Certainly, the Department of Homeland Security should be keenly interested in the answer, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency could do the baseline security assessments to look at some of our vulnerabilities. Does anyone else have input on that response?

Prof. Andrew Loerch – I think that every agency has to look at its own vulnerabilities, to a certain extent. The big problem is that anytime you begin discussing vulnerabilities, it deteriorates into a discussion about scenarios. If you took any five people in this room and had them walk for an hour in opposite directions, they would all come back with a hundred different ways the government might be vulnerable.

The fact is, you can never protect against everything. The process of determining what is critical—which resources should be dedicated to protect which assets, where effort should be focused, and what are their consequences—is an extraordinarily difficult one.

▬ **Col. Charles Lutes** – I would like to address the broader aspect of deterrence. When we are thinking about what we can do to deter others who may engage in unrestricted warfare, we also need to think about what deters the United States from action. What will they be thinking about to keep us from meeting *our* objectives? That is a branch of deterrence theory that has been little explored.

▬ **Prof. James J. Wirtz** – Whichever organization is charged with doing it, I see this as a net assessment question, in the sense that we have to assess the difference between our capabilities and the opponent's.

Q. *John Schuster, APL – I want to follow up on that last comment, because I think it is critical. This morning, we heard one of the best definitions of unrestricted warfare I have yet heard: Whatever it is, it is not a nuisance. This morning we heard that we will have won when what these people are doing is again merely a nuisance. Before 9/11, their activities were a nuisance. Al Qaeda was operative, but what they were doing did not kill enough people for us to declare war.*

▬ **Prof. James J. Wirtz** – Had 9/11 been stopped, there probably would not be a war on terror. It was all wrapped around 9/11. When you consider war-gaming, beyond the first day, the war-gaming scenario does not matter—except for the retaliation against al Qaeda. We have minimized them to some degree. There has not been another attack. So one of the things you have to look at is what creates the vulnerability. If you examine 9/11, many people had considered what kinds of threats airplanes could pose, and they found that there are hundreds of things you could do with airplanes; but there are only a very small number of things you could do with airplanes that would create the impact of 9/11. Everything else would have been a nuisance. For instance, we may have lost one airplane; we have demonstrated before that such a loss would not have caused us to have such a reaction. We could have done that analysis but we did not.

I have participated in some net assessment war games, and the main issue—not regarding airplanes but on other threats—is how do you prevent something big from happening? It turns out


that there are not that many big things. Those are problems that can be analyzed, but they are not going to be analyzed on the second day. By the time you get to the second day, it is too late.

The problem is, if you are actually going to game an unrestricted warfare scenario, you have to let the opponent take the initiative, which implies either an intelligence, military, or political failure on our part—either to anticipate that threat or respond to the indications and warnings that are always in the intelligence pipeline before. If we are going to game the scenario, one of the questions we have to ask ourselves is do we game it to demonstrate how we might prevent it from happening, or is it more realistic to game so that failure has occurred and now we are in it up to our eyeballs.

☞ *John Schuster, APL* – Another approach is to play the first day repeatedly, consider it as ground fall. As you play it, you find out what they can do, look at what you could do, then get a different group to play the same thing, allowing a limited response beforehand. That is the kind of game you have to stop the first day.

☞ *Prof. James J. Wirtz* – The net assessment needs to identify our structural weaknesses. In fact, we have just identified one: our vulnerabilities are not necessarily tied to our military capabilities. Is anyone conducting such an assessment? I do not know whether we are conducting assessments based on understanding our asymmetric weaknesses and trying to integrate them into our military operations.

☞ *Dr. Ronald Luman* – Thanks everyone. I am going to cut this off now. It has been a good dialogue. Considering the last few comments, it looks like the red players get the first move. I think it goes back to what I was saying at the beginning of this roundtable: The American sense of fair play predominates, and we have to let the bad guys take their shot. We could certainly continue to debate that. What I heard on this panel was a call for thought leadership from every one of our panelists, and I think we need to respond to that.



CHAPTER 4

ROUNDTABLE

IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS



4.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS*

Jeffrey Davis

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS BY THOMAS MAHNKEN

If we think about it, we are really in an era of small-unit warfare. The history of warfare from the late 18th century up to the 20th century is primarily one of large-unit operations and command and control of large organizations. In recent experience, however, military operations have been dominated by small units, although the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the exception.

Even in the mid to late 1990s, a lot of attention was given to how dispersed, small units might operate on the battlefield. Early in 1996, the Marines Corps conducted an experiment, Hunter Warrior that tested concepts for dispersed, small units on the battlefield and how they might bring in remote firepower. In a way, this exercise was a prototype for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The Marines didn't follow up on that approach, but then, it was used to great effect in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Captain Davis, USMC, is currently the lead author for the Joint Army/Marine Corps Tactical Commanders Handbook for Counter Insurgency Operations in the Concepts and Plans Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. Since joining the USMC in 1989, Captain Davis has served in Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Iraq, and refugee operations in Cuba; Operation Dynamic Response in Kosovo; antiterrorist operations in the Horn of Africa and in Operation Iraqi Freedom; and on the Coalition Military Training Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command, Iraq, as an advisor team leader to the Iraqi Army in Habbaniyah.

*This paper is an edited transcript of Captain Davis' message.

Other operations going on, both in Iraq or across the globe, are also in the small-unit mode—whether a 12-man Special Forces A-team; a Seal platoon; an MTT; a training team; a military transition team in Iraq or Afghanistan providing advisory support to local forces; or general-purpose forces, platoons, and companies performing activities. Our panel is going to address some of the issues associated with small-unit operations.

If we consider the role of small units in our defense strategy—particularly, what is in the Quadrennial Defense Review—there’s a lot of emphasis on the need for small units to work with and through our friends and allies to build their capacity for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Also mentioned is the need for small units to conduct unconventional warfare in denied areas. This issue is not well understood or well analyzed. As the previous panel showed, much of our modeling and simulation is geared towards high levels of aggregation of force and how large units interact with one another.

Finally, there is the technological dimension. It is certainly true that the infantry is the least technologically intensive part of the U.S. military, or of any military. But even there, there has been considerable change over the last 15 or 16 years. Today’s infantryman has night-vision goggles, a GPS receiver so that he can reliably locate himself on the battlefield, access to an intra-squad radio so he can communicate with other members of his unit, body armor that will actually stop a 7.62 by 39-millimeter automatic rifle round, and a helmet that provides ballistic protection against a round rather than just against shrapnel. Technology is at work, even in the least technologically intensive part of the U.S. military.

JEFFREY DAVIS

I’m not going to talk about tactics here, and I’m not going to talk about what’s currently going on in Iraq. That’s not the issue. Changing tactics and adapting to an ever-changing enemy is something that happens in every war. Unrestricted warfare is no different.

What is important to understand is that small-unit leaders who are conducting operations are making daily decisions that have strategic implications. These young men and women find themselves acting as experts in disciplines they've never had the advantage of studying. And they have to do it in front of the media on a world stage. Each Marine, soldier, sailor, and airman can affect policy on a national and local level, thus making them either a strategic asset or a liability.

“What is important to understand is that small-unit leaders who are conducting operations are making daily decisions that have strategic implications.”

This situation was somewhat foreshadowed in the late '90s with the Marine Corps concept of the “three-block” war. In a three-block war, a single unit could find itself engaged in all out combat on one block, separating two warring factions on a second block, and conducting humanitarian assistance on a third block, all simultaneously or in rapid and unpredictable succession. The concept was to field agile, intelligent, and well-informed small units capable of the fighting vigor and soldierly discipline that has always been expected of them, but also politically and culturally savvy enough to keep centuries-long disputes from erupting and to earn the respect of the local populace.

With unrestricted warfare, those three blocks are multiplied by over 200 countries and an unknown number of nonstate actors. It's clear how much this problem impacts small units as they try to prepare to fully deploy. It's a battlefield that spans the globe, complicated by social, economic, military, and political issues. The same rifle company that fights in the Al Anbar province today may conduct disaster relief in Indonesia next month and antiterrorism operations within its own borders next year. In each one of these circumstances, the leaders and members of that unit must understand the legal, political, social, and military environment in which they operate and weigh every decision based on those factors. Simultaneously, that unit must contend as always with enemy tactics that continually adapt. Those tactics

will always adapt quicker than the scientific community can. Our technological advantages will never keep up with an enemy that can get better connectivity through a group of cell phones than we can get through a million dollars worth of satellite communications.

The units must also deal with enemy behavior that wholly defies western morals and law, creating both moral and psychological dilemmas for the individuals and their leaders. Once again, their actions transcend the local level of battle via the realities of international interests, 24-hour news broadcasting, and nongovernmental organizations. These elements, much like the weather, are unpredictable factors that company commanders must take into account as they conduct operations. Organizations such as special operating forces and other government agencies share the same battlespace as infantry units, sometimes in mutual support and, in other circumstances, with little knowledge of the other's presence.

“In addition to the traditional needs of warfare . . . we have to add pragmatic cultural education and . . . a clear understanding of purpose.”

The effects of the decisions made by the corporals through captains are, in many cases, witnessed by the strategic leaders and the international community faster than the higher level field commanders can respond to them. In other words, tactical-level actions are the path to strategic effects. Higher level commanders must therefore develop and clearly articulate operational designs and end states to the lowest level. In addition to the traditional needs of warfare with well-trained units that are equipped with the best that we can offer, we have to add pragmatic cultural education and, most importantly, a clear understanding of purpose.

My challenge to the analysts and to the strategic community is how do you explain these ideas to the 19-year-old corporal who is walking on the battlefield because he is the one, in effect, that represents national policy to the rest of the world.



4.2 DISCUSSION GROUP INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Thomas Mahnken

We live in an era in which small-unit operations are playing a prominent role. During Operation Enduring Freedom, 316 Special Operations Forces (SOF) operators and 110 Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary officers, working with local forces and backed by large amounts of precision air power, overthrew the Taliban and denied al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan. [1] Small units of SOF played an important role in Operation Iraqi Freedom as well. In southern Iraq, Navy SEALs seized Iraq's oil export infrastructure, preventing Saddam Hussein's regime from destroying it. In the north, Army Special Forces (SF), supported by Kurdish pesh merga militia, pinned down 40 percent of Iraqi divisions. [2] In the west, SOF seized Iraqi military facilities to deny Baghdad the ability to launch missiles against Israel and the coalition. [3] Across the globe, the basic unit of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations is the 12-man SF A-team or SEAL Platoon. Thirteen-man teams are training both the Afghan and Iraqi armies.

“First, there is a need for an extensive effort to collect, store, and analyze data from current military operations across the globe.”

The infantry is not the only practitioner of small-unit operations. Civil affairs and psychological operations forces, consequence management teams, and law enforcement forces all operate in small units as well. Indeed, there may be insights that general-purpose and special-operations forces can glean from these groups. However, blanket solutions are likely to be elusive, given the broad spectrum of local environments in which small units may operate.

The operational environment that small units face is complex. Success requires soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to master not only the physical terrain of their area of operations, but the “human terrain” and “information terrain” as well. Technology can serve as a useful tool for understanding the environment. It is not, however, a guarantee of success.

The discussion group yielded several suggestions for U.S. strategy. Group members recommended that the Defense Department establish small, deployable, interagency units for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, formed around a cadre with intimate knowledge of the location in which the team would be operating. Their main purpose would be to enable local forces to dismantle terrorist groups operating on their territory. To make this concept a reality, the Executive and Legislative branches must work together to significantly expand the capacity of the Department of State and Agency for International Development. Also needed are Defense Department personnel who understand how to tap the skills and capabilities of these and other federal agencies. Finally, a number of skills currently resident in Special Forces—particularly cultural awareness and language proficiency—must be exported to the general-purpose forces.

“ . . . tools that would enable small-unit members to gain an in-depth knowledge of their area over time would be particularly desirable.”

The discussion group also made several recommendations to improve analysis of small-unit operations. First, there is a need for an extensive effort to collect, store, and analyze data from current military operations across the globe. All too often, valuable data are not being collected or analyzed systematically. Second, better modeling and simulation of small-unit operations is needed. Too many of today’s models were designed to portray the interaction of large, conventional forces, not small and often irregular units. Third, and related, is the need for high-quality Red Teaming of irregular warfare.

Finally, the group offered several suggested actions relating to technology. Although group members agreed that technology is not the key to success in irregular warfare, they also believed that certain technologies could play an important role in increasing effectiveness. For example, tools that would enable small-unit members to gain an in-depth knowledge of their area over time would be particularly desirable. Technologies that permit the intelligent filtering of databases would also be useful in understanding the mass of data confronting troops conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. Biometric technologies would be similarly useful for separating insurgents from the population.

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Q: *Paul Shelton, APL – We’ve heard a lot today about Iraq from a lot of people who have never even been to Iraq. I was wondering if you could just give us a few minutes of your experiences and your views of the Iraqi soldiers of your battalion.*

≡ Capt. Jeffrey Davis – As far as Iraqi soldiers go, my opinion of them is, to use a term—probably not politically correct—that was used over there: they are good enough. Their solution to a problem is going to be very, very Iraqi. That’s not a bad thing; it’s just a different thing. At times, it tends to be more effective than American solutions to problems. In many of the units, they have formed cohesive single units—Shiite and Sunni, as well as Kurds—and have become very effective fighting teams.

Q: *John Shissler, APL – Captain Davis, could you talk a little bit about the challenges in preparing the Iraqi strategic corporal as opposed to the Marine strategic corporal. What are the similarities and what are the differences?*

≡ Capt. Jeffrey Davis – There is no strategic corporal in the Iraqi army. As a matter of fact, I think they would have trouble having a strategic major at some places. That raises another point about their army itself: it’s a different culture. They don’t value NCOs in the same way we do. I’m sure that there are plenty of gentlemen here with more experience working in a foreign internal defense mission who could tell you that’s a theme throughout the Third World. Outside of the Western communities, you very rarely see real trust, for lack of a better word, in the NCO corps.

There have been a lot of attempts, both by the Americans and by the Iraqis themselves, to build up pride in the NCO corps, including establishing training academies and pairing up

American and Iraqi NCOs. In the old Iraqi army, the more senior NCOs were treated more like people moving towards the Rhodes program. They were retired on active duty, and they had less and less responsibility as they got higher and higher in rank. With the officers, quite the opposite was true. The officers led in every aspect. The officers, the lieutenants, played the role of sergeants as well as platoon commanders.

Q: *John Shissler, APL – How do you rate the ability of the Iraqi enlisted to employ technology? My experience with other militaries has been that dumping a lot of American technology on a foreign military is not the best way to accomplish your mission.*

☰ Capt. Jeffrey Davis – While I was there, unless something has changed completely, there wasn't a lot of technology to go around to the Iraqi army to begin with. As a matter of fact, they had Motorolas as their operational radio system. Insofar as their ability to actually accept the technology, these are smart people. They are farmers. They are shop owners. Some of them are engineers. They are smart, smart people. Given very little, they will come up with some amazing solutions. So can they accept technology? I know they can. They are very capable with computer technology, and they are also very capable, as I said, in adapting technology to their needs. Their idea of a fair way of getting power is a piece of slash wire tied to a brick and thrown over a power line. That's not only ingenious, but pretty brave.

Q: *Larry Bulanda, APL – You talked about a 19-year-old infantry troop having to be a lawyer; having to be a diplomat, having to hand out candy to kids, and so forth, That's a heavy burden for an individual who is basically trained to fight a conventional force. Because unrestricted warfare is going to be a part of the warfare landscape for our lifetimes anyway, would it be smarter to establish a fighting force that is less of an infantry force and more of an occupying force, such as we need now in Iraq?*

☰ Capt. Jeffrey Davis – In the Marine Corps, and that's all I can talk about, I don't think that's a good idea because we're a forward deployed unit. Our deployment cycle has changed somewhat, but little compared to the Army's deployment cycle,

due to September 11th and subsequently OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom]. We've always been forward deployed. We've always had to respond to changing situations. We are consummate generalists, and that's probably our greatest strength. That idea might work with the Army, but I can't see it as a smart way to go with the Marine Corps.

To qualify what I said before – they don't have to be lawyers. There are lawyers in the units right now who can advise them on legal decisions. What they have to be is informed. If you walked into Iraq right now, grabbed 100 typical soldiers or Marines, and asked them why they were in Iraq, I think you would get 97 different answers. I don't think there is a clear understanding. I'm not focusing just on Iraq; we do a poor job in that area. Higher level commanders or commanders at the tactical level do a great job of presenting intent. When I was with Task Force Tower, I understood what my intent was. I knew what I was doing. When General Madis was on the ground, I think everybody in First Marine Division understood what their intent was.

The problem is not the higher level intent; it's the stuff that changes that policy. I would almost say that PFC England has probably affected the war in Iraq more than General Casey, not because he's not doing anything, but because she was the face of American policy. Every PFC that is out there has that ability. Unfortunately, it tends to be a liability more than an advantage.

The fact is that smaller units are going to continue to be out there. You couldn't make the unit that could specialize in every single problem that comes up. That's what I meant when I talked about the block war and multiplying it by 200 countries. They just have to be well trained, well disciplined. They have to understand the culture, they have to have some idea of the language. They have to have some language skills, whether through an interpreter or their own language skills. But most importantly, they must have a clear purpose for their presence. Otherwise, they are going to continue to make uninformed decisions.

Q: *Prof. Thomas Mahnken – I want to invoke Chair's privilege to draw out the rest of the panel on this issue. What one or two things can the U.S. military do to improve its effectiveness at the small-unit level?*

Mr. Brad Andrew – Obviously, the result of our effort has been the human informational overlaid on the physical dimensions of the battlespace. We came up with it, not because it was necessarily all encompassing, but because you could train young soldiers at the lowest levels to at least be cognizant of those aspects and to think about those three dimensions. We're trying to apply technology to that so that we can provide it to the soldiers at the lowest level.


Mr. Mark Fultz – I came here to brief this particular effort to model beliefs, perceptions, and influence. But speaking to the small unit, the majority of my efforts at the Pentagon are working on developing technologies very rapidly. One of my primary focuses is putting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-related technology into the field as fast as possible. That can be as early as 90 days or may take 18 months, but significantly faster than the defense acquisition cycle.

We believe we're providing the biggest impact for the small unit by putting something very simple in that person's hand, A soldier or a Marine today has to carry an enormous amount of kit and spend an enormous amount of time in memorization to learn all the various pieces of equipment. So, if you are not providing them an order-of-magnitude improvement over what they are currently carrying, they don't want it.

A lot of our effort is to get information to them, whether it's the relevance of a particular situation or full-motion video. We believe we can empower the small unit by putting their surroundings into context. If they are occupying a piece of terrain on a city block, let them know what is going on outside that city block, let them know something actionable.

Mr. Sean Fahey – This is a conflict where small units are the critical units engaged around the world. That poses a particular challenge to the nation in the sense that we are learning a lot of

lessons in a very distributed fashion. The people who are coming back with the most actionable information for how we should be training differently, learning differently, changing the tactics, are pretty much captains or below, distributed in a lot of points around the military. We need to design better systems to capture the information—everything about which neighborhoods are good and bad, what scrap metal is where, and which shop owners are the key points of contact—and use them for training. Then we need to find ways to quickly turn that around so that the nation can lend all of its support to small units. I think that's probably the biggest contribution that we can make.



CHAPTER 5

ROUNDTABLE

DISRUPTING ADVERSARY NETWORKS



5.1 GLOBAL SALAFI TERRORIST NETWORKS*

Marc Sageman

EDITOR'S SUMMARY

September 11, 2001 motivated the U.S. to develop a clearer understanding of terrorist networks to safeguard America and its infrastructure. This led to a concentrated research program at the University of Pennsylvania to collect biographical material on al Qaeda terrorists to test the validity of the conventional wisdom on terrorism. This evidence-based terrorism research focused on specific threats to the U.S. and pioneered the application of the scientific method to terrorism research. It also produced a wealth of information about personality and social characteristics of terrorists and their networks.

Specifically, the study started with 9/11 perpetrators as an index sample, and it examined their use of violence against non-Muslim governments or populations, known as the “far enemy,” to further Salafi or fundamentalist Muslim goals. The study focused on 400 biographies of terrorists using open-source information, such as trial transcripts from attacks in the U.S., France, Germany, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, and Canada. Articles and press accounts from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) were used

Marc Sageman is a Clinical Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. He was a flight surgeon in the U.S. Navy; served in the CIA, where he ran the U.S. unilateral programs with the Afghan Mujahedin; and since 1994, has practiced forensic and clinical psychiatry. His book, Understanding Terror Networks, recounts his research collecting biographical material on al Qaeda terrorists to test the validity of the conventional wisdom on terrorism.

*This paper was produced from Professor Sageman's slides and a transcript of his presentation.

in English, French, German, Arabic, Spanish, Turkish, and Dutch languages. In addition, academic publications and corroborated Internet information were used to develop the biographies and terrorist network characteristics. Further, a mapping database was developed to produce visual displays illustrating the connections between terrorist organizations on a global scale.

ORIGINS OF THE GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD

A review of the development of this global jihad serves to provide perspective toward understanding the social characteristics and group dynamics of Salafi terrorists. The word Salaf generally refers to the first three generations of Muslims. Today, Salafi terrorists can be categorized by two distinct belief structures. The first group are violent Islamists that subscribe to a “born-again” social movement to restore Islam. The second believe in the fight for justice and fairness and the concept of building a better world or utopia modeled on the community of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (Salaf) outlined in the Quran.

Further, the expansion of Salafi terrorists may be characterized by four progressively militant interpretations of the Muslim faith by Islamist revolutionary leaders. The initial Salafi jihadist philosophy is characterized by peaceful capture of the state to create an Islamic government, based on the perfect way of life and social organization outlined in the Quran. This was the philosophy spread by Hassan al Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The second more militant jihadist belief is focused against the “far enemy.” This belief is based on the revolutionary theories of Muhammad abd al Salaam Faraj, an Egyptian engineer who wrote *Al Farida al Ghaiba (The Forgotten Duty)*. His book proposes that faithful Muslims must join together and expel the West from the Middle East fighting against the governing power in the Middle East.

The third philosophy expanded this concept, and calls for a global defensive or military jihad. Dr. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a teacher and inspirational leader, who emerged in Afganistan after working with the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, proposed global violent jihad. His ability to organize, train, and maintain

the peace among hundreds of recruits from all over the world greatly contributed to the rise of al Qaeda.

The fourth revolutionary philosophy further expanded the target of military jihad toward the West or “far enemy” using violence against non-Muslim populations to establish an Islamist state. Here, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri shared ideology, and merged forces between Osama’s followers in Afghanistan and Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic jihad.

THE EVOLUTION OF AL QAEDA

Al Qaeda evolved by a self-selection of militants between 1988 and 1989, where jihadists who came to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan found they could not return home. Between 1991 and 1992, militants expelled from Pakistan went to Sudan, and the strategy began to switch from “near enemy” to “far enemy.” However, in 1996, an estimated 150 militants were expelled from Sudan and returned to Afghanistan to usher in the Golden Age of al Qaeda. This period, between 1996 and 2001, revealed al Qaeda’s control of the “Golden Chain,” a term used to refer to the exclusive funding for terrorism. In addition, they established shelter, training camps, and staff for planning and coordination of terrorist attacks while Afghanistan, a failed state, could do little to control the invasion of al Qaeda jihadists.

THE DIASPORA PHENOMENON

The expulsion of revolutionaries and the fight in Afghanistan explain the growth of an organized al Qaeda and their globalization of the jihad, but do not provide an explanation of why these individual Muslims are drawn into the battle. Although the link between terrorists and diaspora predates the rise of al Qaeda, the diaspora phenomenon, where second-generation and Muslim expatriates in a non-Muslim society bond via language, shared history, ritual, collective norms, and similar cultural artifacts, has had an unprecedented impact on the growth of Salafi terrorist networks. Specifically, 84 percent of the Salafi Mujahedin have joined the jihad while living in diaspora, with 87 percent of those in Western Europe.

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISTS STUDIED

This research analyzed several individual and social characteristics that might lead to Muslims living in diaspora to become jihadists. Specifically, poverty was thought to influence these individuals, so socio-economic status of the terrorist's families was studied. Although Osama bin Ladin comes from an elite and devout Muslim Arab family with abundant financial means, the majority of terrorists involved in 9/11 are from middle class or moderate-income families.

Further, religious devotion was a natural factor of interest; yet, the majority of terrorists studied are from secular or mildly religious backgrounds, devout, but not necessarily Salafi extremists. As many of the revolutionary leaders responsible for the growth of al Qaeda were teachers, education was considered a possible motivating factor, yet the majority, 87 percent, had a secular education, which broadens exposure to Western concepts and cultural differences. Naturally, the naiveté of youth or ignorance due to a lack of education may have contributed to the desire to join the global jihad, but the average age of individuals joining terrorist groups is 26, and 62 percent have a college education in professional or semi-professional engineering courses of study.

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISTS STUDIED

Very few of the terrorists studied have any type of diagnosed psychological problems. No pathological hatred was attributed to their desire to join the global jihad, and very few had a history of family trauma. More often than not, these were overprotected youth. Moreover, sexual frustration leading to aggression and a lack of responsibility were considered possible factors. However, 72 percent of the 9/11 attackers were married, and the vast majority have children.

With the exception of Maghreb Arabs involved in petty crime, very few were criminals before their involvement in the 9/11 attacks. The absence of criminal behavior supports the

finding that 84 percent joined terrorist organizations for a sense of community, in diaspora. Consequently, joining the jihad was a common bond for the group studied. Specifically, social bonds such as friendship appear critical, as 68 percent of terrorists had preexisting or childhood friendships in the organization, or were in a group of friends deciding collectively to join. However, kinship proves significant, in that 20 percent had fathers, brothers, first cousins, or in-laws in the organization, where joining further strengthened their familial or marital bond. Discipleship accounts for only 10 percent of the group studied, primarily those led by Sungkar and Baasyir from Jamaah Islamiyah.

MUSLIM EXPATRIATES

As diaspora is linked to joining Salafi terror organizations, careful study of the trajectory of Muslim expatriates is warranted. This study revealed that jihadists in the West follow two main paths. The first is represented by young economic immigrants to the West. The second by 2nd-generation Muslims in the West. Young economic immigrants to the West share common characteristics:

- Upwardly and geographically mobile or the “best and brightest”
- Mostly from religious, caring, middle-class families
- Global citizens, conversant in three or four languages
- Skilled in computer technology
- Separated from traditional bonds and culture
- Homesick, lonely, marginalized, and excluded from society
- Seek friends
- Drift to mosques for companionship, not religion
- Move in together to share Halal, or permissible food
- Formed cliques

Second-generation Muslims in the West, although upwardly mobile, experience more negative socialization issues. Some of this group is excluded from society after dropping out of school, which may or may not influence their involvement with drug addiction and petty crimes such as dealing in drugs or false documents. Others feel discriminated against and become resentful. This shared feeling of resentment and exclusion motivates some to seek companionship and religion to escape their circumstances. Drawn to the social bond, once involved in a small clique, a collective identity is activated, where personal experiences resonate with Salafi and radical ideology. Group dynamics and interpersonal relationships play an important role in the development of these cliques. Once established, they are a formidable threat and a challenge to counteract.

MOBILIZATION

Surprisingly, most small groups of jihadists are trusted friends who have spontaneously self-organized, with no top-down al Qaeda recruitment program or campaign. In fact, only 15 percent to 20 percent of those interested in joining are accepted into the group. Furthermore, there is no evidence of brainwashing. Each simply acquired the beliefs of their friends, validating the premise that social bonds are stronger than ideological commitment.

JIHADISTS MOTIVATION

The need for social bonds motivates alienated Muslims in the West to seek companionship, and the small-group dynamic instigates an insidious process whereby low-risk participation in terrorist activities with an increasingly closer set of friends solidifies the collective belief and commitment. New values replace the sense of alienation with a Salafi script, where faith and commitment are grounded in intense small-group dynamics and a collective belief in the ummah, or perfect Islamic state. Here a state of “in group love” takes form where self-sacrifice for comrades and the cause obliterates personal beliefs, and material need is superceded by religious and spiritual enlightenment. For members of these small groups, individual concern is less

important than communitarian sacrifice, and apathy is replaced with active engagement. For these group members, other worldly rewards are more important than worldly gains.

OUT-GROUP HATE

Grounded in the everyday experience of discrimination and exclusion from the highest levels of society endemic in the Middle East and Western Europe, the small group dynamic escalates with mutual complaints about unfairness and injustice in society. In general, the group endorses conspiracy theories and Takfir doctrine that sanctions the commission of crimes against Western society. These groups are susceptible to propaganda, and motivated to eradicate Western influence.

GROUP DYNAMICS

Once in the movement, it is difficult to abandon it without betraying close friends and family. This natural and intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists. The fanaticism justifies high-risk terrorist operations such as mass murder and suicide.

CONTINUED EVOLUTION

The success of post-9/11 counterterrorism campaigns is due to the elimination of the sanctuary, funding, communication, and key leaders of strong Salafi organizations and the neutralization of al Qaeda. The physical breakup of formal global Salafi jihad networks has been successful. However, the expansion of homegrown initiatives due to a lack of leadership and restraints has spawned groups in other parts of the country. The shift to local autonomy, self-financing, and self-training smaller organizations with informal communications proves difficult to monitor. Further, the fuzzy boundaries of these splinter groups with no formal initiation or fixed numbers is difficult to track and monitor. There is new, local, and more aggressively reckless leadership that is far more difficult to control.

PRESENT STATUS OF SALAFI TERRORIST NETWORKS

There are four types of networks existing in parallel:

- 1.** The long-standing al Qaeda organization. Counterterrorism tactics to deny sanctuary and monitor communication have effectively neutralized their long-term planning efforts.
- 2.** The organized affiliated groups that are now more autonomous such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi organization in Iraq; the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) in East Asia responsible for the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta and Australian Embassy in September 2004; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines and Malaysia; and the Algeria-based Group Salafist for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).
- 3.** Unaffiliated informal groups that can form an effective reaction to be triggered during social events, such as the Salafia jihadia out of Madrid, Spain; Dutch Islamists group; the Hofstad Network; and London groups.
- 4.** Singletons like Kamel Bourgass, one of a very small group in London, convicted of murder while escaping from charges for producing a biochemical weapon in the U.K.

The effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign has pressured the global Salafi jihad to evolve into unaffiliated informal groups and singletons. Further, it has forced migration of the jihad communication and socialization to the Internet into virtual communities.


TOWARD A GLOBAL “LEADERLESS” JIHAD

The evolution into decentralized, loosely connected networks mobilized and motivated autonomously leads to less large-scale

destructive acts like 9/11, but more frequent smaller events such as the train and subway bombings in Spain, London, and Europe. Specifically, the threat to the West comes from the West. The absence of a military role leaves no hard targets. Here the denial of sanctuary in potential failed or friendly states serves as an advantage against the jihadists. Moreover, the coordination of local counterterrorism activities and understanding the importance of the Internet as a virtual “invisible hand” organizing terrorist operations is imperative. The Internet had served to socially transform the jihad’s center of gravity, but the vision of a Salafi utopia unites the leaderless. Behavioral changes are evident in the Salafi terrorists as they undergo dramatic change, embracing a new community, and becoming more isolated from their old community. For example, Salafis wear short pants, grow a beard, and wear a mark on the forehead and their wives wear traditional Muslim veils. Their small groups solidify the bond through martial activity such as paintball, shooting practice, and camping. The virtual community is vast with jihadi chatrooms, jihadi websites, downloading weapons information and propaganda.

CONCLUSION

This research revealed common characteristics among Salafi terrorists and the social motivation behind their behavior. The war in Afghanistan and now in Iraq, along with the political response to 9/11, have impacted their sanctuaries and funding, as well as how they communicate the militant jihadist philosophy. It is recommended that the West counteract the leaderless Salafi terrorists by continuing to monitor Internet communications where informal recruitment and socialization occurs most often. It is imperative that the West counter anti-western propaganda that fuels an abundant supply of alienated Muslim expatriots and 2nd-generation Muslims in the West, and develops programs employing seasoned enforcement personnel with extensive experience and knowledge of Islam and Middle Eastern cultures and language.



This presentation examines the challenge of understanding and countering enemy networks by pointing out the theoretical and practical problems with the strategy of attempting to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks by attacking them directly. It suggests a possible alternative—creating parallel networks—and discusses the strategic implications of implementing them. Paradoxically, the best way to disrupt adversary networks may be to create competing networks to replace them. This briefing explains how this works and provides some examples.

OVERVIEW

Most of what we “know” about enemy networks is theory; our knowledge evolves through trial and error. The enemy also evolves. This briefing examines how we must continually examine what we think we know about enemy networks, how we traditionally posit theories on how to counter them, and how we test those theories. Ultimately, it suggests an alternative strategy: Paradoxically, the best way to disrupt adversary networks may

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*This paper was produced from Dr. Kilcullen’s slides and a transcript of his presentation.

be to create competing networks to replace them. To shape the argument for creating parallel networks, this presentation:

- Itemizes the theoretical and practical drawbacks with the conventional concept of “disrupting enemy networks.”
- Presents the logic for proposing an alternative to the standard approach of countering enemy networks by disrupting them: i.e., creating “parallel” networks.
- Discusses the strategic implications of these competing networks.

Karl Popper, one of the most highly regarded philosophers of science of the twentieth century, provided a fundamental guiding principle we need to follow as we develop and test theories on enemy networks:

“The fate of a theory, its acceptance or rejection, is decided by observation and experiment – by the result of tests. So long as a theory stands up to the severest tests we can design, it is accepted; if it does not, it is rejected.”

— Karl Popper, *Conjectures, and Refutations*, 1963

We need to design rigorous tests to question what we know about how enemy networks operate and our theories on how we can counter them. First, we must examine how the conventional theory of network disruption is developed.

DISRUPTING ENEMY NETWORKS: THE THEORY

The foundational assumption of this theory is that destroying terrorist networks will help defeat terrorists. The systematic approach to implementing this theory has three phases:

- Understand the network. Among the ways to gain knowledge about the enemy, we can:
 - Study the enemy network’s System Network Architecture (SNA)
 - Develop influence mapping
 - Conduct a complex adaptive systems analysis

- Identify key nodes, links, and processes and find targetable vulnerabilities
- Act to disrupt the network by
 - Destroying nodes
 - Cutting links
 - Forcing a system phase change

The following subsections list the theoretical and practical problems with this approach.

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

It is possible to identify patterns and trends and to gain insights but not to make conclusions about terrorist networks. Theoretical problems with the standard approach to disrupting enemy networks include the following:

- **Tyranny of the known**. Before attempting to destroy an enemy network, we are forced to rely on what is known with certainty. Because of the nature of amorphous, disembodied terrorist networks, trying to “know” anything about them has the following logical drawbacks:
 - **The prominence/significance fallacy**. Acting to destroy or disrupt a network is impeded by the need to avoid the logical error that what seems to be prominent (i.e., is observable) is significant; assigning significance to something without knowing all the details is a fallacy of reasoning that will not yield very good results.
 - **The surveillance/reconnaissance trap**. Identifying key vulnerabilities depends on reliable observation, mandating the need for huge investments in surveillance and reconnaissance.
 - **Intolerance of structural uncertainty**. Without a clear picture of the enemy SNA, destroying a node or cutting a link cannot be known to have any effect.

- **Reification of networks.** To reify a network is a logical fallacy because it converts an abstract concept into a concrete thing.
 - Networks are patterns of interaction, not physical entities (i.e., they are “dissipative structures” nested in the environment).
 - They form a complex, adaptive system.
 - We are part of the system, not separate from it.
- **Sample size and diversity.**
 - Because only a small sample size is achievable with a terrorist network, the sample can rarely yield statistically significant results.
 - Each datum is a complex event needing interpretation.
 - Terrorist networks hide and apply deception.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

Practical problems with the conventional approach include the following:

- Complexity
 - We tend to identify parts of terrorist networks after major incidents; the rest remains opaque.
 - Acting against part of the network temporarily blinds us.
 - Thus, it is almost impossible to gather enough information to do sophisticated “effects-based” targeting against networks.
- Uncertainty
 - We can never do “bomb damage assessment” against a network: Most of the time, we have to guess what effect we are having.
 - Cause and effect are difficult to identify: Why is the network acting this way, and did our actions cause it?

- Flux
 - Our knowledge is a “snapshot” of a rapidly changing situation.
 - Different datum points are out of date by different (but unknowable) amounts.
 - Consequently, we act blindly, and often too slowly.
- Collateral Damage
 - The enemy network is a needle in a haystack.
 - Moreover, we live in the haystack.

These factors add up to make it difficult in practice to disrupt terrorist networks, as Anit Mukherjee’s experience clearly expresses:

“During the first year of my counterinsurgency duties, I believe I created more insurgents than I ... eliminated. This was not only because of inexperience, but also because I lacked fundamental knowledge of the terrain, the people, and the culture. I also did not know how to sift through local intelligence effectively. A combination of my own naïveté and enthusiasm, not to mention pressure from senior commanders to deliver results, resulted in actions that alienated the locals and, inadvertently, helped the insurgency.”

— Anit Mukherjee, “Lessons from Another Insurgency,” *NY Times*, March 8, 2006

PARALLEL NETWORKS: THE THEORY

All humans belong to needs-based, affect-laden, dyadic, sociocultural networks. The enemy network is not separate from its parent society. It is a pattern of relationships within the society. So just destroying enemy networks does no good: They must be replaced with “friendly” networks, or the population just gravitates back to its previous pattern of behavior (i.e., the hostile network). We can call this approach of creating friendly networks “constructive” versus “destructive.”

It turns out that building friendly networks forces the enemy to attack them: The network threatens the enemy's base. This exposes the enemy network, allowing it to be targeted. It shifts the parent society into new patterns and minimizes collateral damage. This approach turns the insurgent concept of "parallel hierarchies" and "liberated zones" on its head—and runs it against the enemy.

PARALLEL NETWORKS: THE STRATEGY

We base the strategy of creating a network that will draw the enemy out, consequently exposing the enemy's network, on a principle Von Moltke expressed at the turn of the twentieth century.

"A clever military leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature from the strategic point of view that the enemy is forced to attack us in them."

— Helmuth von Moltke

The notion of building competing networks as an offensive strategy that will enable us to optimize our tactical defense also has its roots in one of the principles of naval warfare Sir Julian Corbett, the naval historian and strategist, put forth in the early 20th century.

"The strongest form of war is the strategic offensive, combined with the tactical defensive."

— Sir Julian Corbett

PARALLEL NETWORKS: PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATIONS

Some recent examples of successful constructive strategies with networks include the following:

- *Firqat salahuddin* in Oman – the "five lines" campaign
- Hizbullah in Lebanon – terrorist charities
- The Pakistani Education System – filling the network vacuum


- Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam – the residential approach to counterinsurgency
- JI Versus Mass Organizations in Indonesia – non-membership as a predictor for terrorist behavior
- Sections *Administratives Speciaux* in Algeria – peaceful penetration

CONCLUSION

The power of the constructive strategy of building parallel, competitive networks within regions and cultures in which terrorist networks are latent can be seen in David Galula's account of counterinsurgency efforts in the district of Greater Kabylia, Algeria in the 1950s. In his book, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*, published in 1963, Galula presents theories on counterinsurgency and pacification that provide the model for an alternative to traditional counterterrorist tactics. His description of how this approach was successful in Algeria provides useful insights into the challenge we face today.

“We have seen with our own eyes what you have done for us here. You never molested us. None of your soldiers ever cast an eye on our women. Far from stealing from us, they shared their food with the poor. Our sick are taken care of, our children are educated, schools and roads are being built. Recently you had the people elect freely their own leaders and we are now planning with you how to improve our life ... I want to tell you that we will help you finish with the criminals who misled us. Just give us the weapons.”

— Mayor of Tala Mokhor, quoted in David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*, Copyright 1963, 2006 RAND Corporation, ISBN 0-8330-3920-2, available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478/>



This paper argues that concepts drawn from sociobiology can be employed to increase our understanding of the insurgency in Iraq. Specifically, such notions as traits, adaptation, selection/environmental pressure, fitness, reproduction, competition, cooperation, and survival are useful in examining insurgent network behavior and exploring the potential effectiveness of various counterinsurgent strategies. Four broad types of insurgent or adversary networks are identified in Iraq. The insurgent networks are seen as more or less well adapted to the Iraqi environment, i.e., they display various levels of “fitness” with respect to that environment. Strengths and weaknesses of the networks are discussed, and it is proposed that those strategies that seek to change the Iraqi environment beyond the capacity of the insurgents to adapt are more likely to be successful.

INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE

The insurgency in Iraq can be seen as a “network of networks,” consisting of multiple interconnected insurgent organizations with multiple origins, varied natures, and diverse goals. Countering this amorphous challenge has proven a difficult and enduring task for Coalition and Iraqi forces from the beginning of the insurgency in the spring of 2003 to the present. No blend of Coalition counterinsurgent strategies, operations, and tactics has

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succeeded in substantially diminishing the insurgency. At least by some measures it has grown and become more capable. [1] Iraqi insurgent networks (organizations) have survived and even prospered in a complex environment; while Coalition forces have gained much experience with the insurgency and have developed more promising means for dealing with it, there is no certainty that these measures will be successful.

“ . . . only by changing the environment, or “landscape,” on which the insurgents operate beyond their capability to adapt to the change can the insurgency be controlled.”

What makes the networks in Iraq such a difficult target? At the core of the difficulty in dealing with the insurgency lies the fundamental nature of the insurgent networks themselves – social organizations, or organisms, more or less well adapted to the social environment or “landscape” of Iraq, especially Sunni Arab Iraq. The “adaptive” nature of these networks has made them resilient, capable of accommodating substantial military and political changes in the environment, and able to survive. This paper also suggests, tentatively and at a high level, what will work and not work in combating the insurgents. It makes the argument that only by changing the environment, or “landscape,” on which the insurgents operate beyond their capability to adapt to the change can the insurgency be controlled.

This strategy goes beyond “oil spot,” and “clear, hold, build,” although these approaches do aim at changing aspects of the insurgents’ operational environment. It is closer to winning “hearts and minds.” But the adaptive capacity of the insurgents may surpass the ability of even this approach to change the environment.

SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE INSURGENTS

“Combat Darwinism;” “adaptive insurgents;” and “learning opponents” are several terms that have surfaced in the discussion of the insurgency, [2] indicating that scholars, analysts, and military operators working on the Iraqi insurgency are employing

sociobiological concepts, consciously or subconsciously. Insurgent organizations are social networks and, in turn, social networks are a kind of organism. This paper argues that sociobiology can be applied at the analogical and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the explanatory levels to assist in the understanding of the Iraqi insurgency and its networks. (Individual insurgent networks are defined here as a single organism at the level at which sociobiological concepts apply. It is possible that the individual insurgent cell is a more appropriate focus, but information to explore this idea is inadequate.) Our understanding of insurgent networks should be enhanced by employing sociobiological concepts.

Sociobiology is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all behavior. [3] According to the founder of the field, Edward O. Wilson, “Behavior and social structure, like all other biological phenomena, can be studied as ‘organs,’ extensions of the genes that exist because of their superior adaptive value.” [3, p. 22] That is, the behaviors and structures of the insurgents should represent adaptations to the environment based on the “traits” of these “organisms.” In this sense, insurgent organizations have “genetic material” that shapes their ability to adapt to changes in the environment and to survive in their environment. The combination of these traits indicates, but does not alone predict, whether an insurgent organization will survive in the Iraqi setting.

Sociobiology has been controversial since its inception as a field, but it seems well enough established now to be used as one tool in illuminating complex problems involving human behavior, including the behavior of Iraqi insurgents. [4] Sociobiology provides many useful analogies for the insurgency. Analogies “allow for the exploration of descriptive, dynamic, and explanatory similarities across disciplinary boundaries.” [5] Further, “The analogical approach is warranted by the argument of structural similarities between biological and sociocultural processes.” [5, p. 298]

While sociobiology is a very rich field, ranging as far as the discussion of literature [6], there are some concepts that seem especially useful with regard to the insurgency:

- *Traits* are the inherited characteristics of an organism, the genetic package it has as it goes about its business.
- An *adaptation* is “any structure, physiological process or behavioral pattern that makes an organism more fit to survive and to reproduce in comparison with other members of the same species. Also the evolutionary process leading to the formation of such a trait.” [3, p. 578]
- *Selection pressure/environmental pressure* is “The set of all the environmental influences, both physical conditions . . . and the living part of the environment, including prey, predators, and competitors, which constitute the agents of natural selection and set the direction in which a species evolves.” [3, p. 32]
- *Fitness* is how well an organism is adapted to survive in its environment.
- *Reproduction* in this context is replacement or recruitment of individuals and cells/other groups. (Wilson described a form of competition for members among religious sects: “Those that gain adherents survive; those that cannot, fail.” [3, p. 561])
- *Competition* is “the active demand by two or more organisms (or two or more species) for a common resource.” [3, p. 561]
- *Cooperation* is mutually supportive behavior among individuals or groups.
- *Survival* is the continuation of the group as an active participant in the insurgency, i.e., its ability to “reproduce” itself in the face of environmental pressure.

These concepts will be used to illuminate the behavior and the prospects of Iraqi insurgent networks.

IRAQI NETWORKS

While “terrorist” networks in Iraq have captured the attention of the media, and, for some time, of U.S. officials, not all the adversary networks, or even the principal ones, in Iraq are “terrorist” networks. There are at least four “sets” of Iraqi networks that are of significant interest as adversaries.

The first of these sets is a diverse group of Sunni Arab-based networks. These are built on a number of social factors, including kinship (tribal, clan, family), association (especially former regime/Ba’ath party), religion (especially Salafist/Wahabist elements), criminal enterprises, “nationalists,” local or neighborhood association, and functional requirements (bomb making, financial operations). Kinship is most likely the critical social factor underlying Iraqi insurgent networks. According to Edward O. Wilson, “Kinship systems provide at least three distinct advantages. First, they bind alliances between tribes and sub-tribal units . . . Second, they are an important part of the bartering system by which certain males achieve dominance and leadership. Finally, they serve as a homeostatic device for seeing groups through hard times.” [3, p. 554] All of these are important to the resiliency of the insurgency.

The broad social factors on which Sunni insurgent groups are based are not exclusive, and any given Sunni Arab Iraqi insurgent network or organization can represent more than one of them. These networks comprise the bulk of the organizations that make up the “network of networks” in Iraq. Examples of these organizations include The Islamic Army in Iraq, The Army of Muhammad, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and the Mujahadeen Army. These are all Iraqi Sunni Arab organizations, and, while their specific traits may differ, they have played a significant role in the insurgency.

The second set of Iraqi insurgent networks consists of terrorist and foreign fighter groups, the most prominent of which are al Qaeda in Iraq, the organization associated with Abu Musa al-Zarqawi, and Ansar al-Sunna. al Qaeda in Iraq started as a foreign-based organization but has become much more, if not

predominately, Iraqi in terms of its recruitment. Its titular head is now reportedly an Iraqi, Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, as Zarqawi has reportedly stepped aside. [7] Ansar al-Sunna is an indigenous Iraqi group with a membership consisting of Iraqi Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and foreign jihadists, which has emerged as one of the deadliest and most militant of the insurgent groups. [8] It operates widely across the “Sunni triangle.” There are other “terrorist”-type networks active in Iraq, including the Victorious Army Group, which is emerging as an active terrorist element.

Although the insurgency is largely Sunni Arab in its composition, there are Shia networks that also operate in Iraq and are currently, or have the potential to be, adversaries to the Coalition and the Iraqi government. These can be divided into two categories: those that operate in the open and visibly and those that operate partially or completely underground. The first category includes the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Dawa, and the organization overseen by Muqtada al-Sadr. These organizations constitute broad political and religious networks that extend across Shia areas of Iraq and can be used to mobilize support.

The covert Shia networks include the Mahdi Army associated with Muqtada al-Sadr and the Badr Brigades of SCIRI. The Mahdi Army is a readily mobilized militia that willingly responds to al-Sadr’s direction, while the Badr Brigades operate underground in response to direction from SCIRI leadership. Two additional groups, which are probably Shia in membership but may also contain former regime elements (FREs), have also conducted insurgent-type actions (bombings, assassinations, ambushes) in Southern Iraq—the Imam al-Hussein Brigades, and the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades.

Finally, three “metanetworks” have emerged in Iraq that represent a middle layer of command and control, or at least coordination, for like-minded insurgent organizations. These are the “Mujahadeen Shura Council” associated with al Qaeda in Iraq, the “Coordination Department of the Jihad Brigades,” and the “Mujahadeen Central Command.” The Mujahadeen Shura Council reportedly consists of eight organizations, including

al Qaeda in Iraq, the Victorious Army Group, the Army of al-Sunna Wal Jama'a, Ansar al-Tawhid Brigades, Islamic Jihad Brigades, Jama'a al-Murabiteen, the Strangers Brigades, and the Horrors Brigades. [9] The Mujahadeen Shura Council was established in January 2006 as an umbrella organization and coordinating body for insurgent elements following the al Qaeda in Iraq path. [10] The "Coordination Department" reportedly represents the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Mujahadeen Army, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and the Islamic Iraqi Resistance Front (Ja'ami). [11] The Mujahadeen Central Command appears to be associated with FREs. There have also been temporary insurgent cooperative networks. During the period Falluja was under insurgent control (March–November 2004), a Mujahadeen Shura Council operated there, coordinating insurgent political and military activities, and there was reportedly a "united" resistance command active Mosul in December 2004. [12]

While there appears to be a type of formal coordination developing, as suggested by the metanetworks, there is also informal or ad hoc coordination across groups. Insurgent groups occasionally announce that they have conducted joint operations. [13] Further, the Islamic Army in Iraq has been reported in joint actions with at least six other insurgent groups. [14] The emergence of metanetworks and ad hoc joint operations embodies the concept of a "network of networks" functioning in Iraq. These developments can also be seen as adaptive measures responding to the changing military and political environment. In the face of increasing hostility from Sunnis to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's organization, especially in Anbar province, a Mujahadeen Shura Council uniting first six and then eight insurgent groups was announced, [9, 15] and Zarqawi "transferred" leadership to an Iraqi. [16]

CHARACTERIZATION (TRAITS) OF IRAQI NETWORKS

The way Iraqi networks behave will be based, at least in part, on their traits. Nature, structure, scope, membership, resources, skills, and function or purpose of the network will all define how it will behave. Different "packages" of traits should lead to different

behaviors—and, indeed, can be observed. Clearly, there is a distinction between the behavior of groups like al Qaeda in Iraq and Ansar al-Sunna, which represent the extreme violent wing of the insurgency, specialize in terrorist type attacks on civilians, and espouse extreme Islamic views, and more centrist or nationalist insurgent elements like the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Islamic Army in Iraq, which have more moderate religious views and focus on “resistance” to occupation. The differences in traits among Iraqi insurgent groups are the basis for the developing split in the insurgency.

Precise characterization of insurgent networks in Iraq has proven to be a major challenge. [17] As indicated, Iraqi networks can be broadly classified, but determining their exact characteristics has proven elusive. Nevertheless, they have a number of identifiable characteristics or traits, and these traits can provide useful information about these organizations and their ability to operate, adapt, and survive in the Iraqi environment.

Insurgent structures and behaviors are rooted in “inherited” traits (e.g., those the Zarqawi organization “inherited” from al Qaeda and those of FRE-based insurgent groups “inherited” from the Ba’ath). These traits are passed on to new individual and group members.

While insurgent networks possess many traits, among the ones important to their success are:

- Structure – centralized, decentralized, flat
- Nature/identity – kinship, ideological/religious, personal (based on an individual), party/faction, foreign/indigenous, composite (a blend of several identities)
- Purpose/function – operational, support, integrated
- Scope – narrow or broad relative to functions, geographic range, and/or goals

- Knowledge, skills, and abilities – held by group leaders and members
- Membership and recruitment base – kinship, other forms of association, local, foreign, indigenous
- Resources – arms, money, connectivity (to important social structures), status (within the social system)
- Adaptability – ability to learn, ability to change behavior based on learning, preadaptation.

Of these traits, kinship and adaptability seems to be especially important in the Iraqi context.

According to Wilson, “most kinds of social behavior, including perhaps all of the most complex forms, are based in one way or another on kinship.” [3, p. 73] Much of life in Iraq is based on kinship systems. Therefore, it seems natural that the insurgents would operate within these systems. Kinship provides important selection advantages to insurgents who can take advantage of it. In the words of John Alcock:

Selection has evidently favored people with the motivational mechanisms, emotional systems, and intellectual capacities that enable us to learn kinship categories, establish kin-based links with others, educate others about genealogical relationships, and feel a sense of solidarity and cooperativeness with those identified as relatives, especially with our close relatives. [4, p. 201]

The ability of insurgent networks to adapt will vary, but probably all insurgent groups have some capability. Questions to consider for any insurgent network are: how well does the network “learn” about changes in its environment, and what is its capacity for adaptation if the environment changes? Nevertheless, while behavioral flexibility is adaptive [4, p. 57], not every aspect of insurgent behavior is adaptive—adaptation does not/cannot explain all insurgent behavior.

According to Alcock, "Learning abilities evolve in response to selection pressures acting on individual differences in the ability to solve real world problems." [4, p. 163] He further states, "We will change our behavior in particular (adaptive) ways in response to specific (biologically relevant) experiences." [4, p. 167] The acknowledgment that the insurgents are "learning opponents" is a recognition that this principle is at work. What could be a more "biologically relevant" experience than the survival pressures the insurgents face in Iraq. Reporting on insurgent responses to their environment indicates that they clearly learn from their experience and change their behavior based on new knowledge. While undetermined, we can assume that insurgents' learning capacity improves, both as a whole and as individual cells. The rapidity with which insurgent "lessons learned" are distilled and disseminated indicates that evolved learning mechanisms have developed. Imprisoned insurgents are able to pass knowledge to others while detained. [18] The insurgents also demonstrate a certain plasticity of behavior; they can change behaviors, even at the strategic level, to adapt to changes in the Iraqi environment.

Insurgents in a sense are "programmed" to adapt and try different responses to the environment. Which ones survive depends on the value of their responses. Insurgents who learn better and change their behavior accordingly will live longer and pass on their traits. Zarqawi's adaptations, including franchising, affiliation with other groups, and recruitment of Iraqis, provide a kind of "case study" of learning and adaptation in the insurgency. The same is true of some insurgent groups operating in the Ramadi area, which have responded to the changing political environment by distancing themselves from al Qaeda in Iraq and Zarqawi. [19]

Finally, with reference to adaptability, there is the concept of preadaptation. According to Wilson, a preadaptation is "a previously existing structure, physiological process, or behavior pattern, which is already functional in another context and available as a stepping stone to the attainment of a new adaptation." [3, p. 34] The existence of preadaptive structures suitable for the insurgency in Iraq is clear. These include the Ba'ath Party, former

regime intelligence and security services, the tribal system, religious structures, and a nascent foreign fighters network. These structures greatly facilitated both the rise of the insurgency and its ability to adapt to changes in the environment.

THE IRAQI ENVIRONMENT AND NETWORK FITNESS

What are the fundamental aspects of the Iraqi environment that the insurgency must adapt to? The environment of the insurgents is in some ways like our “ancestral environment.” [20] Traits that were adaptive for that environment should be adaptive for the insurgent environment. This is a highly dynamic environment with continual and rapid evolution in its political and military components and slower but also continuous evolution in the economic and social areas. It is a dangerous environment for the insurgents. “Predation” in the form of Coalition operations is continuous. The range and scope of Coalition actions are so varied as to demand continuing response from the insurgents if they are to survive. It is a highly competitive environment. Resources, including adherents, are sought by all insurgent groups. Finally, the insurgents must cooperate to some degree to survive. Cooperation provides them a measure of relief from the environmental pressures of the situation.

Simply put, “fitness” means how well suited or adapted a given network is to survive in the Iraqi environment. Fitness depends on the traits of the networks. Insurgent groups consciously or unconsciously operate to pass on their “genes.” Organizations with nonadaptive traits, or those that are less “fit,” are likely to fail if the environment changes radically enough.

In principle, it should be possible to array Iraqi networks across a spectrum or “landscape” of “fitness.” The traits of Iraqi networks can be used to build up pictures of both “more fit” and “less fit” Iraqi networks (Table 1).

Table 1 Specific Traits for More and Less Fit Iraqi Networks

Trait	"More Fit"	"Less Fit"
Type	Decentralized. Elements of the network operate with broad local autonomy.	Hierarchical, command and control, and other functions are exercised from the top to the bottom, with subordinate elements having little autonomy.
Nature/Identity	Strong kinship connection within tribal/clan/family system, moderate religious views, moderate goals. This network exploits kinship as buffer and as a source of resources, status. It does not antagonize its kinship group or active and passive supporters with extreme views/goals/actions.	Foreign based or of foreign origin, little connection to Iraqi kinship structures or social structures. Network exhibits extreme religious views and as messianic goals.
Membership	Network draws its members from important kinship groups in Iraq. The network is predominantly local or native to its operational area. The network is predominantly Iraqi. It is not predominantly made up of foreigners. Members enjoy other associations such as party membership, military experience, etc. These are reinforcing traits. The more of these that apply, the more positive the membership trait will be for the network.	Significant numbers of foreigners, foreigners dominate leadership positions. Iraqi members are not drawn from important kinship groups or social structures in Iraq. Previous association among members is limited.

Table 1 Specific Traits for More and Less Fit Iraqi Networks (Continued)

Trait	“More Fit”	“Less Fit”
Function	The network performs integrated functions. It is not dependent on other networks for key processes. It is capable of acting on its own to a substantial degree. These traits make it less vulnerable and more adaptable.	Network performs only a single function or a few functions. It is vulnerable to changes in the environment as overspecialized.
Scope	The network carries out a range of actions allowing it to shift effort in response to changes in the environment. The network extends over a broad geographic range, giving it access to additional resources and reducing its vulnerability to local changes in the environment. The network’s goals are broad enough that it can both exploit changes in the environment and avoid becoming irrelevant because of changes in the environment.	Network has only a narrow geographic range, as in a network based in a single neighborhood or locality. Network has narrow goals or objectives. Network has a limited repertoire of actions it can conduct. Local or neighborhood insurgent groups, such as the “Thunder” cell reportedly active in one Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad, would perhaps be an example of a narrow scope group. [21]
Knowledge/ Skills/ Ability	The network possesses key knowledge: social, operational, and technical. It has a broad skill base. It is imbued with quality leadership. It has appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).	The network has inadequate or partial knowledge of its operating environment. It has only a few skills and must depend on outsiders for missing skills. It has leadership deficiencies. Its TTP are inadequate/inappropriate for its environment.

Table 1 Specific Traits for More and Less Fit Iraqi Networks (Continued)

Trait	"More Fit"	"Less Fit"
Resources	The network has the wherewithal to act and survive in the environment. It has the right types of weapons in adequate amounts. It has enough money or other forms of wealth to carry out sustaining and operational functions. It is well enough connected to the social system to operate effectively within it/benefit from it. It is held in some regard for its operational prowess, resources, zeal, or some other factor or combination of factors.	The network has limited or too few resources or is dependent on external actors for support.
Adaptability	The network adjusts to changes in its environment. It learns well; it sees and understands what is going on in the environment. The network demonstrates plasticity of behavior. The network benefits from structures (Ba'ath party organization down to neighborhood level) or behaviors (conspiratorial) that it "inherited" from previously existing structures or behaviors.	The network does not adjust appropriately to changes in its environment. It does not learn well about changes in the environment. Network behaviors are rigid. The network is unable to take advantage of preadaptive structures and behaviors.

Critically, fitness is not static. Networks can rise or fall in terms of fitness depending on changes in the environment and their ability to adapt to those changes. No network in Iraq is guaranteed survival, although some are more likely to endure than others. Even highly fit networks could see the environment change too radically for their "traits" to accommodate. A network's fitness is a function of its adaptability and the environment. Hence, even a nonadaptive network can survive in a situation of low environmental pressure.

VULNERABILITY OF IRAQI NETWORKS

In Iraq, the networks fight back. They are not just hiding to prepare for some future action. Rather, they are actively countering Coalition and Iraqi government efforts, seeking strategic, operational, and tactical goals, and engaging in a wide variety of activities across a broad social and geographic space. These networks have both specific strengths and weaknesses that shape their vulnerability to disruption.

Strengths of the insurgent networks include inherent, or basic, and specific adaptations that have occurred over the course of the insurgency. A range of protective measures represents one of the inherent strengths, including:

- Protective coloration
- Redundancy
- Impenetrability
- Capability for penetration of adversaries
- Cell structures

Protective coloration is the ability of insurgents and their networks to blend into the environment. It has proven difficult for Coalition forces to separate the insurgents and their networks from the backdrop of activity in Iraq. U.S. soldiers frequently comment on the difficulty of distinguishing insurgents from noninsurgents. [22] The same applies to insurgent networks that can rely on traditional forms of economic and social activity to cover operations.

Redundancy is the capacity of insurgent networks to rapidly replace individuals or functions that are eliminated or disrupted by coalition action. Insurgent cells make up losses quickly by recruiting new members, largely by means of personal relationships. [23] Surviving members of insurgent cells that are more damaged or disrupted can be recruited into existing cells or establish new cells.

The relative *impenetrability* of insurgent networks makes it difficult to gain intelligence on them for purposes of either destruction or obtaining greater understanding of them. This impenetrability is based primarily on the bonds of kinship, religion, and purpose that tie members together. The Coalition and Iraqi government officials have always hoped that as Iraqis became more involved in counterinsurgency operations, penetration of insurgent networks would increase. However, this does not seem to have happened on any significant scale.

Insurgent networks have had at least some success in *penetrating* the Iraqi Security Forces. [24] They thereby gain additional potential for protecting themselves by acquiring warning concerning upcoming ISF and coalition operations, as well as other valuable intelligence.

The use of *cells* as a basic form of organization prevents insurgent networks from being rolled up broadly. [25] Cells are fairly frequently disrupted and members captured, but these operations do not lead to broad success against the overall network. [26]

A second inherent strength is the diversity of insurgent networks, which makes them overall more resistant to counterinsurgency strategies and increases their capacity for innovation and adaptation. This diversity has been a basic feature of the insurgency from its inception. [23] It has produced shifting Coalition views of the adversary in Iraq and shifts in counterinsurgent strategy. It led to the search for “high-value targets” (key individuals), the extended campaign against the Zarqawi organization, the effort to disrupt foreign jihadist activity in the upper Euphrates Valley, various “campaigns” against bombmakers and financial networks, and large-scale operations to eliminate insurgent-dominated localities like Fallujah and Tal Afar. These approaches have brought only partial successes. Given limited Coalition resources, concentrating on one facet of the insurgency probably permits other aspects to recuperate and gain strength. Many of the Coalition approaches have not taken into account the capacity of the insurgency as a whole to adapt to pressure on any one part of it, nor the insurgency’s ability to rebound in the face of even fairly

successful operations. Success is never complete—vestiges of the adversary always remain.

A third inherent strength of the insurgent networks resides in specific behaviors. Iraqi networks appear to behave cohesively, maintain connections to Sunni Arab society, and cooperate internally and externally to advance their interests. Iraqi insurgent networks do not fracture easily, even under the considerable pressure of counterinsurgency operations. The advancing political process seems to have generated more demands on the insurgency and to have created rifts between some insurgent elements, especially the terrorist elements, and some Iraqi insurgent groups and tribal Sunni populations. Apparently, however, these rifts have not caused serious divisions within specific insurgent groups. Iraqi networks are highly connected both internally in terms of their members and to the social structure in Iraq. Individual insurgents can be connected to one another and their leaders in multiple ways, including kinship, religion, former association, and history, among other factors. This layering of affinity creates densely internally connected networks and supports their cohesiveness. Through their membership, these networks are also connected to major social structures in Iraq—the tribal system and the Sunni religious structure—giving them opportunities to acquire both resources and support. Within groups and across groups, cooperation increases the “fitness” of the group as “it acts as a buffer to absorb stress from the environment.” [3, p. 59] Insurgent networks cooperate significantly on both the military and political fronts, combining for joint operations and disseminating political and operational directions under joint authorship. [27]

In addition to their inherent strengths, Iraqi networks have made specific adaptations to reduce their vulnerability. How are insurgent elements able to adapt to the changing environment in Iraq? According to Wilson: “If an environmental change renders old features of a social organization inferior to new ones, the population can evolve relatively quickly to the new mode provided the appropriate [sets of traits] can be assembled from within the existing gene pool.” [3, p. 33] This ability could also

be used “offensively,” in the sense that the insurgents could adapt to exploit favorable changes in the environment.

The set of traits possessed by the diverse Iraqi insurgent networks seems adequate to allow for rapid adaptation, a trend that has been witnessed in Iraq. At the strategic level, the most critical adaptation has been the development of a response to the political process. At least some insurgent elements decided to support Sunni Arab participation in this process, even to the extent of providing security for polling places during the October 2005 constitutional referendum and the December 2005 parliamentary elections. This move was a strategic adaptation promoted by Sunni concerns over being left out of the political process. At the operational level, Sunni insurgents have over time increased their relative level of effort against the ISF and other “collaborators” as these were recognized as more of a threat. [1, p. 20] At the tactical level, there is a long history of adaptations, especially in the design and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). [28]

The inherent strengths of the insurgent networks and their adaptations have made them a difficult target; but they are not invulnerable. Weaknesses of the insurgent networks include:

- *Competition* – for resources, including loyalty or acceptance of the population (according to Wilson, “. . . competing species tend to displace one another into portions of the habitat in which each is the best competitor; and these competitive strongholds are not necessarily the preferred portion of the niche.” [3, p. 25])
- *Connectivity* – one person leads to another and even with the use of cell structures, links between individuals can be built up into diagrams of insurgent networks. [29]
- *The requirement to “surface” to act* – especially for action elements, their very activity makes them potentially visible and vulnerable.
- *Inadaptability* – not all insurgent networks have the same capacity for adaptation, and those with less capacity are inherently more vulnerable.

- *Contradictions* – or serious differences between and among groups, and between insurgents and the population base. {An example is the contradiction that developed between Sunni tribal leaders in Ramadi and the al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) organization there, which led to attacks on tribal leaders and police recruits by AQI and retaliation against AQI by tribal elements. [30]}
- *Self-interest* – insurgent groups act in their own self interest, although they are capable of “altruistic” behavior.

These vulnerabilities are potentially exploitable, and account for at least some of the success Coalition forces have had in countering insurgent networks in Iraq.

DISRUPTION/NEUTRALIZATION OF IRAQI NETWORKS

Given the challenge provided by the adversary networks in Iraq, what are reasonable goals and strategies for dealing with them? At the outset, it should be recognized that complete or comprehensive defeat of these networks is unlikely. They are simply too well suited and adaptable for the Iraqi environment for success on such a scale. Such an outcome is probably only possible in the context of a comprehensive and acceptable political outcome—one that eliminates the basis of the insurgency. Even in this case, some insurgent elements, particularly Iraqi terrorists and unreconstructed Ba’athists, are likely to remain active as violent underground elements.

A more attainable goal would be to suppress the insurgent networks to a level where the political process can continue without domination by insurgent actions, which is more or less the current state of U.S. operations at the moment: put the insurgents on the defensive, loosen their control over Sunni localities, attack and destroy high-value insurgent leaders and networks, and buy time for Iraqi forces and governance to extend into Sunni areas and for Sunnis to commit to the political process.

Short of a kind of general suppression, the U.S. could aim for local or temporary suppression of selected Iraqi networks. This has been the goal of numerous operations virtually since the

beginning of the insurgency in April 2003. It has been attempted in key cities, such as Samarra, and areas of concentrated insurgent activity, such as the “triangle of death” south of Baghdad, and in broad geographic areas, such as the upper Euphrates River valley in 2005. This strategy has appeared to work in situations where insurgent activity needed to be controlled for specific periods or in support of specific political or military objectives, such as the Iraqi national voting of October and December 2005 and Shia religious holidays.

Containment as a goal would be appropriate under some circumstances, such as a precipitate U.S. decision to withdraw or a major setback to the political process. Under such circumstances, the aim would be to prevent the insurgents from gaining ground by exploiting the change in the situation.

Several strategies for dealing with the insurgents in Iraq have been tried, but none has been found to provide “the answer.” More experimentation is likely; the latest is the effort to extend what is considered to be the successful approach of the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad to the Sunni triangle itself. [31] U.S. strategies have included:

Large-scale offensive operations – implemented in different ways at the operational and tactical level. These have been employed to break the insurgent hold on specific localities or regions. Examples would include operations in Fallujah in November 2004, Tal Afar in September 2005, and the Marine Corps offensive in the upper Euphrates valley in 2005.

Leadership attrition – sustained efforts to kill or capture key leaders of the insurgency. This approach has been employed against former regime elements, particularly senior leaders of the Saddam regime, and leaders of “terrorist” insurgent groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq. It has also been referred to as the “high-value target” strategy. It relies on persistence of effort in the face of the capacity of insurgent networks to replace their leadership losses.

Counterlogistics – efforts to prevent resources from reaching the insurgents, e.g., people, money, arms. This strategy has been used most prominently in attempts to seal the border with Syria

but has also been attempted internally, especially to disrupt insurgent financial operations.

Changing the “fitness landscape” – changing the operating environment beyond the capability of insurgent networks to adapt.

Of these strategies, the last seems most likely to succeed. Changing the fitness landscape entails some combination of changing the security environment (for example, increasing “predation” of insurgents), the insurgent operating environment (increasing operational difficulties, such as restricting movement, disrupting financial operations), and the social environment (through “hearts and minds” measures). “Clear, hold, build” and “winning hearts and minds” (the turning of the population against the insurgents) are examples of strategies based on changing the fitness landscape. For success, the efforts must be of sufficient magnitude and persistence to exceed the insurgents’ ability to adapt to them. A strategy of “recoil, redeploy, and spoil” has already been attributed to the insurgents. [32]

Unfortunately, any U.S. or Iraqi strategy that depends on time to be effective will run the risk that the insurgents can adapt to it. This problem is one of several that can prevent “landscape” strategies from being successful. The history of the insurgency in Iraq is replete with failures to clear, hold and build. The story of the city of Samarra in Salahuddin province provides one example where all attempts to change the environment beyond the capacity of the insurgents to adapt failed; Samarra remains a locus of insurgent activity and disputed territory. [22, 33] The selection of Samarra as the site for the single most destabilizing attack by insurgents, the February 22, 2006, destruction of the Askiriya Mosque, underlines the point. But there are other places as well where clear, hold, build has not yet proven to be the solution. Ramadi has never been cleared of insurgent activity [34], and some insurgent presence and activity remains even in Falluja and Tal Afar. Even in the location considered by some to be the premier example of “clear, hold, build,” Sadr City in Baghdad [31], the February 22 mosque bombing produced the rapid reappearance of Mahdi Army militia men in the streets and violent incidents by

them against Sunnis. The “clear” and “hold” parts of the strategy are always problematic in Iraq.

CONCLUSIONS

Some important conclusions can be extracted from this discussion. First, Iraqi networks learn and adapt in response to changes in the environment. This phenomenon has been recognized from the birth of the insurgency, is not limited to the tactical level, and accounts for much of the U.S. difficulty in controlling the insurgency. Second, Iraqi networks are highly resilient, surviving in a dynamic and dangerous environment. Their diversity of traits, and of combinations of traits, makes them highly adaptable. While this is not the sole explanation for the insurgents’ survival, it is a primary one. Third, these networks are closely linked to the social environment of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs; they are effectively inseparable from it. They must “behave” in a way that is essentially consistent with the environment; even foreign networks operating in Iraq have to adapt to this environment for their survival. Fourth, Iraqi networks ultimately act in their own self-interest, i.e., their level of altruism and willingness to help others will be limited. This characteristic will provide opportunities for exploitation by the Coalition and the Iraqi government.

Some conclusions can also be drawn regarding how to deal with these networks. Strategies for defeating the Iraqi networks must be persistent and adaptive. While there is no “silver bullet” or certain formula for defeating the insurgents, strategies that seek to change the environment or “landscape” are more likely to be successful. However, there are no guarantees of success.

Finally, sociobiology appears to be an approach worth exploring in greater depth. Approaching the Iraqi insurgency from the perspective of biological processes, whether as analogy or explanation, does seem to illuminate important aspects of the insurgency. It adds to our understanding of the insurgency, not in terms of types of arms and numbers of men or their beliefs, but rather in terms of fundamental persisting processes that work to sustain the insurgency.

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
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Tagging, tracking, identifying, and locating human beings has not been addressed with the top-down approach that has been successfully applied to targets such as submarines, missiles, and facilities. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is applying systems engineering methods to develop a comprehensive and optimized set of technology solutions to the problem. This report summarizes the objectives, methods, and approach of the study. Intermediate results of the target characterization and sensors are documented. The means to develop practical concepts are also described.

INTRODUCTION

Adversary networks are complex entities. Thus, disrupting them requires equally complex planning, preparation, and execution. Evolving networks may splinter or spawn from existing networks, but no two are the same. Regardless of their origin, size, or complexity, networks are composed of people and things. To get to the heart of the network, one ultimately must get to the humans—especially those in positions of leadership and control.

A number of independent studies have reported the need for significant advancements in the Tagging, Tracking, Identification,

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and Location (TTIL) of humans. In 2004, the Defense Sciences Board (DSB) Summer Study [1] noted, "...[a] 'Manhattan Project' in scale, intensity, and focus is required to transform the nation's portfolio of tagging, tracking, and locating programs into an institutionalized discipline to serve the United States for decades to come." A cohesive ability to localize, identify, and track unconventional war targets, such as people, will pay off in a balance/advantage to our troops and the process of peace. And, first responders, law enforcement, etc., will also realize a benefit.

In response to security issues identified by the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, commissioned eight Execution Roadmaps [2] to address the QDR issues. Of particular significance to Unrestricted Warfare are the Locate, Tag, and Track initiative and the Irregular Warfare initiative. The former is intended to address coordination, advocacy, management capability, and resources. The latter is aimed at scoping the capability and capacity for the long war and implementation of transition and reconstruction operations.

Finally, the Director of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall, has concluded that it is time for the Department of Defense to shift selected nontraditional biotechnology applications from study and research to product development and fielding. [3] The investment strategy includes a recommendation for research applied to developing "... a benign tag for tagging a terrorist and terrorist networks."

JHU/APL has undertaken an internally funded effort to apply systems engineering (i.e., a top-down approach) to the problem of tagging, tracking, identifying, and locating human beings. The effort is intended to provide a foundation for the needs and issues raised in the cited studies. This paper reports on the objectives, process, and interim findings of the effort.

TTIL HUMANS: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The primary objective of the TTIL effort is to apply a comprehensive, first-principles, systems approach to tracking human target—in other words, to look at the problem from a top-down perspective. Secondary objectives include optimization of the technology applied to the phenomenology and full integration of data, command and control, and CONOPS. One of the intended outcomes is demonstration of TTIL against human targets.

Systems engineering methods begin with the definition of the requirements to be achieved with the desired capability. Our requirements definition included a thorough understanding of the nature of the target(s) of interest. We next conducted a functional decomposition and ontology of the phenomenology and observables associated with the human body (and related items). In parallel, we cataloged the sensing and measurement technologies that might be applied, and examined common and unique means to gain access to the observables, including placement of sensors and acquisition of samples. The final—and most challenging—step in the process is the development of concepts for optimized methods and technology to prosecute TTIL against humans under very varied circumstances.

APPROACH

Figure 1 is a high-level representation of the functions and interfaces that describe the Human TTIL problem. An analogy to the Mine Countermeasures environment has been used to describe the functional environment. Specifically, detection leads to classification and then to identification. Consider a discrete room of finite volume. The Detect product is a binary answer that indicates whether the room is occupied or empty. If the room is occupied, the Classify product may indicate whether the occupants are human, how many occupants are in the room, where in the room the occupants are located, etc. If there are humans in the room, the Identify product will uniquely discriminate the occupants. The functional boundaries shown in Figure 1 are intended to be representative, not rigid.




Figure 1 Human TTIL Functional Representation

TARGET CHARACTERIZATION

In this study, the definitions are for the final identification product and may be relaxed for detection and/or classification. Next, the Figure 1 functions are decomposed into their elemental parts. Intermediate results of the decomposition of the target, the phenomenology, and the monitors/sensors are described in the following sections. The development of concepts—or, the recomposition—has yet to start, so only a methodology is described.

Targets (humans) have a variety of non-signature characteristics that influence how they do business or operate; these distinctions also pose unique challenges with respect to prosecuting the targets. Based on our assessment, two significant driving characteristics of human actions are the closest range of approach (“keep-out range”) and the level of security that the targets apply to the use of communications and means of information sharing.

The keep-out range is a gauge of how far away an overt measurement means must be to avoid suspicion. The logical assumption is that the higher the value of the target, the greater the

keep-out range. A low-value target is likely to operate freely in a public environment with uncontrolled interactions with unknown individuals. A high-value target is likely to be cloistered and will be suspicious of nearby unexpected events.

The level of security determines the means that individuals will use to shelter themselves from direct interactions with the outside world. Again, the logical relationship is that the higher the value of the target, the greater the level of security applied. A low-value target is likely to have direct contact with the general public and use readily available resources (e.g., cell phone, e-mail). A high-value target will use one or more layers of intermediaries as indirect interfaces with external contacts.

Figure 2 is a graphic representation of the keep-out range and level of security for three target types. The target types are intended to span the range of interest and to be illustrative, not exhaustive. A Type 3 Target represents one of low value and one that is generally abundant; such an individual is expendable in an organization. A Type 1 Target denotes the single individual who has the highest value in an organization’s infrastructure; such an individual commands maximum respect and protection. A Type 2 Target is of moderate value and exists in small numbers; such an individual holds a position of some responsibility and authority.




Figure 2 Human Target Characterization

HUMAN PHENOMENOLOGY

The human body is a complex ensemble of a system of systems existing in a complex equilibrium with its surroundings (Figure 3). The systems exist at the molecular, cellular, organ, and integrated level. Pseudo-static characteristics of the body are physical parameters that are unique to an individual. Traits such as skin color, hair color, and hair texture are classified as pseudo-static because they may be altered by the aging process or by artificial means. The truly static characteristics, generally referred to as biometrics, include qualities such as DNA, fingerprints, and retinal patterns.

The human body must be nourished to survive; it requires the intake of air, water, and nutrients. The nature of the intake materials will influence the physical composition of the body and the resultant byproducts. The intake materials may be artificially manipulated to create predictable signatures, thereby introducing a tag.




Figure 3 Human Phenomenology

The most abundant human traces exist as physical, chemical, or biological products, which manifest as electromagnetic (EM), heat, waste effluent, sound, and motion signatures. Using orthogonal approaches, we have identified phenomenological characteristics of the human body that result in directly or indirectly measurable observables.

Thus, the human body has a large number of attributes and observables that can be sensed and measured. Figure 4 is a representation of the setting in which sensing and measurement must occur. The environment that the human occupies will affect the nature of the observables. For instance, the ambient temperature may influence metabolism, which, in turn, affects the body's thermal signature and the overall thermal signal-to-noise condition. Conversely, the presence of a human may influence the surrounding environment. An example under these circumstances is the introduction of a waste effluent or product that is not found in the uninhabited setting. The implication is that background measurements and/or ground truth measurements may be critical components of TTIL operations.




Figure 4 Influences on Human Phenomenology

An artificial state is one in which a characteristic or observable may be temporarily and intentionally changed. For example, an individual may color his or her hair, wear tinted contact lenses, use makeup to mask or create a cosmetic feature, or walk with an unnatural gait. A more challenging condition is an altered state. An altered state is more intrusive than an artificial state, and,

furthermore, it is permanent. An altered state can include such conditions as a joint replacement, organ transplant, or gender change. The obvious implication is that identification processes may be spoofed by artificial and altered states, and care must be taken to build identification means based on methods that are insensitive to these conditions.

Consideration of the human signature leads us to a unique question. Consider that a distinct composite signature is compiled and archived for an individual, who, at the time of the compilation, is considered to be “normal” and “healthy.” If a composite signature were then compiled for the same individual under “abnormal” or “ill” conditions (e.g., fever, following organ transplant), would the new signature match the archived signature adequately to identify a change in the individual or be different enough to prevent a match?

SENSORS, MONITORS, AND ACCESS

Large numbers of sensors and monitors may be applied to the TTIL Human problem. For the purposes of this effort, we have categorized TTIL sensors as physical, chemical, or biological, based on their operating regime and method of measurement. The taxonomy for the sensors and monitors is shown in Figure 5. JHU/APL has compiled and maintains numbers of sensor databases for the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and other U.S. government agencies. These databases, combined with current staff experience, form the basis for our understanding of technology availability and maturity, performance expectations, and reliability.

Sensor access to potential human signatures is driven by multiple parameters, including the target keep-out range, the sensor standoff range capability, and the environment. Preplacement of covert sensors and/or the use of hidden portals are not likely to be universally viable. Similarly, prosecution by unmanned vehicles may alert the target or place extraordinary requirements on sensor performance. Therefore, we are examining uncommon methods for data acquisition. One such method is animal sentinels.




Figure 5 Sensor and Monitor Taxonomy

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

Following the functional decompositions, the way forward to concept development involves the following steps. First, a matrix is assembled to reveal which of the technologies can be used to measure each of the various phenomena. The matrix includes a number of dimensions of information about the technology-to-phenomenology matchup: sensitivity, specificity, dynamic range, standoff, frequency response, resolution, etc. Second, notional operating scenarios are developed to focus the needed concepts. From these, sub-scenarios are identified that describe unique temporal, spatial, and environmental “building blocks.” The resultant building blocks provide the context within which to apply the TTIL sensors.

The development of application concepts is the third step in the process. Notionally, a set of technologies (toolkit) is selected that will satisfy a sub-scenario context. The ultimate toolkit is one that utilizes mature technology in an appropriate form and format and provides adequate information for the end user. An ideal toolkit will maximize the ability to identify the targets of interest via acquisition of orthogonal phenomena. If an appropriate technology toolkit is not available for a concept, this information can be used to identify the need for directed technology investment(s).

CONCLUSION


Tagging, tracking, identification, and location of human beings is a challenging task. The use of a systems engineering approach to the problem will facilitate the development of a class of solutions that will be comprehensive and optimized for the target of interest, the operating environment, and the end user's needs.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The group met between 12:15 and 1:30 on 15 March to discuss further the morning's roundtable on Disrupting Adversary Networks. In attendance were approximately 30 to 40 symposium participants, including the panelists, less Mr. Jeff White, who had another engagement. After a short review of the morning's roundtable, the group asked additional questions of the panelists. They then discussed the subject further, focusing on the still unanswered questions, and suggested actions for those involved in strategy, analysis, and technology development.

The roundtable heard four presentations. The first, by Prof. Marc Sageman, addressed the profiles of international terrorists and their organizations. He emphasized that their networks are based on kinship, friendship, and discipleship, usually forming in some third country. These networks begin as social entities and then grow into ideological action groups. They do not take or receive any overall direction from outside, but essentially are self-mobilized and directed. The personal links become the operational links of the organization.

Mr. Jeff White spoke next, and he focused specifically on networks in Iraq. Here, he found networks based on tribes and clans within the country. These groups are adaptive learning organizations, best understood from a sociobiological perspective.

Professor Thomas A. Keaney is the Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. His areas of expertise are American defense policy, arms control, military power and strategy, air power, military history, and strategic and security issues.

There are multiple networks in the country, which often evolve over time and common purpose into meta-networks. He counseled that strategies to combat these networks have to become equally adaptive if they are to be successful.

Dr. David Kilcullen spoke next, giving his view of how best to combat adversary networks. He posited that because networks would always exist within societies, attempts to destroy them are doomed to failure—they would only regenerate in some other form. Instead, he suggested the creation of parallel networks to compete with the enemy networks. The existence of competing networks would force the adversary networks to confront the competition. When they surfaced to attack, they would themselves become more vulnerable.

The final speaker, Dr. Wayne Sternberger, presented a method for identifying, targeting, and tracking adversary networks, borrowing from methods used in dealing with other military problems. Because humans are at the heart of any network, the method must aim at them. His approach is to detect, classify, and identify members of the networks, and then to identify the physical, chemical, and biological sensors needed for these purposes. The next step is to develop a technological toolkit that could provide effective sensors. His briefing described an effort now underway to accomplish each of these steps.

Comments in the discussion started with the observation that the term unrestricted warfare involves much more than the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism topics that the symposium is addressing. Also included in the term should be methods to deal with the global al Qaeda/Salafist threat and the failed state phenomena, as well as to prepare the United States for future challenges by other states. The group agreed with this assessment, but recognized the limitations of addressing the subject comprehensively in a single symposium. If the larger issues (rise of China, nonterrorist threats, etc.) had been addressed, topics examined would have included economic, cultural, and resource warfare.

(NOTE: PowerPoint Presentations for each of the speakers are available on the URW website: www.jhuapl.edu/urw_symposium/)

Particularly noted in the discussion was a point introduced by the panelists—there is no single, worldwide network but, instead, a number of loosely affiliated or similarly motivated groups operating independently. Furthermore, there are terrorist groups that are not organized based on Islamist extremism. Other groups of concern include various separatist, ethnic, or ideological organizations at work in the world. For many of these networks, their very nature has made it difficult to penetrate, report on, or undermine them because the affiliations are often based on family/tribal ties or on years of close personal contact.

A subject of extended discussion was the data available on networks, its sufficiency, and effective exploitation. Some important points made:

- There can be a problem with having too many sensors. Attempting to correlate the data available can slow down the analysis, often preventing timely action.
- We have more than enough data; what we lack is the ability to share it.

Some of the suggestions for further action:

- At the strategic level, focus more on specific regions and the differences in each rather than on undifferentiated worldwide threats.
- For Iraq specifically, consider the long-term future of that country:
 - What are the implications of a state of civil war?
 - What will be the options for the Kurdish region?
 - What will be the context for Iraq in dealing with its neighbors in the region?

Addressing the analytical level of URW concerns, the group suggested that analysts need to develop a framework for threat assessment that is more rigorous or more refined than the

force-on-force comparisons that tended to dominate in previous times. Analysts need to discover first what the new areas of interest have become, recognizing that many of the factors to consider will be nonmilitary. New skills may well be required for this analysis, such as in anthropology, biology, and linguistics.

At the level of technology requirements or focus, the group noted that although data collection still had its difficulties, more important was data or information sharing. A method suggested for addressing this problem was the development of an intelligence “pull” method, instead of a more typical “push” method of intelligence. That is, rather than a higher headquarters formulating the intelligence needs of operational units, the headquarters would establish a database from which each unit could individually withdraw needed information. And, a final comment: because terrorists have come to depend on the Internet for recruitment as well as for communications, ways should be devised to confront terrorists via the Internet.



≡ Prof. Thomas Keaney (Moderator) – In this session, we saw a very good example of what this two-day symposium hopes to be about, which is bringing together people who understand technology, analysis, and strategy to find out how they can work together to understand adversary networks and achieve a cogent defense against them.

Q. Prof. Thomas Keaney – To get started, I would like to ask the first question of Marc Sageman. From your presentation, which provides the scope of al Qaeda's network and networks like it, can you compare them with the networks within Iraq that Jeff White discussed?

≡ Prof. Marc Sageman – The network I described and those in Iraq look the same in many respects; they are foreign, transnational, and do not have deep roots because they are a Diaspora community. However, 95 percent of the insurgents in Iraq are not really part of that network. In Iraq, the insurgent networks largely consist of local guys who are totally embedded in their community as opposed to the network participants I described, who are really part of a Diaspora—that is, people from country A, living in country B, going after country C—whereas the Iraqi insurgent networks are people from country A, living in country A—flourishing in country A—and attacking people from country C: us.

≡ Prof. Thomas Keaney – That is an important distinction because we tend to conflate the global war on terrorism and what is happening in Iraq. In this question and answer session, some of you may want to comment on whether one size fits all when we consider how to counter these networks or whether we have to be very specific about particular networks.

Q: *Jim Roberts, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency – My question is for Dr. Sternberger. The five operation-level tasks in personnel recovery are report, locate, support, recover, and return. Of those, in this modern environment, the report and locate are obviously the toughest tasks. Is your team considering the need to report and locate isolated captured friendly personnel?*

Dr. Wayne Sternberger – Absolutely. It is one of the things that I did not go into detail on, but, yes, the functional decomposition talks about exfiltration of information, which can take a variety of different forms. That is the reporting aspect of it. Certainly the problem of identifying where an individual might be is a major part of the task.

Q: *John Schuster, JHU/APL – This question is for Dr. Sageman. Do you postulate an event such as the riots this past year in France as a catalytic event for the creation of a large number of terrorist cells within Europe and specifically France? And if that is true, what would be the identifying characteristics that you would look for to try to identify prototypical groups that were forming?*

Prof. Marc Sageman – Terrorism is categorized by various types of terrorist activities. One is really mob violence, which has been the traditional form of terrorism, and which is why many governments have moved their capitol away from large cities, for instance, to Islamabad instead of Karachi. Mob violence was also critical in the American Revolution, if you think of the sons of liberty that predated by a decade the start of the American Revolution; the KKK is also an example of mob violence.

With the invention of dynamite, you have a tremendous shift. You have the possibility of the few to terrorize the many. This did not really happen until the late 19th century. So you have two forms of terrorism that are perhaps side by side in France, you have young kids who are attracted—and I am talking about teenagers—who are attracted to this mob violence, which basically ran itself out after about three or four weeks, mainly because the original enthusiasm died out.

The form of terrorism that concerns us is a very different phenomenon. There is absolutely no indication that those

teenagers may or may not become terrorists later on. The terrorists I am characterizing are the guys who actually use dynamite or other forms of explosives to try to inspire other people to join the movement. It was called propaganda by deed in the late 19th century; the Egyptians call it a scream for god. This is what the modern form of terrorism is about.

I do not really think that the two are interchangeable in that sense. So the riots in Paris are really young kids who are born French, who rioted because they want to be recognized as French. It has nothing to do with groups like the Salafi groups, who actually try to build a utopia. There is no indication to my mind—or even hint—that one group will become the other.

So to me they are very separate phenomena. One is the more traditional form of terrorism that has existed for about 40 centuries—namely, mob violence—and the other is a new form of terrorism that was made possible by dynamite.

Q. *Anna Whitman, SAIS student – Dr. Kilcullen, can you elaborate on how you make these alternative networks legitimate? American funding or Western funding does not necessarily make them legitimate to fill a vacuum created by a local network.*

Dr. David Kilcullen – That is a good point. I think that you can see a pattern in American efforts in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency to go for legitimacy guaranteed by some form of democracy, such as elections or international sanctions. Most of my operational life has been in the Moslem world, and in the Moslem culture the guarantee of legitimacy is actually not democracy but Koranic law, rectitude, being aligned with Sharia, the body of Islamic law.

What you often find is that making a network legitimate—in the sense of getting the population to believe that it is legitimate—involves some kind of religious negotiation, whereas getting U.S. government funding tends to be a completely different problem. I pointed to an example there: The 82nd Airborne in Afghanistan spent a lot of effort in building irregular, tribally based networks to support their operations, which was much more effective than some other units that spent a lot of effort in building miniature

versions of the U.S. forces to go out and do stuff that we can do ourselves, only better.

I've also had some experience leading an irregular unit of Team Marines against the Indonesian army, and we found that recruiting people on the basis of tribal loyalty and clan loyalty was how you got them in. But how you got them to maintain the rage over time was by essentially pretty physical benefits, such as monetary assistance. How you get people into these networks often turns out to be different from how you keep them in and sustain the effort.

I'll also just make one more point, picking up on something that Marc Sageman said. We often get self-obsessed with terrorism and think that terrorism is primarily directed at us. That is sometimes true, but in many environments the terror is actually a recruitment tool, and so the terrorism is directed at the uncommitted population to try to bring them on board and build the terrorist support network. It is actually not directed at us.

A good example of that is decap videos, as we call them: beheading videos in Iraq. There was a spate of these until about six months ago, when bin Laden issued a directive saying no more decap videos; we do not want to see any more Westerners getting their heads cut off, because most Moslems are kind of disgusted by it; they may get a frisson of excitement seeing it, but they do not want to join al Qaeda after seeing a movie like that.

There has been only one video since bin Laden issued that directive and no more. They have actually stopped doing them, because the purpose of that terror was not to frighten Westerners, although it had that effect; it was to recruit Moslems. They were told to stop doing it because it was not having that effect. What I am saying in essence is: What is legitimate—what works—depends on the culture and the environment of the people with whom you are dealing and you have got to tailor what you do to be different to match the environment.

Q: Any scenario I can imagine in Iraq will result in some of the insurgents ending up on the losing side. Would you expect them or some of them to leave Iraq and become terrorists elsewhere?

▬ Prof. Thomas Keaney – A general question, who would like to take that?

We have a yes and a perhaps. I would like to ask Jeff White a follow-on question about the riots in France and the more hardcore terrorist. If you look at Iraq, can you parse what you would see as general old-style rioting from the hardcore terrorists who have a political agenda as opposed to those who are taking advantage of the situation? Is there a crossflow between those two?

▬ Mr. Jeff White – In Iraq I do not think we have seen a lot of rioting. We've seen some spontaneous outbursts of violence like what happened after the mosque bombing. Even then, it is questionable as to how spontaneous those riots were. I tried to keep track of what I call organized opposition in Iraq for a while and it just was not anything like street demonstrations except those few early on by Moqtada al Sadar's people in Baghdad. So Iraq has not really had that kind of phenomenon of rioting and large-scale demonstrations. The violence in Iraq has been highly organized from the beginning, by multiple different networks. They have not used that technique.

Q: Marc Sageman makes a case that lonely, bored, marginalized groups of guys get together, something triggers them, and they become terrorists. I would guess that those conditions might apply in American prisons. Instead of asking Marc to comment on that, I will ask David Kilcullen to comment on whether parallel networks are being formed in the American prison that compete with this natural tendency Marc Sageman described.


▬ Prof. Marc Sageman – I am going to answer that in what may appear to be a slippery fashion and talk about Indonesian prisons and then come back to American prisons. One of the biggest problems in the war on terrorism is what happens to detainees, what do you do with them? I do not need to tell Americans this because Guantanamo is what happens to prisoners. In the Indonesian prison system, Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists are just put in with the rest of the prison population.

So Abu Backar Bashir, the spiritual leader of JI, leads Friday prayers in prison. People from the prison population come and hear sermons by the JI leader. It is seen as part of Bashir's civil rights that we do not stop him from preaching. Similarly, because they are all in amongst the general prison population, when new prisoners arrive they get drawn into networks that exist in the prison.

About a year ago, there was a scandal in Indonesia known as the Bank Indonesia scandal where a number of directors of Bank Indonesia went to jail. The scandal was on a similar scale to the Enron scandal in the U.S. A lot of those bank directors are now in the same prison having a Chuck Colson prison conversion moment under the guiding hand of JI leaders. These are people who are well tapped into the Indonesian elite, have a lot of money, and are only in there for fraud; they are going to be out in a couple of years.

It so happens that a lot of the people who are in jail around the world for terrorism-related offenses starting from the early part of the war on terrorism are going to get out around 2008, which is convenient for this administration, but it also means that there is going to be a big backlog of people getting out around the same time, I would hazard a guess, that we will be drawing down substantially in Iraq. So we have got a bit of a perfect storm coming, driven by jail populations.

Now turning to American populations, I do not have the data, but we know that there is a phenomenon of religious propaganda in American prisons. We do not have a clear link, as far as I am aware, between that and terrorism at this stage. Someone else might have better data than I do.

 **Prof. Marc Sageman** – I have looked at this phenomenon, and it very much depends on the structure of the prison. The prisons in California, for instance, are similar to those in Indonesia, with people pooled together so that a few bad apples can infect the rest of the groups. This is not true in the Northeast of the U.S., however. The NYPD examined this issue carefully and found that even though there is a lot of proselytism and people declare

themselves Moslem in prison, they often do that for the benefits, such as better food and getting out of their cell five times a day to pray.

But it does not stick. Once they are released, the NYPD study found that less than 1 percent of the convicts would do something such as joining a Mosque after leaving prison. The same phenomenon is seen in France, where the majority of prisoners are Moslem. They only found four people who converted in the last 10 years to a violent form of Islam. They have a lot of converts, but they are not becoming terrorists.

Spain was very different because Spain pooled prisoners just as they do in Indonesia and California. In Spain, it was a disaster. Their terrorist movement was really very much generated in the prison itself. You have to examine how the transition from convert to terrorist works. Usually the person who converts you is your cellmate because he is with you 24 hours a day. It is not the guys who come in once a week for about an hour that really have any effect on prisons, even though that is our fear. It is not the way it works.

You really have to look very much at the social structure of the prison, how people interact, to actually guess whether it is a problem or not. On the East Coast, it is not a problem; on the West Coast, it might be. And in New Mexico it probably is a worse problem. (Laughter)

Q: *Eric Thorsos, Applied Physics Laboratory at the University of Washington – This question is also for Marc Sageman. I am curious if you would be willing to comment more generally on your feelings about the network situation in the United States. Can you expand on your comments about no more 9/11s?*

Prof. Marc Sageman – It turns out that the United States has been protected in a sense against those violent born-again networks who are willing to go after the United States. Let me underline those. For instance, the Lackawanna, New York terrorist cell was willing to do things against Russia, not here. They were Americans who were more than happy to go to Chechnya to kill

some Russians, but they were not willing to go after the United States. Now why is that? Well, three things:

- First, the class of Moslems that we have here is very different from the European one. We actually cherry picked. We only allowed physicians, people with money, and so on. If you look at the socioeconomic statistics of the Moslem population in the United States, it actually is better than the average in the United States.
- Second, the American dream; there is no European dream. By American dream I mean the concept of the land of opportunity. We are a country based on immigration, so we can remember at least one of four grandparents coming from the old country. So having a foreigner here is not so unusual for us. It is just grandpa trying to come here and make ends meet. You do not really have the kind of discrimination that you do have in Europe, where people think that they have the essence of being French, the essence of being English, and so forth; immigrants do not share this essence, so you have discrimination in terms of jobs. If you look at the unemployment rate in Europe, it is three or four times the average unemployment in those pockets where you have Moslems. So the American dream, whether it is true or not does not matter; as long as people believe it, it is an important factor in limiting the growth of the terrorist mentality.
- The third factor is our great notion of American individualism. As long as you believe that whether you succeed or not depends on you, you do not really develop this collective identity, which is the start of the terrorist phenomenon. If you ask an American Moslem what he is, in any poll an American Moslem would tell you I am American and I am Moslem. But if you ask the same question to a European Moslem, he would tell you I am a Moslem, period. They define themselves in contrast to the rest of the population and sometimes in hostility to the rest of the population. You need to have this collective identity in contrast to the rest of the population to really start the process of hating the

rest of the population, doing things against it. So American individualism is also protective.

Q: *Dean Simmons, APL. My question is for Dr. Kilcullen. You had a very nice exposition on parallel networks. I see how they could be a potential benefit in Iraq. But I was wondering if you could comment on their applicability perhaps in London or Madrid where you are not engaged in combat openly with the terrorists but yet they can do significant damage. Is there any value in those circumstances or is it even credible to think about building parallel networks?*

Dr. David Kilcullen – Let me preface this by saying there is a real debate going on in the Intel community, which I am sure some of you are aware of, on this very question about the utility of destroying individual high-value targets versus the utility of trying to change the environment to make it less permissive for them. I think the idea of building a parallel network in a society like the UK or particularly Western Europe is not really the same as building it on the Northwest frontier, where what you are trying to do is build a competing network of irregular fighters.

It is more a matter of trying to restructure the environment in which the enemy network operates by making it harder for them to recruit, making them stand out more from the background, and giving the other people who might potentially join in that group somewhere else to go. So it is a slightly different issue.

Another question that we now have is the Internet-based issue. One of the biggest differences between the Northwest frontier province or central Java and London is Internet penetration.


So far, I think the consensus is that it is certainly possible for people to be totally recruited, trained, and operationally deployed just using the Internet. As an individual, you might have a radically altered view of religion or ideology based on what you read online, and you could get onto an online chat group and get socialized. You could find all the data you need to make a bomb, and you could find all the targeting data you need to target that bomb, and you could go out and do it on your own.


Although it is certainly possible, we are not actually seeing it yet. What we are seeing instead is that there is always a human in the loop; there is some kind of individual face-to-face contact where the catalyst for action is some kind of human-to-human contact. That does not mean that we will not see a pure Internet-based approach in the future; but it does mean that at the moment it seems like it is all based on having a human connection.

I think that goes back to the point that the human is central in the network regardless of how complex the network might be. When you are looking at a society, particularly one like Western Europe, you are looking more at changing the conditions under which the enemy network operates.

Then there is a completely different type of environment like Afghanistan, Iraq, some parts of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, where the networks are already in open conflict against their parent society. In that case, you are looking at a straight counterinsurgency approach in which you are building a parallel network to wean the population away from the enemy.

So it is horses for courses. The difference is whether you are primarily enemy-focused or you are primarily environment-focused in your approach.

 **Prof. Thomas Keaney** – Before the next question, I would like to ask Jeff White to comment on this issue in the Intel community that Dave Kilcullen mentioned about constructive versus destructive targeting networks. What is your perspective on dealing with Iraq in that regard?

 **Mr. Jeff White** – My sense is that the high-value target strategy has not worked very well in Iraq. It is necessary to pursue these people and to bring them to justice. But it does not look to me like it has had strategic or maybe even operational effects on the insurgency, because, as I said, the insurgency is adaptive; it finds ways to replace high-value targets that are lost. Much more effective, I think, is the strategy of changing the environment.

In keeping with what David was saying, we have an example now of an alternative network in Ambar Province in Iraq. The

Ambar revolutionary brigade is an organization (whether we're behind it or not I cannot say), but it is an organization that grew up naturally out of the Sunni Arab community, out of a tribal community there. It is now competing with the al Qaeda, terrorist, and foreign fighter elements in Ambar Province and it is competing by killing them, at least as is being reported. That seems to me to be a much greater threat to the AQI organization in Iraq than the high-value target strategy.

☰ Prof. Thomas Keaney – Before we end, I would like to ask Wayne Sternberger one question about your presentation on targeting tracking. You explained the process and direction of your research. Could you just say how much direction you got from strategists of what they would like to see? In other words, do you get guidance from them for the kinds of things they would like to see from that? Or are you proceeding where the technology takes you?

☰ Dr. Wayne Sternberger – I would like to say that we are getting as much sage counsel as we can from strategists, analysts, and technologists. We are clearly not doing this just from a technology standpoint. Classical systems engineering starts with determining what your requirements are. From that perspective, we have examined the information available to us in a variety of different forms, both classified and unclassified, to frame the context in which we need to proceed.

A soldier in a helmet is shown in profile, aiming a rifle with a laser sight. The laser beam is a bright, glowing line that extends from the rifle towards the upper left corner of the frame. The scene is dimly lit, with light coming from a window in the background, creating a silhouette effect. The overall color palette is dark and monochromatic, with shades of brown and black.

CHAPTER 6

ROUNDTABLE

COUNTERING COMMON ADVERSARY WEAPONS



6.1 DISCUSSION GROUP INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Edward A. Smyth

The panelists on the Countering Common Adversary Weapons Roundtable were Dr. Richard White of the Institute for Defense Analyses; Dr. Eric I. Thorsos of the Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington; Mr. Andrew Green of Hazard Management Solutions; and Dr. Stephen McBrien of The MITRE Corporation. Each panelist presented a short briefing to the Symposium.

The participants were tasked to identify and examine three primary issues:

- What are the common adversary weapons to be addressed in 2006 and in the near term (5–8 years in the future)?
- From a technology perspective, where is the United States in terms of our ability to counter these weapons?
- What are the most important challenges, technological and otherwise, in the years ahead?

In addressing these issues, it is important to consider the full range of the elements that comprise the term, unrestricted warfare, as defined by Liang and Xiangsui in their recent book [1]. Clearly, if unrestricted warfare is construed to encompass such diverse areas of conflict as cultural, drug, economic aid, environmental,

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financial, international law, media, network, psychological, resource, smuggling, technological, and terrorism, then the challenges facing the technology community in countering such a wide array of weapons' choices are immense.

The scale of this challenge is further evidenced by several insights provided by the Symposium's Keynote Speaker, Anthony Zinni. In Zinni's view, the demise of the former Soviet Union has been a spur to globalization, which, in turn, has enabled both potential friends and foes to gain access to the most sophisticated technologies. According to Zinni, this problem is further complicated by the lack of a national strategic vision to counter the threats of today and tomorrow. The challenges faced by the technology community in developing appropriate countermeasures result from the combination of these two factors. A subsequent Symposium speaker, T. X. Hammes, added yet another level of complexity to this problem by challenging the technology community to anticipate future adversary weapons before they actually appear.

"... technology in and of itself will not be sufficient to defeat the movement. Advances in ... strategy and analysis—are essential."

Where then does the technology community begin to address such an immense challenge? The Roundtable panelists began by assessing perhaps the most significant common adversary weapon in use today, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and some of its common derivatives. According to data available as of 7 March 2006, since March 2003, more than 40% of the U.S. hostile action fatalities—more than 700 hundred deaths—in the Iraqi theater of operations can be attributed to IEDs. Although data on the number of U.S. wounded attributable to IEDs is not readily available, it is presumed that a similar percentage could be reasonably applied to the nearly 17,000 wounded in action [2]. Such statistics provide ample rationale for the Roundtable's focus on weapons of terror and IEDs in particular.

The panelists agreed that IEDs are clearly weapon systems that warrant immediate attention. They are extremely inexpensive and easy to develop and use. In comparison to major U.S. weapons systems, IEDs can be developed, modified, produced, and employed in days rather than years and at a tiny fraction of the cost of more sophisticated weapon systems. In the hands of Iraqi terrorists, IEDs serve not only to inflict human casualties but to instill fear, shape media coverage and public opinion, and separate U.S. forces from the local population.

“If we are to prove successful in meeting the challenges of unrestricted warfare, the analysis community must develop tools and processes that address more than just physical phenomena. The full range of societal, informational, cultural, and military interactions must be incorporated into future analytical developmental efforts.”

IEDs exist in many forms and variations. They may be timed devices, using either mechanical or electrical timers, or command-detonated weapons that are initiated when a suitable target comes within range. In Iraq, the IED is most commonly used as a roadside bomb, initiated with some form of electronically controlled device. It was noted, however, that IEDs are complex weapons systems that employ simple technology. The IED weapon system consists of not only the device itself but also a fairly sophisticated support infrastructure that provides for identifying suitable targets and target vulnerabilities, producing the device, emplacing the device, and providing requisite command and control for detonation.

In Iraq, other adversary weapons that are frequently encountered include suicide bombs and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Like IEDs, suicide bombs exist in several forms, most notably, vehicle bombs, suicide belts, and briefcase bombs. All are relatively inexpensive to construct and use and difficult to detect. RPGs also pose a serious threat because with minimal training, they can be effectively used by an individual against vehicular targets. Recent events indicate that RPGs are becoming

progressively more lethal and must be considered as threats even against armored vehicles.

CHALLENGES

The Roundtable panelists stated that while developing the means to defeat the weapons and devices themselves is of the utmost priority, such countermeasures cannot be addressed in isolation. Countermeasures must also consider:

- Defeating the device
- Defeating the system
- Defeating the insurgency
- Defeating the movement

In defeating the device and the system, the panelists suggested the need for technology to swiftly and accurately detect bomb factories. Specifically, technology should be developed to provide wide-area coverage for trace detection of explosive chemicals and for efficient monitoring of waste streams such as garbage and sewage. In addition, technology is needed to locate the IED man-in-the-loop and to detect and track large-scale truck bombs. Given the widespread use of roadside IEDs, sensors are needed that can detect changes and disturbances in road and ground surfaces and ground penetration at standoff distances.

Also needed is technology to detect subtle changes in the behavior of the local population that could indicate an imminent major threat weapon event. Some means also should be provided that would allow members of the local population to safely and clandestinely report imminent threat activities. It was further suggested that the United States and its Allies need an intelligence coup similar to that experienced in World War II, when the Allies intercepted and broke the Axis code system. As was the case in World War II, the United States should strive to maintain secrecy about any and all intelligence gains or breakthroughs.

It was noted that technology in and of itself will not be sufficient to defeat the movement. Advances in the other two components of the Symposium triad—strategy and analysis—are essential. It is

also important for the United States to improve its understanding and appreciation of the systemic relationships of the complex 21st-century world. We must understand the operational context of this world, including the relationships among its physical, societal, and informational attributes, as well as our own capabilities and vulnerabilities.

ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS

Comments by the participants in the Discussion Group both reinforced the insights offered by the Roundtable panelists and provided their own unique perspective. The group recognized that most of the previously addressed common adversary weapons have multiple purposes and effects. Specifically, these weapons were recognized as primary elements of a larger, terrorist-directed information operation. These weapons have also successfully separated U.S. military forces from the local population, modified U.S. military behavior, and have been partially successful in fomenting civil war.

The participants felt that IEDs, in particular, will remain a significant threat weapon of choice until the Coalition develops successful technological countermeasures. While recognizing the acute need to develop and successfully use such countermeasures, the participants also placed a high priority on developing the means to remedy the economic, societal, and cultural ills of the population that create support for the use of such weapons.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS FOR STRATEGY

The participants agreed that it is essential for the United States to fully understand the cultural, religious, economic, societal, and military motivations of the factions using IEDs. Only then will we be able to take positive steps to effectively separate the insurgents from the population, generate local populace support for both Iraqi and American security forces, overcome past differences, establish a necessary level of mutual trust, and successfully counter IED-type weapons.

The Discussion Group also suggested that U.S. efforts to counter IEDs would be best served by restricting the publication of

revised tactics and countermeasures. A policy such as that recently imposed by the Department of Defense to curtail the distribution of information on counter-IED efforts was considered overdue.

Strategists need to take a much broader view of unrestricted warfare. Although the Discussion Group clearly appreciated why the ongoing conflicts in Southwest Asia received so much attention during the Symposium, strategists were urged to broaden their scope. They should focus not just on the “here and now” of the Arab/Islamic cultures but should consider other potential threats, other cultures, and unrestricted warfare elements other than terrorism. Similarly, the participants believe that the United States must adopt a broader perspective on how we consider and respond to conflicts. All too often, the U.S. response has been dependent on military action and the use of sophisticated military technology. Recent experience indicates that successful conflict resolution may require a different approach.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS FOR ANALYSIS

As for the analysis community, the Discussion Group believes that our current analytical capabilities remain wedded to a conventional attrition-based set of values. If we are to prove successful in meeting the challenges of unrestricted warfare, the analysis community must develop tools and processes that address more than just physical phenomena. The full range of societal, informational, cultural, and military interactions must be incorporated into future analytical developmental efforts. Specific attention should be focused on developing and achieving consensus on metrics that incorporate these types of factors and that will effectively discriminate between operational and technical options.

The Discussion Group also recommended that the analysis community do a better job of collaborating with key activities in related areas. For example, ongoing research in Tagging, Tracking, Identifying, and Locating (TTIL) capabilities are highly relevant and should be routinely shared with other efforts, such as those involved in IED defeat issues.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY

On the technology side, the Discussion Group participants endorsed the needs voiced earlier by the Roundtable members. Technology to swiftly and accurately detect bomb factories is an urgent requirement. It should be capable of providing wide-area surveillance coverage using trace detection of explosive chemicals and efficient monitoring of waste streams. In addition, there is a recognized need to develop technology to locate the IED man-in-the-loop in both complex urban environments and in less populated areas. Identifying means to detect and track large-scale truck bombs is also a significant and important challenge. Given the urgency of countering roadside IEDs, there is also a need for technology to detect changes and disturbances in road and ground surfaces and ground penetration at standoff distances.

The Discussion Group also endorsed the need to detect subtle changes in the behavior of the local population that could indicate an imminent major threat weapon event. In addition, members of the local population should have a means for safe, clandestine reporting of imminent threat activities.

SUMMARY

Both the Roundtable panelists and the Discussion Group participants agreed that the Unrestricted Warfare Symposium was a unique and successful initial effort to explore the challenges of unrestricted warfare from the strategic, analytical, and technological perspectives. It was suggested that future symposia of this type consider expanding the discussion beyond the ongoing hostilities in Southwest Asia to address elements of unrestricted warfare beyond terrorism. If appropriate, future symposia should be classified to enable a broader range of discussion.

REFERENCES

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6.2 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS HIGHLIGHTS

Transcripts



Q: *Grant Hammond, Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College – This is a comment, and then I would like whoever on the panel might like to pick it up to have a run at it. As we have discussed this problem of unrestricted warfare the last couple of days, it has been clear that the solution may not be a technological solution, and the moral dimension and human aspects of combating insurgency are obviously critical.*

That said, the technological aspects of this long war will become greatly complicated over the next few years. It may not be fourth-generation warfare; it may be fifth-generation warfare in which insurgents have access to high tech. The research, technologies, and available capabilities such as directed energy, biotechnology, and nanotechnology, are increasingly civilian designed, commercially available, globally distributed, and outside the purview of governments or the military. The issue of available technology is no longer limited to militarily critical technologies. In an Internet-connected, globalized world you can access much of this technology with a laptop and a credit card—and you can steal both of those. I think we will look back on this era as a relatively simple, low tech one.

Is anybody tracking, assessing, or worrying about this much more difficult circumstance in a relatively near-term future in a so-called long war? If we are dealing with unrestricted warfare, I would like to suggest that unrestricted thinking, particularly along these lines, might be in order? Thank you.


Mr. Ted Smyth – I am not sure whether I want to thank you or not with that question. Obviously, we have a challenge. Does anyone on the panel care to offer a comment or two?

The question seems to be this: Is anyone tracking the availability of technologies that could potentially be used against us? I think the answer is yes, probably more than we care to think about. Many analysts worry about the proliferation of all kinds of technologies generated in the civilian community that would be available to potential opponents, and even more are concerned that the civilian community is able to generate ideas and capabilities much faster than DoD can.

It is not a very cheerful thought that it may take us 15 years to develop a system that can combat an alternate system that will be developed and discarded in three weeks. I think wise heads would have to judge whether or not the U.S. military or any military is anxious to incorporate civilian technologies in ways that would allow it to be protected and at the same time used for military operations.

Let me also follow that up in a somewhat related but a somewhat different way. I would hope that someone is tracking these types of challenges. However, I was struck last night by the comments of Steve Flynn, who opened my eyes to the fact that many of the events since 9/11 that we had all assumed were being taken care of—it is not necessarily the case that they are.

I am also recalling the comments of our keynote speaker, General Anthony Zinni, who was frankly lamenting the fact that we do not necessarily have a national strategic vision. When I use the term “national” I am not suggesting just simply a DoD-supported effort, but the entire fabric of the U.S. government as well as the industrial sector itself tracking these issues, thinking about these issues, and hopefully making some progress against some of these issues—and not only today’s concern, IEDs. I can only fanaticize about what our next major weapon du jour might be and what we need to do now to start countering that possibility.

 **Dr. Eric Thorsos** – I couldn’t agree more with the final speaker here—Steve McBrien—that we are not helping ourselves by discussing openly all the things that people are considering and developing. DoD has a huge program underway devoted to trying to counter IEDs, and they probably are addressing many of the

concerns you were raising. It is not a kind of question that is easy to discuss in an open forum.

Q: *When I looked at the television coverage of the London bombings, I was impressed by the level of camera or video coverage of much of the city of London. When commentators and news organizations discussed it, they said a similar video monitoring capability in that level of detail existed in the Washington, DC, metro system. How could that video monitoring capability be used to help us in a situation in Baghdad or along those routes that we are traveling all the time with our troops in the field?*

Mr. Andrew Green – I will make two points in response to that question, if I may. Clearly, in the case of the London bombings, the pictures from those cameras have only been useful in terms of the prosecution of the case after the event. Sadly, they did not prevent the events taking place in the first place. I think that is the first point to be aware of when we are talking about that use of cameras. Second, you are absolutely right that the application of that sort of technology—not only fixed cameras but cameras mounted on a variety of platforms—clearly is one of the tools that is invaluable in prosecuting this war.

Q: *John Leonardis from Northrop Grumman Corporation – Mine is I think a pragmatic question, and I appreciate that we cannot really go into detail in a public forum. I have seen proposals for techniques in jamming or detection in which the asset would be way too expensive to have any merit. Given the constraint that counter-IED solutions have to be cheap, is there a possibility of having a predetonation of these devices? Has thought been given to a standoff procedure of clearing an area and inducing a detonation, that is, treating them basically as landmines?*

Mr. Andrew Green – To answer your question directly: yes, it can be done. Whether that is always going to be the best way of dealing with these things is another matter. Someone earlier touched on the point that not only would such a device take out the intended target, it would also cause collateral damage. The political ramifications associated with knowingly initiating devices irrespective of who put them there in the first place is a serious point that would need to be considered.

It would not be the terrorist that is causing that device to function; it would be the government or the coalition forces that was causing it to function. What that does not address is actually detecting them in the first place. To be able to apply some form of predetonation technology, you have to know where they are to apply that technology.

If you are just sweeping an area just to induce detonation, obviously there will be a risk of collateral damage, but that would occur anyway if the device were exploded. By using some of the technologies you are talking about, you are going to be causing not only physical collateral damage, but also fratricide to communications equipment, computers, you name it—everything within that area is also going to be fried at the same time. I suspect that you can assume that any easily described approach as you have described is being investigated because the program is large. My involvement is more toward the long range, and all of these types of things have been considered. Without being particularly privy to the short term, I think the scope of the program suggests that these are being investigated.



CHAPTER 7

SENIOR PERSPECTIVES

7.1 UNRESTRICTED WARFARE—SENIOR PERSPECTIVES



Henry A. Crumpton

EDITOR'S SUMMARY

Ambassador Crumpton's address focuses on how to face a new kind of enemy that consists of small, agile micro-forces operating in a global battlefield. He characterizes the challenges in intelligence, statecraft, legal, and moral issues that countering the terrorist threat poses. How successfully we are able to remap the social and political terrain in which unrestricted warfare takes place depends on how we orchestrate the instruments of politics, diplomacy, military power, the rule of law, and covert action. Ambassador Crumpton proposes three strategic areas in which to concentrate our power: enemy leadership, enemy safe haven, and the specific local conditions the enemy exploits.

TRANSCRIPT

Thank you for the opportunity to speak, and thank you all for your participation, your focus, and your work on what will be an enduring priority for our nation and our partners around the world.

I want to keep my comments fairly brief and very broad. First, I want to discuss the enemy, which you touched on in some of your wrap-up discussions. I believe the enemy is going to be fundamentally small, fast, and agile, consisting of micro-forces that have micro impact, operating in an increasingly fragile and global battlefield. I know Steve Flynn talked to you last night about

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how vulnerable America—and, really, the world—is becoming. This trend will continue.

We will be facing enemy forces of small teams, even individuals. They will be sophisticated. They will be using highly effective tradecraft and weapons that are more powerful. This threat poses challenges on many levels. The first challenge is intelligence collection:

- How do we define and collect intelligence on these enemies?
- In terms of our response, what kinds of instruments or statecraft do we use, and how do we apply them?

In addition, what we do will have an impact on us legally. Right now, we are wrestling with the question of detainees. It will have an impact on us morally and philosophically. As an example, we are fairly reconciled to bombing from 30,000 feet, understanding that we may be killing innocents, as regrettable as that is; but we move forward. In contrast, the notion of targeted killings—assassinations—is counter to our moral principles; yet, I fear that is what we will be facing in the future when we have to engage these small, fast, agile targets.

Another piece of the problem is remapping the social and political terrain. Conventionally, we center our focus on just the enemy and us, with all the other people on the battlefield—all the noncombatants—pushed to the side. We try our best to avoid them. Increasingly, however, noncombatants will be part of the terrain in which we fight. Therefore, we must take them into account. We cannot simply think in terms of just friend or foe; we must consider all the people in between and figure out how to work with them. How do we recruit them? How do we bring them to our side?

A part of this, of course, is how we respond. How does intelligence inform the instruments of statecraft, politics, diplomacy, military power, the rule of law, economic might, and covert action? How do we orchestrate those instruments, and where do we concentrate that power? I suggest three strategic

areas: enemy leadership; enemy safe haven; and the most difficult one, those specific local conditions the enemy exploits.

It is important that when we orchestrate and apply this power, we think about a just war. Saint Augustine talked about this at some length. He especially talked about proportionate power, which will be more important than ever because of the global battlefield, a battlefield covered by an aggressive, sophisticated international media. This issue is about perception (often misperception), which in turn leads to the question of legitimacy. Therefore, how we calibrate our power will be increasingly important because it affects perception and legitimacy that ultimately either enhance our power or diminish it. It is one of the challenges we face right now with all the might of America. How do we exercise that power given the constraints that we face because of misperceptions of our might due to these questions of legitimacy?

My response to these questions is to emphasize the need for field-based strategies. This issue is especially difficult because as Americans, we tend to think we can do it all from right here in Washington. One of the issues we discussed in one of the presentations is the need for a grand strategy. That is important; but more important are strategies that are responsive, agile, and field-based. When we look at the power of creative, strategic thinking, it is invariably interwoven with the application and implementation of flexible strategies in a very dynamic process. Consider Afghanistan as one example. The interagency teams that were deployed there the first year—CIA, military, and civilian—really did act as semiautonomous networks that responded with great speed and great agility to enemy forces in those particular local conditions.

In Afghanistan, the CIA responded to the field in a support role. For example, in one 60-day period, the U.S. Air Force, in concert with the CIA, dropped 1.69 million pounds of bombs from the air during more than 110 drops in 41 locations. They tailored each drop to the specific request of each of the teams on the ground, which, in turn, were responding to the specific needs of the Afghan partners, whether it was for blankets, food,

or weapons. That is the type of response we will have to have in this network warfare that we face.

The kind of partnership we formed with the Afghan partners is another critical element in our response to this new global threat. Our success in unrestricted warfare—in counterterrorism warfare—is directly related to our success in the partnerships we forge at every level, whether global, in the United Nations, regional, national, or local—in a particular valley or in a particular suburb.

As we look at the enemy and the way we must respond, we must also look at metrics. I submit that perhaps the most straightforward way of measuring success is to look at enemy safe havens, which I referred to earlier as one of the key strategic areas in which we must focus our power. Basilan, a small island in the Southern Philippines, is a recent example of where U.S. Military Special Operations, in concert with U.S. aid and the Philippine government, denied the enemy safe haven.

Now, we are planning to replace that safe haven with something better: economic prosperity and civic society. The Afghan–Pakistan border and big pieces of Iraq are enemy safe havens and must be addressed, not only with the kinetic aspects of counterterrorism but also—more important—with enduring aspects of liberal institutions, civic society, and, ultimately, democracy.

Finally, let me underscore the point made in one of the wrap-up sessions about the need to attack the enemy strategy. Xiangsui figured this out a long time ago. If we give him some credit, listen to him, and follow through, we will get a lot further in this conflict.

7.2 UNRESTRICTED WARFARE—SENIOR PERSPECTIVES



Robert A. Caslen, Jr.

EDITOR'S SUMMARY

The National Security Presidential Directive just signed by the President sets forth the U.S. government strategy for combating terrorism. It calls on the government and each department, for the first time, to develop complementary strategies and plans and metrics that operationalize the strategies. The government's strategy for combating terrorism has three elements: to defend the homeland, to go on the offensive, and to support mainstream Islam in dealing with extremists. The DoD strategy includes military objectives to deny terrorists safe havens, leadership, and ideology; to enable partner nations to deal with terrorists; and to develop fast, agile forces that operate at the grassroots level. This last strategy is a key part of the government's framework for the war on terrorism.

TRANSCRIPT

You probably read in the papers last week that the President signed the National Security Presidential Directive, which provides the appropriate authorities, tasks, and responsibilities to the departments of the United States government for the war on terrorism. That document includes the revised U.S. government strategy for combating terrorism. It was publicly released by

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Frances Townsend [Homeland Security Advisor to the President] in an unclassified speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace. The document also calls for the National Counterterrorism Center, which was created based on the 9/11 Commission recommendations, to write a government plan that operationalizes the government's strategy and provides some metrics for measuring progress for that strategy. The National Security Presidential Directive also tasked each department to write a department strategy and to develop department metrics to measure progress for its own strategy.

So, for the first time, there is a U.S. government strategy and an operational plan for that strategy with a set of metrics, and department strategies with department plans and department metrics that are consistent with the overarching government metrics. This development is really historic. It will probably take a while for all of it to come together, but this kind of integration and synchronization over time and space is probably one of the best ways to go about it.

What's important here is the government's strategy and how the Department of Defense's strategy is nested into it. The government's strategy for combating terrorism rests on three strategic objectives. One is defensive—to defend the homeland. A second is an offensive element, or a defense in depth. A third one is realizing that we're probably not going to win the war with a kinetic solution. As our President told the American people back in September 2001, it's going to take all the instruments of national power that we have to deal with this extremist ideology.

We've studied Jihads over the centuries, realizing, as most Islamic anthropologists would agree, that we are in the fifth Jihad. In studying what caused periods of activity and periods of abatement, we found that introspection within Islam caused the periods of activity. The paradox throughout history is that only Islam is able to defeat the radical wing within Islam. This introspection occurs when moderate mainstream Islam collapses and extremists arise. When they are perceived to affect the legitimacy of Islam and the security of the *ummah*, they are suppressed.

This third element of the government's strategy goes right to the heart of that process. It says that we will support mainstream Islam to make the case to the rest of Islam that the way of the future is tolerance and plurality and inclusion rather than, as an extremist would have it, the establishment of a repressive regime through a radical interpretation of Islam. That particular strategic objective is significant because it recognizes that we're really focusing our efforts on dealing with the ideology. That's not to say that it will replace any of the defensive or offensive kinetic strategies, but the strategy recognizes how important that particular piece is.

The Defense Department strategy was incorporated in the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, which was released in its classified version a year ago and in an unclassified version last month. It included six military strategic objectives, the first of which focuses on enemy organizations and networks. It says that we will defeat the terrorists or deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive. If we look at terrorist organizations and identify the resources they need, we really end up focusing on what Ambassador Crumpton just mentioned—safe havens, leadership, and ideology. That's what we're going after.

We also have an objective on enabling partner nations. Building partnership capacity in the war on terrorism is important for solving the 21st century dilemma of how to go to war against an enemy that's operating within the borders of a country that you're not at war with. You build partnership capacity so that those countries will be able to track down the terrorists, apprehend them, bring them to trial in a fair and just judicial system, and punish them. Another objective is to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists, deny them safe havens, and support other governments' efforts to deny ideological support to terrorists.

But in the end, I could not agree more with Ambassador Crumpton when he said that the real means of executing this battle is to decentralize in the field at the grassroots levels. He said that our enemy has fast, agile, mobile microforces. We need fast, agile, lethal forces, and we also need to deal with the ideology. Our interagency teams in Iraq have come together at the very

local level in a way that will affect the future of the war being fought today. Because they are at the grassroots level, they're maintaining flexibility and agility. They have quick access to the areas they need, and their accomplishments are very significant. This strategy is a key part of our government's framework for the war on terrorism.

7.3 UNRESTRICTED WARFARE—SENIOR PERSPECTIVES

Anthony A. Cucolo, III

EDITOR'S SUMMARY

During planning, we should visualize the end-state and bring in all Block IV elements to integrate civilian and military efforts, as illustrated in Figure 1. In execution, forces on the ground have to be provided with resources and equipped to conduct concurrent stability, reconstruction, and security operations. We should commit to the work of interdependency among civilian and military effort. The speed of information flow demands rapid decision-making processes using tools that help inform decisions.

TRANSCRIPT

The United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), focuses on real-time assessment of ongoing military operations worldwide to facilitate immediate improvements for the warfighter. JCOA's observations are primarily concentrated on the 2- and 3-star joint headquarters organization levels to produce a "living diagnosis" versus a post-mortem report. Thus, JCOA informs future operations, training, and concepts. From these observations, we believe that fighting

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*This paper was produced from General Cucolo's slides and a transcript of his presentation.




Figure 1 An Illustration Depicting the Evolution of Command Capabilities Toward a Synergistic, Interdependent Relationship Between Military, Government, and Industry

wars successfully requires a government–industry–military synergy as never before.

Analysis of recent operations ('95 through the present) has proven the need to properly pre-plan and resource the broad tasks that support security, transition, and reconstruction in the post-conflict environment. Civilian and military efforts in this environment are not “parallel” but interdependent—true Block IV operations, as shown in Figure 1.

JCOA’s analysis has led to a matrix of groups of similar lessons, referred to as a complex lessons crosswalk, as shown in Figure 2. The matrix comprises four critical groups or areas for discussion:

- Planning
- Execution
- Impact of the Information Age
- Information Pathology




Figure 2 JCOA Complex Lessons Crosswalk

PLANNING LESSONS

The point of departure for pre-conflict planning should be an agreed-upon end state, a desired outcome. However, be cautious about your planning assumptions. Assumptions drive resources and responsibilities. Moreover, assumptions must be accepted by all involved in the operation. Remember, the enemy has a vote, so be prepared for conditions to change rapidly. It is critical that we understand, accept, and learn to work with the “cultural” differences among the military, civilian agencies, and other organizations involved in the planning process. For example, alliance and partner rules of engagement may drive assigned tasks, so it is important to deal with these issues “up front” during planning.

EXECUTION LESSONS

There are two primary lessons in execution. The first is that security leads all actions—security of “self” and reasonable security of assigned areas. Capabilities for both cannot be over emphasized. If only soldiers are present initially, expect great demand for their use to immediately improve conditions. If “money is ammunition,” authorities and resources equate to mission responsibility. Further, balance force protection with local contact, for local contact is force protection.

A key element includes maintaining the pace of operations, where military and civilian operations are linked, concurrent, and interdependent. Finally, the transition points used to establish unity of effort and leadership (i.e., who is in charge) must be flexible and condition based.

The second lesson in execution involves post-conflict host nation infrastructure. A failed state or post-conflict host nation government will lack skilled bureaucrats, and will require:

- Mentorship of ministries
- Development of security forces and a security apparatus
- Willingness to accept that the initial existence and competence of the host nation government may be linked to your operations

Contractors on the battlefield are essential, but bring accountability and support challenges that require planning. Nongovernmental organizations require conditions to be set (your effort), but also should be held responsible for their actions.

The question, “Where do we focus our efforts?” is critical in unrestricted warfare in a complex environment. Resources and attention are focused on four main areas. Where effort and resources are directed may change depending on the resource and the level within an organization. Figure 3 diagrams where we focus our effort, where:

- D = Diplomatic activities
- I = Information-related activities
- M = Military endeavors
- E = Economic efforts.

A capital D, I, M, or E, indicates the activity that is most important to that level of the organization.

Challenge of Battle Command in a Complex Environment	
<i>Where do you focus your effort?</i>	
<p><u>At MNF-I and CFC-A level:</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">D I m E</p>	<p>To focus the effort, ask: If this (left) is true, ...</p> <p>What staff sections have primacy (at each level)?</p>
<p><u>At MNC-I and CJTF-76 level:</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">d i M e</p>	<p>What skill sets are in greatest demand (at each level)?</p> <p>How should the nature/structure of the staff adapt to execute/support this emphasis?</p>
<p><u>At Division and Brigade level:</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">D I M E</p>	<p>Is there necessary and/or unnecessary redundancy?</p> <p>What interagency organizations need to be present at each level?</p>

Figure 3 Focus of Battle Command Effort in Complex Environments

IMPACT OF THE INFORMATION AGE

Planning and execution of operations must take a local, regional, and global view. Strategic communications is one critical civilian–military integrated task that must be properly managed with adequate resources. Specifically, the speed of information has a tremendous impact. We have massive volumes coming in and even more going out. Consequently, force headquarters must be equipped and prepared to manage and react to the demand.

In addition, data have a critical role in how “you see yourself” and how “others see you,” in terms of measuring success and making decisions. Note, too, that data can paralyze decision makers. Uncertainty will not go away. This type of information overload may be described in terms of an information pathology:

- Information collection and analysis are often disconnected from decisions. We cannot know everything; we need to know what we need to know!
- Too much unfiltered data obscure the “picture.” (Information does not equal understanding.)
- Staffs hiding behind volumes of data leave forces vulnerable to the next big surprise.
- Fear of failure leads to analysis paralysis.

Leaders must decide what to do using the information they have. To counteract information overload, leaders must focus on proactive measures rather than reactive ones, set conditions for victory, and mitigate against defeat. The solution is to filter information to inform decisions, which raises the question, “What decisions should be informed?” The decisions are made based on the conditions we want to create. Specifically:

- Strategic Aim
- Desired End State
- Operational Objectives and Effects

By determining these three primary selection criteria, decision makers can begin to identify common goals and clearly define what elements will be measured to determine success.

For example, JCOA began using simple word equations to identify what was needed to bring about stability in post-conflict nations (Figure 4). The word equations helped to establish interagency agreement on what is needed for infrastructure stability. Figure 5 illustrates a more complex word equation, which leads to a more comprehensive decision matrix.

OCT 2003 - Dynamics of Post-Major Combat Operations	
Power + Industry	= Employment
Employment + Security	= Stability
<u>Stability + Governance + Justice</u>	= Success
Unemployment + Security	= Confrontation

Figure 4 Simple Word Equation to Identify Knowledge Needs

July 2004 - Dynamics of Post-Major Combat Operations	
Power + Industry	= Employment
Employment + Perception + Security	= Stabilization
Stabilization + Iraqi-ization	= Progress
Progress + Governance + Justice	= Success
Unemployment + Security	= Confrontation
<u>Stabilization – Perception</u>	= Alienation
Economic + Employment + Governance + Justice = Success of Military and Civil Missions	

Figure 5 Expanded Word Equation to Identify Measurements

Further clarification and detail result in an effective tool to counter information overload and pathology and lead to informed decisions and focused use of resources. Note that a negative perception of security forces can lead to alienation, which, in an unconventional war, can undermine military, civilian, and diplomatic missions.

A shared understanding of the desired end state and the nature of challenges is required to couple operational efforts with strategic goals. Decision makers at all levels must be aligned, and no agency can do it alone.

Although word equations do not specify how to implement change and where efforts should be directed, they do uncover common areas in need of strategic planning. Figures 6 through 8 illustrate how word equations can be used to lead to information analysis, which may be used as a decision tool.

2005 - 2006 Dynamics of Transition to Sovereignty Victory in Iraq: Credible, Viable, Self-Sustaining Governance	
Recruitment + Equipping + Training + Experience² + Leadership³	= Competent Security Forces
Competent Security Forces + Judicial System + Confidence	= Rule of Law
Rule of Law + Success Against Insurgents + Managing Foreign Influence	= Security
Security + Infrastructure + Power + Commerce + Jobs	= Economic Opportunity
Economic Opportunity + Security + Rule of Law + Sovereignty	= Credible, Viable Self-Sustaining Governance
Action Against Terror: De-legitimize the Insurgency	
Decrease Political Gain + Increase Risk + Increase Cost + Reduced Funding	= Reduced Opportunity
De-legitimize Leaders + Kill Experts + Reduce Extremists	= Ineffective Terror Organization
Reduced Opportunity + Ineffective Terror Organization	= Reduced Terror Threat
New Security Framework: Address Root Causes/Build Global Partners	
Self Worth + Community + Opportunity	= Climate of Moderation
Elected Government + Capitalism + Secular Government	= Democracy
Alliances + Coalitions + United Nations	= International Engage- ment and Support
Climate of Moderation + Democracy + International Engagement and Support + Globalization + Regional Security	= Global Partner

Figure 6 A Word Equation as a Decision Tool


Again, although these word diagrams are not an official policy, they are helpful tools for developing more detailed and useful information and identifying determining factors on which to base analysis. For example, the **Recruitment** equation from Figure 6 is further defined in Figure 7.

Competent Security Forces		
	Recruitment + Training¹ + Equipping² + Experience³ + Leadership⁴	= Competent Security Forces
Recruitment:	Internal Intelligence (vetting) + Adequate Pay + Freedom from Intimidation	= Recruitment
Training:	Secure Facilities + Competent Trainers + Education + Establish a Culture of Service	= Training
Equipping:	Standardization + Available Resources + Matched to Threat	= Equipping
Experience:	Operations + Successful Combat Engagements	= Experience
Leadership:	U.S. Advisors + Initiative + Character + Cohesion	= Leadership

Figure 7 The Concept of Recruitment Further Defined to Clarify Information for Analysis and Develop a Tool to Support Effective Decisions

Having defined several key areas necessary for Competent Security Forces, we can then measure our programs in quantitative terms. The graph and table in Figure 8 show trends in internal intelligence or vetting with regard to recruitment.

Once we have identified key elements and determined measurements, we can move forward to establishing a metric and data points. Naturally, lessons learned requires that these metrics be continuously modified to accurately reflect the information available.



Trend	▶ Improving – Sustaining - Declining
Impact	Effect on success or failure
Possible COA's	Potential actions to leverage success / minimize failure
Decisions	Leader directed actions
Opportunities	Situations to exploit or mitigate

Figure 8 Trends in the Recruitment of Competent Security Forces, Providing Information for Analysis, Planning, and Implementation

7.4 UNRESTRICTED WARFARE—SENIOR PERSPECTIVES

Peter F. Verga

EDITOR'S SUMMARY

Mr. Verga observed that the conclusions of the working groups were very similar to those that drove Department of Homeland Security strategy: controlling entry into the U.S., preventing multiple simultaneous attacks, and shaping the political will. Nation state threats are still a major focus of DHS strategy, especially the possibility of a rogue state supporting unrestricted warfare terrorist networks. The defensive approach includes an active layer of defense in the forward regions, approaches, and interior of the United States. As was clearly stated in the QDR, close-in defense is not a job just for the Department of Defense. Consequently, DHS developed a strategy of “lead, support, and enable” for homeland defense, in which the DoD will lead the military defense of the United States, support other agencies (e.g., the CIA, State Department), and enable other agencies to do their jobs better (e.g., by applying DoD’s discipline and culture of planning and facilitating interagency cooperation). Military defense is not the only means of defending the U.S. The internal interactions, interrelationships, and authorities of the U.S. need commonality of purpose and approach and must engage in planned, synchronized, and mutually supportive activity that the

As Principal Deputy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense PDASD (HD), Peter F. Verga directs the DoD Homeland Security Task Force. As a U.S. Army officer, he served in many capacities, including Operations Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Support and Policy Integration, and Deputy Director for Emergency Planning in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

nation needs to defeat an enemy practicing unrestricted warfare. However, defining the U.S. as a practitioner of unrestricted warfare is controversial: We need to carefully define what we mean by the U.S. version of unrestricted warfare. Mr. Verga does not believe that U.S. unrestricted warfare should mean engaging any target including innocent individuals for the sole purpose of creating terror and chaos, but he says it remains to be seen whether the U.S. practices that kind of warfare.

TRANSCRIPT

I'm the Homeland Defense guy. And, as General Caslen said, one of the pillars of the national strategy is to defend the homeland. I was struck by some of the conclusions of the different working groups because they were very similar to the conclusions and assumptions that we developed in our strategy for Homeland Defense: controlling entry into the United States, preventing multiple simultaneous attacks, shaping the great political will are all areas that we have to be concerned about.

The other thing that we did when we developed a strategy on homeland defense was to not forget about nation state threats. We have to worry about rogue state threats. We also have to worry about that sort of perfect storm of problems, which is a nation state or a rogue state supporting one of these unrestricted warfare terrorist networks. And that's one of the possibilities that is of greatest concern.

There is nothing particularly insightful in the defensive approach that we took: an active layer of defense of the United States, with defense in the forward regions, defense in the approaches, and defense in the homeland. But as we got closer in to the homeland, we discovered again, as I think much of the symposium has, that it is not a job just for the Department of Defense. That came out very, very clearly in the QDR. Consequently, we developed a strategy that was based on a concept that we called lead, support, and enable. That means there are some areas in which the Department of Defense is going to lead: the military defense of the United States, such as defending against missile attack, defending against nation state attacks, conducting

traditional military defense activities, maintaining maximum awareness of potential threats, intercepting and defeating threats at a safe distance, and assuring the American people that the Department of Defense will be able to carry out its assigned missions.

We then determined that there are some areas where DoD will support others, ranging from supporting the CIA in Afghanistan, supporting the State Department in improving relations with nations overseas through military-to-military cooperation, or, even in the United States, supporting other government agencies in carrying out their activities, both in securing the United States from the potential threat of terrorism or responding to events like a hurricane.

“We find ourselves in a time when defending the United States doesn’t mean just the military defense of the country. In particular, the internal activities—which, because of our federal system and our constitutional form of government, are a very, very complicated set of interactions, interrelationships, and authorities—cry out for that commonality of purpose and commonality of approach that we’re trying to achieve.”

We also have that third category called “enable.” That’s where the Department of Defense tries to enable others to do their jobs better. I have spent my entire adult life in the Department of Defense and am pretty chauvinistic about our capabilities. I think we do things pretty well. Many of the things that the working groups talked about had to do with better interagency cooperation, better planning, those sorts of issues. We’re placing a lot of emphasis, as we did in the QDR, on how are we going to help others to do their jobs better. There’s no group in the world that plans better than the Department of Defense. You name it; we have a plan for it. We’ve thought of everything from attacks from outer space to the simplest problems. We’ve developed a discipline and culture of planning.

What we think we can do is in fact enable others in the government to embrace that culture of planning and reach the synchronized, mutually supportive activity that we as a nation need to defeat this particular type of threat. Many of the lessons that General Cucolo has pointed out aim us in those directions. Many of the conclusions of the QDR aim us in those directions. We find ourselves in a time when defending the United States doesn't mean just the military defense of the country. In particular, the internal activities—which, because of our federal system and our constitutional form of government, are a very, very complicated set of interactions, interrelationships, and authorities—cry out for that commonality of purpose and commonality of approach that we're trying to achieve.

Hence, we find ourselves spending a lot of effort in those particular areas. It's self evident that all the elements of national power are going to be needed to defeat an enemy practicing unrestricted warfare. I have to be honest: I was struck a bit by the choice of that particular term, and I was particularly struck by one group's conclusion that the United States is the best practitioner of unrestricted warfare. I sat up in my chair and said, "Well, gee, I don't think of us as practitioners of unrestricted warfare, if unrestricted warfare equals targeting essentially innocent individuals for the sole purpose of creating terror and chaos."

Yes, we do wage very good warfare. We're from the Defense Department, and we bring pain, violence, and destruction—that's our job. But I think some thought ought to be given to what we really mean by unrestricted warfare. For example, we had unrestricted submarine warfare in the first world war, where the enemy sank any ship he came across, not just combatant ships. If unrestricted warfare means that you engage any target, not necessarily just combatant targets or military targets or targets that have some value, that you engage targets solely for the purpose of causing pain, chaos, and death, then I would probably take issue with the conclusion that the United States is a practitioner of that kind of warfare—but that remains to be seen.

7.5 UNRESTRICTED WARFARE—SENIOR PERSPECTIVES

Kevin E. Williams

EDITOR'S SUMMARY

Mr. Williams profiled the modern STRATCOM as fundamentally changed so that nuclear war planning is only one of many evolving parts. Today, STRATCOM engages in strategy, analysis, and technology integration similar to that underway at Joint Forces Command. Because of rapid world changes, strategy needs to change rapidly as well. To take advantage of government–industry–military synergy, STRATCOM has reorganized to bring the operational functions closer to the acquisition functions. The former triad was bombers, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles; now, STRATCOM has a more flexible construct including nuclear weapons and adding a wide range of abilities, including net-centric operations, to counter a variety of potential threats. SKYWEB, STRATCOM's knowledge information website portal accessible anywhere in the world, is used to increase communication and break down the barriers between staff and structure. The changes have resulted in a cultural shift, with an emphasis on horizontal integration, moving from a need-to-know construct to a right-to-know or right-to-share paradigm that includes web accessibility and standardizing databases to minimize stove piping and allow staff at all levels to use data for their own defined purposes. Successfully integrating strategy, analysis, and technology requires an environment that

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encourages risks and facilitates collaboration. Mr. Williams recommends spending greater effort on integration like that underway at STRATCOM.

TRANSCRIPT

I would like to echo the other panelists here in thanking you for the opportunity to be part of this. I'm substituting. Originally, General Newton from the J5 was supposed to be here, and I feel very fortunate to have slipped into this. I know we're running short on time so I'm going to go faster and funnier, come at this from a slightly different angle, and just do the minimum here, maybe plant some ideas for questions because I think the Q&A is probably going to be one of the better parts of this for all of us.

I'm at STRATCOM. I've been there about five months. This is not your father's STRATCOM anymore. I don't say that derogatorily because from Strategic Air Command to the initial years of STRATCOM, people were doing great things. They were doing what they needed to do for the time and the situation. But now, STRATCOM has so fundamentally changed that I really think almost a new name is needed to describe it. A lot of the time when you say STRATCOM, what comes into people's minds is a big nuclear exchange, mutually assured destruction, and while that's still a part of STRATCOM, it's only one of many evolving parts. If you come out to STRATCOM, you'll see strategy analysis and technology integration at work in just the same way you'd see it at Joint Forces Command, as General Cucolo described.

In fact, he hit on some of the themes that I was going to touch on as well. So there's some good thinking going on out there. My boss likes to say the world is changing rapidly, and we have to change the way we deal with that change, and the pace at which it is changing is probably faster than our ability to change our strategy to deal with it. So how do you do something about it? If you've been watching what's going on at STRATCOM, there's been a major overhaul of how we're organized. We've gone to joint function and component commands, reorganized to bring that operational part close to the acquisition part.

For example, General Keith Alexander is the commander of net warfare, and he also wears the hat as the Director of NSA. We're trying to take advantage of that synergy, which General Cucolo also mentioned as government–industry–military synergy. We're going to the new triad from the old triad. It used to be the triad was bombers, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Now we're going to a much more flexible construct that doesn't include just nuclear weapons but also a wide range of abilities to do with potential threats. We're pushing hard to net-centric operations, and that was also one of the things that came in at the end.

"This is not your father's STRATCOM anymore."

I was wondering when someone was going to get to that and they did. General John Cartwright is pushing hard on this whole net-centric idea, not just talking about it but actually institutionalizing it. I don't know if you've heard of SKYWEB; it's STRATCOM's knowledge information website. It's a portal you can access anywhere in the world. It's got all sorts of information about what's going on in STRATCOM, and he uses that to communicate. His goal in getting that system put together was to break down the barrier between staff and structure. He said by the time it goes up and down the chain, it's too late for me; they've washed out all the ambiguity, so there's nothing for me really to decide anymore.

He has really made a huge cultural shift out there. Again, trying to transform things is sometimes challenging. He's on the record. You can read this in articles. He's talked about the "tethered goat." Initially, senior ranking officers in the STRATCOM didn't like to have an E4, an O3 communicating directly with a four-star about things going on in their units, their J-code or whatever. Their reaction was don't say anything unless I know about it first. No blogging with the boss unless it's clear. Then the word got out that they couldn't do that. The tethered goat came in when the senior ranking officers wrote stuff under the names of the

lower ranking officers, Cartwright read them the riot act and said anybody caught doing that is going to be fired, and he meant it.

So a big cultural change and horizontal integration is going on. And, another theme that was hit on in the out brief, we're pushing hard on horizontal integration. How do you go from this need-to-know construct to right-to-know or right-to-share? We're pushing hard on standardizing databases. Bottom line is getting it accessible on the net, and making it so people can use it for their own defined purposes and not be stove piped. Those are some of the big things.

"If we're really going to get good integration between strategy, analysis, and technology, we have to be willing to take risks, and we have to have an environment that encourages risks."

If we're really going to get good integration between strategy, analysis, and technology, we have to be willing to take risks, and we have to have an environment that encourages risks. If you don't have that, then people think, well, if I take a chance, I'm going to get hurt. It takes a different individual. So creating a risk-taking environment is also going on. It's very exciting and it's a great place to be right now.

Second part here, reacting to the out briefs, all pretty good. I agree with Peter Verga about the title. I wouldn't get hung up about this title of unrestricted warfare. I also wondered why we would use that as a title because it's not unrestricted on our side—it's unrestricted on their side. I'm not sure we have to spend a lot of brain bytes on that definition. We should spend more effort on getting back to that integration of the key parts of how this all works together, realizing that it shouldn't be stove piped and that you can't look at it individually, that you've got to have this collaborative piece.

And with that I will turn back the balance of my time to the floor.

7.6 UNRESTRICTED WARFARE—SENIOR PERSPECTIVES

James Thomas

EDITOR'S SUMMARY

In his address, Mr. Thomas summarizes the conference and proposes several ways to reassess our efforts in defining, measuring, and countering the unrestricted warfare challenge. The first notion is that our understanding of unrestricted warfare is still quite limited, which makes it difficult to define and measure success. Instead of using a mechanical approach to define a formula for winning and thinking of winning as an end state, we may need to define success as not losing. A biological model may be more appropriate as an analogy to the current threat, which is like a mutating virus. We need to examine and comprehend the jihadists' theoretical perspective and goals to formulate our strategy effectively, and that strategy will need continual adaptation. Because it is a protracted struggle, we must maintain agility. To do this, we need more than a grand strategy, which can limit agility; we need an integrative strategy that harnesses all instruments of national and international power and takes into account the limits of those powers. One of the most essential proposals is to exercise endurance, perseverance, and patience over time while facilitating introspection within the Islamic world to turn their attention to the extremists within their midst. Mr. Thomas concludes by emphasizing the importance of integrating

Mr. James Thomas is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans, responsible for the major strategic planning functions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 2005, he helped to orchestrate the activities of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and was the principal author of the Report. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a reserve Naval officer.

military forces and all instruments of national and international power to change the character of this conflict from our war as a single entity to a shared international endeavor.

TRANSCRIPT

I want to extend my thanks and appreciation to all of the speakers, all of whom have made tremendous contributions in the last four or five years to resolving the conflict that we are in and to helping us better understand unrestricted warfare and related issues. I have learned a lot from all of them.

“ . . . we tend to think of “winning” in terms of an end state. . . . we should use a different model. . . . and think of winning as not losing, especially if we are in a protracted conflict.”

I thought I would close out today with some propositions that I would like to present to you based on just listening to the discussions in the past couple of hours. The first is that while we have developed a better understanding of the enemies we face and the nature of the conflict and phenomenon of unrestricted warfare in the last few years, I propose that we still have a long way to go—and that our understanding really does remain quite limited. It remains quite limited about the enemy, and it remains quite limited about the nature of the conflict we are in—and the other types of unrestricted warfare conflicts that we may enter into as we look ahead.

One of the questions Mary Habeck raised was: How do you know if you have won—or how do you know if you are winning? I have thought a lot about it, and I have observed that we tend to think of “winning” in terms of an end state. I think we tend to take an almost physical approach to it—or a mechanical approach—that there is a formula for winning. However, the second idea I propose is that maybe we should use a different model. Perhaps we need to define success from a negative perspective and think

of winning as not losing, especially if we are in a protracted conflict.

Another way to think about URW is with a biological model. If you have had the flu and have gotten better, you know that you have won one round, but you also know that next year there will be a slightly different strain of flu and you will continue to have to face a slightly different threat. If you think of the enemies we face as having a viral nature, you can understand that you cannot achieve an ultimate, permanent, durable victory and peace that I think we sometimes look for. This point of view about URW is a little more difficult to resolve, partly because a large challenge in thinking about our own theory of strategic victory is actually getting a better grasp of the enemy's theory of strategic victory.

Reading the writings of the jihadists to understand their theories and doctrine and develop the greatest insight we can will help us in graphing and formulating our own. With the National Security Strategy, we have begun to articulate a theory of strategic victory. I would argue that this is going to need continued adaptation over time.

“We must maintain our agility in a long protracted struggle.”

That brings me to my next proposition: We must maintain our agility in a long protracted struggle. It may sound like a banal point, but when we ask ourselves if we need a grand strategy, I think the answer is certainly yes. More than that, we need an *integrated* strategy that harnesses all of our government's efforts and harnesses all of the international community's efforts against the common enemies we face. One caveat is that sometimes a definitive strategy—a strategic construct—can be very rigid. Frankly, a grand strategy can lock you in, so that you lose your agility over time and you lose some of your ability—as General Caslen was saying—to achieve the kind of decentralized execution I think is vitally important to prosecuting the war that we are in today.

So, with that caveat in mind, we must think about how we balance the need for agility, constant reassessment, and adaptation with the need for an approach that harnesses all instruments of national power. The third proposition, then, is to develop an understanding, first, of the limits of all military power in terms of what can be accomplished using military force. Even greater than that is understanding the limits on our national power. What I propose is just a realistic evaluation of the challenge we face and a realistic evaluation of the power that we can bring to bear. The United States is an incredibly powerful nation, as everyone in this room understands, but there are limits to what we can accomplish directly in the world, and there are limits to what we can accomplish alone in the world.

“ . . . we need more than [a grand strategy], we need an integrated strategy that harnesses all of our government’s efforts and harnesses all of the international community’s efforts against the common enemies we face.”

My fourth proposition, I believe, is one of the things that is going to be most important. The struggles that we are going to face in the 21st century call for endurance, for perseverance, for resolve, and for patience over time. In this sense, you can hearken back to the early days of the Cold War, and try to envision a strategy of patience—of waiting for the adversary’s aims to mellow over time. I would not propose “containment” as the appropriate strategy for a long war.

Although this is not a threat that can simply be left to its own devices until it mellows, I would say that there is substance to the idea of demonstrating patience and endurance over time, while—as General Caslen was saying—trying to hasten the introspection within the Islamic community itself. We need to transform the character of the struggle from one of a broad Islamic movement versus the west or versus the United States towards mainstream Muslims—and mainstream Middle Eastern societies

in particular—turning their attention to extremists within their own midst and helping to transform the conflict.

The last point I want to make—to sum up—is about the importance of integration. I use the word integration at the risk of creating a buzzword. Frankly, I do not think a buzzword can sum up the current strategic approach, as “containment” could in the last half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, I propose that we consider the importance of integration: the integration of military forces—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps; the integration of all instruments of national power; and the integration at the international level with our allies and partners around the world. This is the real critical part to how we change the character of this conflict, from making it our war as a single entity to sharing the risks and responsibilities and complicated planning for the adversary over time by making this a more shared endeavor.

Thank you.

7.7 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS HIGHLIGHTS

John McLaughlin




Q: *Good afternoon, gentlemen. A lot of what we've heard over the last two days has been focused on irregular warfare and the physical security aspects of unrestricted warfare. So, I was wondering if a couple of you would comment on, say, nonmilitary means of securing other critical potential targets of unrestricted warfare, such as our banking and financial system, or critical resources from countries that we're not at war with, or our telecommunications system. And could you also offer an assessment on how you think we're doing as a country with regard to nonmilitary aspects of prosecuting this unrestricted warfare idea, such as our diplomatic, economic, and cultural progress in this war?*

≡ **BG Anthony A. Cucolo, III** – I'll go after the last part—how we're doing. From my point of view, the operational level is better than it's ever been before and about half as good as it needs to be. The synergy you mentioned is there in all the areas. It's improving every day, every week, every month, but there are still a couple of walls we have to break down to create that integration and interdependency that we were talking about.

≡ **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – I'll comment on the first part. The Department of Homeland Security has a major outreach effort to private industry to address those questions of cyberspace and telecommunications. In many respects, the process is just starting, and we have a long way to go. Private industry has been very cooperative, not only with DHS but with state and local authorities. There are also other initiatives underway. For example, Mr. John McGaffin, who is in the audience, is working with the White House to understand the national infrastructure and working with private industry to develop means and ways to protect it. State and local officials are also included.

The problem, as I mentioned earlier in my opening comments, is that our global society is becoming increasingly more exposed, increasingly more fragile, because of our deep dependence on the Internet and other electronic systems, among a variety of things. We have a long way to go to understanding that issue and to working together to integrate our efforts. I think it's going to be an enduring problem. I don't think we're going to have an answer any time soon.

 **Mr. John McLaughlin** – May I just add a comment on the first part of that question? Steve Flynn was quite clear last night in saying that our homeland is not yet secured. He pointed to all sorts of gaps and vulnerabilities that we still have. My sense is that we're gradually coming to understand that. At the beginning of this war on terror in 2001, 9/11, as someone who was involved in foreign intelligence, I must say it was frustrating to watch the slow evolution of our awareness of our own vulnerabilities at home the first year or so.

The Homeland Security attitude among agencies always struck me as “collect the intelligence that tells us when we're going to be attacked and then we'll prevent it.” It took us a long time to get the point across that that is not the right strategy. Yes, we'll collect intelligence, we will find some attackers; and we will disrupt some. But this enemy is one who's probably going to get through at some point, somewhere. The old saying is that they have to be lucky only one day, and we have to be lucky and good every day. As a foreign intelligence community, we were always urging the domestic intelligence community to approach this from the standpoint that Steve Flynn was talking about last night.

Look at the vulnerabilities; look at what we've learned about their targeting strategy. There are huge, thick documents available now on the bad guys' targeting strategy, what they think about our infrastructure, collected over three or four years. We need to study those things and harden targets in our own country so that we're prepared in the event they do get through. My sense is that that approach is starting to be an operational driver within the Homeland Security community, but I think we've got a long way to go.

▬ **Mr. Peter F. Verga** – Pete, if I could just pick up on that—that’s a very good point. One of things that we always struggle with as a community is how do you deter terrorists? And one of the conclusions I think that some have reached, that I agree with, is that traditional methods of deterrence and holding things at risk just doesn’t work because, for anybody that’s going to blow themselves up, there’s not a lot you can hold at risk. But you do have the fear of failure as a potential deterrent.

Think about what John said about hardening targets, The reason that we build bank vaults instead of trying to figure out which bank somebody is going to rob is because we want to deter anyone from trying to rob any bank, not just the particular branch at 5th and Main. Following along those same lines, hardening targets might have some potential as a means of deterrence.

▬ **Mr. John McLaughlin** – The other key thing here is information sharing. We’ve come a ways on this, but we’re still not where we need to be. The problem now is that the domestic foreign boundary has been erased all but legally in terms of dealing with threat. If a highway patrolman out here in Maryland picks up a suspicious group of characters and cannot figure out who he’s got and whether he ought to be worried about it, it is arguably an FBI or a CIA failure in part. Data gathered overseas needs to be in the domestic environment in a database that domestic officials can access, just as an intelligence official serving overseas ought to be able to access a database that includes what that highway patrolman has learned, what Customs has learned, or what the border patrol or the Coast Guard has learned. We’re not quite there yet, although as I understand it, vigorous efforts are underway to integrate all of these databases.

There are 26 of them now that flow into or arrive at, I should say, the National Counterterrorism Center. But if you walk through that Center, you’ll still see three or four or five or six CPUs stacked up under a lot of number of desks. We’re not at the point yet where all of those things are in an information architecture because combating this problem is not a matter of structure, it’s a matter of things that are even more prosaic, such as fusion of data. And

all of our attention as a country has gone toward such a structure, but we're getting there I think.

Q. This question is really for the panel as a whole. Bin Laden's strategy is essentially economic targeting of our political will. Given our budget deficits and the demographic problems we're going to face as a society over the next couple of years, can we sustain this level of effort both politically and economically?

BG Robert L. Caslen, Jr. – We're actually working on the long war. The real purpose of the long war is to build public resolve for Americans on what really is important in the war on terrorism. I think it's been referred to throughout this conference and even this afternoon up here with the panel. The war college recently completed an interesting study of insurgencies. Two critical criteria must come into balance before public resolve wears out: the building of institutions of that government and a decrease in casualties. If those two criteria are out of balance, the public will probably support the efforts for about two to three years. After three years, unless they come back into balance, you're going to lose public support. Joe Casey just recently testified that, historically, insurgencies in the 20th century were won, and it took about nine years. If you're going to lose an insurgency, normally it takes about 13 years. It took the Russians 20 years to lose in Afghanistan. So if public support will stay in place for three years, and victory over insurgency is going to take nine years, you automatically have a six-year gap unless you get those two criteria in place.

Both Afghanistan and Iraq are case studies in terms of casualties and building institutions—political institutions, economic institutions, infrastructure, judicial institutions. We're now entering a period when we're going to be out of balance. We're hitting the three-year mark, and it's necessary to sustain public will during that six-year period. At that particular point, it's important to communicate to the citizens the nature of the war, the nature of the enemy, our strategy for building confidence in that particular strategy, and the implications of success or failure.

I think that's where we're heading at this particular point, to a critical junction in the war on terrorism.

▬ **Mr. Peter F. Verga** – I think the framing of the question and the framing of the answer is instructive. If you postulate that what’s going on in Iraq and Afghanistan right now is in fact the sum total of the problem, then yes, there is a short-term issue of maintaining the will on those particular rounds of the battle, those battles of the war, or of the campaign. I would just argue that we have no choice but to maintain our will over the long term. If we lose the battle in Iraq, heaven forbid, or we lose the battle in Afghanistan, that’s not going to be the end of it.


As Jim was saying, you won’t know when you win—you’ll only know when you lose. So we’re going to have to maintain this effort over time. I don’t think we’re going to see the end of radical Islamic Jihadism in our lifetime unless we defeat them on a piecemeal basis. In the cold war, for example, we probably ended up actually losing more engagements than we won, if you talk about tradition. We lost in Vietnam, and we stalemated in Korea. Angola might have been a wash, but the campaign of containment in the end ultimately caused the Soviet Union to start collapsing of its own weight. I think trying to come up with an analogy for today’s environment might be useful.

▬ **Mr. James Thomas** – I had lunch with a European diplomat yesterday, and he made a point that I think gets at the heart of your question. He said, in some ways, U.S. economic performance over the past five years has been nothing short of remarkable. At the start of 2001, we were on the verge of a recession. I think one of the aims of al Qaeda was in fact to impose huge economic costs on the United States—an amount economists estimate to be \$500 billion.

What’s remarkable is that there was no recession, and we kept the economy on an even keel. I think that, over time, this conflict is politically sustainable and economically sustainable, and the two are intertwined. There’s simply no question that we have the resources, financial and nonfinancial, to prosecute a long war. If you think of 9/11 as a cost in position strategy on the part of our adversary, both in terms of blood and treasure, imposed on the United States, how do we better turn the tables on our adversaries? I think we have a long history of fighting

wars the hard way—fighting them in ways that impose cost on ourselves rather than our adversaries. This is an issue that we need to address. We need to address it in our strategy, we need to address it in resource allocation, we need to address it as part of our theory of victory as we look ahead so that we can practice economy of force and economy of effort. In part, we do this by thinking about the distribution of risks, how to share them more appropriately in terms of responsibilities, and how we share them more appropriately across all agencies and departments as well as with our international partners.


You maintain your resolve in this by maintaining an understanding of what this fight is about, why it is important that we sustain it, and why it's important that ultimately we prevail, given the options.

 **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – I'm not concerned about our not sticking with it. I don't think we have any choices as noted earlier. I'm more concerned about what's going to happen when we're attacked in the Homeland, and it will happen. How do we respond? Do we respond too forcefully? Do we fail to calibrate our power? I think that's probably a bigger question, a bigger concern for me anyway.


Q. *Jerry Yonas, Sandia National Laboratories – Question for Ambassador Crumpton. I think we did more than containment in the cold war. We engaged in techniques that might be called asymmetric or irregular or maybe unrestricted in some ways. I'm not sure what those words mean, but we didn't do everything in a straightforward way. There were some covert activities that were extremely important. The goal was undermine the resolve and the capability and the capacity of the Soviet Union. We were very effective at some of those things. The stories aren't well known.*

I give Bill Casey a lot of credit for waging this irregular asymmetric war. So my question is—of course, you can't give any details; a simple yes or no would suffice—are we engaging in those kinds of very clever activities to shorten this long war? In particular, I doubt very much if we can avoid a nuclear detonation in the United States if it's a long war. Then I worry

about how we would react. I advocate that we make this war just as short as possible, and that we have a very active program that's more asymmetric or irregular and so on. So, simple question—are we pursuing these more clever approaches?

 **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – Yes. Every day and long before 9/11, and it's made an enormous contribution to successes. Importantly, it's covert action by the CIA, increasingly integrated with our military partners, with partners in law enforcement and especially interdependent on our foreign partners. I think that if you look at DIME, we need to add two things: the rule of law in covert action, which increasingly will play an important role, and the importance of secrecy because of its enormous strategic value. This is what gives the enemy a big advantage. We need to start doing a better job in terms of protecting our secrets and what we're doing on the battlefield.

Q: *Yes. Brad Doyle. I'm software engineer at Naval Surface Warfare Center and a student in the Naval War College. In terms of containment during the cold war and looking for an analogy today, I would reverse-engineer the problem and say containment confronted communism. What exactly are we confronting today? We've gone from the war on terrorism to the war on tyranny. Seems to me the best word is fundamentalism, and that gives you a broad base across all regions of the world, whether you're talking about Islamic problems or non-Islamic problems, whether they're related to globalization in South America or elsewhere. Since there are some people in the audience who've written strategy documents, I wanted to make that point. I'm curious about why we haven't hammered that home to the American public—that fundamentalism is really the common thread that we're fighting against.*

 **Mr. Peter F. Verga** – As a follow on, to answer my own logic, I would say I think transformation is the word that is analogous to containment. Transformation confronts fundamentalism the same way that containment confronts communism. I think where we're falling short in the grand strategy area is that we haven't spelled out how transformation is going to be extended beyond the defense arena down to the ground, the villages or wherever.

Q: *John, it's not a bad combination, but I think the difference was that the brilliance of the containment strategy against communism was the realization that left to its own devices, it would collapse in on itself. You didn't have to defeat communism—all you had to do was wait it out because it was unsustainable as a system. That was the genius in coming up with a containment strategy. I'm not sure that we have figured it out yet here. Bob's point about getting the moderate Muslims to go through this reexamination until they eliminate the Jihad as unsustainable might be the same idea, and we're always looking for a silver bullet. But I don't think we've come up with that yet.*

Mr. James Thomas – I think there's another element to that. Containment worked in the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union had a mailing address. We had a policy of deterrence as well. Here, you're dealing with actors that are far more difficult to deter especially through traditional means. Therefore, with the specter of catastrophic attacks, wars of mass destruction, you'd probably have to take a more activist approach than simple containment.

The issue with fundamentalism, however you categorize this extreme interpretation of Islam, is that, in part, it's hastening this period of introspection. The other part is that there will be an awakening or a stirring up of debate within the Islamic community itself—for example, on a very simple issue, such as the separation of faith and state. We've had these debates in the U.S., but it hasn't played itself out in the Muslim world in a fuller way yet.

A couple of years ago, I was in Baghdad and I had dinner with Ayatollah Hussein al-Sadr, a leading Shiite cleric, and I asked him if Islam is about man's submission to God. Does man submit to God because it's God's will, or does man submit to God of his own free will? His answer was that man submits to God of his own free will. That answer has real implications in terms of attitudes toward self-rule or self-government and the choices that you make. I think that that's the kind of debate that we're going to have to go through.

One of things I think is instructive about the Protestant Reformation is that it was not a zero sum contest. At the end of

the day, whether you were a Protestant or a Catholic, all ships tended to rise in Europe in terms of prosperity and in terms of subscription to the new principles of the Western state system. It led to a period of relative peace for a couple of hundred years, with some limited wars but nothing like the 30-years war. I think we need to see the emergence of some sort of phenomenon like that within the Muslim world.


Q. *Rick Rigazio, Navy Warfare Development Command in Newport – I was in high school in the 1970s and went to a model Congress that year. We debated whether the President should be impeached because the war was going so badly and he was in the midst of authorizing bombing in North Vietnam. I read in one of our local newspapers in Connecticut now where an AP history class is bringing articles of impeachment against our President because the war is going so badly. I come to this forum and hear that the war is actually going well, and we've got a strategy for a way forward. How do we get that message into the media, into our high schools, into our teaching staff in a country that is open and amenable to many opinions, most of them bad?*

Mr. Kevin E. Williams – I'll try. I spent a year in Iraq. Being in Iraq and then watching the news and seeing the differences between how things were portrayed in the U.S. and how we saw them in Iraq was quite a disconnect. I don't know if there's any good answer. I think we've just got to keep trying to get the message out. It's not easy. There are other, bigger agendas at work in the country that affect how this is portrayed. They're trying to deal with it.


This is not in my field, so I'm speaking on my own nickel here. The government is trying to get Karen Hughes and others to advise on strategic communications—how to get the messages out and how to speak with one voice. But how do you go up against the media and the 24/7 news coverage? You don't see the stories of schools being rebuilt, supplies being taken to children, the hospitals being built, people being treated medically, and so forth.

If I piggy back on the last question about fundamentalism at war, we've got to stay the course in terms of changing the root


cause here. Part of how the victory is defined is that at some point, they're going to realize that maybe there's a different way, a different future, a different alternative than killing themselves, and suicide bombs, and wanting to kill a lot of people indiscriminately. We've got to keep doing what we can do to get the message out, try to get the truth out.

 **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – I'd like to add to that if I may. One, I hope we haven't painted a rosy picture of the war in which we're engaged. We have some major challenges. In fact, radicalization is expanding, and we haven't turned the corner on that yet. In terms of the public perception within our country and around the world, there are a couple of key things that we need to do. We need to engage with our Muslim-American partners. Last night, I gave a speech to 50 Muslim-American leaders. They're eager to help, and we need to do more in terms of listening to them and engaging their assistance.

The second piece of this is the globalization of the international media that we face. We can't just look at Aljazeera and say that's the voice of the enemy. We need to engage with Aljazeera. We need to work with them. We need to bring them up to what we think is a responsible level of journalism. That effort is underway. There are some other aspects, but those are two key points that I think that we need to focus on in terms of public perception and public education.

 **Mr. Peter F. Verga** – The fundamental issue is that media in the United States is a business. Claims of special status notwithstanding, it is in fact a business in response to economic business pressures. The media in the rest of the world is not necessarily that same business, so you've got a counterpoint where you have state-controlled media. State-controlled media doesn't have to respond to economic pressures; it can put out what the state wants. American media does what Americans want to see, and they respond to ratings. If people didn't watch the news when they saw all the bad stuff, then the news media would start covering other stuff. It's just one of the wonderful things about the United States that we get to do that. We don't have controlled media. When you talk about getting the message out around the

world, as Hank said, there are ways of doing that. If you go back to the cold war analogy, we had a very, very vigorous information operation—Radio Free Europe and all those other sorts of ways of distributing information, which have now fallen out of vogue. It was one way of getting the word out. The old colloquialism was that it wasn't the United States that defeated the Soviet Union, it was the Sears catalog.

 **Mr. John McLaughlin** – I echo what Hank said. We've had some discussion here that indicates things have gone well in some dimensions of Iraq and the war on terrorism but it hasn't always gone well. I mean, let's be frank. There have been mistakes made, and there have been ups and downs. There have been bad weeks and good weeks and bad months and good months. In terms of sustaining public support, the best thing we can do is be very honest with the American public. My own judgment is that people in the United States respond well to the truth when they know what the calculus is. What we need to encourage particularly in this war is persistence. There's no question that we can win in all of these respects, but it will take persistence. And it won't be easy, and it'll be costly.


We've never faced an enemy like this, and that's one of the things that blurs our discussion here, I kept thinking throughout these two days that there is a difference between Iraq and the rest of the war on terrorism, and they tend to merge in our discussions and in our thinking. Not that one is better or worse—it's just that they're different arenas. There are some linkages between them. The other problem is that the enemy we face is not well understood. It was very easy to understand the Soviet Union. They had big ugly leaders who pounded tables with their shoes and said they were going to bury us. And here we're dealing with an occasional thought or a grainy video by a guy who is living somewhere up in the federally administered tribal area, we suspect.

For most Americans, my sense is the threat is fading. This is wrong; it shouldn't be fading. With Hank, I think there's a high certainty here that we're going to be hit again. If you look at the controversy and the public debate over the last year, it's very revealing. It has been almost uniquely about the

means of counterterrorism and almost zilch about the ends of counterterrorism.

Hence, endless discussions of the NSA monitoring program, integration techniques, all of the things that need to be discussed and are worthy of public debate, but very little focus in our public arena and the media and elsewhere on what's this all about? What's the challenge? What are the ends? As public figures, those of us who have an opportunity to speak in public have to keep focusing people on the ends, on the nature of the problem. If we're whacked again, I'm concerned that we're losing a lot of the tools in our toolkit that we need to keep this war going forward in many respects.

Q: Many panelists have mentioned the criticality of the interagency aspects of our strategy. As General Caslen notes, a football coach wins games in practice, not during the games. So how do we better integrate our interagency partners in areas like JTFXs [Joint Task Force Exercises] and other DoD exercises that Department of State and these other important organizations don't currently work with us on?

 **BG Anthony A. Cucolo, III** – Come on down. Right now, Multinational Experiment Four is going on—absolutely incredible interagency and multinational operation. JFCOM [U.S. Joint Forces Command] has made a concerted effort to involve the interagency cooperation. It started snowballing with Ambassador Carlos Pascual from State asking for some help in setting up the stabilization reconstruction element in his area. But Joint Force Command is pushing. Interagency cooperation is involved to the greatest degree in every mission rehearsal exercise for CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force], the next CJTF76, and the next MNCF [Multinational Corps, Iraq] forces. So there's a great push going on and cooperation has improved incredibly.

A Goldwater–Nichols Act for the interagency has been talked about a lot, just from the point of frustration, I'd like to see something like that, maybe not the full extent of what Goldwater–Nichols did in the military because it only had to deal with Department of Defense. A Goldwater–Nichols Act for the interagency would be dealing with multi-agencies that have specific missions of their

own that they do very well. Some hybrid of that would help us go further.


▬ **Mr. Peter F. Verga** – One small step in that area that we’ve got underway right now is a study based on the Congressional resolution and last year’s Defense Authorization Act as to whether there’s a need for a national security university along the lines of the National Defense University. I think the general conclusion is that yes. Now the question is how to do it. We in Defense have the luxury of being able to invest very heavily in training and education. Roughly 10% of our force structure in personnel at any given time are undergoing some sort of training. In a 20-year career, you’re going to spend five or six years of that in some sort of training or school. Other departments and agencies don’t have that luxury, and so it’s really a change of culture on the part of the rest of the interagency.


▬ **BG Anthony A. Cucolo, III** – That’s a really important point that Mr. Verga makes. If you want the State Department or Justice to have that same level of training that Department of Defense invests in, you need to grow the State Department 10 percent personnel wise. The implications are really important.

▬ **Mr. James Thomas** – Actually that’s part of it. In terms of division, we’d love to see a Goldwater–Nichols for the interagency. But more immediately, even before 1986 and Goldwater–Nichols and the Department of Defense, you actually had an Army, a Navy, an Air Force, and Marines. You had forces, and you actually had a culture of planning that was already going on. I think one of the things on the way to Goldwater–Nichols for the interagency is that we obviously have a foreign service in the State Department. But how do you grow the forces across the U.S. government? And particularly, how do you grow planning cells?

Some of the planning that goes on is long-range planning, but how do you get a more operationally oriented planning cadre across the government that we can plug into? This is one of the things we’re looking to do in terms of training as we fight and fighting as we train in the future. Or, how are we going to operate

together in the interagency? Building that capacity is going to be critical.

 **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – I need to emphasize the bias to the field. I mentioned that in my opening comments. Every day you have interagency at war with in-country teams. Bear in mind that the Ambassador overseas is the President's representative. He is uniquely positioned to integrate all those instruments of statecraft. Every day, he works with the entire U.S. government executive. He has close relations with the combatant commanders. He's got intimate relations with the intelligence community, increasingly with the Department of Homeland Security, and across the board. So I think we have a ways to go in terms of interagency in DC, in terms of how we train together and how we work together. But there is no doubt that interagency work in the field in most cases is excellent. That's also true in the battlefield. Go and look at the interagency teams in Iraq; it's a good news story.

 **BG Robert L. Caslen, Jr.** – It's Washington where it's most bureaucratic; it's Washington where the authorities come from and the resources come from. We have got to get our act together here so we can get the authorities where they need to be and the resources down to the bottom. NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center] is one means to do that. It's still in draft form but we're very anxious to see how that's going to play out.

***Q:** Dr. Ronald Luman, JHU/APL – I'm really glad the topic of deterrence has come up, and I'm going to try to nail something down here if I can. I think the notion of deterrence is the core concept that the American people will look for when they see us come out with an overall strategy. Pete's already brought up the idea that there has to be a balance between resilience to attack and the notion of punishment that we typically associate with deterrence. The concept of creating tailored deterrence postures has come up in the QDR [Quarterly Defense Review]. Assuming that's possible, I think I'd like to address Ambassador Crumpton: it sounds like a lot of work to develop a set of tailored deterrence postures for various adversary classes. Is anybody working on that, and how can we be confident that it will work once we have those postures figured out?*

▮ **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – Yes. It's broken down into different levels: global, regional, national, and local, especially local because a lot of the grievances I think are local. Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to claim these local grievances as their own. They try to aggregate all these various conflicts and exploit them. In terms of deterrence, I think a variety of things are being implemented, but there is a hard core among the enemy that I do not believe can be deterred. The only thing you can do is capture or kill them.

Q: *Balance of resilience and threat, right?*

▮ **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – Right. And I think that's best applied at a local level. That's very uneven when you look at the rule of law. You look at military applications. You look at moral authority. That might be the most important aspect of this. How do you harness moral authority, whether it's in a mosque or in a university, and use that as a deterrent? That's an increasingly important part of this. But it's not only deterrence, it's also the positive aspect of giving people opportunity, whether it's economic or increasing their opportunities to enhance their pride, their prestige, their honor. You have to blend that also, the negative and the positive. I hope that covers your question in a two-minute answer.

Q: *It's hard to believe it would be just a two-minute answer. I'm looking for a relatively significant effort. You mentioned you were talking to some Muslim scholars. I would think that if you were going to set up a real intellectual foundation for a true full-up deterrent strategy that blended resilience and attack, you would need to know what al Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalists really value, and so forth? How do we deter the next attack on the homeland? What are we trying to deter? What do the bad guys value? What do we value in terms of how to set up prioritized measures for what we're going to try to really protect? We need a full strategy that the American people would say was the complex modern-day equivalent of contained communism.*

▮ **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – How long an answer do you want?

Q: *It seems like it would be a big effort and a very visible effort.*

Mr. John McLaughlin – Ron, I heard at least two ideas here that play into the deterrence ambition. One was the idea that the speaker Steve Flynn put out last night that if you harden targets in the United States, it does have a deterrent effect. There's no one answer here obviously. The second thing I heard that relates to this is Dave Kilcullen's idea of parallel networks. If I understood it correctly, if we could create those things in the Islamic world, it would mess up their circuits enough to start to divert them from focusing on us to focusing more on the internal problems they have within their own structure.

But I suspect deterrence in this case is a dramatically more complex equation than we faced when we were seeking to deter missiles that could hit the United States. Part of it is tied up in the enemy's response to globalization. They do believe that their traditional societies are under assault and being challenged, and that's true. They are. With globalization, free markets, and the rule of law, civic society will eventually win.

Amb. Henry A. Crumpton – In terms of deterrence, you've got to deal with that hard core with lethal means, and you've also got to look to moral authority whether it's trusted networks, or working with our foreign partners, or a combination of those things. A good example of this is the Mecca declaration signed by the OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference] just last year. That lays a pretty good foundation; it is part of the ongoing reformation within Islam, and as the King of Jordan refers to it, the reaffirmation of the true Islam. I think the moral authority in that is going to be a big part of the deterrence.

Q: *Steve Peduto, APL – The common theme so far today has been security and keeping quiet about some of these innovative solutions so the adversary cannot forecast them. A question about public perception and our job of relaying good news to the public was asked previously. In light of the security concerns, how much of the good news coming out of this war and this conflict can't be related to the public because of these security concerns? And how should we balance the release of news and*

public information to keep the public well informed with security issues and concerns in the future?

☰ **Mr. Peter F. Verga** – It’s tough. If you go back to World War II, you could assert a success, and it would be accepted and reported and people would go along with that. Today, if you assert a success, somebody is going to want to dig into it and find the where and the how. That does in fact make publicizing difficult. I don’t know that it makes it impossible for the kind of successes that we’re talking about, but it does make it more difficult. I don’t think we can cast it as impossible and give up on the idea.

☰ **Amb. Henry A. Crumpton** – I think one piece of this, which I discussed last night with the Muslim–American leadership group, is the role of our Muslim partners overseas. The understanding and the success that they’re having is almost completely lost in the media. I think of what the Saudis did in May 2003, the tactical operational success they’ve had. Just two weeks ago, when I was in the Gulf, I was speaking to a senior intelligence official, and he chided me. He said, “Why don’t you have any coverage of how you helped the Muslims fight Serbian terrorists in the Balkans?” These were the so-called Christian enemy. It’s a remarkable story, and it’s really never discussed.

Look at what the Afghans did in Afghanistan. Look at what some of the Iraqis are doing. There is very little coverage of that. Those are great successes by our Muslim partners. Everyday, every night, around the world they’re engaged in lethal combat. They’re losing forces, they’re killing the enemy, and it’s a great success story that is hardly ever covered. Now how do we get there? I’d welcome your suggestions.



AFTERTHOUGHTS



AFTERTHOUGHTS

John McLaughlin

By any measure, this has been an extraordinary conference. For starters, it's the first time analysts, strategists, and technologists have come together on this subject, and the synergy among them has been a joy to watch. We may not have gotten everything done here that we wanted to get done, but it was an excellent start, and I think it provides a platform for a lot of future work. If you think about it, this has also been an extraordinary conference in terms of its substantive scope. We've gone from a 30,000-ft perspective, talking about sophisticated anthropological concepts, right down to street level when we discussed things like suicide belts and curbside IEDs.

So we've really covered an incredible spectrum of issues. As you reflect on this, you're likely to be astonished at what you're taking away. This is probably just the right time to do this in our national history. In fact, it's regrettable that we didn't have C-Span cameras here so that some of the things we've discussed could be shared with the American public more broadly. It's the right time for us to have discussed and debated all of this, because this may be a moment when it's appropriate in the war on terror to have a kind of strategic pause—not a pause in the action or in the

Mr. McLaughlin is a Senior Fellow in the Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of The Johns Hopkins University. He has served as Acting Director and as Deputy Director of the CIA, Vice Chairman for Estimates, and Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a national security advisor to the Cable News Network (CNN).

aggressiveness, but a pause in terms of thinking about what we're really doing and whether there's a better way to do it. And that's basically what we've begun here today.

We have fought this war very aggressively in the first four-and-a-half years since 9/11. But it's mostly been about tactics. Yes, there's been strategic content and focus in it, but it's mostly been about reducing enemy numbers and effectiveness. This may be the time to stand back from all of this—if this is a long war—and ask ourselves: is this the way we want to do it? Is this a strategy that will stand up over a long period of time against a determined enemy?

In truth, we still don't have the equivalent of George Kennan's famous "X" article from the late 1940s that in one word—containment—gave everyone a strategic concept appropriate to the challenges of that era, an era in some respects just as complex as our own. So perhaps our conference here is a starting point down that road toward one of you thinking about all of this and writing this generation's "X" article.



APPENDIX A

SYMPOSIUM AGENDA



APPENDIX A

MEETING THE UNRESTRICTED WARFARE THREAT: INTEGRATING STRATEGY, ANALYSIS, AND TECHNOLOGY AGENDA

DAY 1 (14 MARCH 2006)

- 8:15 - 8:30 **Welcome**
Dr. Ronald Luman, JHU/APL
- 8:30 - 9:15 **Keynote**
Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Former COMCENTCOM
- 9:30 - 11:00 **Roundtable - Understanding Unrestricted Warfare**
Prof. Mary Habeck, SAIS (moderator)
Prof. Fawaz Gerges, Sarah Lawrence College
RADM Robert S. Harward, USN
Joint Staff Representative to the National Counterterrorism Center
Dr. Montgomery McFate, Institute for Defense Analyses
Dr. Michael Vlahos, JHU/APL
- 11:15 - 12:00 **Meeting the URW Threat: Strategy, Analysis, Technology**
Prof. Thomas Mahnken, SAIS
- 12:00 - 1:30 **Lunch**
Col. Thomas X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.), 4th Generation Warfare
- 1:45 - 3:15 **Roundtable - URW Analysis: Supporting Deterrence and Warfighting**
Discussion of analytical techniques suitable for assessments of unrestricted warfare.
Dr. L. Dean Simmons, JHU/APL (moderator)
Maj. Timothy A. Kraner, USAF, Defense Intelligence Agency
Prof. Andrew Loerch, LMI Research Institute
Col. Charles D. Lutes, USAF, NDU/INSS
Prof. James J. Wirtz, Naval Postgraduate School
Mr. Charles Crossett, JHU/APL
- 3:30 - 5:00 **Roundtable - URW: Implications for Small Unit Operations**
Discussion of the impacts of URW on small unit operations, with particular focus on reconnaissance.
Prof. Thomas Mahnken, SAIS (moderator)
Mr. Brad Andrew, Army G2 Project Manager ISR Resourcing
Capt. Jeffrey Davis, USMC
Mr. Mark Fultz, Chief Army G2 Science & Technology
Prof. Ahmed Hashim, U.S. Naval War College
Mr. Sean Fahey, JHU/APL
- 6:00 - 8:00 **Dinner**
Dr. Stephen Flynn, Council on Foreign Relations
Resiliency to URW Threats to the Homeland

DAY 2**15 MARCH 2006**

- 8:00 - 10:00 Roundtable - URW: Disrupting Adversary Networks**
Discussion of ways to identify and disrupt adversary networks, including use of tagging, tracking, identifying, and localizing (TTIL) technologies.
Prof. Thomas Keaney, SAIS (moderator)
Dr. David Kilcullen, State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Prof. Marc Sageman, University of Pennsylvania
Mr. Jeff White, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Dr. Wayne Sternberger, JHU/APL
- 10:15 - 12:00 Roundtable - URW: Countering Common Adversary Weapons**
Discussion of ways to counter selected weapons commonly used by URW threats, particularly improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Mr. Edward (Ted) Smyth, JHU/APL (moderator)
Mr. Andrew (Andy) Green, Hazard Management Solutions
Dr. Stephen McBrien, MITRE
Prof. Eric Thorsos, University of Washington Applied Physics Laboratory
Dr. Richard White, Institute for Defense Analyses
- 12:15 - 1:30 Working Lunch in Discussion Groups**
Develop group perspective on URW threats, strategies and technologies to counter.
- 1:40 - 2:00 URW: The QDR Perspective**
Mr. James Thomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans
- 2:00 - 3:00 Discussion Group Presentations**
What is the status of our knowledge regarding URW and the role of strategy, analysis and technology in countering it?
What work remains to be done? Can specific corrective or remedial actions be identified?
What implications devolve from these actions?
With what priority should these actions be accomplished?
- 3:15 - 5:00 Unrestricted Warfare: Senior Perspectives**
Perspectives of senior government personnel on the URW threat, and the development of strategies, analytical methods, and technologies to counter it.
Mr. John McLaughlin, Senior Fellow, SAIS (moderator)
Amb. Henry A. Crumpton, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State
BG Robert L. Caslen, Jr., USA, Joint Staff Deputy Director for War on Terrorism
BG Anthony A. Cucolo III, USA, USJFCOM
Mr. James Thomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans
Mr. Peter F. Verga, Principal Deputy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense PDASD (HD)
Mr. Kevin E. Williams, Director of the Global Innovation and Strategy Center, USSTRATCOM



ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS



APPENDIX B

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

3GW	Third-Generation Warfare
4GW	Fourth-Generation Warfare
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AQI	al Qaeda in Iraq
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CINC	Commander in Chief
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
DIMES	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Social-cultural
DMP	Daily Maintenance Packs
DNA	deoxyribonucleic acid
DSB	Defense Science Board
E/M	electromagnetic
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or ETA (Basque for “Basque Homeland and Freedom,” an armed Basque nationalist organization that seeks to create an independent socialist state for the Basque people in the Basque Country, separate from Spain and France)
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FRE	Former Regime Elements
GSPC	Group Salafist for Preaching and Combat
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
JHU/APL	The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Jl	Jemaah Islamiya
MAK	Maktab al-Khidamar
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Noncombat Operations

NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SASO	Security and Stability Operations
SCIRI	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SF	Special Forces
SOCOM	Southern Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
STRATCOM	Strategic Command
TTIL	Tagging, Tracking, Identification, and Location
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UAE	United Arab Emirates
URW	Unrestricted Warfare
VMI	Virginia Military Institute
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction